Abstract: On December 30, 2025, a China Coast Guard (CCG) officer instructed a Taiwanese vessel by radio to identify as Chinese, communicate in Mandarin, and reject Taiwan independence. The transmission was more than a military warning. It was a performative speech act that sought to assert authority by creating, rather than merely describing, a political reality. This paper argues that the exchange reflects a broader Chinese strategy to normalise jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait through repeated speech, coordinated maritime operations, and institutional practice. It shows how Beijing seeks to construct a new de facto order without resorting to kinetic force. The South China Sea, particularly the Scarborough Shoal sequence, which Chinese analysts later described as a replicable model, provides empirical proof of concept.
Problem statement: How should Taiwan and its partners respond to a Chinese grey-zone strategy that operates primarily through the accumulation of authoritative presence and speech?
So what?: Taiwan’s coast guard officers have already identified the most effective counter-move through improvisation: responding in English on the international channel before an audience Beijing cannot control. That instinct needs to become doctrine. This means institutionalising multilingual release of CCG radio exchanges, building a jointly operated maritime incursion registry with Japan and the Philippines as co-anchors, and investing in domain awareness infrastructure capable of tracking Beijing’s expanding coercive apparatus. The deeper conceptual shift required is this: Beijing’s grey-zone behaviour is not a succession of provocations to be protested. It is a construction project to be interrupted. Recognising that distinction is the precondition for designing a response commensurate with the strategy.

The Performative Act
On December 30, 2025, during the second day of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) “Justice Mission-2025” exercises, a China Coast Guard (CCG) officer broadcast the following message over maritime radio to a Taiwanese vessel operating in surrounding waters:
“两岸同属一个中国,我们都是中国人,请你使用中文交流。搞’台独’就是死路一条。搞武力对抗没有出路,请你们不要误判形势,引火烧身。”
“Both sides of the Strait belong to one China; we are all Chinese. Please communicate in Chinese. Pursuing ‘Taiwan independence’ is a dead end. Armed confrontation leads nowhere. Do not misjudge the situation or bring fire upon yourselves.”[1]
The broadcast was one of several released by the CCG during the two-day exercise, which deployed 14 coast guard vessels alongside 14 PLA Navy (PLAN) warships, the largest integrated operation of its kind around Taiwan since the drills that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit in August 2022.[2] Beijing’s Eastern Theatre Command described the exercise as “a stern warning to ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a just and necessary operation to defend national sovereignty.”[3] The stated trigger was a US$11.1 billion arms package approved by Washington earlier that month, compounded by Taiwan’s announced intention to raise defence spending to three per cent of GDP in 2026.[4]
Beijing routinely frames such operations as reactive, and the sequencing of provocation, exercise, and press statement has become familiar enough that analysts have begun treating it as a form of calendar. The contest in the Taiwan Strait extends beyond ships and aircraft to the terms by which their presence is interpreted. Beijing has been shaping those terms with care and consistency for more than a decade.
Speech Acts, Rules, and Social Reality
The strategic puzzle at the centre of this paper is not primarily about force. It concerns how authority is made to appear ordinary. Beijing does not need to alter the physical environment of the Taiwan Strait in decisive ways to change its meaning. What it needs to shape is what actors in that space come to treat as normal, legitimate, and expected. That process unfolds through language, repeated interaction, and coordinated presence.
J. L. Austin argued that some utterances do not simply describe reality but help create it. He called this the illocutionary dimension of language – what is accomplished in the act of speaking.[5]
The December 2025 instruction to communicate in Mandarin operates in this register. It asserts authority over the communicative channel regardless of whether the listener complies. Nicholas Onuf extended this insight to international relations by arguing that repeated speech acts become rules through consistent practice.[6]
The radio exchange follows this logic. It moves from an assertion of shared identity to a directive about language and, finally, to a warning that forecloses future choices. Together, these moves seek to define reality, establish hierarchy, and constrain future action.
Rules acquire their force not through proclamation but through the gradual accumulation of practice. A claim stated once is an assertion. The same claim, repeated across hundreds of encounters in a consistent form by an institutionally backed actor, begins to shape participants’ expectations. Expectations, once adjusted, are difficult to reset even when the underlying political dispute remains unresolved. Alexander Wendt argues that identities and interests are not fixed attributes that states bring to their interactions. They take shape through those interactions and can be reshaped by sustained patterns of encounter.[7]
In the Taiwan Strait, the pattern of encounters generated by Beijing’s maritime posture consistently casts Taiwan’s coast guard officers as recipients of instructions from a legitimate authority, rather than as agents of a co-equal polity. The cumulative effect of that positioning, across enough encounters, is what Wendt’s account helps explain.
This paper applies a Constructivist lens to a specific empirical puzzle rather than advancing a systemic theoretical claim. The framework is adopted because it captures what deterrence-based approaches consistently miss: that the primary contest in the Taiwan Strait is over what counts as normal, and that normality is established through practice as much as through force.
