Abstract: The international system is undergoing a transformation that extends beyond conventional great-power rivalry. What is changing is not simply the distribution of power among states, but the mechanisms through which power is exercised, sustained, and constrained. Assumptions that shaped much of the post-Cold War era economic interdependence as a stabilising force, globalisation as a path toward convergence, and military superiority as the principal measure of strategic influence now appear increasingly uncertain. In their place, a more fragmented and competitive strategic environment is emerging, one in which energy dependency, technological sovereignty, supply chain resilience, and economic fragmentation have become central to geopolitical competition.
Problem statement: What determines strategic power in an international environment where military capability and economic scale no longer provide a sufficient explanation of geopolitical influence?
So what?: This shift has consequences well beyond great-power competition. Regional crises increasingly generate global economic and political spillover effects, technological dependence creates new national security risks, and economic interdependence can become a strategic liability. For policymakers and strategic institutions, understanding this transition is no longer optional.
A Framework for Strategic Power
One limitation of many traditional discussions of power is that they continue to focus primarily on military capability and economic scale. Both remain important, but recent crises suggest that they no longer provide a complete explanation of strategic influence.[1], [2]
States with considerable military or economic resources can still face serious constraints if they depend heavily on vulnerable supply chains, external energy sources, foreign technology, or fragile information environments. For example, Russia’s dependence on Western microelectronics for precision-guided munitions became a significant constraint after export restrictions were imposed following the invasion of Ukraine.[3], [4]
Conversely, states with more limited material capabilities may exercise greater strategic flexibility if they possess stronger resilience in these areas. Israel provides one example, having compensated for demographic limitations through sustained investment in technological innovation, cyber capabilities, and advanced unmanned systems. Its highly developed domestic defence technology sector, including drone and cyber capabilities, has enabled it to offset some of the constraints associated with its relatively small population and limited strategic depth.[5]
This suggests that strategic power is increasingly shaped not only by what states possess, but by what they can sustain under pressure. Military strength, economic scale, technological capacity, industrial resilience, and information resilience should therefore be understood as interconnected components of strategic influence rather than separate policy domains.
The End of Strategic Certainty
For nearly three decades after the Cold War, the international system operated within a relatively stable strategic framework. The United States remained the dominant global power. Economic globalisation deepened integration across regions. Supply chains became more efficient, capital moved with remarkable speed, and many policymakers assumed that greater interdependence would reduce the likelihood of major systemic confrontation.[6]
What is unfolding today is not merely another cycle of geopolitical competition, nor simply the return of traditional great-power rivalry. The more significant shift lies in the erosion of assumptions that shaped much of the post-Cold War strategic environment. Economic interdependence was widely expected to reduce geopolitical confrontation by increasing mutual dependence between major economies. Recent events have challenged that assumption. The disruption of global supply chains during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed structural vulnerabilities in highly interconnected economies, while Europe’s energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated how energy dependency can become a geopolitical liability. Similarly, growing restrictions and competition surrounding semiconductor supply chains have elevated technological dependency from a commercial concern to a national security issue.[7], [8], [9]
Rather than reducing strategic competition, interdependence in certain sectors has, in some cases, created new forms of strategic exposure. The international system is not simply becoming more competitive; it is becoming more complex, as economic interdependence, technological rivalry, and regional crises increasingly intersect in ways that complicate strategic planning.
Traditional measures of power still matter. Military capability, industrial capacity, economic scale, and geographic reach remain indispensable elements of strategic influence. A technologically advanced economy that relies heavily on externally concentrated semiconductor manufacturing may find its strategic autonomy constrained during crises, particularly when access to advanced chips becomes subject to export controls or geopolitical disruption.[10] The United States’ dependence on TSMC in Taiwan for advanced semiconductor production illustrates how technological concentration can create strategic vulnerability despite broader economic and military strength.[11], [12] Recent restrictions on semiconductor technology transfers between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) illustrate how technological dependence can rapidly evolve from a commercial concern into a strategic liability.[13], [14] Similarly, states with substantial military capabilities but vulnerable supply chains may face operational constraints if critical components, logistics networks, or external suppliers are disrupted.
