Abstract: With each passing day, the amount of verified information regarding violations of international humanitarian law and human rights by the Russian Federation continues to grow. One of the most striking examples of the Russian Federation’s disregard for its international obligations is its treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). These violations include executions, torture, denial of access to fair trials, intelligence operations targeting their relatives, and more.

Problem statement: Could the crimes committed by the Russian Federation against Ukrainian prisoners of war not be isolated incidents, but elements of a systematic state policy?

So what?: The international community must officially acknowledge these crimes as state policy, expand independent monitoring, and support legal accountability mechanisms. Ukraine should coordinate investigations and lead public communication efforts.

”A Hard Standard”

On June 2, 2025, following the second round of negotiations in Istanbul, Ukraine and Russia agreed on a new prisoner exchange, building on the earlier successful one carried out according to the 1000-for-1000 formula.[1]
On May 6, 2025, the Russian Commissioner for Human Rights, Tatyana Moskalkova, stated[2] that nearly all of the Ukrainian prisoners of war she interviewed said that everything during their captivity in Russia was “of a high standard.” Earlier, in her briefing on November 2, 2024,[3] the official representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, emphasised that Russia adheres to the norms of international humanitarian law in its treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war and accused Ukrainian officials of exploiting this issue for political speculation.

…that everything during their captivity in Russia was “of a high standard.”

Instead, on February 28, 2025, during a meeting[4] between the Presidents of the United States and Ukraine, the U.S. side was provided with photographs of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) after their captivity in Russia. These images were shocking and vividly demonstrated numerous violations of multiple norms of international humanitarian law (IHL) by the Russian Federation (RF).

Background

In a sequential analysis of reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) for 2024, there is an evident increase in the number and severity of crimes committed by Russia against POWs:

• 39th Report (2nd quarter):[6] Individual cases of torture recorded; isolated incidents of sexual violence;
• 40th Report (3rd quarter):[7] More than 97% of interviewed POWs experienced torture and ill-treatment. Over 68% experienced sexual violence, including cases of extreme cruelty (e.g., electric shocks to the genitals);
• 41st Report (4th quarter):[8] Over 61% of those interviewed reported torture aimed at extracting forced confessions. 76% reported sexual violence, with 100% of women interviewed subjected to it.

Most interviewed POWs indicated that torture and sexual violence were systematic and continuous at every stage of their captivity. Various state institutions of the Russian Federation (RF) participated in these crimes, including the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the Federal Penitentiary Service, the Investigative Committee, and the Prosecutor’s Office.

According to OHCHR reports, RF authorities consistently deny OHCHR representatives access to Ukrainian POWs, who are intentionally held in an information vacuum. Representatives of international organisations have never visited more than 90% of POWs,[9] including the International Committee of the Red Cross. No monitoring of their conditions has been carried out.

Also, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine reported[10] on May 28, 2025, that the Russian Federation is creating organisations that imitate the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations. These entities are actively used in propaganda efforts and serve as a justification for denying international access to prisoners of war. In total, it was reported that there are 186 detention sites for Ukrainian prisoners where Russian authorities do not allow representatives of the Red Cross or other international monitoring missions.

It was reported that there are 186 detention sites for Ukrainian prisoners where Russian authorities do not allow representatives of the Red Cross or other international monitoring missions.

The 41st report recorded a sharp surge in the number of executions of prisoners of war. On February 3, 2025, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (the Mission) reported[11] that since August 2024 alone, it verified and documented 74 executions of captured Ukrainian soldiers in 24 separate incidents through analysis of media materials from various sources. Danielle Bell, Head of the Mission, stated: “These incidents did not occur in a vacuum.”

In 2024, the Mission recorded at least three calls by Russian state officials and numerous messages on social media and messengers ordering, initiating, or approving executions of Ukrainians. Calls for the execution of Ukrainians have been consistently voiced by Russian public figures (for example, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev)[13] Numerous examples were documented[14] by the non-governmental organisation Crimean Human Rights Group, reflected in OHCHR Reports No. 40 and No. 41, as well as in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment[15] by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) for October 2024.