The South China Sea record provides empirical proof of concept: Beijing’s 2012 seizure of the Scarborough Shoal, Spratly Islands construction beginning in 2013, and the 2024 territorial sea baseline declaration illustrate a consistent strategy. Through repeated acts of presence sustained below the threshold of armed response, Beijing establishes social facts of authority that legal instruments subsequently cannot reverse.[8] Beijing’s own analysts named this the 黄岩岛模式 — the Huangyan Island Model — a replicable template theorised internally before being deployed systematically.[9]
The analogy only goes so far. Scarborough Shoal had no residents and no coast guard answering back. Taiwan does: twenty-three million people, a functioning maritime service, and recordings already in public circulation.[10] Presence below the threshold of force can still travel. Acceptance of the claim cannot. The close returns to that gap.
Speech does not make a social fact by itself. Someone has to take it up. Taiwan’s coast guard did not stay quiet in December 2025. It released the tape and called the broadcast a form of coercion.[11] Partners noticed.[12] Beijing’s claim and other people’s acceptance of it are still far apart. The rest of the paper asks which side closes that distance first.
Coordination as Coercion
The strategic logic described in the preceding section requires material infrastructure to operate. In the Taiwan Strait, that infrastructure has been assembled over more than a decade through institutional reorganisation, doctrinal development, and the patient accumulation of operational habit. Three instruments provide the architecture: the CCG, the maritime militia, and uncrewed aerial systems. Each operates at a different register of legal ambiguity. Their combined effect is not additive but multiplicative.
From Five Dragons to One Command
Before 2013, five separate agencies maintained overlapping and conflicting maritime jurisdictions, the arrangement Chinese officials called 五龙闹海, five dragons stirring up the sea. The March 2013 reform consolidated four of them under a unified Coast Guard Bureau. The 2018 reform militarised what 2013 had unified: the CCG was transferred to the People’s Armed Police (PAP), which reports exclusively to the Central Military Commission, with all officers becoming uniformed PAP personnel, new recruits following PLA-modeled training, and retired PLAN warships transferred to the fleet.[13]
The legal consolidation arrived in February 2021 with the Coast Guard Law. Article 83 stipulates that the CCG shall “carry out defence operations and other missions in accordance with the National Defence Law, the Armed Police Law, and other relevant laws, military regulations, and orders of the Central Military Commission.”[14]
Unlike the U.S. Coast Guard or Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration—which operate under civilian oversight in peacetime and transition to military chains of command only during armed conflict—the CCG operates under the Central Military Commission’s direct military command on a day-to-day basis. This creates an institutionalised gap between its outward presentation as a civil law enforcement body and its permanent peacetime military command structure.[15] The operational evidence is quantitative. The CSIS Futures Lab’s “Geometry of Coercion” analysis, published in May 2026, found that the daily average of distinct CCG vessels entering Taiwan’s near waters increased by more than 500 per cent between January 2020 and December 2025, while daily incursions into Taiwan’s second maritime security ring more than quadrupled.[16]
These are not episodic spikes. They represent a sustained recalibration of the operational baseline, conducted in daily increments rather than discrete escalations. Around Kinmen, CCG formations appear in converging, multi-axis configurations, often coordinated with nearby aerial and naval activity. By late 2024, the Fujian CCG was varying its entry times specifically to prevent Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration from establishing predictive patrol schedules.[17]
The Maritime Militia: Ambiguity as Method
The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia operates at a more fundamental register of ambiguity. The PAFMM utilises civilian-crewed fishing vessels that are organised and directed by local PLA commands, receive military training and state subsidies, and maintain the profile of commercial operations. Consequently, its strategic value depends entirely on the difficulty of identifying it as an organised force.[18]
Around Taiwan, its function is infiltrative and supportive: fishing vessels extend the physical reach of CCG patrols without formally enlarging them, and make it difficult to establish in real time the distinction between commercial activity and state direction.[19]
The militia’s Taiwan-specific role is most clearly documented at Dongsha. On February 15, 2025, the CGA reported an “unprecedented” flotilla of six mother ships and twenty-nine smaller boats entering restricted waters, simultaneously with a CCG vessel that moved to intervene in the CGA’s law-enforcement response.[20]
In the first three months of 2025 alone, the CGA reported repelling 77 instances of Chinese fishing vessel intrusions. By June 2025, an additional 111 incursions by 31 Chinese fishing boats had been recorded, with seven vessels confiscated.[21]
Su Tzu-yun of Taiwan’s Institute for National Defence and Security Research has identified the exhaustion logic embedded in this tempo: if the CGA is worn down, the pressure shifts to the Navy, progressively raising the cost of defending sovereignty across all domains.[22]
Unmanned Aerial Systems: Presence Without Contact
At 5:44 a.m. on January 17, 2026, a PLA WZ-7 Soaring Dragon surveillance drone entered the territorial airspace over Taiwan-controlled Pratas Island. Taiwan’s military broadcast a warning via the international communications channel. At 5:48 a.m., the drone departed — the first confirmed PLA violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace in decades, described afterwards by the PLA Southern Theatre Command as “normal flight training in airspace near China’s Dongsha Island.”[23]
The drone had entered space Taiwan claims as sovereign, received Taiwan’s assertion of authority, and withdrawn at a time of its own choosing, reproducing the communicative hierarchy of the December 2025 radio exchange in four minutes of airspace without a word being spoken. Chinese civilian drones began appearing over Kinmen in 2022; the January 2026 overflight of Pratas extended that gradient into a new geographic domain with a categorically different class of asset, each step testing Taiwan’s response threshold and establishing a new behavioural baseline against which the next increment would be measured.[24]
Coordination as the Decisive Element
What makes the triad strategically consequential is its cumulative effect on what surrounding actors treat as routine. During Justice Mission-2025, CCG vessels operated in proximity to PLAN ships, with synchronised verification and expulsion drills conducted; drone surveillance was conducted simultaneously; and PAFMM assets supplemented CCG patrols in the outlying island approaches. No single element was unprecedented in isolation. Their simultaneous deployment was.[25]
The apparatus has since extended beyond the established triad. In June 2026, four Ministry of Transport vessels—including Haixun 09, Haixun 06, the rescue ship Donghaijiu 113, and Haixun 08 conducting hydrographic surveys with dual-use bathymetric value—deployed in a mutually reinforcing formation east of Taiwan. Supported by CCG units, these vessels contacted three foreign-flagged merchant ships by radio to request their port of departure, destination, and crew numbers.[26]
The Ministry of Transport’s civilian assets performing jurisdiction-assertion functions while maintaining full legal insulation represent a meaningful extension of what the triad can accomplish. In June 2026, Zhang Junshe of the Naval Research Academy described the accumulated result: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) had “effectively entered a new phase” of governance over waters surrounding Taiwan, characterised by “a coordinated management model involving multiple departments.”[27]
The word governing is doing significant work in that sentence. It is the vocabulary of established authority describing its own normal operations.
