Abstract: The military confrontation between India and Pakistan that took place in May 2025 has demonstrated that in South Asian, the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in active combat roles has become a reality. This growing utility of UAVs stems from their cost-effectiveness, precision, flexibility, and the reduced risk associated with their unmanned nature. In terms of active combat, both India and Pakistan have so far restricted the use of UAVs to tactical systems. However, New Delhi’s shortage of fighter squadrons makes it increasingly probable that India may employ larger Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) systems, which could also lead Pakistan to follow suit. Nevertheless, the use of drones in South Asia for active combat tasks may be dangerously escalatory due to the nuclearised nature of this theatre, the absence of doctrinal clarity concerning the employment of UAVs, and both states’ asymmetric strategic compulsions.
Problem statement: How is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in active combat becoming more likely in South Asia, and what distinctive features could characterise drone warfare between India and Pakistan?
So what?: To mitigate the escalatory risks associated with the use of UAVs, both Pakistan and India need to introduce transparency and predictability in their use of UAVs. This can be pursued by establishing doctrinal clarity regarding the use of UAVs, as well as by implementing confidence-building measures that can reduce misperceptions and pave the way for mutual restraint.
UAVs in Combat: The South Asian Debut
In recent years, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have emerged as a prominent platform employed by militaries, both in active conventional combat, as well as for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) purposes.[1], [2] In the South Asian context, however, while drones have been used for ISR tasks, they have not been used in active combat. This changed with the recent India-Pakistan military confrontation in May 2025, where drones were used in strike roles.[3] Essentially limited to loitering munitions for saturating enemy defences, the debut of combat drones in South Asia raises questions about the future of drone warfare in the region. The concern is significant since India and Pakistan are two nuclear-armed, territorially contiguous arch-rival states. This configuration renders escalation pathways volatile; thereby compressing the dynamics of conflict escalation. Currently, both India and Pakistan operate some of the world’s most advanced military UAVs, including the MQ-9 Reaper (operated by India) and the Bayraktar TB2 and CAIG Wing Loong II drones (operated by Pakistan).
In recent years, UAVs have emerged as a prominent platform employed by militaries.
India’s Drone Warfare Capabilities
New Delhi’s current UAV inventory includes loitering munitions, armed drones, surveillance platforms, and swarm systems. At present, India operates around 50 Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) drones, including the Israeli-origin Heron and Searcher-II, primarily designed for ISR missions.[4] These drones are reportedly deployed along the Line of Control and the Line of Actual Control to provide real-time situational awareness regarding force deployments. New Delhi’s combat-centric UAVs primarily include the Israeli-origin Harop and Sky Striker, as well as the indigenously produced ALS-50 drones.[5] These are loitering munitions designed for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) missions. Furthermore, in the future, New Delhi’s prospective acquisition of MQ-9B Predator drones, particularly the Sea Guardian variant, will also mark a significant leap in India’s strike capabilities, maritime domain awareness, and its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.[6]
In addition to this, New Delhi is also prioritising advancements in indigenous drone manufacturing. Two key areas of technological development in this regard are India’s pursuit of Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) and swarm drone technology. However, these projects—notably the Ghatak Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle project, and the Naval Abhimanyu Drone project are hampered by bureaucratic delays, driving speculation about their timely deployment.[7]
Furthermore, while New Delhi has long prioritised the development of a robust unmanned aerial fleet, the May 2025 military confrontation has noticeably intensified its focus on this front, as evident from New Delhi’s recent debates on procuring more UAVs.[8], [9]
Pakistan’s Drone Warfare Capabilities
Pakistan also possesses sophisticated and diverse UAV capabilities, fielding both imported and indigenously-produced UAVs. During the recent May 2025 confrontation, Pakistan reportedly employed the Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB-2 and SONGAR drones.[10] Pakistan’s employment of drones was allegedly aimed at testing the robustness of India’s air defence systems.[11]
Pakistan reportedly employed the Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB-2 and SONGAR drones.
