Abstract: Across many waves of indiscriminate missile and drone attacks by Iran, the performance of defensive systems deployed by the GCC, especially the UAE, has been both consistent and strategically consequential. In a region where stability is both a security imperative and an economic necessity, this represents a major strategic achievement. The next phase of GCC deterrence will therefore be to complement the existing strong defensive foundation with carefully calibrated mechanisms that signal consequences.
Problem statement: What is the next phase of the GCC deterrence?
So what?: The next phase of Gulf states deterrence lies not only in defeating attacks, but in shaping the enemy’s behaviour through integrated defence and the strategic signalling that the enemy would perceive in a way that any escalation will carry meaningful consequences.
The Iran Conflict and GCC Defensive Deterrence
In the evolving security landscape of the Gulf, one conclusion has become increasingly difficult to dispute: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at the top, has built an effective defensive deterrence architecture.[1] The 2025 defence spending of the GCC states was close to 135 billion USD, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE leading in expenditure at 83 billion USD and 24 billion USD, respectively.[2], [3], [4] Across many waves of indiscriminate missile and drone attacks by Iran, the performance of systems deployed by GCC states, such as the UAE, has been both consistent and strategically consequential.[5] Advanced air and missile defence networks, anchored by capabilities such as the Patriot missile system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), and locally developed systems such as the UAE’s SkyKnight, have demonstrated a significant interception success rate. Furthermore, 85% of the drones launched by Iran were tackled by UAE-made jammers.[6] Early warning systems, integrated command and control, and close coordination with partners,[7] such as the United States (U.S.), have also enabled a high level of responsiveness across the Gulf.
Despite not choosing to be part of the conflict from the start, approximately 83% of Iran’s missile and drone strikes were aimed at Gulf states,[8] with the UAE emerging as the most heavily targeted country with over 2,800 missiles and drone attacks.[9], [10] Yet the UAE successfully intercepted more than 96% of such attacks and emerged as one of the most states in the region in a defensive deterrence posture.[11] Although other GCC states, including Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, were subject to missiles and drone attacks by Iran, and average interception rates were also above 90% collectively, the missile and drone attacks in each of the said states are not half of what the UAE faced.[12], [13]
The results are clear: societal disruption is effectively contained, critical infrastructure remains operational, and economic continuity is preserved. In a region where stability is both a security imperative and an economic necessity, this represents a major strategic achievement. This is not simply defence but deterrence by denial at scale,[14] and it is working. Yet the very success of this model is now shaping the next phase of the overall GCC’s strategic thinking.
An Evolving Deterrence Environment
Iran’s deterrence behaviour is shaped by a combination of strategic insecurity, regional ambitions, and longstanding perceptions of encirclement.[15] From Tehran’s perspective, its missile arsenal, drone capabilities, proxy networks, and advancing nuclear programme form part of an asymmetric deterrence architecture developed under decades of sanctions and military pressure.[16] Unable to compete symmetrically with the conventional capabilities of the U.S. and several regional actors, Iran has prioritised survivable, dispersed, and deniable capabilities designed to complicate adversary planning and raise the costs of confrontation.[17] This logic is reflected in Tehran’s reliance on calibrated escalation, maritime pressure in the Strait of Hormuz, proxy-based coercion, and periodic attacks against critical infrastructure.[18]
Iran’s emphasis on strategic depth through regional non-state actors and long-range strike systems, therefore, reflects not only coercive intent but also a persistent perception of vulnerability. This does not diminish the destabilising impact of Iranian activities across the Middle East, nor the security concerns of GCC states.[19] However, understanding how Iranian decision-makers perceive escalation, survivability, and strategic risk remains essential to designing an effective deterrence posture. Deterrence ultimately depends not only on military capability, but also on shaping the adversary’s expectations regarding costs, thresholds, and the credibility of potential responses.[20]
Accordingly, the current deterrence posture of the GCC reflects a deliberate and rational choice. Facing an adversary using a blend of asymmetric tools, maritime pressure, conventional capabilities, and proxy networks, Gulf nations have focused on public safety, resilience, continuity, and escalation control.[21] In this regard, defence measures have been implemented to safeguard populations and infrastructure. This approach has ensured that, even under pressure, the region’s core economy continues to operate with minimal, almost no, disruption.