The Cognitive Front: Deconstructing the Phrase
The December 2025 radio exchange has been called deterrence, psychological warfare, and propaganda. Each label fits part of the recording. None of them accounts for the whole of it.
Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration treated the broadcast as cognitive warfare and responded in both English and Chinese.[28] During the same exercise, the Ministry of National Defence’s Political Warfare Bureau logged a separate stream of disinformation aimed at morale and at confidence in the U.S. alliance.[29] Official Chinese coverage called the same words law enforcement and cultural recognition.[30]
Those readings describe the message. They do not describe the act. In the seconds it was spoken, the officer tried to establish a hierarchy: she spoke as the authority; the Taiwanese crew answered as subordinates. If that hierarchy holds, later coercion has less work to do. The next order would already sound like administration.
The phrase runs in three movements. Each prepares the ground for the next.
The Kinship Trap
“两岸同属一个中国,我们都是中国人。“
The opening clause presents itself as a statement of fact. It does not argue; it declares. The verb 属, to belong, positions both sides as objects of a pre-existing condition rather than parties in an ongoing negotiation. Shared Chinese identity is announced as the frame within which the exchange is already taking place, not as a proposition for the listener to consider.
The claim is not entirely false, which is precisely what gives it purchase. Mandarin is spoken on both sides. Family histories cross the Strait. Elements of Confucian social practice remain recognisable in both societies. Rejecting the claim therefore requires something more than disagreeing with a policy position. It requires the listener to contest an identity description: to say not merely “we disagree about governance” but “we are not what you say we are.” That is a harder and more personally costly act.
The demographic reality against which this claim operates is stark. National Chengchi University’s Election Study Centre, which has tracked identity in Taiwan since 1992, recorded an exclusive Taiwanese identification rate above 67% in its December 2025 survey, with only about 3% of respondents identifying primarily as Chinese.[31]
The phrase is addressed to an audience whose self-description contradicts it almost entirely. If the unity were genuinely felt, the announcement would be unnecessary. The frequency of the assertion is inversely proportional to its current credibility.
Authority Over the Channel
“请你使用中文交流。“
Having declared that the interlocutor is Chinese, the speaker draws the immediate communicative implication: Chinese people, in Chinese waters, speak the language of the Chinese state. The instruction is not offered as a convenience. It follows from the identity claim as its first operational consequence.
The choice of Mandarin is not neutralö it is the state language of the PRC. The instruction to use it asserts that this interaction falls within PRC administrative authority, that the Taiwanese officer is communicating with a domestic authority rather than a foreign counterpart. The instruction makes the claim through its form.
This is what Austin meant by illocutionary force: the action accomplished by an utterance in the act of speaking it, distinct from both its literal content and its eventual effect on the listener.[32] The CCG officer is not asking whether the Taiwanese vessel prefers Mandarin. She is asserting that Mandarin is the appropriate medium here, positioning herself as the party with authority to determine what is appropriate.
The Liberty Times reported in April 2025 that Taiwan’s CGA Vessel Chiayi (CG-5001) had used an English broadcast to drive away a CCG vessel, and that the CCG had retorted in the same exchange: “Please use Chinese to communicate.”[33]
The formula had not changed from the December 2025 transmission. Its consistency across multiple encounters is not evidence of bureaucratic inflexibility. It is evidence of institutional design. The formula is standardised because the function it performs is standardised: asserting authority over the communicative channel is a rule-claim that requires repetition to acquire social purchase, and the repetition is being managed. That PRC media celebrated the December 2025 officer’s delivery as simultaneously imposing and gentle, 霸气 and 温柔, confirms that the communicative form was managed at the institutional level.[34] Rote scripts are not usually celebrated for their tonal precision.
