Abstract: The vested economic interests of some riparian states have led them to usurp transboundary water resources at the expense of others, culminating in tensions and even hydro-wars. A multiplicity of strategies has been employed to manage these water disputes: International Water Agreements (IWAs), Integrated Water Management (IWM) and Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms. Despite the changing geopolitical and climate landscapes, IWAs still form the cornerstone for all other capacity-building measures.
Problem statement: Are decades-old IWAs still relevant globally, amidst the heightened geopolitical competition and worsening effects of anthropogenic climate change?
So what?: IWA clauses should be codified into IWM conventions to allow multilateral bodies, like the United Nations, to have oversight over the state-of-affairs of riparian regions. Since rivers are indispensable to humankind’s ecological security, the UN should actively intervene through diplomacy and peacekeeping forces to safeguard the peace and stability of these transboundary regions.
Peace and Stability
Rivers are contiguous and indivisible resources that flow through multiple territories, allowing for state-to-state socio-economic exchanges. Despite being “permeable membranes through which there is flow of life”, they have also been flashpoints of geopolitical rivalry and tension.[1] As such, policymakers have devised various conflict resolution mechanisms to safeguard the peace and stability of riparian regions globally, including International Water Agreements (IWAs), Integrated Water Management (IWM) and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) strategies.[2] Despite being the oldest water resource management strategy, they remain omnirelevant.
Rivers are contiguous and indivisible resources that flow through multiple territories, allowing for state-to-state socio-economic exchanges.
IWA: A Time-tested Solution
IWAs are legally binding agreements that outline the distribution of water resources in a specific manner. They are the culmination of years of negotiations and compromise, during which territorial boundaries are agreed upon and the legal implications of infringing them are spelt out.[3] They can be seen as a lynchpin of peace and stability in many river basins globally. A notable IWA is the 1994 Water Treaty between Jordan and Israel for the use of the Jordan River.[4] Israel recognised the water scarcity Jordan faces and agreed to provide 50 million cubic metres of water every summer.[5] This gesture of goodwill helped to alleviate tensions and reduce military skirmishes between the former foes following the Six-Day War in 1967.[6]
The Overlooked Geo-Strategic Significance
Even so, Stuart Eldon (2013) cautions to consider the “strategic, political dimension” of the territory agreed upon in the 1994 Water Treaty, which allocates water resources to Israel and Jordan, but not Palestine. This formalises Israel’s exploitation of the West Bank aquifers, one of the region’s most abundant water resources.[7] While Israel signed an Interim Agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1995, its failure to reach a comprehensive peace agreement has impeded progress on cooperative water management.[8] Therefore, the IWA could be regarded as a Trojan Horse for Israel to establish a modus vivendi, while creating a fait accompli for the eventual annexation of Palestinian territory.
Israeli-occupied Territory Over Time[9]This echoes with Segal and Weizmann’s (2003) observation that the “irrigation basins, valleys, rifts, cracks and streams were no longer […] naive topographical features, but […] a series of legal manipulations (that) created […] overlapping self-referential ethno-geographies, held together in startling and horrifying proximity.[10]” With water from the West Bank aquifers piped away to major Israeli cities, the Palestinian communities living in the West Bank consume a tenth of the water consumed by Israel.[11] Insufficient water undermines agricultural and economic activities, perpetuating the “development of underdevelopment”. Andre Gunder Frank (1966) posits that the underdevelopment of some nations is a direct consequence of their exploitative relationships with dominant “core” nations.[12] Such a paradigm is observed as the Palestinian communities living on land illegally occupied by Israel continuously rely on the latter for their basic needs.[13] Therefore, the IWA provides Israel with a carte blanche to use water as a political weapon, suppressing the self-determination of the Palestinians in the long run.
Navigating Uncharted Waters
However, IWAs do not evolve in response to dynamic geo-physical changes, such as anthropogenic climate change. Global temperatures have risen steadily, resulting in increased evapotranspiration (output) and decreased precipitation (input).[14] Consequently, the volume of water in hydrological basins globally has been reduced. Additionally, the Middle East is projected to experience the highest average temperature increase. Thus, it reduces the quantity of available water significantly.
Projected Temperature Changes Globally [15]With a 30% decrease in the volume of water in the Jordan River, Israel has been unable to meet the clauses of the IWA since 1997.[16] This suggests that while IWAs are crucial, they need to be complemented with other measures to ensure they can be fulfilled during extraordinary circumstances beyond the signatories’ control. As such, commentators have touted the importance of IWMs.
