Abstract: Ever since the war in Iran erupted early in 2026, much of the world’s attention has been fixated on the Middle East. North Korea is no exception. It will likely be closely monitoring the conflict to extract lessons on regime survival, deterrence, and how to survive a multi-front war involving the United States. While the Iran case is not directly analogous to the Korean Peninsula, it nonetheless offers a set of strategic signals that will shape internal debates within the North Korean leadership. This conflict may reinforce North Korea’s existing policy trajectory rather than prompting a fundamental strategic shift.
Problem statement: What lessons is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea likely to draw for its deterrence, diplomacy, and strategic positioning?
So what?: Policymakers should expect greater rigidity in Pyongyang’s nuclear stance and adjust toward risk reduction and deterrence management rather than denuclearisation-first approaches. Any future diplomatic efforts aimed at Pyongyang by Washington will have to be grounded in the recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear state, with negotiations focused on consistency, trust-building, reciprocal action, and arms control.
The Primacy of Nuclear Weapons
Four weeks into the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, the most consequential lessons may be drawn not in Washington or Tel Aviv, but in Pyongyang. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) military strategists are likely studying the conflict closely, assessing what it reveals about the evolving character of war, the reliability of alliances, and the risks to regime survival under external pressure. While the situation is not directly analogous to the Korean Peninsula, the conflict nonetheless sends signals that will shape internal debates within the DPRK leadership about deterrence, diplomacy, and long-term strategic positioning.
The DPRK and Iran have been allies since 1973, with relations deepening over the decades due to military cooperation, a shared quest to develop nuclear weapons, a shared enemy (the U.S.), and global isolation due to sanctions.[1] The DPRK had been following the situation in Iran before the conflict broke out. Given its own history of diplomacy with Washington, Pyongyang will have monitored the pre-conflict negotiation period closely, reading for signals about Trump’s approach to talks.
The DPRK and Iran have been allies since 1973, with relations deepening over the decades due to military cooperation, a shared quest to develop nuclear weapons, a shared enemy, and global isolation due to sanctions.
That Iran was struck while negotiations remained active will have registered as a serious warning in the DPRK, reinforcing the regime’s scepticism of engaging with the U.S.[2] As the war unfolded, Pyongyang would also have closely studied Iran’s response to U.S.-Israeli air dominance, given its own similar vulnerabilities vis-à-vis US-ROK superior air and conventional military power.[3]
The clearest conclusion that the conflict is likely to reinforce is the centrality of nuclear weapons to regime survival. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the fact that Iran—lacking a nuclear deterrent—was subjected to preemptive U.S. military strikes and ongoing decapitation operations will deepen the regime’s long-standing belief that nuclear capability is the ultimate guarantee against external intervention.[4] This interpretation is consistent with the DPRK’s codified nuclear doctrine and repeated leadership statements framing nuclear weapons as irreversible and essential.[5] Rather than introducing a new lesson, the conflict is likely to narrow further the already limited space for any future denuclearisation discussions.
The conflict also highlights the costs of prolonged economic isolation. If sanctions had been lifted sooner, allowing for a better integration of Iran in the international community, the current conflict may have been avoided. While Iran has shown its resilience in the conflict despite years of sanctions, fighting a prolonged war under extreme economic pressure will be difficult to endure. For the DPRK, which faces similarly heavy sanctions, this reinforces a dual calculation. On one hand, sanctions relief remains important for long-term economic stability and international standing.[6] On the other hand, nuclear weapons are still seen as essential to regime survival.[7]
These two priorities are not interchangeable. The DPRK is unlikely to view denuclearisation as an acceptable price for sanctions relief. Instead, the Iran case may sharpen the perceived value of relief as a goal in its own right—separate from any nuclear concessions—and underscore the costs of continuing without it. While the DPRK has long adhered to its state ideology of Juche—centred on self-reliance—Kim Jong Un likely recognises that the only way to achieve long-term economic security is through economic engagement with the outside world.[8] In this sense, the conflict does not move North Korea closer to disarmament, but may strengthen its interest in limited economic engagement that preserves its nuclear deterrent.
Strategic and Operational Lessons
The war may also deepen the DPRK’s scepticism toward the reliability of its strategic partners. Witnessing the exfiltration of Venezuela’s Maduro and then the neutralisation of the late Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran as a result of swift, preemptive U.S. actions will likely reinforce Pyongyang’s Juche approach to its security. The DPRK has a formal mutual defence treaty with the PRC and a treaty with mutual assistance provisions that may amount to a defence commitment, but the scope and enforceability of this commitment with Russia remain unclear.[9] However, the extent to which both would come to the DPRK’s aid in the event of a conflict is questionable, especially if other strategic theatres demand their immediate attention (e.g. Taiwan for the PRC or Ukraine for Russia).