The Foreclosure of Futures
“搞‘台独‘就是死路一条。搞武力对抗没有出路,请你们不要误判形势,引火烧身。“
The third movement abandons warmth entirely. The imagery is elemental: a closed path, a trapped space, a fire that returns to its source. This is not a threat in the conventional sense. A threat specifies a consequence and implicitly acknowledges that the threatened party retains a choice. What the transmission does instead is pre-script the interpretation of future events. Any escalation by the Taiwanese side has already been categorised as the self-inflicted result of ignoring a clearly delivered warning. The speaker has ensured that whatever response follows will be legible as Taiwan’s fault.
The formula is not original to this exchange. PLA Daily carried the 死路一条 construction in its October 2021 editorial following the Australia-United Kingdom-United States security partnership (AUKUS) announcement, and the Ministry of National Defence has deployed it at irregular intervals since, most recently in the press release accompanying Joint Sword-2024B.[35]
A foreclosure, stated often enough, begins to operate as an assumed horizon, not because listeners accept it, but because its repetition accustoms them to encountering it as the default framing of independence as a political option.
The Circular Structure and the Reception Gap
Read across all three movements, the exchange exhibits an internal tension it cannot resolve. Unity is asserted as pre-existing and settled; directives and warnings are then issued that only make sense if unity is absent and actively contested. The necessity of the instruction reveals the fragility of the claim; the necessity of the warning reveals the vitality of what it seeks to suppress.
Sustained reassertion across enough encounters can narrow the distance between assertion and acceptance over time. Rather than persuading anyone, it makes the claim such a persistent feature of the environment that it begins to shape the terms on which the dispute is conducted. When Taiwan’s CGA publicised the December 2025 broadcast, it disrupted Beijing’s intended communicative dynamic. A transmission designed to position the Taiwanese officer as a subordinate recipient within a Chinese communicative order was instead reframed as evidence of PRC coercion for international scrutiny. This reception dynamic has limits that Taiwan’s response architecture has yet to fully exploit. The CGA’s April 2025 English broadcast, the December 2025 media circulation, and the FTV news coverage of the bilingual exchange were each instinctive counter-assertions, episodic and uncoordinated.[36] That she and her institution chose to publish the recording and publicly contest the framing is the beginning of a counter-strategy. It is not the strategy itself yet.
Structural Constraints, Analytic Gaps, and Counter-Performance
The argument developed across the preceding sections rests on a specific claim about intent: that Beijing’s coercive posture constitutes a deliberate effort to construct a new operational reality through the accumulation of authoritative presence and speech. Two persistent scholarly constraints challenge that reading, and a third analytic gap shapes how the situation is addressed, before a counter-strategy is derived from the analysis.
The Defensive Interpretation
The most academically serious counter-argument comes from Alastair Iain Johnston’s careful examination of seven cases in Chinese diplomacy between 2008 and 2012, published in International Security in 2013. His finding is precise: in only one case, maritime disputes, does one see more assertive Chinese rhetoric and behaviour. Everything else had been overstated, misread, or explained by changed external conditions.[37] Individual CCG exercises reliably follow identifiable triggers, and the sequencing is real.
Where the reading breaks down is in what it cannot explain. The 2018 CCG reorganisation preceded the intensification of cross-Strait operations by years and was not a reaction to any specific provocation. The Kinmen patrol pattern, with its deliberate variation of entry times to prevent Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration from establishing predictive response schedules, reflects the management of a sustained campaign rather than episodic reaction. PRC MND spokesperson Wu Qian was direct after Joint Sword-2024B: “Every ‘Taiwan independence’ will prompt the PLA to advance one step further.”[38]
The trigger may be real; the direction of travel is consistent regardless of which trigger fires.
The Interdependence Assumption
A second interpretive constraint holds that Taiwan’s centrality in global semiconductor supply chains functions as a structural guarantee of Chinese restraint. Farrell and Newman’s work on weaponised interdependence explains why the intuition is incomplete: dense economic ties create chokepoints, and chokepoints create coercive opportunities distinct from the logic of mutual assured economic destruction.[39]
The semiconductor constraint defines the upper limit of coercion’s intensity, not the space in which coercion is exercised. The grey zone is the space that Taiwan’s economic indispensability has structured. That indispensability is also eroding. The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 and sustained PRC domestic semiconductor investment have both been designed to reduce dependence on Taiwanese fabrication over the medium term. Taipei knows its leverage is a depreciating asset. So does Beijing. If the semiconductor ceiling on coercion is declining as diversification proceeds, the space available for grey-zone exploitation below that ceiling expands. The constraint still matters in the near term. It is not a permanent guarantee. That is why the counter-performance measures proposed below cannot wait.[40]
The May 2026 Trump-Xi summit introduced a further complication. Trump described the pending $14 billion Taiwan arms package as “a very good negotiating chip for us, frankly” in a Fox News interview after his Beijing visit, breaking from the consistent bipartisan practice of not discussing Taiwan arms sales with Beijing.[41]
Rubio’s reassurance that “U.S. policy on the issue of Taiwan is unchanged as of today” did not alter the material fact that the arms package remained paused and a sitting U.S. president had publicly framed a security commitment as a bilateral bargaining variable. More troubling was the narrative alignment it revealed: Beijing has branded President Lai a “Taiwan independence diehard” who would bring war to the island; Trump told Fox News that “Taiwan would be very smart to cool it a little bit.”[42]
If Beijing’s performative strategy is designed to construct a world in which Taiwan’s sovereignty is treated as illegitimate by the relevant audience, a U.S. president echoing its central characterisation of Taiwan’s leadership is a meaningful data point about how far that construction has travelled. American extended deterrence has become a variable in the Taiwan equation where it was previously treated as a constant.