From Unipolarity to a More Fragmented Multipolar Order
The post-Cold War international order was often described as unipolar, for good reason. American military might, financial influence, institutional leadership, and diplomatic leverage created a degree of strategic coherence that shaped global politics for decades.[15]
The PRC’s rise did not begin in the current decade, nor is it the sole driver of strategic transition. However, the cumulative effects of China’s economic expansion, military modernisation, and technological ambition have accelerated shifts in the global balance of power. India’s growing strategic relevance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, alongside the increasingly assertive behaviour of middle powers such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, reflects a broader pattern in which states pursue more flexible and interest-driven alignments rather than fixed bloc loyalties.[16]
Still, the concept of multipolarity can be misleading if it suggests a relatively balanced distribution of power or a stable equilibrium among major actors. In practice, contemporary power distribution is highly uneven, with states possessing different combinations of military capability, economic influence, technological capacity, and regional leverage rather than comparable forms of power.
The emerging order is neither balanced nor stable in the traditional sense, because major actors possess fundamentally different forms of power. The United States retains unmatched military reach, the PRC combines economic scale with technological ambition, whereas regional powers often exert influence through geography, energy leverage, or diplomatic positioning rather than comprehensive global capability.
This asymmetry matters because it complicates strategic alignment and crisis management. States with different forms of influence are less likely to follow predictable alliance logic and more likely to pursue selective or transactional partnerships. Unlike the bipolar structure of the Cold War, today’s geopolitical competition is less structured around rigid ideological blocs and more around overlapping strategic interests. This has made alliance behaviour less predictable, as states increasingly pursue selective cooperation rather than fixed alignment.
This shift matters because it weakens assumptions about stable bloc politics and complicates long-term strategic planning. For example, India’s continued strategic autonomy despite closer defence cooperation with the United States reflects a preference for issue-based alignment rather than formal bloc dependence. Similarly, Gulf states increasingly balance relations with Washington, Beijing, and Moscow to maximise strategic flexibility, making regional alignment patterns more fluid than traditional alliance frameworks would suggest.[17]
Energy and the Return of Hard Geopolitics
Energy has always shaped international politics, but its strategic meaning has evolved. Oil and natural gas remain central to state power, not only because modern economies continue to depend on them, but because control over supply, transit infrastructure, and pricing still generates geopolitical leverage with consequences far beyond producing regions.[18] Recent crises have demonstrated how rapidly disruptions in energy markets can translate into inflationary pressure, industrial strain, fiscal uncertainty, and political instability.[19] The sharp increase in European gas prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 illustrated how energy shocks can rapidly generate economic and political consequences far beyond the immediate conflict zone.[20] At the peak of the crisis, European natural gas prices reached levels several times higher than their historical average, placing significant pressure on households, industry, and public finances across the continent.[21] Yet the strategic energy landscape has become more complex than traditional hydrocarbon politics alone can account for.
The transition toward cleaner technologies does not eliminate strategic dependency; in many cases, it changes its form. Clean energy technologies such as batteries, electric vehicles, and renewable energy infrastructure depend heavily on critical minerals, including lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements, as well as on geographically concentrated processing and manufacturing capacity. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements are no longer simply industrial commodities.[22] They have become strategic assets. According to the International Energy Agency, processing and refining capacity for several critical minerals is highly concentrated, with China accounting for a dominant share of global rare earth processing and a substantial proportion of lithium and cobalt refining. This concentration highlights how the clean energy transition may create new forms of strategic dependency even as reliance on hydrocarbons declines.[23]
This complicates the assumption that the green transition automatically produces strategic independence. In some cases, states may simply exchange one form of dependency for another. Reducing reliance on hydrocarbons does not eliminate vulnerability if replacement technologies depend on externally concentrated ecosystems for extraction, refining, or manufacturing. Energy security, in that sense, must now be understood more broadly than in previous decades.