A particularly cruel incident involved the beheading of a bound Ukrainian POW. This incident was verified by the fact-checking department “BBC Verify,” as reported[16] by the Ukrainian branch of the British public service broadcaster on September 17, 2024. The international community strongly condemned the execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war captured on video. The UN Mission expressed outrage,[17] emphasising the systematic nature of such cases; the EU and its leaders stressed the need for accountability, while the ambassadors of the United States and the United Kingdom accused Russia of escalating brutality.[18]

However, such acts of brutality have not ceased and continue to this day. In February 2025, the Russian side handed over the remains of prisoners of war to Ukraine, among which was an unidentifiable body in a bag marked with a tag, bearing wounds, broken ribs, and other signs of torture. A DNA test later revealed that the body did not belong to a soldier, but to 27-year-old Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna, whom Russian forces had previously captured.[19]

In February 2025, the Russian side handed over the remains of prisoners of war to Ukraine, among which was an unidentifiable body in a bag marked with a tag, bearing wounds, broken ribs, and other signs of torture.

The Prosecutor General of Ukraine stated[20] that cases of executions of Ukrainian POWs were not isolated incidents but elements of an organised and deliberate policy of Russia. In an interview[21] dated December 18, 2024 (hereinafter the interview), Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmytro Lubinets (the Ukrainian Commissioner), stated that information on executions is increasingly demonstratively presented in Russian social networks. He also stated that these executions pursue the following goals: “To tie Russian soldiers with blood,” depriving them of the opportunity to surrender due to fear of retaliation by Ukrainian forces; demoralising Ukrainian troops; demonstrating strength and impunity to the international community.

Totalitarian Heritage

In an attempt to justify its war crimes, the Russian Federation actively resorts to historical narratives promoted by its propaganda (e.g., the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF, “The Human Rights Situation in Ukraine”[22]), seeking to equate Ukraine’s actions with those of Nazi Germany (briefing by Russia’s MFA on February 27, 2025[23]). In light of this, a legitimate question arises: how do the actions of the Russian Federation correlate with those of the USSR, whose legal successor Russia officially claims to be?

The basis for this historical analysis is the declassified report “Russian Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel World War II”[24] (hereinafter the Report), published by the CIA on October 1, 2002. Comparing the Report and OHCHR documents reveals direct continuity in the following patterns:

• The USSR developed a multi-level system involving numerous state agencies to manage POWs;
• To demoralise the enemy and suppress resistance among occupied populations, many soldiers were executed upon capture;
• Throughout the prisoners’ “way” from their capture to detention centres, they were subjected to particularly cruel and diverse forms of torture, including beatings, mutilation, starvation, inhumane detention conditions, and constant psychological pressure;
• When recruiting agents, Soviet agencies found it especially effective to hold family members of recruited individuals as hostages, guaranteeing the agents’ “loyalty”;
• After the Second World War, the USSR fabricated criminal cases to retain POWs and deprive them of protections under IHL, extracting confessions through coercion and detaining POWs in standard penitentiary facilities.

A comparison of historical and contemporary materials confirms that Russia’s policy toward Ukrainian prisoners of war is systematic and widespread, rather than fragmented or chaotic. All the described patterns have been adapted, refined, and incorporated into the practices of Russia’s government structures. Moreover, unlike the Soviet Union, Russia immediately abandoned the placement of POWs in specialised centres prescribed by IHL. It began fabricating criminal cases even before transferring prisoners of war to penitentiary institutions. In one aspect, however, the RF has surpassed its totalitarian predecessor–the field of information warfare.

Tragedy Production

On July 29, 2022, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation reported[25] an alleged Ukrainian missile strike on Volnovakha Correctional Colony in the settlement of Olenivka, where Ukrainian POWs were being held. The OHCHR report on the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Persons Hors de Combat in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine (February 24, 2022 – February 23, 2023)[26] provides a detailed account of Russia’s criminal preparatory actions leading up to the events of the night of July 28–morning of July 29, 2022.

The OHCHR report on the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Persons Hors de Combat in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine provides a detailed account of Russia’s criminal preparatory actions.