The Epistemic Gap
Beneath both constraints lies something more consequential: a fundamental incompatibility between the procedural frameworks through which Taiwan and Beijing each make sense of what is happening in the Strait. Taiwan operates within a rule-of-law paradigm, and the implicit assumption is that documented violations accumulate into a constraining case before a shared normative audience.
Beijing proceeds from a different premise. Its actions are not framed internally as breaches requiring justification but as steps through which its claims are rendered progressively routine. The CCG’s own five-year review statement is explicit: the goal is “a new pattern of law-based governance of the Taiwan Strait in accordance with the one-China principle.”[43] Each protest Taiwan files is data confirming that normalisation is incomplete, not evidence that it must stop.
The exchange of May 2026, when CCG vessel 3501 asserted “sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Dongsha Islands” during a thirty-hour standoff, and Taiwan’s CGA responded by telling the Chinese crew that their country should “return and pursue democracy,” illustrates the gap at its most compressed.[44]
The CCG claimed domestic jurisdiction; the CGA invoked international legitimacy and democratic values. Neither speech act reached the other. Measures intended to contest normalisation can, if confined to protest and documentation, become structural features of the normalising pattern itself. The challenge is not only to contest individual actions but also to disrupt the accumulation by which those actions acquire meaning, a task that requires operating on the same dimension as the strategy being countered.
Counter-Performance: Three Lines of Effort
An effective response must operate on the same terrain as the strategy it seeks to counter. Three mutually reinforcing lines of effort stand out.
Narrative Sovereignty. The Vessel Chiayi incident of 3 April 2025 provides the clearest template. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) issued its expulsion warning in English, prompting the CCG to reply, “please use Chinese to communicate.”[45]
The response is revealing. Rather than ignoring the English broadcast, the CCG reasserted its claim to authority over the communicative channel. A claim that must be repeatedly defended has not yet become accepted. English-language broadcasts on the international maritime channel recast these encounters as exchanges between two parties under internationally recognised maritime procedures rather than domestic law enforcement. This should become standing CGA practice. Every encounter should generate an English-language broadcast, followed by the rapid release of recordings and translations through Taiwan’s international media channels. Routine publication is more valuable than isolated high-profile incidents because routine, not spectacle, shapes expectations. FTV News reported strong public support for this bilingual approach after the December 2025 exchange.[46] Taiwan’s most effective response is not to deny shared cultural heritage but to distinguish cultural inheritance from political authority.
Transparency as Evidence Architecture. Taiwan already publishes data on CCG incursions. The next step is to internationalise that evidence. A CGA press release remains a bilateral claim; the same incident, logged in a jointly managed registry and supported by Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provisions, and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) communications standards, becomes an internationally verified record. Partners such as Japan and the Philippines could anchor such a registry, with participation from other like-minded states where feasible. The joint statement issued by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany on June 24, 2026, demonstrated that this approach is politically viable.[47] Beijing’s rebuttal in the Global Times, accusing the three governments of misusing international law, suggests that the competing narrative was both noticed and contested.[48]
A response that Beijing feels compelled to answer is shaping the information environment. While the Centre for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) proposed a rotational U.S. Coast Guard presence as the operational foundation for such cooperation, recent uncertainty in U.S. policy suggests that a registry anchored by Japan and the Philippines would provide a more durable basis for multilateral coordination.[49]
Maritime Domain Awareness. Effective documentation depends on effective surveillance. The June 2026 Haixun flotilla demonstrated that the PRC’s coercive toolkit now extends beyond the CCG to civilian maritime agencies. The incident was first documented not by Taiwan’s authorities but through Zack Liao’s open-source vessel-tracking project, Observing China.[50]
Taiwan’s maritime domain awareness architecture should therefore expand beyond traditional coast guard surveillance to monitor dual-use civilian platforms. Investments in UAVs, UUVs, and other persistent sensing capabilities would improve documentation and attribution while reducing the personnel burden imposed by Beijing’s strategy of operational exhaustion.[51]
Together, these measures apply the same logic in reverse. English-language broadcasts create an international record of individual encounters. A multilateral registry transforms those records into shared evidence. Expanded maritime domain awareness ensures the record remains complete as Beijing’s coercive apparatus evolves. The Vessel Chiayi broadcast demonstrated the right instinct. The task now is to turn that instinct into doctrine.
The New Status Quo
The phrase will be broadcast again. The next exercise will carry the same instructions to speak in Mandarin, the same assertion of shared identity, and the same warning against independence. What changes is not the wording but the world around it, or more precisely, whether repeated encounters have shifted expectations in the direction the words assume. The principal instrument of this strategy is not military force but the accumulation of asserted normality through repeated patrols, radio transmissions, and overflights. The South China Sea demonstrates that this approach can succeed.