Imported UAVs in Pakistan’s drone fleet mainly include Chinese and Turkish UAVs.[12] The Chinese-origin Wing Loong II and CH-4 drones are MALE systems, which can carry over 300 kg of munitions and conduct ISR missions. Similarly, the Bayraktar TB2 drones are combat-hardened and used for reconnaissance and precision strikes. Türkiye’s Asisguard Songar is an armed quadcopter with swarming capabilities, suited for tactical, close-range missions. With regards to indigenously produced drones, Pakistan possesses Shahpar drones, which are also primarily used for reconnaissance and precision strike missions. In addition to this, Pakistan is reportedly also scheduled to acquire further drones to expand Pakistan’s fleet.[13]
Future of Drone Warfare in South Asia
While the recent India-Pakistan confrontation has clearly demonstrated that UAVs are emerging as a key system for warfare, both militaries have restricted the use of UAVs to tactical drones, despite possessing larger MALE drones. While this may indicate that there is little appetite among the two South Asian rivals to employ MALE systems for warfighting, however, this proposition is complicated by the Indian military’s shortage of fighter jets and squadrons, which has only worsened following the 2025 confrontation.[14] Hence, in a future conflict, the Indian military could draw on plugging this gap by introducing MALE drones. Therefore, in the future, there is a strong probability that in South Asia, UAVs may not just emerge as auxiliaries but as force multipliers—acting as a strategic bridge for India to extend its operational presence, to bolster its lethality, whilst mitigating risks to human assets. This may also prompt Pakistan to employ its fleet of larger drones in response.
However, it is pertinent to note that the employment of drones in the South Asian theatre can be exceedingly escalatory as compared to other regional theatres. This concern mainly results from the nuclearised nature of this theatre, coupled with the absence of doctrinal clarity regarding the employment of UAVs, as well as India and Pakistan’s asymmetric strategic compulsions.
To begin with, the escalatory dynamics of South Asia differ significantly from those of other theatres. India and Pakistan are not merely conventionally armed adversaries; rather, they are two nuclear-armed rivals. Hence, in case of any drone strike taking place on or around any sensitive or strategic installation, it may easily be interpreted as a deliberate provocation, leading to conflict escalation.
Secondly, UAVs tend to provide asymmetric incentives, particularly to India by offsetting its fighter jet shortages, and to Pakistan by allowing it to offset India’s conventional superiority. While India already faces a debilitating shortage of fighter aircraft, the crisis is all the more exacerbated by the fact that New Delhi faces a two-front war, i.e. vis-à-vis Pakistan as well as Pakistan. Therefore, rather than serving tactical purposes, there is an increased propensity that UAVs may also substitute for conventional forces. Hence, in South Asian, UAVs have the potential to very quickly compress escalation timelines.
Furthermore, as of now, neither India nor Pakistan has formally integrated the modalities of drone warfare into their operational and doctrinal frameworks. This may leave UAVs’ employment largely ad hoc. Hence, in the absence of established procedures or doctrinal guidance, it remains highly difficult to ascertain or predict the operational creativity that the two states may bring to bear, both in terms of ISR roles and striking or sabotage roles. The uncertainty only further complicates strategic calculations, thereby enhancing the risks of miscalculation and crisis escalation.
Neither India nor Pakistan has formally integrated the modalities of drone warfare into their operational and doctrinal frameworks.
Another feature of UAVs is that the maximisation of UAVs’ utility depends on the ‘creativity’ of their employment, as evident in the use of drones in recent conflicts. This implies that beyond their technical specifications, UAVs’ operational effectiveness is also a function of how imaginatively and effectively these systems are employed. Most prominently, Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb is a case in point, demonstrating how UAVs, as small and inexpensive as quadcopters, can be adapted for missions once thought possible only with advanced strike aircraft.[15] Operation Spiderweb entailed the Ukrainian forces’ use of commercial quadcopters (platforms reportedly costing no more than a few hundred dollars) to sabotage Russia’s strategic bombers, which cost hundreds of millions. Hence, demonstrating that UAVs—if used creatively—can potentially deliver massive damage, while expending minimal resources. This may lead to UAVs emerging as an attractive tool for militaries for offsetting conventional disadvantages or asymmetries. In addition, the operation also highlighted the highly escalatory risks associated with the use of UAVs.
Likewise, in the South Asian theatre, in any future conflict, the UAVs’ ability to offer a combination of low-cost accessibility with high-stakes consequences may afford them a distinctive role in shaping escalation dynamics. Furthermore, by lowering the threshold for the use of force, UAVs also embolden risk-taking, thereby complicating the dynamics of escalation. Additionally, in the long run, the potential rise of UAVs from auxiliary systems to central pillars of military strategy will inevitably alter the nature of force structures in both states, not only transforming traditional notions of deterrence but also necessitating doctrinal rethinking and operational planning.
In the South Asian theatre, in any future conflict, the UAVs’ ability to offer a combination of low-cost accessibility with high-stakes consequences may afford them a distinctive role in shaping escalation dynamics.