In doing so, the GCC has effectively reduced the strategic utility of Iran’s erratic attacks. The ability to intercept and neutralise threats imposed by missiles and drones at scale diminishes the likelihood that any single strike, or even a series of strikes, can achieve decisive impact. This is a credible form of defence, and it further underscores the need to elevate deterrence measures to complement the existing measures.
At the same time, defence and deterrence are not static. It evolves alongside the enemy’s behaviour and adaptation. In this sense, recent developments have made it clear that Iran is operating within a framework that is less about decisive escalation and more about sustained, calibrated pressure.[22] Iran does not necessarily seek to overwhelm defences in one fell swoop but instead to test their limits over time,[23] probe for vulnerabilities, and sustain a persistent level of strategic tension.
In such an environment, even very effective defensive systems can coexist with ongoing low-level threats. This is not a failure. Rather, it reflects the emergence of a new equilibrium, one defined by resilience on one side and persistence on the other.
From Effectiveness to Influence
The natural evolution of this equilibrium is a shift in focus from defence effectiveness to influence over the adversary’s decision-making. In this respect, defensive deterrence or deterrence by denial,[24] by design, shapes outcomes: it ensures that attacks do not achieve their intended objectives. However, the GCC nations’ next step is to complement this with mechanisms that also shape intentions, thereby reinforcing the adversary’s understanding that initiating an attack carries consequences that extend beyond its immediate tactical effect.[25] This is where the concept of deterrence by punishment enters, not as a departure from the current model, but as its logical extension.[26], [27] Given Iran’s hostile actions towards the GCC, along with the “weaponisation” of the Strait of Hormuz,[28] in addition to threats posed by the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen to other critical maritime chokepoints such as Bab El Mendeb,[29] a deterrence by punishment approach would not be an easy task unless possibly achieved through a collective defence coordination.[30]
In the Gulf context, this does not imply a shift toward escalation or confrontation. Instead, it calls for the construction of a more comprehensive deterrence framework in which the effectiveness of defensive systems is reinforced by a clear set of responses to invoke when necessary. The objective is not to replace resilience with retaliation, but to ensure that resilience is paired with strategic clarity in times of strategic uncertainty.[31]
Deterrence Signalling Consequences
A key challenge in this evolution is maintaining the GCC’s core strategic advantage: stability. Historically, GCC leadership has favoured measured responses that do not provoke unnecessary escalation while maintaining protection of national interests. In this respect, any steps toward a more comprehensive deterrence posture must maintain this balance. This can be achieved through a calibrated approach that focuses on signalling, proportionality and multi-domain options.
First, signalling matters. Deterrence is ultimately a psychological construct.[32] It depends on what Iran believes, not only about capabilities but also about the strategic intent of GCC states. Clearly articulated threshold levels, coupled with consistent patterns of responses across levels, can gradually shape expectations without requiring overt escalation. For decades, Iran has viewed the GCC as an extension of the U.S.,[33] while the U.S.-GCC relationship is strategically built on ensuring security, stability, and economic prosperity for all states involved.[34]
Secondly, proportionality ensures control. Responses need not be symmetrical to be effective. In many cases, limited, precise actions, whether in the cyber domain, through intelligence operations, or via selective military measures, can impose meaningful costs while keeping the broader strategic environment stable.[35] Third, diversification of tools expands flexibility. Modern deterrence is no longer confined to kinetic responses.[36] Economic measures, technological counteractions, and diplomatic signalling all contribute to a multi-layered deterrence posture that is both adaptable and controlled.
Overall, the deterrence aim that should be moved towards is a strong defensive architecture that is not merely designed only to absorb attacks but one that also shapes the enemy’s perception, signalling that the capabilities that deny Iran’s impact also enable a counterresponse of a scale and precision that any adversary must factor into its calculus and clearly perceives the cost that could follow continued provocation.
The Need for Strategic Deterrence Integration
The UAE and Saudi Arabia dominate much of the Gulf’s operational defensive architecture today due to their scale of procurements, investments, localisation, technological modernisation, and capabilities development, but the broader GCC deterrence landscape is more complex and uneven than is often presented. Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman all vary in their physical, strategic, and political realities, meaning they have had diverse threat assessments and defence objectives. Bahrain’s security equation has been closely tied to its internal stability rather than to direct concerns about Iranian proximity. Kuwait has traditionally underlined a balanced diplomacy and strategic caution; Oman has long held a position based on mediation and de-escalation; whereas Qatar has coupled a strong defence modernisation with a largely independent and at times flexible regional foreign policy posture.[37] The notion of “GCC deterrence” should not be read as a fully integrated strategic framework, but as an evolving and often fragmented security architecture with varied national approaches to escalation, alignment of strategic interests, and regional engagement.