According to the report:

• On July 27, 2022, one day before the explosion, 193 Ukrainian POWs were transferred to a specially prepared barrack;
• The security post was relocated farther from this barrack, and a trench was dug for the guards—measures not implemented for other buildings in the colony;
• Starting July 28, 2022, guards at this barrack began wearing bulletproof vests and helmets, unlike other personnel guarding different areas of the colony;
• On the same day, a Grad multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) was deployed near the colony and put into use.

The report examines the circumstances of the explosion, which destroyed the barracks holding Ukrainian POWs, as well as the subsequent actions of Russian representatives:

• Survivors reported that after the explosion, they were denied medical assistance for several hours, leading to many critically wounded prisoners dying from massive blood loss;
• Lightly wounded Ukrainians were placed in solitary confinement, effectively isolating them from communication with other prisoners;
• The Russian side claimed that the strike was carried out using a Ukrainian HIMARS rocket, but OHCHR noted that the damage was inconsistent with HIMARS impact characteristics;
• Video recordings and satellite images analysed by OHCHR did not establish a definitive cause of the explosion.

In its conclusions, the circumstances preceding the tragedy included the transfer of prisoners, security preparations, and the presence of artillery near the colony raised reasonable suspicions that the tragedy was premeditated and orchestrated by the Russian side.

On July 29, 2024, the Centre for Countering Disinformation (Centre), a working body of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC), compiled materials[27] on this case, which has become one of Russia’s most egregious crimes against POWs. The materials outline the key actions of the Ukrainian side and the international community. Additionally, it is noted that Russian occupiers had no intention of exchanging the prisoners held in Olenivka and deliberately executed them to cover up the torture and inhumane detention conditions, as, before the explosion, Ukrainian defenders were systematically tortured.

It is noted that Russia had no intention of exchanging the prisoners held in Olenivka and deliberately executed them to cover up the torture and inhumane detention conditions.

At the same time, in his Interview, the Lubinets suggested that another motive behind this Russian war crime was to discredit military aid to Ukraine from foreign partners. This claim appears logical, given that the first public mention[28] of HIMARS systems in Ukraine occurred approximately one month before the Olenivka tragedy. Furthermore, Russia’s accusations against Ukraine, alleging a HIMARS strike on Olenivka (widely propagated across all Russian state media), were refuted at the international level: Al Jazeera,[29] Reuters,[30] and The Washington Post.[31]

The Ukrainian Commissioner drew parallels between the Olenivka tragedy and the January 24, 2024, downing of an IL-76 aircraft in Russia’s Belgorod region, which the RF claimed was carrying 65 Ukrainian POWs. He noted that just like in Olenivka, the IL-76 incident was covered by Russian media at an unrealistically rapid pace. Russian disinformation focused on the claim that the aircraft was allegedly shot down by an American Patriot missile, immediately followed by Russia’s appeal to the international community, demanding a halt to arms supplies to Ukraine.

Notably, a similar parallel was drawn by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its first official statement[32] regarding the downing of the IL-76. As of February 13, 2025, no official conclusions from the international community have been released. Meanwhile, the Russian side, specifically Svetlana Petrenko, an official representative of the Investigative Committee of the RF, claimed[33] that “irrefutable evidence” of Ukraine’s responsibility for the downing had been discovered, including fragments of mechanisms bearing Patriot missile system markings. Unfortunately, refuting this statement remains impossible because, despite calls[34] for an independent international investigation, Russia has effectively prohibited international representatives from accessing the crash site: OHCR states that due to the lack of access, OHCHR has not been able to establish the circumstances of the crash sufficiently;[35] Russia’s Permanent Representative to the OSCE, Alexander Lukashevich, stated that Russia refused to invite the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe to participate in the investigation of the downed Il-76 crash.[36]

Russia, specifically Svetlana Petrenko, an official representative of the Investigative Committee of the RF, claimed that “irrefutable evidence” of Ukraine’s responsibility for the downing had been discovered.