Before April 2012, Scarborough Shoal remained genuinely contested. By the end of the year, the PRC had established effective control through law enforcement rather than military action, a change that subsequent legal rulings have not reversed. As Taylor Fravel observed, the PRC moved from having no permanent presence to exercising effective control within months.[52] Zhang Jie later described this sequence as the Huangyan Model, arguing that Beijing would increasingly rely on non-military instruments as its capabilities expanded.[53] The PRC’s 2024 territorial sea baseline declaration and its subsequent submission to the United Nations completed a process that began with persistent presence rather than decisive force.[54]
The Taiwan case is structurally different in ways that matter. Scarborough Shoal was an uninhabited reef with no resident population to contest the frame, no democratic institutions sustaining a rival political identity, and no coast guard disputing the terms of each encounter in real time. Taiwan is a self-governing democracy of 23 million people with a consolidated political identity, its own maritime enforcement apparatus, and an international media presence that can reframe Beijing’s transmissions as evidence of coercion within hours of their broadcast. The accumulated presence mechanism is operating in the Taiwan context, as the Kinmen and Dongsha patterns demonstrate.[55] However, it faces a resistance Scarborough Shoal never did: an audience actively contesting the frame, not merely absent from it.
That resistance points to a distinction the evidence forces. Operational normalisation, the habituation of coast guard officers, regional observers, and international shipping to routine CCG presence, is advancing. Ontological normalisation, the absorption of Beijing’s identity claims by Taiwan’s population, is not. The NCCU data does not record a population drifting toward Chinese identification. It consistently records the opposite over three decades.[56] Beijing can establish routine CCG presence in Taiwan’s near waters without establishing the political reality that presence is designed to assert. Whether that divergence between operational fact and political meaning holds over a long horizon is the question the strategy is ultimately designed to answer, on a timeline measured in decades, not years.
The Taiwan Strait reflects the same logic in a more advanced form. The CCG now operates under the Central Military Commission’s authority from the outset, while radio broadcasts complement maritime patrols by asserting authority over language and identity, as vessels assert authority over space. Zhang Junshe’s description of a “coordinated management model involving multiple departments” presented this as an accomplished reality rather than an aspiration.[57] The expansion of this model to Ministry of Transport survey vessels east of Taiwan suggests that Beijing continues to widen the institutional reach of its normalisation campaign.[58]
Two uncertainties remain. The first concerns external balancing. U.S. extended deterrence, long treated as a constant, has become less predictable following the May 2026 Trump-Xi summit, making it prudent for Taiwan’s proposed counter-performance strategy to rely on both regional partners and Washington.[59] The second concerns identity. Taiwan’s democratic political identity has consolidated over three decades. NCCU’s Election Study Centre found that more than 67 per cent of respondents identified exclusively as Taiwanese in December 2025, while only about 3 per cent identified primarily as Chinese.[60]
Beijing may normalise operational patterns without normalising the political claims those patterns are intended to support. Routine CCG presence may become an accepted feature of the maritime environment even as its underlying sovereignty claims remain firmly rejected.
Whether such a divergence between operational reality and political identity is stable or dangerous remains an open question. The condition is not emerging by accident. It is being constructed through repeated encounters by an actor that has articulated its method, institutionalised its practices, and steadily expanded their scope. The phrase will be broadcast again. The question is not whether the words will change, but whether the world around them will.
[1] “Fujian Coast Guard Demands Communication in Chinese,” China Daily, December 30, 2025, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202512/30/WS6953c37da310d6866eb31439.html; “中国海警要求台方用中文交流” [Zhongguo haijing yaoqiu taifang yong Zhongwen jiaoliu; China Coast Guard Demands That the Taiwan Side Communicate in Chinese], 新浪财经 [Sina Finance], December 31, 2025, https://cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/1887344341/m707e96d503301phbm. English wording follows the China Daily release; the Chinese text follows the Fujian Coast Guard broadcast as carried by Sina.
[2] Noah Reed, Ethan Connell, and Jonathan Walberg, “Creeping Closer: Timeline and Analysis of the Justice Mission-2025 Joint Exercise,” Taiwan Security Monitor, January 2026, https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/creeping-closer-timeline-and-analysis-of-the-justice-mission-2025-joint-exercise/; “China’s Live-Fire Drill around Taiwan ‘Unilateral Provocation’: Presidential Office,” Focus Taiwan, December 29, 2025, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202512290005; “Justice Mission 2025 Sheds Light on Maritime Playbook for Taiwan Contingency,” Janes, December 2025.
[3] John Dotson, “The PLA’s ‘Justice Mission-2025’ Exercise around Taiwan,” Global Taiwan Brief, January 7, 2026, https://globaltaiwan.org/2026/01/pla-justice-mission-2025/; Jonathan Walberg, “Justice Mission-2025: The Narrative Battle inside China’s Latest Taiwan Exercise,” Taiwan Security Monitor, January 2026, https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/justice-mission-2025-the-narrative-battle-inside-chinas-latest-taiwan-exercise/.
[4] “US Announces $11 Billion Arms Package for Taiwan, Largest Ever,” Reuters, December 18, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-says-us-has-initiated-111-billion-arms-sale-procedure-2025-12-18/.
[5] J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 4–11.
[6] Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989; repr., London: Routledge, 2013), chaps. 1–2.
[7] Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chaps. 3–4; Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–425.
