Abstract: The Middle East, until recently under predominant U.S. influence, is witnessing the gradual expansion of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic footprint. Beijing emphasises economic statecraft, infrastructure diplomacy, and energy interdependence, while increasingly engaging in regional mediation, most notably between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Through investments in ports, industrial zones, and strategic maritime chokepoints, China is integrating itself into the region’s economic and security architecture. This evolving presence signals a shift from a U.S.-centric security model toward a more multipolar regional order in which economic and diplomatic tools increasingly complement traditional military power.
Problem statement: How is the PRC’s growing footprint reshaping strategic competition in the Middle East?
So what?: Middle Eastern states and global powers must recognise the multidimensional nature of China’s strategy. Policymakers should incorporate Beijing’s economic leverage, maritime infrastructure investments, and mediation efforts into their analyses of regional security. Failure to account for these dynamics risks miscalculating the balance of power, energy security, and diplomatic alignments.
Great Power Rivalry
The Middle East has once again become a locus of great-power rivalry in the early twenty-first century. Historically, the United States exerted influence through military primacy and long-standing alliances, ensuring access to strategic energy resources and maintaining regional stability.[1] The PRC is pursuing a different approach, emphasising economic statecraft, infrastructure diplomacy, selective political mediation, and energy interdependence. Beijing’s strategy reflects its rising global ambitions and a redefinition of influence in a multipolar system, with energy security, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Iran, forming the backbone of its long-term policy.[2] Beyond hydrocarbons, the PRC engagement includes investments in ports, logistics corridors, industrial zones, and telecommunications infrastructure, largely through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[3]
Diplomatically, the PRC has evolved into a credible mediator, demonstrated by its facilitation of the 2023 Iran-Saudi rapprochement, highlighting an alternative model of influence that emphasises sovereignty and non-interference rather than military coercion. Strategically, China has invested in maritime infrastructure in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, strengthening its capacity to safeguard energy flows and trade routes. However, these efforts operate alongside a continued U.S. presence, characterised by extensive military deployments, longstanding alliances, and institutionalised security partnerships. Rather than a direct confrontation, the interaction between Chinese economic initiatives and U.S. military primacy creates a complex, multipolar environment in which regional states actively navigate between both powers to maximise security and economic benefits.[4], [5]
The Slow Demise of Unipolarity
The post-Cold War international system was largely defined by U.S. dominance in military, economic, and technological spheres. The United States maintained unparalleled influence over regional security architecture, leveraging alliances and military presence to project power. However, prolonged interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan gradually strained American resources and political capital, revealing the limitations of sustained unipolarity.[6], [7]
At the same time, emerging powers such as the PRC and key regional actors pursued greater autonomy in foreign policy and security cooperation. This evolving environment has enabled the Middle East to transition gradually from a U.S.-centric security order toward a more multipolar strategic landscape, where influence is increasingly shared among multiple global and regional actors.[8], [9]
Several concrete developments illustrate this shift in the balance of power. First, major military interventions, particularly the 2003 Iraq War and the extended presence in Afghanistan, placed significant demands on U.S. military and financial resources. Second, economic instruments such as sanctions on Iran during the 2010s demonstrated Washington’s continued leverage but also encouraged regional actors to diversify their external partnerships. Third, China’s investments in ports, logistics hubs, and infrastructure projects across the Gulf region reflect a growing willingness among Middle Eastern states to engage with alternative partners.[10], [11] Collectively, these indicators highlight the region’s gradual movement toward strategic hedging and diversified external relationships.
The PRC as a Global Power
PRC’s Rise
The PRC’s rapid economic and military modernisation has positioned it as a central actor in global affairs. Over the past two decades, sustained economic growth, technological advancement, and increased defence spending have enabled Beijing to project influence far beyond East Asia. This transformation reflects the PRC’s ambition to secure long-term economic stability and protect global supply chains essential to its development.
Belt and Road Initiative and Regional Implications
Programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) play a critical role in advancing these objectives. The initiative promotes connectivity, infrastructure development, and trade integration across multiple regions, including the Middle East. For regional governments, Chinese engagement offers access to financing, infrastructure development, and market opportunities without the political conditions often associated with Western partnerships.[12], [13]
The United States in the Middle East
U.S. strategy in the Middle East has historically relied on a combination of forward military presence, security alliances, and diplomatic engagement. Since the end of the Second World War, Washington has maintained military bases across the region and established long-term security partnerships with key allies such as Israel and the Gulf states. These arrangements allowed the U.S. to project power, deter regional threats, and protect energy flows vital to the global economy.
