Abstract: Germany’s official security discourse has increasingly embraced the concept of integrated security. The 2023 National Security Strategy, the Operational Plan for Germany, the institutionalisation of Heimatschutz, the Bundeswehr reserve network, and the country’s strong voluntary civil-protection culture all point in the same direction: security is increasingly understood as a whole-of-state and whole-of-society problem. Yet Germany’s territorial resilience architecture remains incomplete. Its main pillars exist, but they still operate under different institutional logics. Heimatschutz is a state-military layer; the reserve links military and civilian structures; voluntary civil protection is a civic and technical response system; and the hunting community represents a legally regulated, territorially rooted civilian layer outside the official security architecture. Germany’s existing security pillars require clearer legal roles, operational procedures, and coordination mechanisms before a major crisis tests them.
Problem statement: How can Germany transform its existing territorial defence, reserve, civil-protection, and regulated civilian capacities into a coherent resilience architecture without militarising civilian participation or undermining legal safeguards?
So what?: The practical priority is to develop clearer legal linkages, role definitions, pilot frameworks, and operational coordination across the existing layers before crisis conditions force ad-hoc coordination under pressure. This is not merely a technical adjustment; it is a prerequisite for maintaining public trust and institutional coherence during a major crisis.
Integrated Security and the Missing Operational Link
In recent years, the official discourse on security in Germany has shifted significantly. The 2023 National Security Strategy introduced, for the first time in a coordinated way, the concept of “integrated security.” It brought external threats, internal stability, infrastructure protection, societal resilience, and the state’s overall preparedness together within a single framework.[1] Germany now treats security as a broader question of military readiness, diplomacy, internal stability, infrastructure protection, and societal resilience.
Unpacking this transformation further, the National Security Strategy marks a shift away from purely military strength toward a broader set of pillars that deserve closer examination. The question is no longer whether Germany recognises the multidimensional character of security. It clearly does. The more important question is whether this recognition has been translated into a practical architecture that can connect the actors and capacities already present inside German society and state structures.
From 2025 onward, the Bundeswehr institutionalised the Heimatschutzdivision as a distinct territorial defence layer within its military structure. The official description of the Operational Plan for Germany speaks openly about the joint work of civilian and military structures in peacetime, crisis, war, and hybrid-threat scenarios.[2] This marks a significant departure from earlier planning, which treated military and civilian preparedness as separate domains. In that sense, the German system is moving toward a more comprehensive logic of territorial resilience, even if the process is not yet complete.
At the same time, Germany possesses another often underestimated pillar of security: voluntary civil protection. The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance has highlighted that approximately 1.76 million adults are engaged in civil and disaster protection on a voluntary basis.[3] The European Commission’s description of Germany’s civil-protection system also shows a multilayered crisis-management architecture operating between federal, state, regional, and local levels.[4]
Germany, therefore, already has a national security strategy, a military planning instrument for national and collective defence, a new Heimatschutz component, reserve capabilities, and a broad voluntary civil-protection network. Yet the existence of these pillars does not by itself produce a unified operational system. External assessments of Germany’s comprehensive defence debate point to the same gap: the strategic language has advanced more quickly than the civilian and operational implementation.
Germany has accepted security as a broader responsibility of the state and society. The next challenge is connecting existing pillars that still function according to separate legal, institutional, and operational logics. Recent German analysis has described the civilian side of comprehensive defence as still lagging behind the military component.[5]
Four Pillars, Four Different Logics
The systems already in place in Germany share a common relevance for resilience, yet they differ significantly in their functions and institutional logic. Some are explicitly military, others civilian, some are reserve resources, and others are not formal parts of the official security architecture at all. They therefore need to be examined individually before their possible operational relationship can be assessed.
Heimatschutz is the most visible state-military component among these pillars. It is a territorial defence structure within the Bundeswehr. According to the Bundeswehr’s official description, the Heimatschutzdivision will comprise six Heimatschutz regiments, 60 companies, and 42 locations across Germany. Each regiment also includes a training company for citizens preparing for up to twelve months of service.[6] Its primary function is to provide a distinct, state-controlled military layer of territorial defence rather than to organise general public participation.
The reserve is a systemic pillar of a different character. Like Heimatschutz, it has a concrete organisational structure, while its role remains distinct. The territorial reserve also includes the network of Kreisverbindungskommandos and Bezirksverbindungskommandos, which serve as links between civilian authorities and the military during crises.[7] These command structures facilitate information-sharing and coordination at the district and regional levels. The reserve contributes additional manpower and also serves as an institutional mechanism for maintaining practical civil-military links.