Conclusion
The rapidly growing centrality of UAVs in the South Asian theatre is evident. However, as a technologically-transformative force, UAVs also possess the potential to usher in far-reaching strategic consequences. While they are very attractive systems for both India and Pakistan, their employment may carry the potential of risk-taking in a nuclearised environment. Therefore, unless both states acknowledge the escalatory potential of drones and move toward building doctrinal clarity regarding the modalities of their employment, alongside carving out restraint mechanisms and confidence-building measures, UAVs could transform from force multipliers into catalysts of crisis. Hence, the future of drone warfare in the South Asian theatre hinges as much on politico-strategic choices as on technological imperatives. Thus, keeping in view the highly escalatory potential of UAVs, both India and Pakistan not only need to acknowledge the escalatory potential of drones but also exercise restraint and move toward doctrinal clarity about the employment of drones. Furthermore, mutual restraint and confidence-building measures, as well as the use of UAVs, remain imperative for preventing UAVs from becoming a catalyst for escalation. Therefore, in conclusion, the future of drone warfare in South Asia hinges as much on politico-strategic choices governing the use of UAVs as it does on technological developments.
Maryam Raashed is a research associate at the Strategic Vision Institute in Islamabad. Her research interests include South Asian geostrategic and military-technological developments. She has published on several national and international platforms, including The Diplomat, Global Defence Insight, and Strafasia. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the Strategic Vision Institute.
[1] Jack Detsch, “The U.S. Army Goes to School on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Foreign Policy, March 30, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/30/army-pentagon-nagorno-karabakh-drones/.
[2] Ibrahim Naber, “Why Ukraine Remains the World’s Most Innovative War Machine,” Politico, August 27, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/08/27/ukraine-drones-war-russia-00514712.
[3] Zohaib Altaf and Nimra Javed, “India and Pakistan’s Development of Drones: Implications for Strategic Stability,” Stimson Centre, October 03, 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/india-and-pakistans-development-of-drones-implications-for-strategic-stability/.
[4] Rajat Pandit, “Army gearing up to induct more heavy-duty drones,” Times of India, February .2, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/army-gearing-up-to-induct-more-heavy-duty-drones/articleshow/117847274.cms.
[5] Bala Chauhan, “Desi drones cleared pilot test under Operation Sindoor,” The New Indian Express, May 18, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/explainers/2025/May/17/desi-drones-cleared-pilot-test-under-operation-sindoor#:~:text=India’s%20use%20of%20drones%20%E2%80%93%20Harop,22%20to%20FY%202023%2D24.
[6] Usman Haider, “The MQ-9B Sea Guardian and the revolution in anti-submarine warfare,” The Wavell Room, November 03, 2023, https://wavellroom.com/2023/11/03/the-mq-9b-sea-guardian-and-the-revolution-in-anti-submarine-warfare/.
[7] “Ghatak UCAV: Delayed Sanction and its Implication for Indian Airforce,” Indian Defence Research Wing, June 24, 2025, https://idrw.org/ghatak-ucav-delayed-sanction-and-its-implications-for-the-indian-air-force/.
[8] “Defence Industry Gives Nod to Rs 30,000 crore UAV drone deal: Two firms to share contract; local production, export in focus,” Times of India, August 12, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/defence-ministry-gives-nod-to-rs-30000-crore-uav-drone-deal-two-firms-to-share-contract-local-production-exports-in-focus/articleshow/123228494.cms.
[9] Sarita Chaganti Singh and Shivam Patel, “India plans $230 million drone incentive after Pakistan conflict, sources say,” Reuters, July 04, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-plans-230-million-drone-incentive-after-pakistan-conflict-sources-say-2025-07-04/.
[10] Marcus Andreopoulos, “Turkey and Drone Warfare in the Pakistan-India Conflict,” The Geopolitics, ”https://thegeopolitics.com/turkey-and-drone-warfare-in-the-pakistan-india-conflict/.
[11] “Pakistan used 300-400 Turkish drones to attempt infiltration, tried to target India’s military installations on May 8-9: MEA,” The Economic Times, May 09, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-used-300-to-400-drones-to-attempt-infiltration-tried-to-target-military-installations-on-may-8-9-mea/articleshow/121030911.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
[12] Maryam Raashed, “Comprehending India’s Acquisition of MQ-9B drones,” Global Defense Insight, February 19, 2025, https://defensetalks.com/comprehending-indias-acquisition-of-the-mq-9b-drones/.
[13] Jitendra Bahadur Singh, “Chinese killer drones, launchers: Pakistan ramps up arms shopping with China, Turkey,” Business Today, May 26, 2025, https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/chinese-killer-drones-launchers-pakistan-ramps-up-arms-shopping-with-china-turkey-477753-2025-05-26.
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[15] Katjo Bego, “Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web is a game-changer for modern drone warfare. NATO should pay attention,” Chatham House, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/ukraines-operation-spiders-web-game-changer-modern-drone-warfare-nato-should-pay-attention.