Within this framework, energy security should be understood as a component of industrial resilience rather than a standalone policy concern. States that cannot secure reliable access to critical energy inputs or strategic resources may find their economic flexibility and geopolitical autonomy constrained during periods of crisis.
Technology as Strategic Infrastructure
Technology is no longer merely an engine of economic modernisation. It has become a pillar of geopolitical power. In many respects, access to advanced technologies now plays a role similar to that once associated with control over critical energy resources. For decades, technological progress was framed primarily in the language of innovation, competitiveness, and growth. Today, technological competition is increasingly framed in terms of sovereignty, strategic dependency, and national resilience.[24] Semiconductors provide perhaps the clearest example.
Modern economies rely on advanced chips for everything from telecommunications and artificial intelligence to weapons systems and critical infrastructure management.[25] Dependence in this domain is therefore not simply commercial; it is strategic.[26] That helps explain why semiconductor policy has moved decisively into the national security arena.
Export controls, industrial subsidies, domestic manufacturing initiatives, and supply chain restructuring are no longer simply economic tools. They are instruments of geopolitical competition.[27] The strategic competition between the United States and the PRC illustrates this transformation particularly clearly.[28] Semiconductor export controls, industrial subsidy programs such as the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, and efforts to reduce dependence on externally concentrated supply chains demonstrate how technological interdependence is increasingly treated as a strategic vulnerability rather than an unqualified economic benefit.[29] In this context, technological capability is no longer only a driver of economic growth; it has become an essential component of national sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Within the framework proposed here, technological sovereignty represents a distinct dimension of strategic power. States that depend heavily on external technological ecosystems may retain economic strength or military capability, yet still face constraints on their strategic autonomy if access to critical technologies becomes restricted during periods of geopolitical tension.
Conflict, Technology, and the Changing Character of War
Military power remains a central expression of state capability, but recent conflicts have shown that conventional measures alone do not adequately capture battlefield effectiveness.[30] The war in Ukraine, for example, has demonstrated how relatively low-cost unmanned systems, electronic warfare, precision targeting, and rapid technological adaptation can significantly alter battlefield dynamics despite traditional asymmetries in force structure.[31] Ukrainian FPV drones, often costing only a few hundred dollars, have repeatedly destroyed military equipment worth millions, illustrating how technological adaptation can offset conventional disadvantages.[32] Conventional indicators such as force size, industrial output, logistics, and deterrence capacity remain important, but military effectiveness increasingly depends on adaptability, technological integration, and operational resilience.
Technological Adaptability Increasingly Shapes Battlefield Effectiveness
The spread of unmanned systems, cyber operations, autonomous capabilities, and AI-assisted targeting has altered both tactical calculations and broader strategic thinking. In some cases, technological agility can offset weaknesses that would once have been decisive disadvantages.[33]
This does not mean conventional military power has become irrelevant. However, it does mean that the hierarchy of military effectiveness is becoming more complex. Drone warfare provides a particularly clear example of this shift. In Ukraine and in conflicts across the Middle East, relatively inexpensive unmanned systems have imposed disproportionate operational and financial costs on conventionally stronger militaries, forcing adjustments in force protection, battlefield awareness, and tactical planning.[34] At the same time, technological modernisation creates new dependencies. States that rely heavily on imported defence systems, foreign software ecosystems, or externally controlled electronic components may discover that procurement alone does not guarantee operational autonomy, particularly if access to maintenance, updates, spare parts, or critical software support becomes politically constrained.
Owning advanced systems is not the same as controlling the infrastructure that makes them functional. Military effectiveness in the coming decade may depend less on headline capability and more on resilience, industrial depth, and technological sovereignty.