Major military interventions further reinforced U.S. dominance. Operations such as the Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003) demonstrated Washington’s willingness to use force to preserve regional stability and maintain strategic influence. Over time, however, the financial and political costs of sustained military engagement have encouraged regional actors to diversify their external partnerships and explore alternative security and economic relationships.[14]
Maritime Chokepoints
In addition to diplomacy and economic engagement, maritime security plays a crucial role, making it a key component of the PRC’s regional strategy. Historical conflicts such as the Gulf War (1991) and the 2003 Iraq War highlighted the importance of secure access to key maritime corridors for regional stability and uninterrupted global energy flows.[15]
The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of global oil passes, is one of the most sensitive maritime passages. The Bab-el-Mandeb, handling roughly 6–7 million barrels of oil per day, serves as a gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, the Suez Canal, facilitating approximately 12–15% of global trade, connects the Mediterranean with the Red Sea and remains a crucial artery for international commerce.[16]
Any disruption to these chokepoints could have severe economic and geopolitical consequences, affecting not only the Middle East but also global energy security and trade. Their stability, therefore, is a central concern for both regional actors and major global powers, who seek to safeguard energy flows and maintain uninterrupted trade.
Ideological and Civilisational Centrality
Beyond strategic and economic considerations, the Middle East also holds profound religious and symbolic significance, influencing billions globally. Cities like Jerusalem, sacred to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, illustrate how local events can have global repercussions. This civilizational dimension intersects with the region’s security and geopolitical dynamics; for example, the Sunni-Shia divide in Iraq and Syria has fueled conflicts that drew in external powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, shaping alliances and regional policies. Multipolar competition, driven by the PRCand Russia, now interacts with these civilizational factors, further complicating the strategic environment. Understanding these dynamics matters because instability in the Middle East affects global energy markets, refugee flows, and international security, showing that what happens in the region resonates far beyond its borders.
The Iran–Saudi Rapprochement
In March 2023, representatives from the PRC, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran met in Beijing for several days of high-level consultations. These discussions culminated in the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia after a seven-year rupture. Under Chinese mediation, the two countries agreed to reopen embassies, resume formal diplomatic ties, and establish mechanisms for continued dialogue and cooperation across political, economic, and security sectors.[17]
These consultations brought together senior officials from the two regional rivals under the facilitation of Chinese diplomats, creating a neutral space for dialogue after years of heightened tension and diplomatic estrangement. The outcome of these consultations was substantial; the two countries agreed to restore full diplomatic relations, reopen their respective embassies, and renew security and economic cooperation that had been largely dormant for several years. In addition, the agreement established mechanisms for ministerial-level exchanges across multiple sectors, including trade, technology, transportation, and cultural collaboration, laying the groundwork for sustained engagement and practical cooperation.
Building on this diplomatic breakthrough, it remains essential to examine its long-term effectiveness. While the initial 2023 breakthrough marked a significant departure from previous hostilities, ongoing geopolitical dynamics, including competitive influence in Yemen and differing alignments with external powers, continue to test the sustainability of rapprochement. Observers note that high-level agreements do not automatically translate into deep structural cooperation unless supported by consistent implementation, confidence-building measures, and tangible policy outcomes. Thus, while the trilateral consultations demonstrated China’s capacity to orchestrate a diplomatic reset, the true test of meaningful rapprochement lies in long-term shifts in interstate behaviour, regional security cooperation, and economic integration.