The DPRK has a formal mutual defence treaty with the PRC and a treaty with mutual assistance provisions that may amount to a defence commitment, but the scope and enforceability of this commitment with Russia remain unclear.
The conduct of the conflict itself also offers operational lessons for the DPRK. Iran’s response has included forms of horizontal escalation, targeting U.S. military assets and regional energy infrastructure rather than attempting to directly match U.S. and Israeli conventional superiority.[10] This approach raises conflict costs while preserving a degree of escalation management. For the DPRK, which faces a comparably asymmetric balance of power against the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK), particularly in air power, the model carries relevant lessons. Pyongyang’s missile forces, including systems capable of targeting U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan, offer a framework for applying a similar strategy in a regional contingency.[11]
Relatedly, the extensive use of drones in the conflict will likely reinforce existing priorities in Pyongyang. Iran’s deployment of unmanned systems to strike dispersed targets and saturate air defences reflects a broader shift toward lower-cost, scalable capabilities that can offset conventional disadvantages.[12] The DPRK has already signalled its intent to expand in this domain, pledging to develop its unmanned warfare capabilities and deepening cooperation with Russia toward that end.[13] The Iran conflict provides a live validation of this approach—one that is unlikely to go unnoticed and may accelerate the DPRK’s investment in drone warfare as a core asymmetric instrument.
The war may also result in ruptures in U.S. alliances in the region, a development the DPRK may seek to exploit. While U.S. defence treaties with the ROK and Japan[14] do not legally require either Seoul or Tokyo to militarily assist the U.S. in its ongoing military operations against Iran, Trump has made his expectations clear, and the reluctance to help will not go unnoticed.[15] With Trump’s handling of the relationship with South Korea already straining the alliance since his return to office,[16] the DPRK may use the deepening rift in ties to ramp up military provocations on the peninsula and place increasing pressure on ROK deterrence capabilities.[17]
Finally, the apparent targeting of Iran’s senior leadership underscores the vulnerability of highly centralised political systems to decapitation strategies. For the DPRK, where authority is concentrated in the Kim family and institutional autonomy remains limited, this risk is particularly acute.[18] The DPRK will be taking close note of Iran’s ability to maintain domestic control and war-fighting capability despite losing multiple key officials. If not already in place, Pyongyang will likely consider establishing its own “mosaic” style strategy for dealing with potential decapitation scenarios, especially after witnessing the crucial importance of such a strategy in Iran.[19]
Pyongyang’s Evolving Risk Calculus
The differences between Iran and the DPRK remain significant, most notably Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons and the unique strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula. The presence of U.S. treaty allies, the proximity of the PRC, and the risk of rapid escalation all contribute to a deterrence dynamic that differs fundamentally from the Middle Eastern context. These factors continue to reduce the likelihood of a direct military campaign against the DPRK in the near future.
Even so, the Iran war is likely to shape how Pyongyang interprets both risk and opportunity in its external environment. Most importantly, the conflict will reaffirm Pyongyang’s perceived need to maintain its nuclear arsenal, as Iran may not have been targeted if it had successfully completed its nuclear program sooner. As the conflict continues, the DPRK will assess not only military tactics and operational outcomes but also the durability of the Iranian state, the trajectory of escalation, and the terms of any eventual de-escalation.
The conflict will reaffirm Pyongyang’s perceived need to maintain its nuclear arsenal, as Iran may not have been targeted if it had successfully completed its nuclear program sooner.
The conclusions drawn are unlikely to produce a sharp shift in policy. Rather, they will reinforce existing tendencies: a continued emphasis on nuclear deterrence, persistent caution toward diplomatic engagement with the U.S., and a pragmatic, if limited, interest in diversifying the regime’s external relationships. The only non-military way out of the deadlock with the DPRK remains the resumption of diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang. Since Kim Jong Un has made any such talks conditioned on the U.S. acceptance of the DPRK as a nuclear state,[20] however, Washington would have to shift its strategy for dealing with the DPRK away from denuclearisation toward one centred around gradual reciprocal actions, reinforced by consistent communication and trust-building. With Trump distracted in the Middle East, however, such a shift in strategy toward the DPRK is unlikely to come anytime soon.
[1] 38 North, “The North Korea–Iran Relationship: An Anti-American Alliance or Transactional Partnership?,” November 24, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/11/the-north-korea-iran-relationship-an-anti-american-alliance-or-transactional-partnership/.