Regional Crises and Strategic Spillover
One defining feature of the current geopolitical environment is the extent to which regional crises now generate consequences far beyond their immediate geography. Recent crises illustrate how regional instability increasingly generates broader strategic spillover. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, disrupted European energy markets, intensified inflationary pressures, and accelerated defence policy adjustments across NATO states.[35] The conflict also contributed to Finland and Sweden abandoning decades of military non-alignment and seeking NATO membership, illustrating how a regional conflict reshaped the European security architecture beyond the immediate battlefield.[36] This complicates In the Middle East, conflict dynamics directly affect global energy pricing, maritime security, and supply chain confidence through critical chokepoints such as the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz.[37]
Migration provides another clear example of geopolitical spillover. Large-scale displacement resulting from war or state collapse can rapidly reshape domestic political debates far beyond the originating crisis, influencing border policy, social cohesion, public trust, and electoral politics across Europe and elsewhere.[38] The 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, for example, significantly influenced border policy debates and domestic political dynamics across several European countries.[39]
The refugee influx also contributed to the rise of immigration as a central electoral issue in several European states, reinforcing support for stricter border controls and reshaping broader debates on migration and national security.[40]
Information, Influence, and Strategic Perception
Power in the contemporary international system is not exercised solely through military force or economic leverage. Influence over narratives, information flows, and public perception has become a significant dimension of geopolitical competition.[41] Digital communication has transformed not only how information moves, but how rapidly political interpretations form.[42] States, institutions, and non-state actors now operate in an environment where public perception can shift in real time, often before policymakers have fully assessed unfolding events. This creates a different strategic environment from earlier eras, particularly because information operations now move at digital speed and are often difficult to attribute with certainty.[41] Russia’s information operations surrounding the war in Ukraine, as well as broader concerns about foreign influence campaigns targeting democratic societies, illustrate how strategic communication can be used not only to shape narratives but also to generate confusion, distrust, and political fatigue.[44]
The strategic objective is not always persuasion in the traditional sense.[45] In some cases, weakening public confidence in institutions or increasing social polarisation may be sufficient to produce strategic effects. In that context, information resilience becomes a component of national security rather than merely a communications concern. Information resilience should therefore be understood as a strategic capability in its own right. A state may possess considerable military or economic resources, yet still face significant constraints if public trust, institutional credibility, or decision-making processes become vulnerable to sustained informational pressure. In this sense, information resilience contributes directly to a state’s ability to preserve strategic coherence during periods of crisis.
Economic Fragmentation and Strategic Vulnerability
The geopolitical consequences of economic fragmentation may ultimately prove as consequential as military competition itself. For much of the globalisation era, economic integration was widely understood as a stabilising force.[46] Efficiency, interdependence, and supply chain optimisation were treated as strategic virtues. Recent years have sharply challenged that assumption.[47]
Pandemic-era disruptions exposed structural weaknesses in supply chains.[48] Energy shocks demonstrated how quickly economic stress can spread across borders.[49] Sanctions regimes, export controls, and industrial policy competition have revealed the extent to which economic interdependence is vulnerable to weaponisation.[50] What once appeared to be efficiency increasingly appears, in some sectors, to be strategic exposure.
This helps explain the growing emphasis on industrial policy, domestic manufacturing, and supply chain diversification across major economies. Measures such as the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act and similar strategic industrial initiatives in Europe reflect a broader effort to reduce dependency in critical sectors and strengthen economic resilience.[51]
The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, enacted in 2022, allocated approximately USD 52.7 billion to support domestic semiconductor manufacturing, research, and workforce development.[52] Similarly, the European Chips Act seeks to strengthen semiconductor production capacity within the European Union and reduce strategic dependence on externally concentrated supply chains.[53] Together, these initiatives illustrate the broader shift from efficiency-driven globalisation toward resilience-oriented industrial policy.
However, this shift carries significant trade-offs. Greater national control over strategic industries may reduce vulnerability in specific sectors, but broader economic fragmentation can also contribute to higher production costs, inflationary pressure, reduced efficiency, and slower long-term growth.[54] Economic securitisation may be strategically rational in the short term, but its broader systemic consequences remain uncertain.
Power in Transition
The international system is not collapsing. But it is changing in ways that challenge assumptions that shaped much of the post-Cold War era. The most consequential shift is not simply the redistribution of influence among major powers. It is the changing nature of power itself. Military strength still matters. Economic scale still matters. Geography still matters. But none of these operates in isolation as they once did.
