Abstract: This paper illustrates the evolution of third-party intermediaries from crisis ad-hoc responders to credible systemic actors, i.e. diplomatic surrogates. The main argument is that surrogate diplomacy signifies a transition from state-centric international relations towards networked international relations, having more effective and systematic means of resolving disputes than traditional diplomacy in multipolar conditions. Surrogate diplomacy’s capabilities of plausible deniability, asymmetric engagement, contextual modularity and distance make it a viable means of conducting diplomacy in the modern world. In the contemporary context, these characteristics position the surrogate of diplomatic activity at the centre of adaptive diplomacy, enabling it to manage relations in an increasingly complex, multi-polar world. The central argument of this paper is that surrogate diplomacy represents a shift away from state-centric diplomacy and toward networked diplomacy, as presented through the creation and analysis of the Adaptive Surrogate Diplomacy Framework (ASDF), which includes a five-stage Maturity Model of Surrogate Diplomacy as a component.

Problem statement: How can surrogate diplomacy effectively complement or substitute formal diplomatic processes to overcome entrenched hostilities and political stalemates?

So what?: The proposed framework uses diplomatic entrepreneurial initiatives as a verification tool, establishing alternative negotiation spaces separate from established processes that still have significance. States and international organisations should engage in institutionalised support of informal diplomatic forms of work, such as informal diplomacy. They should develop strong systems that legitimise the outcomes of informal diplomacy efforts and incorporate these outcomes into formal peace processes, thereby enhancing diplomatic resilience in contexts where established processes repeatedly fail.

Introduction

An array of unprecedented crises is challenging established diplomatic approaches, and current crises are breaking down traditional state-to-state negotiation processes.[1] The world has reached a point at which some states are unable to conduct traditional international negotiations. This incapacity to negotiate has triggered the development and institutionalisation of surrogate diplomacy, or the act of delivering a message or mediating differences by proxy through a trusted third party, while continuing negotiations (or to settle disputes) despite parties being incapable of talking to each other or, worse yet, unwilling to speak to each other.

The world has reached a point at which some states are unable to conduct traditional international negotiations.

Surrogate diplomacy represents a departure from traditional modes of bilateral diplomacy, transitioning to a networked set of multilayered international relations that reflect the characteristics of multipolar systems. Surrogate diplomacy is not only mediation; it operates through “strategic indirection”: intermediaries act as negotiators while maintaining plausible deniability. Surrogate diplomacy influences the management of multi-level interdependencies, even in frozen conflicts, with unique attributes including expected deniability, asymmetric access, and a modular context, introducing the Adaptive Surrogate Diplomacy Framework as one of the main original academic contributions by the author in this paper.

Historical Evolution and Theoretical Foundations

Origins and Development

Surrogate diplomacy has a well-documented history, and it has only recently emerged formally in the literature as a separate entity. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is often cited as the founding moment of modern diplomacy’s state-centric view. However, even within the confines of a state-directed process, the process of indirect negotiation existed wherever direct diplomatic processes were inadequate or when political processes precluded direct official action. For example, informal intermediaries were extensively utilised during the Congress of Vienna in 1815, while the Holy Alliance’s early mediation processes can be seen as an early example of ideological surrogacy.

The 20th century saw significant evolution in surrogate mechanisms, particularly during the Cold War’s Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), which reflects the limitations of direct diplomacy. The event had an evolving potential in this period for surrogate mechanisms where numerous actors (journalists, academics, and diplomats from third countries) developed indirect yet influential communication channels.[2] However, these were still mostly ad hoc.

The post-Cold War period has reflected a qualitative turn toward institutionalised surrogacy, for example, the Oslo Accords of 1993.[3] In the 1990s, the Oslo Channel represented secret, informal communications organised by educational organisations and NGOs between negotiators from the Israeli side and negotiators from the Palestinian side.[4] This informal channel provided a neutral space for less formal discussions, free from pressure, where trustworthy relationships could be built and political impasses could be addressed. This institutional surrogate for official diplomacy led to the historic Oslo Accords, illustrating how non-state actors can effectively advance or supplement official diplomatic initiatives when few options are available.[5] It also highlights how academic institutions and NGOs can create ‘safe spaces’ for dialogue that may not have been requested or explored through official channels.[6] Similarly, the establishment of precedents for humanitarian surrogacy from former prisoners in the Carter Centre’s programmes for the eradication of diseases in conflict zones pointed to approaches that would inform broader applications of surrogate diplomacy.[7]

This informal channel provided a neutral space for less formal discussions, free from pressure, where trustworthy relationships could be built and political impasses could be addressed.