On January 24, 2025, the Media Initiative for Human Rights (MIHR), a Ukrainian non-governmental organisation, published findings from an independent investigation into the IL-76 incident.[37] Among the key facts noted by independent experts:

• Suspicious flight path: The aircraft was likely moving northeast at the time of the crash, meaning it was moving away from the Ukrainian border;
• Russia’s use of a military transport aircraft for prisoner transfers, particularly along active combat zones;
• The absence of the Ministry of Defence of the RF negotiation group on board IL-76 on the day of the crash, despite the fact that they always accompany prisoners and are always present during exchanges;
• Unrealistically rapid and widespread media coverage of the “incident” in Russian state media, as well as the uniformity of the official Russian position on the event.

Considering the last point, it is important to note that with one of the first notices about the downed aircraft appearing at 9.49 am (Central European Time)[38] on January 24, 2024, reported by the Telegram channel of the 112 media channel, the first tracked speculation of the involvement of the Ukrainian side appeared as early as 9.53 am on another anonymous channel.[39] At 4 am, based on reports of the Russian MoD, the channels[40] have officially started sharing information about the Ukrainian POWs present onboard the aircraft, and at 10.21 am, the first tracked message blaming the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) in the tragedy was shared on an anonymous Telegram channel.[41] The wave of following messages reiterated the alleged blame on the AFU and claimed[42] that the Ukrainian media channels have reported on it themselves.

The structure of the informational space following so closely after the tragedies shows a pattern of behaviour that may be a sign of coordinated action.

Hostages of the Information War

In the Interview, the Lubinets noted that Russian Ombudsperson Tatyana Moskalkova regularly publishes lists[44] of potential POWs, claiming that Ukraine is sabotaging the POW exchange process. These statements are then amplified by Russian media[45] to discredit the Ukrainian government. A report[46] published on December 3, 2024, by the ISW reflects a similar position regarding Russia’s manipulation of these lists to discredit the Ukrainian government. The report emphasises that Ukraine has been the primary initiator of POW exchanges, while Russia has systematically refused to engage in such exchanges.

It is worth noting that Ukraine provided an official response the very next day after the publication of these lists. The Main Directorate of Intelligence stated that:[47]

• The Russian POW lists are inaccurate and manipulative;
• Ukraine has not received any official communication regarding these exchanges through proper diplomatic channels;
• Some of the prisoners listed had already been released;
• The lists contained numerous errors in names and dates of birth;
• Among those labelled as “prisoners of war” were ordinary civilians.

Such manipulations are not only aimed at the international community but also at Ukrainian society, specifically the families and relatives of Ukrainian POWs. Furthermore, Ukrainian officials have repeatedly emphasised[48] that Russia actively seeks to involve the families, friends, and loved ones of Ukrainian POWs (both military and civilian) in efforts to destabilise Ukrainian society and weaken the state.

According to information provided by the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereafter Coordination Headquarters), a temporary auxiliary body of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine:

• Russian agents impersonate international humanitarian organisations on social media and in personal communications, offering “assistance” to POW families while gathering personal data on them, missing persons, and detained Ukrainians;[49]
• Russian intelligence services and the Russian Armed Forces (RF Armed Forces) increasingly target the relatives of captured Ukrainian soldiers. Sometimes, families receive calls directly from the battlefield immediately after their loved one has been taken prisoner. The intent is to shock, manipulate emotions, and pressure the family into cooperating. Families are promised better treatment for the prisoner or even inclusion in an exchange if they comply with specific demands;[50]
• Russia creates “doppelgänger” accounts that mimic official Ukrainian institutions, such as the Coordination Headquarters, as well as fake chatbot services on various messaging platforms, to mislead and extract sensitive information.[51]

The Coordination Headquarters asserts that Russian intelligence deliberately seeks to reach as wide an audience as possible and accumulate data on Ukrainians for various purposes, including:

• Recruitment of Ukrainian citizens for intelligence purposes;
• Blackmail and intimidation of POW families;
• Psychological manipulation to weaken public morale;
• Undermining social unity and fostering internal divisions within Ukraine.