This fragmentation has possible consequences for the future of collective Gulf deterrence, and it effectively shifts from political consensus to operational mechanisms that increase the overall deterrence level against the adversary.[38] In this respect, the success of deterrence rests not only on the sophistication of national defence systems, but also on the adversary’s perception of political cohesiveness and a coordinated regional response. In this regard, an adversary is more likely to test a region where defensive capabilities are sophisticated but collective strategic signalling remains uneven and/or uncoordinated.[39]
Accordingly, a key element of this next phase of deterrence is deeper international and regional integration within the frameworks of strategic defence cooperation. Individual GCC states have made significant progress in building national defence capabilities,[40] but the credibility of deterrence is amplified when it is perceived as a collective system of response.[41] Integrated air and missile defence architectures, shared intelligence frameworks, and coordinated response strategies can increase both the effectiveness of denial and the credibility of potential consequences. In this regard, ongoing efforts toward greater interoperability within the GCC and with key international partners represent a critical foundation.[42] The more seamless the system, the more difficult it becomes for any adversary to identify exploitable attack gaps. For years, the GCC did not take a unified approach towards Iran.[43] However, after this war is concluded, each of the Gulf states’ strategic objectives will be to increase defence investments, build a joint Gulf defence system, institutionalise collective deterrence strategies, and, most probably, strengthen relations with the US in particular and the West in general.[44]
It is important to emphasise that this trajectory does not represent a critique of the current approach. On the contrary, it is enabled by its success. Without the high level of defensive effectiveness currently in place, any discussion of expanded deterrence would carry far greater risk. It is precisely because the Gulf states have achieved resilience that they now have the strategic space to shape the broader environment more proactively and collectively. This is how deterrence is built, not by big leaps but by a gradual sharpening as the dynamics change, or in other words, incremental deterrence.[45]
Completing the Deterrence Equation
The GCC’s defensive architecture has significantly strengthened regional resilience against missile and drone threats, demonstrating that sustained attacks can be mitigated without severe disruption to critical infrastructure, economic continuity, or societal stability. This represents an important strategic achievement and reinforces the effectiveness of deterrence by denial within the Gulf security environment. At the same time, the persistence of low-level and calibrated threats highlights an enduring strategic reality: defensive effectiveness alone does not necessarily alter an adversary’s long-term behaviour or escalation calculus.
The next phase of GCC deterrence will therefore likely depend on integrating existing defensive strengths with more coherent mechanisms of strategic signalling, proportional response, and collective coordination. This does not require abandoning the region’s preference for restraint or for control over escalation. Rather, it suggests the gradual evolution of a broader deterrence framework in which resilience is reinforced by the credible perception that continued provocation carries increasing political, economic, technological, or operational costs. In this sense, deterrence in the Gulf is evolving not toward open confrontation, but toward what may be described as incremental deterrence: a calibrated process through which denial capabilities, strategic communication, and integrated regional responses collectively shape adversary decision-making over time.[46]
The long-term credibility of GCC deterrence will therefore depend not only on sustaining advanced defensive capabilities but also on strengthening interoperability, collective signalling, and coordinated strategic responses across the region. By pairing defensive resilience with carefully managed consequence frameworks, Gulf states can move beyond merely absorbing pressure and increasingly shape the broader strategic environment in favour of stability, restraint, and regional continuity.
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[40] Ali Bakir, “GCC States in Transition: Defense, Security, and Military Adaptation in an Era of U.S. Decline: Introduction to the Special Issue,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political (2025), https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754251399856 .
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[45] National Institute of Justice, “Five Things About Deterrence,” June 5, 2016, https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/five-things-about-deterrence.
[46] Vytautas Kersanskas, “Deterrence: Proposing a More Strategic Approach to Countering Hybrid Threats,” Hybrid CoE, March 2020, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Deterrence_public.pdf.