Significance of the 2023 Beijing Consultations
The significance of the 2023 Beijing consultations extends far beyond the immediate bilateral gains for Tehran and Riyadh. It showcased the PRC’s capacity to act as a neutral and credible mediator in a region historically dominated by Western diplomatic interventions. By facilitating this reconciliation without imposing political or ideological conditions, Beijing reinforced its policy of non-interference and dialogue-based conflict resolution. The successful hosting of the accord also enhanced the PRC’s soft power and international legitimacy, positioning it as a constructive actor in global diplomacy. Moreover, this development challenged the traditional U.S.-centric order in the Middle East, demonstrating that regional powers are increasingly willing to engage with alternative actors capable of balancing interests without the baggage of historical intervention or colonial entanglements. The March 2023 Beijing consultations, therefore, represent both a practical achievement in regional diplomacy and a symbolic shift in the architecture of Middle Eastern relations.[18]
Implications for Gulf States’ Strategic Outlook
A potential shift in the Gulf States’ strategic outlook is increasingly evident as U.S. influence is perceived as waning in the region. With U.S. influence perceived as waning in the region, these states may indeed seek alternative stabilising partners. In this context, the PRC’s non-interventionist approach, economic leverage, and growing diplomatic credibility make it a logical candidate to play a balancing role, though regional dynamics and historical alliances will continue to shape how quickly and extensively this occurs.
Why the PRC Could Mediate
The PRC’s ability to mediate effectively between Iran and Saudi Arabia can be largely attributed to several strategic and structural factors. First, Beijing benefits from a neutral historical record in the Middle East, having no colonial past or history of direct military interventions in the region. Unlike Western powers, whose involvement is often viewed with suspicion due to historical occupations or ideological impositions, the PRC approaches the region with minimal historical baggage, thereby being perceived as an impartial actor.
Second, the PRC has developed deep economic interdependence with both states, particularly in the energy sector, which creates mutual incentives for stability. With nearly 45–50% of the PRC’s crude oil imports originating from the Middle East, including substantial supplies from both Saudi Arabia and Iran, any escalation between these countries would directly affect the PRC’s energy security and industrial supply chains. This structural interdependence gives Beijing a practical stake in de-escalation and facilitates its credibility as a mediator focused on mutual benefit rather than partisan advantage.
Third, the PRC’s foreign policy emphasises sovereignty and non-intervention, principles further institutionalised through the launch of the Global Security Initiative in 2022. By prioritising dialogue-based conflict resolution and respect for domestic governance structures, Beijing aligns itself with the preferences of regional governments that remain cautious of external interference. These principles have strengthened China’s credibility as a diplomatic actor capable of facilitating negotiations in complex regional disputes.
Strategic Implications
However, the PRC’s influence in the Middle East faces significant constraints. For instance, the PRC benefits from the U.S.-provided security architecture, such as the naval protection of key sea lanes, yet it lacks the extensive network of overseas military bases and formal security alliances that the United States maintains in the region. Moreover, the fragility of mediation success limits the PRC’s diplomatic leverage; for example, the recent Iran–Saudi deal may be more tactical than strategic, with its durability heavily dependent on ongoing regional dynamics, including the conflict in Yemen and other proxy disputes. Additionally, economic dependency risks complicate the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, as rising debt concerns and political instability in host states could undermine long-term investments and influence. Taken together, these structural and regional limitations suggest that while the PRC is an increasingly active player, its role remains constrained, even as it pursues diplomatic initiatives.
Nevertheless, the PRC’s effectiveness as a mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia stems from a combination of historical neutrality, deep economic interdependence, and a principled commitment to non-intervention. Unlike Western powers, it approaches disputes without the ideological or colonial baggage that can hinder trust. Its reliance on Middle Eastern energy, which supplies nearly half of the PRC’s crude oil imports, provides a tangible incentive to promote stability, while its emphasis on dialogue-based conflict resolution aligns with regional governments wary of external pressure. In this way, China’s constrained influence paradoxically enhances its credibility as a neutral mediator. These factors position the PRC as a distinctive actor capable of facilitating complex diplomatic negotiations in the Middle East[19], [20]. However, this effectiveness has limits, as the initial rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia has already faced setbacks, reflecting enduring geopolitical tensions and competing regional interests that cannot be fully resolved through mediation alone.
Conclusion
The PRC’s expanding footprint in the Middle East reflects a carefully calibrated strategy that integrates economic leverage, diplomatic influence, and strategic positioning. The PRC is, therefore, a system stabiliser, not a challenger, structurally depending on U.S. security provision. By deepening energy interdependence with key regional actors, mediating between historical rivals such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, and investing in critical maritime infrastructure, Beijing creates structural incentives that secure both its economic and geopolitical interests. Unlike the United States’ traditional military-driven approach, the PRC’s model prioritises stability, non-interference, and long-term connectivity, positioning it as a credible alternative power broker in a multipolar system. This multifaceted engagement allows the PRC to shape the regional balance of power, safeguard vital energy and trade routes, and enhance its global influence, signalling to policymakers that the future architecture of Middle Eastern stability and global diplomacy will increasingly hinge on strategic competition and cooperative engagement beyond conventional security paradigms.