Trampled Laws

The presented materials contain numerous facts indicating Russia’s severe violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949:[52]

• Article 13, guaranteeing humane treatment of prisoners of war;
• Article 14, affirming the right of POWs to respect for their honour;
• Article 17, regulating interrogation methods for prisoners of war;
• Article 19, ensuring the detention of POWs away from combat zones;
• Article 22, regulating the placement of prisoners of war;
• Article 25, defining the conditions of POWs’ detention;
• Article 30, guaranteeing access to medical care;
• Article 71, establishing the right to correspondence;
• Article 84, affirming the exclusive jurisdiction of military courts over prisoners of war;
• Article 87, prohibiting corporal punishment;
• Article 99, ensuring POWs’ right to a fair trial;
• Article 121, requiring investigations into the deaths of POWs; as well as
• other norms of IHL: Articles 1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 12, and 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,[53] and Articles 75 and 85 of Protocol I[54] to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, concerning protection of victims of international armed conflicts. Ignoring such extensive violations of IHL norms cannot be coincidental and indicates intentional actions.

Key Takeaways

According to the presented materials, it becomes evident that the Russian Federation resorts to several inhumane practices against Ukrainian prisoners of war. Some POWs are executed immediately upon capture in a demonstrative manner aimed at demoralising the Ukrainian Armed Forces and creating a psychological “point of no return” for Russian troops. Such executions are even encouraged by official representatives of the Russian Federation.

In other cases, Russian forces confiscate prisoners’ phones, contact their relatives, and employ intimidation tactics to extract information and attempt recruitment. Instead of being transferred to dedicated POW camps, as prescribed by international humanitarian law, Ukrainian prisoners are moved through a chain of temporary detention points and ultimately sent to prisons within the RF.

Throughout their captivity, Ukrainian POWs are subjected to torture and cruel treatment intended to break them psychologically and exert pressure on their families back in Ukraine. They are held in complete information isolation, while representatives of international monitoring missions and humanitarian organisations are systematically denied access to the places of their detention. At the same time, the prisoners are subjected to continuous interrogations, and criminal cases are fabricated against them.

Information about POWs is actively used for propaganda purposes. In some cases, as seen in the Olenivka explosion and the downing of the Il-76 aircraft, entire tragedies may be orchestrated to serve the aims of Russia’s information warfare. It can be argued that violations of international humanitarian law are not accidental but constitute deliberate acts intended to establish precedents of impunity.

The actions above are massive and systematic, revealing the coordinated involvement of Russian security structures, state institutions, and propaganda apparatus. They are rooted in historical practices, rely heavily on information manipulation, and represent blatant violations of international humanitarian law. Taken together, these large-scale and organised crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war demonstrate a deliberate, state-orchestrated policy of the Russian Federation designed to advance its objectives through hybrid warfare.

Recommendations

Given the ongoing and brutal nature of the Russian Federation’s war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war, the international community must take decisive action. This includes recognising these crimes as acts of deliberate state policy, engaging a broad spectrum of international, governmental, and independent institutions, and intensifying pressure on Russia to allow international organisations access to detention facilities. Thorough documentation and systematic analysis of the crimes should be conducted to identify and prosecute responsible individuals and entities. Additionally, targeted sanctions must be strengthened to increase accountability.

Simultaneously, the Ukrainian side should assume responsibility for coordinating and funding independent investigations, as well as organising legal and diplomatic efforts to address and prevent such crimes. It is also essential to launch public information campaigns (pre-bunking) aimed at countering Russian disinformation and raising awareness of the treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war.

 

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Bohdan Pshenichnyi is a Ukrainian international law expert and dual PhD candidate specialising in human rights, hybrid warfare, and international humanitarian law. He previously served as a State Expert at the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine; publication example: The Ukrainian Journal of International Law “International Legal Regulation of the Transfer of Military and Dual-Use Technologies as a Form  of Investment” DOI: doi.org/10.36952/ujil.2024.2.27-33. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of any affiliated institution.