IWM: Managing Water Resources Sustainably
IWMs refer to capacity-building measures underpinned by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs are part of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda, a blueprint for addressing pressing global challenges. Signatories are required to report their progress in achieving the metrices under each of the 17 SDGs.[17] In so doing, the UN envisions “development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.”[18] This strategy addresses the evolving challenges posed by anthropogenic climate change and leverages transnational resources to overcome water scarcity.[19]
The UN envisions “development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.”
A notable IWM is the Mekong River Commission (MRC), established in 1995 by Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand, and Vietnam.[20] Signatories agreed to protect the environment from pollution by cooperating on the development of hydropower and irrigation.[21] Should such a commitment be followed, SDGs 6 and 15 will be achieved.[22]
Enhancing Regional Rapprochement
Over the years, the MRC has been proven to be an effective platform for multilateral cooperation. In May 2025, the MRC initiated a Joint Water Quality Monitoring Initiative to manage water pollution in the Kok River, a transboundary tributary of the Mekong River that flows from Myanmar into Northern Thailand. Both states agreed to exchange data and technical expertise to improve water quality.[23] Furthermore, the MRC has collaborated with supranational bodies to enhance its expertise in climate change adaptation. It recently signed a Memorandum of Intent with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance to strengthen its disaster monitoring, forecasting and response capabilities.[24]
Given the worsening effects of anthropogenic climate change, IWMs are a step in the right direction. By 2060, temperatures in the Mekong basin could increase by up to 3.3 Degrees Celsius, and the total annual precipitation could decrease by up to 16%.[25] As a result, the food and economic security of villagers living along the river will be severely undermined. Patricia Mische (1989) observed, “The danger arises not from what Nature can do to the human, but rather the impact of human activities on Nature and, in return, the consequent effects on the human.[26]” While riparian states are unable to reverse the environmental effects, IWMs act as a bulwark against aggravating the dire situation.
The Centrepiece of IWMs
The effective implementation of IWMs is underpinned by effective agenda-setting. States prioritise resources to address specific transboundary challenges and outline roadmaps for long-term solutions. The basis for these blueprints would be IWAs, as their inherent limitations are likely to be a source of contention. Thus, riparian states are compelled to collaborate on sustainable, long-lasting strategies to uphold the peace and security of the river basin. On this note, IWAs remain omnirelevant.
Reshaping Regional Geopolitics
Even so, IWMs are truly effective when all riparian states work towards a shared vision. As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Myanmar are not members of the MRC, they are only required to share hydro-meteorological data.[27] This increases their propensity to take unilateral action because they are not obliged to manage the river’s resources collectively. This limitation is significant, given the PRC’s location at the head of the Mekong. It wields unparalleled influence over the region’s water supply.[28]
IWMs are truly effective when all riparian states work towards a shared vision.
Due to climate change and rapid industrialisation, the PRC has channelled a lion’s share of the Mekong’s water resources for irrigation and electricity generation using Hydroelectric Power (HEP) dams.[29] This has compromised the quantity and quality of water downstream. Notably, the reduction in output from the Jinghong HEP dam in 2021 led to a significant drop in water levels in Thailand. Sandbars were exposed, turning the meandering river into a braided channel.[30]
Sandbars exposed in the Mekong River [31]On the other hand, the unseasonal release of water has increased the risk of flooding downstream [32]. Some politicians attributed Thailand’s heavy flooding in 2022 to the sudden release of stormwater upstream by the PRC, a claim that the PRC Embassy in Bangkok has denied.[33] These dubious claims could be considered as political scapegoating, given the country was reeling from one of its “worst floods in years”.[34] It is prudent to note that Tropical Storm Noru had inundated Thailand with unprecedented precipitation at around the same time, compelling the Thai authorities to release excess stormwater behind the HEP Dams urgently.[35]
Philip Hirsch (1988) notes that “the fascination of large dams has been further accentuated by their very scale […] as symbols of independence and national self-sufficiency.[36]” As HEP projects are considered a hallmark of economic progress, there is a vested political interest. Calling upon the PRC to impose a moratorium will be a Gordian Knot and may even be perceived as provocative. Nonetheless, the PRC has recognised the value of rapprochement and established the Mekong-Lancang Corporation (MLC) in 2016 as a “sub-regional cooperation mechanism for efficient water resource management.[37]” Unlike the MRC, the MLC adopts a top-down, state-led approach spearheaded primarily by the PRC. While there is a “breadth of vested interest” involved [38], the fundamental principles governing transboundary river projects benefit from being based on IWAs because they are time-tested, structured documents that govern the utilisation of water resources. Policymakers should strive to codify IWAs into IWM agreements to ensure no one’s interest is impinged upon by others.