[8] Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 22, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/; “China Declares Baselines Around Disputed South China Sea Shoal,” The Diplomat, November 13, 2024; “China ‘Deposits’ Statement Regarding Disputed Scarborough Shoal to UN,” Radio Free Asia, December 3, 2024.
[9] Zhang Jie [张洁], “黄岩岛模式与中国海洋维权政策的转向” [Huangyan dao moshi yu Zhongguo haiyang weiquan zhengce de zhuanxiang; The Huangyan Island Model and the Turn in China’s Maritime Rights-Defence Policy], cited in Andrew S. Erickson, testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, 114th Cong., September 21, 2016, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20160921/105309/HHRG-114-AS28-Wstate-EricksonPhD-20160921.pdf.
[10] M. Taylor Fravel, “Redefining the Status Quo,” November 2, 2012, https://taylorfravel.com/.
[11] “海巡署增「中英雙語」廣播喊話” [CGA Adds a Chinese–English Bilingual Broadcast], 民視新聞網 [TTV News], December 30, 2025; “海巡「中英文」廣播驅離中國海警船 大批網友讚翻” [CGA Chinese–English Broadcast Drives Off a China Coast Guard Vessel; Netizens Praise], 民視新聞 [FTV News], December 31, 2025, https://www.ftvnews.com.tw/news/detail/2025C31P08M1.
[12] “Britain, France and Germany Warn Against Chinese Activity in Waters East of Taiwan,” Reuters, June 24, 2026.
[13] Conor Kennedy, “China Welcomes Its Newest Armed Force: The Coast Guard,” War on the Rocks, April 5, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/china-welcomes-its-newest-armed-force-the-coast-guard/; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Reform and Its Implication on the Regional Maritime Disputes,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 1, 2015; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018 Report to Congress (Washington, DC: USCC, November 2018).
[14] 《中华人民共和国海警法》 [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haijing Fa; Coast Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China], adopted January 22, 2021, effective February 1, 2021, art. 83; Shuxian Luo, “China’s New Coast Guard Law and Implications for Maritime Security in the East and South China Seas,” Lawfare, January 18, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/chinas-new-coast-guard-law-and-implications-maritime-security-east-and-south-china-seas. Article 83 provides that coast guard agencies “shall carry out defence operations and other missions in accordance with the National Defence Law, the Armed Police Law, and other relevant laws, military regulations, and orders of the Central Military Commission.”
[15] Kennedy, “China Welcomes Its Newest Armed Force.”
[16] Jose M. Macias III and Benjamin Jensen, “The Geometry of Coercion: Tracking the PRC’s Maritime and Air Pressure on Taiwan,” CSIS Futures Lab, May 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/geometry-coercion-tracking-prcs-maritime-and-air-pressure-taiwan.
[17] Ying Yu Lin and Tzu-Hao Liao, “China Coast Guard Increasingly Assertive,” China Brief (Jamestown Foundation), April 12, 2025, https://jamestown.org/china-coast-guard-increasingly-assertive/.
[18] Wu Shu-wei [吳書緯], “國防部證實中共海上民兵參與軍演 國軍海巡共同應對” [Defence Ministry Confirms PRC Maritime Militia Took Part in Exercises; Armed Forces and Coast Guard Respond Jointly], 中央社 [Central News Agency], April 2, 2025, https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202504020372.aspx.
[19] “How China Uses Ferries and Fishing Boats to Pressure Taiwan,” ABC News (Australia), April 7, 2026, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-07/how-china-uses-civilian-ships-to-pressure-taiwan-without-firing/106410412.
[20] Connor Fiddler, “Charting a Course: Addressing Chinese Maritime Coercion Around Taiwan,” Center for International Maritime Security, January 19, 2026, https://cimsec.org/charting-a-course-addressing-chinese-maritime-coercion-around-taiwan/.
[21] Coast Guard Administration, Republic of China (Taiwan), “CGA Intruding Chinese Fishing Vessels in Dong Sha Waters,” press release, 2025, https://www.cga.gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=164687&ctNode=9601&mp=eng.
[22] Su Tzu-yun [蘇紫雲], quoted in “Taiwan Coast Guard Repels Chinese Vessel from Dongsha Restricted Waters,” Taiwan Current News, May 23, 2026.
[23] “Taiwan Says Chinese Drone Made ‘Provocative’ Flight over South China Sea Island,” Reuters, January 17, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-says-chinese-drone-made-provocative-flight-over-south-china-sea-island-2026-01-17/; “PLA Drone Enters Airspace over Taiwan-Controlled Dongsha Island,” Focus Taiwan, January 17, 2026, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202601170009.
[24] Yiyao Alex Fan, “PRC Gray Zone Activities Against Taiwan: Civilian Drone Incursions,” China Brief (Jamestown Foundation), June 7, 2025, https://jamestown.org/prc-gray-zone-activities-against-taiwan-civilian-drone-incursions/.
[25] “Justice Mission 2025 Sheds Light on Maritime Playbook for Taiwan Contingency,” Janes, January 19, 2026.
[26] Zack Liao, “Chinese Presence East of Taiwan,” Observing China, June 2026. See also Ryan D. Martinson, “The New Normal East of Taiwan,” China Maritime Studies Institute Note 21, July 6, 2026.
[27] Zhang Junshe [张军社], quoted in “CCG Holds Ops East of Taiwan Island,” China Daily, June 9, 2026.