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[1] Reuters, “Russia and Ukraine complete largest prisoner swap,” Reuters, May 25, 2025,

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[11] UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, “Ukraine: Alarming Rise in Executions of Captured Ukrainian Military Personnel,” Kyiv, 03 February 2025,

https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Alarming-Rise-in-Executions-of-Captured-Ukrainian-Military-Personnel.

[12] Olha Robeiko, “WSJ розповіла історію розстріляного за “Слава Україні!” військового Олександра Мацієвського,” Unian, April 02 2023,

https://www.unian.ua/war/yak-zaginuv-oleksandr-maciyevskiy-rozkrilisya-vsi-obstavini-rozstrilu-viyskovogo-za-slava-ukrajini-12202470.html.

[13] Dmitry Medvedev, Telegram, July 16, 2024, https://archive.ph/Tm5Xm.

[14] Кримська Правозахисна Група, “Приклади висловлювань – закликів до страт Українських військовополонених,” November 04, 2024,

https://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/dodatok-1.pdf.

[15] Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan and others, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 13, 2024,” ISW Press, October 13, 2024,

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2024.

[16] BBC News Україна, “BBC Verify: кадри вбивства українського полоненого мечем дійсно свіжі,” BBC News Україна, September 17, 2024,

https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c1k7nnjw72eo.

[17] Stepan Smyshliaiev, “В ООН “приголомшені” стратами РФ українських військових,“ Deutsche Welle, April 04, 2023,

https://www.dw.com/uk/v-oon-prigolomseni-stratami-ukrainskih-vijskovih-rosianami/a-65290434.

[18] Oleksandr Kunytskyi, “У ФРН назвали відео страти ще одним доказом жорстокості РФ,“ Deutsche Welle, April 12, 2023,

https://www.dw.com/uk/u-frn-nazvali-video-strati-ukrainskogo-vijskovogo-se-odnim-dokazom-zorstokosti-rf/a-65294054.

[19] Reuters, “Ukraine suspects Russia of torturing Ukrainian reporter who died in captivity,” Reuters, April 24, 2025,

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-suspects-russia-torturing-ukrainian-reporter-who-died-captivity-2025-04-24/.

[20] The Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Telegram, October 15, 2024, https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/26742.

[21] ”Українська Правда “Розстріли полонених. Тортури в полоні. Викрадені діти. Скарги на ТЦК – ЛУБІНЕЦЬ | ВЕЧІР СЕРЕДИ,” YouTube, December 18, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtWssl0zFGk&ab_channel=%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B4%D0%B0.

[22] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “The Human Rights Situation in Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, May 29, 2024,

https://archive.ph/FdE87#selection-1065.3-1065.6.

[23] Maria Zakharova, “Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, Moscow,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, February 27, 2025

https://archive.ph/k2PVo#selection-2117.0-2117.83.

[24] Kermit G. Stewart, Russian Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel World War II (Central Intelligence Agency, 1951),

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01043r002800220002-1.

[25] Varvara Koshechkina, “Минобороны заявило о ракетном ударе ВСУ по СИЗО с пленными бойцами “АЗОВА,” Lenta RU, 29 July 2022,

https://archive.ph/XkAgH.

[26] OHCHR, “Report on the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Persons Hors de Combat in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine: 24 February 2022 – 23 February 202,3” OHCHR, March 24, 2023,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-report-treatment-prisoners-war-and-persons-hors-de-combat-context.

[27] Center for Countering Disinformation, “Що змінилося у другу річницю трагедії в Оленівці?,” Center for Countering Disinformation, 29 July, 2024,

https://cpd.gov.ua/articles/shho-zminylosya-u-drugu-richnyczyu-tragediyi-v-olenivczi/.

[28] Oleksii Reznikov (@oleksiireznikov), X, June 23, 2022,

https://x.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1539931757621006336.

[29] Al Jazeera, “Russia accuses Ukraine of killing POWs with HIMARS system,” Al Jazeera, July, 2022,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/29/russia-accuses-ukraine-of-killing-pows-with-himars-system.

[30] Reuters, “Russia says Ukraine struck prison in Donetsk region, killing 40,” Reuters, July 29, 2022,

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-40-ukrainian-pows-killed-by-ukrainian-missile-strike-donetsk-prison-2022-07-29/.