ADR: Agreeing to Disagree Meaningfully
However, there are times when states do not even agree with IWM or IWA clauses. As such, commentators point to the ADR, where an independent third party mediates the dispute.[39] Among the different ADR mechanisms is adjudication. This involves referring a dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a legally binding decision based on international law.[40] This strategy was successfully employed during the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute between Hungary and Slovakia (then-Czechoslovakia).[41]
There are times when states do not even agree with IWM or IWA clauses.
Location of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrages [42]Despite agreeing to construct one HEP dam (known as a Barrage) each in their respective sections of the Danube River, Hungary unilaterally terminated the agreement in 1992 owing to widespread public opposition.[43] In contrast, Slovakia completed its HEP dam and sought to alter the river flow and improve navigational routes for ships. Consequently, Hungary perceived this as a violation of the Treaty of Trianon and the 1947 Treaty of Peace, which delineated the international borders between the two states.[44] Eventually, the dispute was brought before the ICJ in 1993, which ruled that Slovakia could not operationalise the HEP dam and Hungary had to pay half the construction costs the former incurred. The project’s future will also be decided by the ICJ.[45] Although no formal applications have been made to reopen the case, Hungary’s populist Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, seems inclined to address the elephant in the room amidst his country’s 2025 elections.[46] Thus, it is yet to be seen if the ADR will provide a satisfactory conclusion to this transboundary river conflict.
Although an ADR mechanism was adopted, Hungary’s arguments were fundamentally based on the alleged contravention of legal treaties.[47] This suggests that IWAs are still the moral standards that riparian states uphold. There will only be a basis for meaningful disputes when these sacrosanct rules are broken. Therefore, IWAs are indispensable in tempering conflict between riparian states in today’s rules-based global order.
Conclusion
Amidst the worsening environmental impacts of anthropogenic climate change, Patricia Mische (1989) astutely noted that ecological security “cannot be defined ideologically (or) resolved through conventional competition for power.[48]” As such, policymakers should practice realpolitik and strive to resolve transboundary river conflicts via IWAs, IWMs and ADR mechanisms. While developing their conflict resolution strategies, it is essential to ensure that IWAs form the backdrop for any capacity-building measures or disagreements. After all, IWAs serve as political signals for enhanced collaborations through IWMs. On the flipside, disobedience brings states to the negotiating table via ADRs. Amidst the unravelling of the rules-based global order and climate change, IWAs bring states in disequilibrium (tensions) to equilibrium (mutually acceptable resolutions).
Chow Xin Jie Nathan graduated with Distinction from Nanyang Junior College and the National University of Singapore Higher 3 (NUS H3) Programme, Geopolitics: Geographies of War & Peace. Offered to outstanding Pre-university history and geography students, the NUS H3 Programme provides greater academic depth and rigour of a first-year university module. His research interests include the South China Sea territorial dispute and the US-China Power Rivalry. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of Nanyang Junior College and the National University of Singapore.
[1] Patricia M. Mische, “Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualise Sovereignty,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 1989, 390.
[2] Daza-Clark, “Resolving Water Conflicts: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Applicable to International Water Resources,” peacerep.org, April 02, 2022, https://peacerep.org/publication/dispute-settlement-mechanisms-applicable-to-international-transboundary-water-resources/.
[3] Global Water Partnership, “International Water Law,” waterknowledgehub.org, June 09, 2025, https://waterknowledgehub.org/node/54/revisions.
[4] Maya Manna, “Water and the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan,” Roger Williams University, January 04, 2006, https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=cmpd_working_papers.
[5] AFP, “Israel signs deal to double water supply to Jordan,” France 24, October 12, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211012-israel-signs-deal-to-double-water-supply-to-jordan-1.
[6] United Nations, “Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” peacemaker.un.org, October 26, 1994, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/il20jo941026peacetreatyisraeljordan.pdf.