Strategic influence increasingly depends on a more complex combination of technological capability, energy resilience, industrial adaptability, informational credibility, and institutional flexibility. This does not necessarily point toward a stable multipolar equilibrium. If anything, the emerging environment appears more fluid, more contested, and less predictable than many traditional geopolitical frameworks anticipated. That does not mean the international system is descending into disorder. It means the logic of competition is evolving.
Looking ahead, the importance of these factors is likely to increase rather than diminish. Competition over critical technologies, supply chain security, strategic resources, and information environments is expected to remain a defining feature of international politics. As a result, the ability to manage vulnerability and maintain resilience may become an increasingly important measure of strategic influence in the years ahead.
The central argument of this article is not that military power, economic scale, or geography have become irrelevant. Rather, these traditional measures no longer provide a sufficient explanation of strategic influence on their own. States increasingly operate in an environment where disruption, dependency, and systemic vulnerability can constrain even materially powerful actors.
What distinguishes strategic power in the emerging international order is therefore not simply the possession of resources, but the ability to sustain and adapt them under pressure. Technological sovereignty, industrial resilience, energy security, and information resilience are increasingly interconnected. Taken together, they help explain why some states are better able to preserve strategic autonomy and adapt to disruption than others. The states most likely to shape the coming decade may not necessarily be those with the greatest resources, but those best able to convert those resources into resilience, flexibility, and long-term strategic autonomy.
[1] Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology (New York: Scribner, 2022).
[2] International Monetary Fund (IMF), Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism, IMF Staff Discussion Note (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2023).
[3] Sujai Shivakumar and Charles W. Wessner, Semiconductors and National Security: What Are the Stakes? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022).
[4] Miller, Chip War.
[5] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024 (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2024).
[6] Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008): 18–31.
[7] International Monetary Fund (IMF), Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism.
[8] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2024 (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2024).
[9] Miller, Chip War.
[10] International Monetary Fund (IMF), Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism.
[11] Miller, Chip War.
[12] Shivakumar and Wessner, Semiconductors and National Security.
[13] Miller, Chip War.
[14] Shivakumar and Wessner, Semiconductors and National Security.
[15] Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008): 18–31.
[16] Lowy Institute, Asia Power Index 2024: Key Findings Report (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2024).
[17] Lowy Institute, Asia Power Index 2024: Key Findings Report.
[18] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2024 (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2024).
[19] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2024.
[20] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2024.
[21] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2024.
[22] International Energy Agency (IEA), The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2021).
[23] International Energy Agency (IEA), The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions.
[24] Miller, Chip War.
[25] Shivakumar and Wessner, Semiconductors and National Security.
[26] Shivakumar and Wessner, Semiconductors and National Security.
[27] Miller, Chip War.
[28] Miller, Chip War.
[29] Shivakumar and Wessner, Semiconductors and National Security.
[30] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024 (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2024).
[31] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024.
[32] James Black et al., The Future of Warfare in 2030 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020).
[33] Black et al., The Future of Warfare in 2030.
[34] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024.
[35] International Monetary Fund (IMF), Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism.
[36] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Finland and Sweden’s Accession (Brussels: NATO, 2023).
[37] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2024.
[38] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2024).
[39] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024.
[40] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024.
[41] Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).
[42] Paul and Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model.
[43] Paul and Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model.
[44] Paul and Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model.
[45] Paul and Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model.
[46] International Monetary Fund (IMF), Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism.
[47] International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 2025 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2025).
[48] International Monetary Fund (IMF), Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism.
[49] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2024.
[50] International Monetary Fund (IMF), Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism.
[51] Shivakumar and Wessner, Semiconductors and National Security.
[52] U.S. Department of Commerce, CHIPS for America (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023).
[53] European Commission, European Chips Act: A European Strategy for Semiconductors (Brussels: European Commission, 2023).
[54] International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 2025.