Theoretical Foundations

Surrogate diplomacy traps different assumptions about international relations theory. For realists, surrogate mechanisms were conceptually difficult to accommodate. However, as neo-realists have demonstrated (as shown in Stephen Krasner’s work on ‘organised hypocrisy’), states accept a range of such surrogate arrangements because they allow governments to maintain official positions while engaging in pragmatic, unofficial accommodation.[8] Within this framework of surrogate diplomacy, the focus is on liberal institutionalism and constructivism, as these are the most relevant approaches. Both highlight how the networked attributes and normative influence of surrogate diplomacy create unique pathways for conflict resolution.

Liberal institutionalist theory provides a stronger theoretical basis for surrogate diplomacy than realism. Robert Keohane’s “complex interdependence” framework also anticipated the multi-actor, multilayered environment underwriting surrogate diplomacy.[9] Keohane emphasises the number of channels through which states communicate with each other and the decreasing role of force as diplomatic power, matching exactly how surrogate diplomacy operates, through networks rather than through state-to-state power projection.

Constructivist international relations theory reinforces the theoretical basis of surrogate diplomacy. Scholars who emphasise identity and normative transformation illuminate the ability of surrogate diplomacy to reconceptualise conflicts and create new discursive spaces for resolution.[10] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s landmark analysis of “norm entrepreneurs” demonstrates how non-states transform normative discourses that set the parameters for international behaviour,[11] an essential and effective mechanism of surrogate diplomacy. Surrogates don’t just create channels of communication; they make it their business to transform how disputing parties think about their disputes.

Together, these theoretical perspectives highlight some of the structural benefits of surrogate diplomacy, also differentiating it from traditional intermediaries. Surrogate diplomacy operates through institutional networks, rather than power hierarchies; it can utilise normative influencers to redefine and reshape conflict narratives; and it can tap into multiple channels for engagement, beyond those traditional bilateral engagements offer. This theoretical foundation establishes surrogate diplomacy not as a tactical improvisation, but as a systemic response to operationalising a complex political environment. Given its pivoting from other theoretical perspectives, such as realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches, it has a more established and extensive literature. Although this critical theory perspectives are underdeveloped due to being an evolving concept in it’s nascent stages, in addition to the current traditional diplomatic channels posing interdisciplinary challenges, they are still helpful for contemplating surrogate diplomacy and its capacity to disrupt hegemonic structures, observed by the critiques of traditional diplomacy, imperialism, or global governance, under critical theory’s application to other areas of international relations or diplomacy. Surrogate diplomacy has the potential to level the playing field between smaller states and non-state actors, enabling them to exert influence in the disputes or shifts of the most powerful countries, thereby redistributing agency in the international environment.[12]

Network Theory and Diplomatic Innovation

Recent research in network theory offers the richest theoretical perspective for understanding surrogate diplomacy. Emilie Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander Montgomery’s articulation of network structures in international relations argues that diplomatic networks may compensate for the limitations of third-party states in engaging directly with other states.[13] Their notion of “network effects” defines how surrogate actors can produce disproportionate effects relative to their capacity through their positionality in diplomatic networks.

Emilie Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander Montgomery’s articulation of network structures in international relations argues that diplomatic networks may compensate for the limitations of third-party states in engaging directly with other states.