[2] NK News, “What the Iran War Reveals about the Dangers Facing Kim Jong Un,” March 16, 2026, https://www.nknews.org/pro/what-the-iran-war-reveals-about-the-dangers-facing-kim-jong-un/.
[3] Lowy Institute, “Why North Korea Is Modernising Its Conventional Arsenal,” December 12, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-north-korea-modernising-its-conventional-arsenal; NK News, “US Troops Hold Air Defense Drills on Countering North Korean Threats,” March 18, 2026, https://www.nknews.org/2026/03/us-troops-hold-air-defense-drills-on-countering-north-korean-threats/.
[4] Al Jazeera, “Iran Confirms Security Chief Larijani, Basij Commander Soleimani Killed,” March 17, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/17/israel-says-it-has-killed-ali-larijani-irans-top-security-official; The Washington Post, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Killed in U.S.-Israeli Attack; Tehran Strikes Israel, Arab States,” March 1, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/02/28/israel-strikes-iran-live-updates/.
[5] Reuters, “North Korea Says Its Nuclear Weapons State Is Irreversible,” September 15, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-says-its-nuclear-weapons-state-is-irreversible-2025-09-14/.
[6] Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), “Converting Maximum Pressure to Maximum Leverage: The Role of Sanctions Relief in Negotiations with North Korea,” May 2020, https://keia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/kei_aps_wertz_190409_final.pdf.
[7] Reuters, “Kim Jong Un Says North Korea’s Nuclear Status Is Irreversible, Threatens South,” March 24, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-pushes-new-five-year-economic-plan-nuclear-deterrent-parliament-2026-03-23/.
[8] 38 North, “Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Juche and Foreign Trade,” February 16, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/02/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-juche-and-foreign-trade/.
[9] Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), “China and North Korea: A New Peak of Comradeship,” December 17, 2021, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/china-and-north-korea-new-peak-comradeship-32716; Reuters, “Putin Signs into Law Mutual Defence Treaty with North Korea,” November 10, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-signs-mutual-defence-treaty-with-north-korea-2024-11-09/.
[10] Foreign Affairs, “Why Escalation Favors Iran,” March 9, 2026, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/why-escalation-favors-iran.
[11] 38 North, “Eight Lessons for North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Forces from the Ongoing Iran Conflict,” March 16, 2026, https://www.38north.org/2026/03/eight-lessons-for-north-koreas-nuclear-and-missile-forces-from-the-ongoing-iran-conflict/.
[12] CSIS, “Unpacking Iran’s Drone Campaign in the Gulf: Early Lessons for Future Drone Warfare,” March 10, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-irans-drone-campaign-gulf-early-lessons-future-drone-warfare.
[13] NK News, “Russia Training North Korean Drone Pilots near Wonsan Resort, Capital: Kyiv,” July 2, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/russia-training-north-korean-drone-pilots-near-wonsan-resort-capital-kyiv/; Al Jazeera, “Kim Jong Un Declares AI Military Drone Development a ‘Top Priority’,” September 19, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/19/kim-jong-un-declares-ai-military-drone-development-a-top-priority.
[14] United States Forces Korea (USFK), “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea,” October 1, 1953, https://www.usfk.mil/portals/105/documents/sofa/h_mutual%20defense%20treaty_1953.pdf; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.
[15] The Chosun, “Trump Pressures South Korea on Hormuz, Citing Security Umbrella,” March 19, 2026, https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/03/18/RQWPCJW2KFDR5E7PAAW4BNA2GM/.
[16] The Japan Times, “South Korea Is Learning the Hard Truth about U.S. Promises,” March 2026; Peninsula Dispatch, “How the Iran Conflict Is Testing an Already Strained US-ROK Alliance,” March 25, 2026, https://www.peninsuladispatch.com/p/how-the-iran-conflict-is-testing.
[17] NK News, “South Korea Prepared to Deter North, Even If US Moves Defense Systems: Lee,” March 10, 2026, https://www.nknews.org/2026/03/south-korea-prepared-to-deter-north-even-if-us-moves-defense-systems-lee-says/.
[18] Peninsula Dispatch, “North Korea’s Succession Question: The Future of the Kim Dynasty,” March 16, 2026, https://www.peninsuladispatch.com/p/north-koreas-succession-question.
[19] The Soufan Center, “Iran’s ‘Mosaic Defense’ Strategy: Decentralization as Resilience Factor,” March 9, 2026, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-march-9a/.
[20] NK News, “Kim Jong Un Leaves Door Open to Talks If US Accepts North Korea’s Nuclear Status,” February 26, 2026, https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/kim-jong-un-leaves-door-open-to-talks-if-us-accepts-north-koreas-nuclear-status/.