[31] Liz Sly, David Walker and David L. Stern, “Ukraine and Russia trade blame for attack killing Mariupol prisoner,” Washington Post, July 29, 2022,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/29/ukraine-russia-donetsk-prison-strike-azov/.

[32] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Заявление МИД России в связи с уничтожением российского военно-транспортного самолета Ил-76,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, January 24, 2024, https://archive.ph/rQJb4.

[33] ТАСС, “СК получил доказательства, что самолет с пленными над Белгородом сбили ВСУ,” ТАСС, June 25, 2024, https://archive.ph/RjOkH.

[34] Associated Press, “Ukraine says it has no evidence for Russia’s claim that dozens of POWs died in a shot down plane,” Associated Press, January 27, 2024,

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-plane-crash-pows-c9f2e952a6bb869b1464ee842e0843b5.

[35] OHCR, “Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 December 2023 to 29 February 2024,” OHCR, March 26, 2024, https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/38-periodic-report-EN.

[36] Evgeny Smagin, “Россия не пригласила ООН и ОБСЕ к расследованию удара по Ил-76,” OTP, January, 25 2024,

https://otr-online.ru/news/rossiya-ne-priglasila-oon-i-obse-k-rassledovaniyu-udara-po-il-76-228518.html.

[37] Media Initiative for Human Rights, “Рік мовчання. Хто відповідальний за збиття Іл-76 над Бєлгородом — розслідування,” Media Initiative for Human Rights, January 24, 2025,

https://mipl.org.ua/rik-movchannya-hto-vidpovidalnyj-za-zbyttya-il-76-nad-byelgorodom-rozsliduvannya/.

[38] 112 (@E112News_bot), Telegram, January 24. 2024, https://archive.ph/TNXAy.

[39] ПУТИН в Telegram (@Putin_tg_Russia), Telegram January 24. 2024, https://archive.ph/4h2on.

[40] Media project of the Russian Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Север Реалии,” Telegram, January 24. 2024, https://archive.ph/si07q.

[412] Putin.Life (anonymous Telegram media channel), Telegram, January 24, 2024, https://archive.ph/OeFO5.

[42] Политика Страны (anonymous Telegram media channel) Telegram, January 24, 2024, https://archive.ph/1P8ge.

[43] ПОДСЛУШАНО В Запорожье (anonymous Telegram media channel) Telegram, January 24, 2024,

https://archive.ph/fY5IV.

[44] Tatyana Moskalkova, Telegram, December 02, 2024, https://archive.ph/eFNYQ.

[45] RBC, “Москалькова опубликовала список военнопленных, которых не забрал Киев,” RBC, December 02, 2024, https://archive.ph/6Ejk2.

[46] Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov and others, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 3, 2024,” ISW, December 03, 2024,

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2024.

[47] Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, “Ця гра росіян – лише на публіку, і вона особливо цинічна – Секретар Коордштабу Дмитро Усов,” Main Directorate of Intelligence, December 03, 2024,

https://gur.gov.ua/content/tsia-hra-rosiian—lyshe-na-publiku-i-vona-osoblyvo-tsynichna—sekretar-koordshtabu-dmytro-usov.html.

[48] TSN, “Росіяни намагаються залучити родини військовополонених до дестабілізації ситуації в Україні – омбудсмен,“ TSN, December 18, 2024,

https://tsn.ua/ato/rosiyani-namagayutsya-zaluchiti-rodini-viyskovopolonenih-do-destabilizaciyi-situaciyi-v-ukrayini-ombudsmen-2726136.html.

[49] Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Telegram, January 13, 2025,

https://t.me/Koord_shtab/10196.

[50] Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Telegram, January 27, 2025,

https://t.me/Koord_shtab/10470.

[51] Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Telegram, January 10, 2024,

https://t.me/Koord_shtab/7930.

[52] “Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,” OHCHR, August 12, 1949,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war.

[53] “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” OHCHR, December 10, 1984,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading.

[54] “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),” OHCHR, June 08, 1977,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-additional-geneva-conventions-12-august-1949-and.