Voluntary civil protection is another pillar of Germany’s security architecture, different in nature from both Heimatschutz and the reserve. Here, the focus is on institutionalised civic participation through firefighters, the Technisches Hilfswerk, aid organisations, and other emergency-response bodies rather than military service. Germany has long cultivated a broad culture of public participation in crisis response, and this participation has developed primarily along non-military, rescue-oriented, technical, and civilian lines.[8] In peacetime, the Länder remain responsible for disaster management, while the Federation is responsible for civil protection in defence-related situations.[9]
The fourth pillar is the hunting community. It stands outside the official security system and should be discussed carefully, without presenting it as an armed security actor. Nevertheless, it possesses characteristics relevant to territorial resilience. According to the Deutscher Jagdverband, Germany registered 467,682 licensed hunters in 2025.[10] Hunting in Germany is also a regulated legal activity that requires licensing and a state examination as a precondition for the first hunting licence.[11] The relevant point is the existence of a licensed, territorially knowledgeable civilian layer whose primary functions are linked to hunting, environmental management, and legally regulated stewardship of the natural environment. This local knowledge and territorial embeddedness could be valuable in crisis situations, provided roles are clearly defined. Finland illustrates how such auxiliary roles can work in practice. Under the SRVA system, local hunters assist the police in incidents involving large game. Hunters also contribute to national wildlife-monitoring programmes, while Finland’s broader voluntary rescue framework (Vapepa) demonstrates how organised civilian volunteers, including hunting organisations, can support authorities during accidents, crises, and missing-person searches. Together, these examples show how local field expertise can be integrated through clearly defined civilian functions without turning hunters into security actors.
These four pillars have considerable potential. They do not yet form one system. Heimatschutz is a state-military layer; the reserve is a civil-military liaison and augmentation resource; voluntary civil protection is an institutionalised form of public participation; and the hunting community is a regulated civilian layer connected to geography, environment, and local knowledge. The difficulty is the lack of a clearly defined operational relationship among these actors.
Main Obstacles
The visible fragmentation of the German system can be attributed to a combination of institutional caution, federal structure, legal sensitivity, and incomplete operational translation. These challenges are not unique to Germany; in different forms, they are common across many European countries, where military preparedness, civil protection, and societal resilience still have to be connected without weakening legal safeguards or public trust. Germany’s particular configuration of pillars, however, makes them especially salient. Under the right conditions, however, these same obstacles could become foundations of a future system. Germany has already acknowledged security as a multilayered issue. The next step is to build a model based on the joint operation of multiple sectors rather than on a single force or ministry.
One major obstacle is federal fragmentation. The German system is structured so that, in peacetime, primary responsibility for disaster management and population protection rests with the Länder, while the federal level coordinates civil protection functions in defence-related circumstances.[12] From the standpoint of comprehensive security, this arrangement complicates a single central chain of command. Yet the same feature can also become an advantage: what may hinder rapid centralised control can, with the right legal linkages, increase resilience by distributing capacity across multiple levels.
A second obstacle is the relatively underdeveloped civilian component compared with the military one. Recent German analytical discourse addresses this directly: comprehensive defence requires both military and civil preparedness, and the civilian side continues to lag behind.[13] This weakness also creates an opportunity. Germany can build on an already existing civilian pillar. The shortfall is best understood as a coordination problem among existing resources.
A third obstacle is the sensitivity surrounding the state monopoly on the use of force and the legal regulation of weapons. German weapons legislation is framed around public security and public order, and any discussion linking civilian layers to security or to legally held weapons enters a sensitive domain.[14]This sensitivity is not a barrier to integration but a boundary condition that must be respected in any proposed framework. This is why the hunting community can only be discussed in a strictly non-militarised and legally bounded way: as a territorial knowledge and crisis-support resource, not as a substitute for state authority or a parallel security formation.
These obstacles leave room for integration only if integration avoids mechanical merger. International experience in comprehensive security indicates that different actors can strengthen the system when their roles and functions are clearly defined. Examples from countries such as Sweden and Finland, where civil-military cooperation is well established, illustrate this principle. In Germany’s case, the main unresolved issue is the lack of a clear definition of the relationships among the existing pillars.
From Fragmented Pillars to an Operational System
A comprehensive security system requires more than simply merging different pillars into a single structure. Heimatschutz, the reserve, voluntary civil protection, and the hunting community need clearly defined places, boundaries, and purposes. Only after that can systemic coherence become possible.
The construction of the future system cannot begin from a purely military logic. If the problem is framed only in terms of defence or armed response, the entire structure will be incomplete. Germany’s own strategic language already points beyond such a narrow approach. Integrated security requires a broader architecture in which military planning, civil preparedness, federal-state coordination, voluntary participation, and legally regulated civilian capacities are connected without being confused.
The philosophy of the hunting community requires particular precision. Presenting it as an additional voluntary armed resource would move the argument in the wrong direction. Viewed as a licensed, organised, territorially rooted civilian layer with knowledge of the environment, wildlife, and local geography, its significance becomes clear. It can then be discussed as a potential auxiliary resource for crisis support, local orientation, communication, logistics, mapping, or environmental awareness, subject to clearly defined state rules.
In this framing, the state’s task is to maintain a clear picture of existing legally regulated civilian capacities and define when and how such capacities may support crisis or emergency functions. The key point is role definition. Any potential contribution must remain non-military in character, legally bounded, subordinate to state authorities, and limited to auxiliary functions.