[7] Stuart Elden, “The Birth of Territory,” The University of Chicago Press, 2013, 35.
[8] Zachary Zeliff, “Water Politics in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Path Forward?,” Syracuse University, 2015, https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1860&context=honors_capstone.
[9] Mike Smith, “50 years after Six-Day War, Israeli-Palestinian divide widens,” photograph, Dawn, June 01, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1336606.
[10] Eyal Weizman, “Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation,” Verso Books, 2007, 117.
[11] Eyal Hareuveni, “Parched: Israel’s policy of water deprivation in the West Bank,” reliefweb.int, August 12, 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/parched-israels-policy-water-deprivation-west-bank-enarhe.
[12] André Gunder Frank, “The ‘Development of Underdevelopment,” New England Free Press, 1966.
[13] Marta Parigi and Hamid R. Oskorouchi, “The Effects of Israeli Policies on Palestinians’ Basic Needs in the Occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem,” IZA Discussion Papers, No. 17176, Institute of Labor Economics, 2024, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/302693/1/dp17176.pdf.
[14] Olivia Rosane, “Climate crisis is speeding the water cycle, satellite data reveals,” World Economic Forum, May 09, 2022, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2022/05/climate-crisis-is-speeding-the-water-cycle-satellite-data-reveals/.
[15] Michael E. Mann, “Potential effects of global warming,” photograph, Britannica, September 13, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/science/global-warming/Potential-effects-of-global-warming.
[16] Climate Diplomacy, “Jordan and Israel: Tensions and Water Cooperation in the Middle-East,” climate-diplomacy.org, n.d., https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/jordan-and-israel-tensions-and-water-cooperation-middle-east.
[17] United Nations, “The SDGs in Action,” www.undp.org, n.d., https://www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals.
[18] United Nations, “Sustainability,” www.un.org, n.d., https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/sustainability.
[19] United Nations Development Programme, “Climate Change Adaptation and Integrated Water Resources Management,” unepdhi.org, 2007, https://unepdhi.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/05/Cap-Net-CCA-and-IWRM-December-2018.pdf.
[20] Mekong River Commission, “Vision and Mission,” mrcmekong.org, n.d., https://www.mrcmekong.org/vision-and-mission/.
[21] Mekong River Commission, “1995 Mekong Agreement and Procedures,” www.mrcmekong.org, August 2024, https://www.mrcmekong.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/MRC-1995-Agreement-n-procedures.pdf.
[22] United Nations, “The 17 Goals,” sdgs.un.org, n.d., https://sdgs.un.org/.
[23] Mekong River Commission, “MRC Supports Constructive Cooperation Between Myanmar and Thailand Over Kok River Water Quality Through Joint Monitoring Effort,” www.mrcmekong.org, May 23, 2025, https://www.mrcmekong.org/media-releases/pr-05272025.
[24] Mekong River Commission, “AHA Centre, MRC partner to enhance disaster monitoring and response in ASEAN,” www.mrcmekong.org, May 22, 2024, https://www.mrcmekong.org/media-releases/aha-centre-mrc-partner-to-enhance-disaster-monitoring-and-response-in-asean/2024/.
[25] Mekong River Commission, “Climate Change,” www.mrcmekong.org, n.d., https://www.mrcmekong.org/climate-change/.
[26] Patricia M. Mische, “Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualize Sovereignty,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 1989, 392.
[27] Mekong River Commission, “Dialogue Partners,” www.mrcmekong.org, n.d., https://www.mrcmekong.org/dialogue-partners/.
[28] Park Yiu, “China dams make ‘upstream superpower’ presence felt in Asia,” Nikkei Asia, July 24, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/asia-s-age-of-hydropolitics/china-dams-make-upstream-superpower-presence-felt-in-asia.
[29] Nathaniel Matthews and Stew Motta, “China’s Influence on Hydropower Development in the Lancang River and Lower Mekong River Basin,” State of Knowledge, July 2013, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a32ed915d622c0005f5/China-influence_Eng.pdf.
[30] Deena Robinson, “Mekong River Group Claims Water Levels Have Dropped Downstream Despite China’s Promise,” earth.org, August 20, 2021, https://earth.org/mekong-river-group-claims-water-levels-have-dropped-downstream-despite-chinas-promise/.