[1] James D. Miller, “China’s Growing Role in Middle East Energy Security,” Middle East Policy 28, no. 4 (Winter 2021): 45–60, https://www.mepc.org/china-middle-east-energy-security.
[2] Nadine Godehardt, “China’s Diplomacy in the Middle East: Between Mediation and Strategic Interests,” SWP Comment, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/china-diplomacy-middle-east.
[3] Blake Herzinger and Ben Lefkowitz, “China’s Growing Naval Influence in the Middle East,” PolicyWatch 3706, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 17, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/chinas-growing-naval-influence-middle-east.
[4] Andrea Stricker, “China as a Diplomatic Mediator: Case Study of the 2023 Iran–Saudi Rapprochement,” Asian Survey 64, no. 1 (February 2024): 112–135, https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article/64/1/112/192836.
[5] Christopher H. Blanchard, “U.S.–China Competition in the Middle East: Implications for Regional Security,” Congressional Research Service Report, March 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47248.
[6] Stanley U. Nweke Eze and Josef Ostřanský, “Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative: Why Host Country Agency Is the Key to Success,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, February 12, 2026, https://www.iisd.org/new-belt-and-road-initiative-small-yet-smart.
[7] Michael Eisenstadt, “The Strategic Implications of China’s Presence in the Gulf,” Policy Focus 158, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/strategic-implications-chinas-presence-gulf.
[8] Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, “China’s Red Sea Play: From Security Free Rider to Disruption Enabler,” Stimson Center, Middle East & North Africa, September 18, 2025, https://www.stimson.org/2025/chinas-red-sea-play-from-security-free-rider-to-disruption-enabler.
[9] Rania Ghanem, “Energy Interdependence and Chinese Soft Power in the Middle East,” Energy Research & Social Science 90 (August 2022): 102621, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629622001624.
[10] Robert A. Manning, “China and the United States in the Middle East: The New Strategic Competition,” Foreign Affairs 102, no. 5 (September/October 2023), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2023-08-15/china-and-us-middle-east-strategic-competition.
[11] Qian Zhang, “The Beijing Agreement: China’s Mediating Role in Saudi–Iran Relations,” Contemporary International Relations 33, no. 4 (2024): 56–72, https://www.ciis.org.cn/en/publication/china-saudi-iran-mediation.
[12] International Crisis Group, “China in the Middle East: Balancing Diplomacy, Trade, and Security,” Middle East Report no. 239, February 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/china-middle-east-balancing-diplomacy-trade-and-security.
[13] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Trilateral Statement by the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” March 10, 2023, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367487.html.
[14] David B. Roberts, “China’s Middle East Strategy: The Role of Economic Diplomacy and Energy Security,” Middle East Journal 76, no. 3 (Summer 2022): 407–425, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-middle-east-strategy.
[15] William B. Quandt, “Review of War and Peace in the Middle East: A Critique of American Policy, by Avi Shlaim,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 1994, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1994-09-01/war-and-peace-middle-east-critique-american-policy.
[16] Laura Silver, “Iran–Saudi Relations and the Regional Balance of Power,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/10/iran-saudi-relations.
[17] Mark N. Katz, “China’s Role in Mediating Middle East Conflicts,” Journal of International Affairs 78, no. 2 (Winter 2024): 89–107, https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/china-mediation-middle-east.
[18] Bassam Haddad, “The Gulf States and Strategic Hedging in a Multipolar Middle East,” Middle East Policy 30, no. 2 (Summer 2023): 65–81, https://www.mepc.org/gulf-states-strategic-hedging.
[19] Shihua Lu, “The Belt and Road Initiative and Maritime Infrastructure in the Middle East,” Asian Journal of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2022): 55–73, https://www.asianjournal.org/china-bri-middle-east.
[20] Michael Doran, “U.S.-China Competition and the Future of Middle Eastern Security,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 2023, https://www.fpri.org/article/us-china-middle-east-security.