The implementation of the system should be phased. In Germany’s case, it is difficult to imagine a new nationwide model being implemented quickly. A more realistic path would begin with pilot frameworks, limited programs, selected regions, legal clarifications, public communication, and the gradual allocation of roles. For instance, a pilot program in a single Bundesland could test coordination mechanisms before expansion. This approach is also more consistent with German political and administrative culture, where sensitive issues are traditionally managed step by step.
The Operational Plan for Germany already shows that civil-military cooperation, federal-state coordination, transport, logistics, infrastructure, and civilian support services are becoming part of the planning environment.[15] Yet OPLAN DEU remains primarily the military component of overall defence planning and does not, by itself, complete the wider civilian resilience architecture. That is precisely why the connection between existing civilian and military-adjacent pillars requires additional conceptual, legal, and operational work.
Political framing is decisive. If the issue is presented as an expansion of state power, a sudden redefinition of civic duties, or a militarisation of civilian society, it will enter the most sensitive fault lines of German political life. If it is framed instead as territorial resilience, civilian preparedness, role distribution, and the coordinated linking of already existing legal capacities, the same question can move into a more practical field of debate. In this sense, precise political language is not cosmetic. It is a precondition for building the future system.
Conclusion
Germany already possesses strong, structurally diverse pillars. Some are military, some are civilian, some are reserve-based, and some exist outside the formal security architecture, yet remain relevant to territorial knowledge and resilience. The problem is that sufficient legal linkages, role definitions, and operational relationships among them have not yet been created.
The next stage of Germany’s integrated-security development should therefore focus on connections. Heimatschutz, the reserve, voluntary civil protection, and regulated civilian capacities do not need to be merged. They need to be placed within a coherent operational logic. That means defined roles, bounded responsibilities, legal safeguards, pilot projects, and clear procedures for cooperation, all of which are tested before crisis conditions expose the existing gaps.
Germany’s strongest future resilience advantage may lie precisely in the characteristics that currently complicate integration: federal polycentricity, broad civic participation, legal caution, and the coexistence of actors of different institutional natures. With careful political management, these can become structural strengths. Without clear operational links, however, they will remain strong, separate pillars rather than one territorial resilience architecture.
[1] Federal Government of Germany, National Security Strategy: Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany (Berlin: Federal Government of Germany, 2023), https://www.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/National-Security-Strategy-EN.pdf; Federal Government of Germany, “National Security Strategy,” June 14, 2023, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/national-security-strategy-2196356.
[2] Bundeswehr, “Operational Plan for Germany,” last modified November 18, 2025, https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/bundeswehr-joint-force-command/missions/operational-plan-for-germany.
[3] Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK), “Neue Studie belegt: ehrenamtliches Engagement im Zivil- und Katastrophenschutz ungebrochen hoch,” April 22, 2025, https://www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2025/04/pm-22-studie-ehrenamtliches-engagement.html; Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK), “BBK-Kampagne zum Anfassen stärkt Ehrenamt,” December 9, 2024, https://www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2024/12/pm-09-kampagne-anfassen-ehrenamt.html.
[4] European Commission, Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, “Germany: National Disaster Management System,” accessed June 17, 2026, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/national-disaster-management-system/germany_en.
[5] Helena Quis, “Implementing Comprehensive Defence: Three Areas to Reinforce the Civil Dimension,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung, January 13, 2026, https://www.boell.de/en/2026/01/13/implementing-comprehensive-defence-three-areas-reinforce-civil-dimension.
[6] Bundeswehr, “Heimatschutzdivision,” March 12, 2026, https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/heer/struktur/heimatschutzdivision.
[7] Bundeswehr, “Territoriale Reserve und Heimatschutz,” August 29, 2019, https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/menschen-karrieren/die-reserve-der-bundeswehr/territoriale-reserve; Bundeswehr, “Regional Territorial Command,” June 5, 2025, https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/bundeswehr-joint-force-command/regional-territorial-command.
[8] Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK), “Neue Studie belegt: ehrenamtliches Engagement im Zivil- und Katastrophenschutz ungebrochen hoch”; Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK), “BBK-Kampagne zum Anfassen stärkt Ehrenamt.”
[9] European Commission, Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, “Germany: National Disaster Management System.”
[10] Deutscher Jagdverband, “Neuer Jäger-Rekord in Deutschland,” January 26, 2026, https://www.jagdverband.de/neuer-jaeger-rekord-deutschland.
[11] Federal Ministry of Justice, Bundesjagdgesetz, §15, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bjagdg/__15.html.
[12] European Commission, Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, “Germany: National Disaster Management System.”
[13] Quis, “Implementing Comprehensive Defence.”
[14] Federal Ministry of Justice, Weapons Act (Waffengesetz), §1, official English translation, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_waffg/englisch_waffg.html; Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, “Weapons Law,” https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/security/weapons-law/weapons-law-node.html.
[15] Bundeswehr, “Operational Plan for Germany.”