[31] Sarun Keithmaleesatti, et. al, “Impact of Water Fluctuation from a Dam on the Mekong River on the Hatching Success of Two Sandbar-Nesting Birds: A Case Study from Bueng Kan Province, Thailand,” photograph, Research Gate, May 2022, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360980240_Impact_of_water_fluctuation_from_a_dam_on_the_Mekong_River_on_the_hatching_success_of_two_sandbar-nesting_birds_a_case_study_from_Bueng_Kan_Province_Thailand.
[32] Roseanne Gerin, “Water release from Chinese dam causes Mekong River to rise downstream,” Radio Free Asia, April 21, 2022, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/jinghong-dam-04212022174123.html.
[33] Meredith Chen, “China says Mekong dam did not discharge water downstream amid heavy flooding in Thailand,” South China Morning Post, August 28, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3276291/china-says-mekong-dam-did-not-discharge-water-downstream-amid-heavy-flooding-thailand.
[34] Patpicha Tankasempipat, “Worst Thai Flood in Years Damage Crops, Risk Tourist Revival,” Bloomberg, October 04, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-04/worst-thai-flood-in-years-damage-crops-risk-tourism-recovery.
[35] B. Triubune, “Noru leaves huge flood impacts behind as it dissipates,” Bangkok Tribune, October 01, 2022, https://bkktribune.com/noru-leaves-huge-flood-impacts-behind-as-it-dissipates/.
[36] Philip Hirsch, “Dammed or damned? Hydropower versus people’s power,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, July 05, 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14672715.1988.10404428.
[37] Mekong Institute, “Regional Cooperation Mechanism on Priority Areas under the Mekong Lancang Cooperation Framework,” mekonginstitute.org, December 16, 2019, https://mekonginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/4.Study_on__Regional_Cooperation_Mechanism_on_Priority_Area_apr2020.pdf.
[38] Megan M. Ferry, “To Dam Or Not To Dam: An Insight Into The Environmental Politics Of Rivers,” Research Gate, April 2008, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/388286459_To_Dam_Or_Not_To_Dam_An_Insight_Into_The_Environmental_Politics_Of_Rivers.
[39] Kariuki Muigua, “Managing Transboundary Natural Resource Disputes through Alternative Dispute Resolution,” kmco.co.ke, n.d., https://kmco.co.ke/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Managing-Transboundary-Natural-Resource-Disputes-through-Alternative-Dispute-Resolution.pdf.
[40] Richard Bilder, “Adjudication: International Arbitral Tribunals and Courts,” Institute of Peace Press, 1997, 155-190.
[41] International Court of Justice, “Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),” www.icj-cij.org, n.d., https://www.icj-cij.org/case/92.
[42] Rayhanul Islam, “The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, Hungary v. Slovakia (1997),” photograph, lawhelpbd, September 20, 2016, https://lawhelpbd.com/international-law/gabcikovo-nagymaros-project-case-hungary-v-slovakia-1997/#google_vignette.
[43] Nico Schrijver and Vid Prislan, “Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case (Hungary/Slovakia),” Oxford Public International Law, April 2008, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e135?d=%2F10.1093%2Flaw%3Aepil%2F9780199231690%2Flaw-9780199231690-e135&p=emailAyeegzUnqi.VY&print.
[44] Greg Englefield, “The International Boundary Between Hungary And Slovakia: The Nagymaros-Gabcikovo Dispute,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, July 1993, https://www.durham.ac.uk/media/durham-university/research-/research-centres/ibru-centre-for-borders-research/maps-and-databases/publications-database/boundary-amp-security-bulletins/bsb1-2_englefield.pdf.
[45] Stephen Deets, “Solving The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Conflict,” Wilson Centre, July 07, 2011, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/171-solving-the-gabcikovo-nagymaros-dam-conflict.
[46] Miroslava Sirotnikova and Edit Inotai, “Hungary and Slovakia look ready to end the Danube Dam dispute: Why now?,” Balkan Insight, July 21, 2025, https://balkaninsight.com/2025/07/21/hungary-and-slovakia-look-ready-to-end-the-danube-dam-dispute-why-now/.
[47] Nico Schrijver and Vid Prislan, “Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case (Hungary/Slovakia),” Oxford Public International Law, April 2008, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e135?p=emailAKgywRh5Z4O.E&d=/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e135&print#:~:text=While%20recognizing%20the%20serious%20problems,a%20duty%20to%20mitigate%20da.
[48] Patricia M. Mische, “Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualise Sovereignty,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 1989, 393.