[28] “海巡署增「中英雙語」廣播喊話,” 民視新聞網, December 30, 2025. The CGA described the added bilingual script as a response to Chinese “cognitive warfare” (認知作戰).
[29] “Military Highlights Chinese Disinformation during Drill,” Taipei Times, December 31, 2025.
[30] “Fujian Coast Guard Demands Communication in Chinese,” China Daily, December 30, 2025; “中国海警霸气喊话:请使用中文交流” [Zhongguo haijing baqi hanhua: qing shiyong Zhongwen jiaoliu; China Coast Guard’s Forceful Call: Please Communicate in Chinese], 中华网 [China.com], December 31, 2025.
[31] Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity,” December 2025 update, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/. Exclusive Taiwanese identification, 62.0 percent; Chinese only, 2.5 percent; both, 31.7 percent.
[32] Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 4–11.
[33] Chen Yu-fu [陳鈺馥], “海巡「嘉義艦」英文廣播驅離 中國海警反嗆「用中文交流」” [CGA Vessel Chiayi Uses an English Broadcast to Expel; China Coast Guard Retorts “Communicate in Chinese”], 自由時報 [Liberty Times], April 3, 2025, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/5000774.
[34] “中国海警喊话中国台湾桃园号” [Zhongguo haijing hanhua Zhongguo Taiwan Taoyuan hao; China Coast Guard Hails the ‘Chinese Taiwan Taoyuan’], 中华网 [China.com], December 31, 2025, https://3g.china.com/act/military/13004177/20251231/49124383.html.
[35] 《解放军报》 [PLA Daily], editorial commentary on AUKUS, October 2021; 中华人民共和国国防部 [Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China], spokesperson statement accompanying Joint Sword-2024B, October 14, 2024. Exact headlines were not recovered; both are official outlets.
[36] “海巡「中英文」廣播驅離中國海警船 大批網友讚翻,” 民視新聞, December 31, 2025.
[37] Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?,” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 7–48.
[38] Wu Qian [吴谦], PRC Ministry of National Defense press conference, quoted in CSIS China Power Project, “Analyzing China’s Escalation After Taiwan President William Lai’s National Day Speech,” November 5, 2024.
[39] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42–79.
[40] CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-167, 136 Stat. 1372; Kathrin Hille, “Taiwan Wrestles with Its Silicon Shield,” Financial Times, March 2023. The inference that a declining semiconductor ceiling expands grey-zone space is the authors’.
[41] Global Taiwan Institute, “How Taiwan Fared During the 2026 Trump-Xi Summit,” May 22, 2026, https://globaltaiwan.org/2026/05/how-taiwan-fared-during-the-trump-xi-summit/; Donald J. Trump, interview by Bret Baier, Fox News, May 16, 2026.
[42] “U.S. Halts Taiwan Arms Package as Trump Courts China,” Foreign Policy, May 26, 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/05/26/taiwan-china-us-arms-sales-package-trump-xi/.
[43] Zhang Jianming [张建明], China Coast Guard five-year review statement, quoted in Reed, Connell, and Walberg, “Creeping Closer.”
[44] “Taiwan Coast Guard Repels Chinese Vessel from Dongsha Restricted Waters,” Taiwan Current News, May 23, 2026; Global Taiwan Institute, “China’s Next Target in the South China Sea: Taiwan?,” May 2026.
[45] Chen, “海巡「嘉義艦」英文廣播驅離 中國海警反嗆「用中文交流」.”
[46] “海巡「中英文」廣播驅離中國海警船 大批網友讚翻.”
[47] “Britain, France and Germany Warn Against Chinese Activity in Waters East of Taiwan.”
[48] “Three European Nations Weaponize Maritime Law Language, Ignore Core Issue,” Global Times, June 25, 2026.
[49] Fiddler, “Charting a Course”; Huynh Tam Sang, “Taiwan’s Coast Guard: Countering China’s Gray-Zone Actions,” Pacific Forum Young Leaders Blog no. 129.
[50] Liao, “Chinese Presence East of Taiwan.”
[51] Coast Guard Administration, “CGA Intruding Chinese Fishing Vessels in Dong Sha Waters”; Su, quoted in “Taiwan Coast Guard Repels Chinese Vessel from Dongsha Restricted Waters.”
[52] Fravel, “Redefining the Status Quo.”
[53] Zhang Jie, “黄岩岛模式与中国海洋维权政策的转向,” cited in Erickson, testimony.
[54] “China Declares Baselines Around Disputed South China Sea Shoal”; “China ‘Deposits’ Statement Regarding Disputed Scarborough Shoal to UN.”
[55] Lin and Liao, “China Coast Guard Increasingly Assertive”; Coast Guard Administration, “CGA Intruding Chinese Fishing Vessels in Dong Sha Waters.”
[56] Election Study Center, “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity.”
[57] Zhang Junshe, quoted in “CCG Holds Ops East of Taiwan Island.”
[58] Liao, “Chinese Presence East of Taiwan.”
[59] Global Taiwan Institute, “How Taiwan Fared During the 2026 Trump-Xi Summit”; “U.S. Halts Taiwan Arms Package as Trump Courts China.”
[60] Election Study Center, “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity.”