Diplomatic entrepreneurship entities comprise non-state actors, typically including NGOs, scholars, and business executives, who innovate and pursue informal diplomatic opportunities that often exist outside of normal institutional or diplomatic channels.[14] Diplomatic entrepreneurship is important because it adds a necessary verification mechanism for the significance of surrogate diplomacy and eventually contributes to articulated measures of output, such as collaborative and significant agreements or de-escalating conflict, which provide verification of the workings of these informal channels. The entrepreneurs and diplomats act as credible witnesses and third-party spatial and temporal documents of how surrogate diplomacy works in place of formal negotiations.[15] They also demonstrate the strategic importance of successful surrogate diplomacy in situations where formal processes are ineffective.[16] Jan Melissen’s work on diplomatic innovation illustrates how non-state actors and other non-traditional actors, like multinational corporations and religious organisations, are essential dimensions of diplomacy today.[17]

The Adaptive Surrogate Diplomacy Framework

Conceptual Architecture

In this paper, the author proposes the Adaptive Surrogate Diplomacy Framework (ASDF), a systematic analytical tool for understanding how surrogate diplomacy operates along multiple dimensions. ASDF is developed as an original analytical tool to propose the integration of the Maturity Model hierarchy as its dynamic progression mechanism, with three justified dimensions selected for their explanatory power. The three key dimensions that the ASDF bring together are the structural mechanisms, operational modalities, and adaptive protocols.

ASDF is developed as an original analytical tool to propose the integration of the Maturity Model hierarchy as its dynamic progression mechanism, with three justified dimensions selected for their explanatory power.

Structural Mechanisms include the institutional arrangements for surrogate involvement. These include formal organisations (e.g., international organisations and regional organisations), semi-formal networks (e.g., Track II processes or academic consortia), and informal avenues (e.g., business relations, cultural relations, and personal connections). The ASDF recognises that to be effective, surrogate diplomacy will often occur simultaneously across multiple structural levels.[18]

Operational Modalities capture how surrogate actors enact diplomatic functions. The ASDF presents five discrete modalities: 1) message posting, which references the act of sending positions between the disputants; 2) facilitative dialogue, which references creating space for discussion; 3) mediation, which references proposing solutions; 4) monitoring, which references overseeing the implementation of an agreement; and 5) signalling, which references delegating the intent of the surrogate actor through actions. Each modality will require different types of surrogate actors, and each modality provides various benefits and risks.[19]

Adaptive Protocols describe how surrogate diplomatic arrangements evolve as situations change. This includes surrogate selection, defining the mandate, establishing accountability, and outlining the process for exit. Adaptive and flexible protocols that benefit political actors must be incorporated into surrogate diplomacy to capitalise on shifting political landscapes and emerging opportunities.

The Maturity Model: From Crisis Response to Systemic Architecture

The ASDF incorporates the following Maturity Model to show how surrogate diplomacy evolves; progression between stages is determined by increasing institutionalisation, actor coordination, and predictive capacity. The ASDF uses a five-stage maturity model that shows the progression of surrogate diplomacy from a spontaneous crisis management response to a systematically integrated form of proactive crisis management:

Stage 1: Crisis Surrogacy Ad-Hoc is the reactionary deployment of any available representatives during specific crises. There is no systematic planning, and the reaction is solely based on the availability of prior relationships and chance. An example of spontaneous crisis surrogacy: In 1978, when Argentina and Chile were on the edge of war over the Beagle Channel, the intervention of Pope John Paul II showed the power of surrogate diplomacy. Both military regimes faced incredible domestic pressure: retreat would be political suicide, while war would be a disastrous escapade filled with risk. The Pope offered helpful “strategic indirection”, i.e. he allowed for both parties to invoke mediation set forth by the church, whilst benefitting from the Pope’s moral authority that neither side looked weak in front of their respective national populations. This type of spontaneous diplomatic surrogacy prevented bloodshed while allowing both nations to retain dignity. It demonstrated how a trusted intermediary can facilitate finding solutions that benefit both parties when traditional bilateral diplomacy is absent.[20]

Stage 2: Institutionalised Neutrality Surrogacy develops specialised institutions or routinely employs neutral states to fill a mediation role. Norway’s role in the Middle East peace process is a good example. The Norwegian government has established units purposely for the Middle East, exercising neutrality for mediation purposes, along with protocols for privately facilitating crisis mediation.[21] India’s “Vaccine Maitri” (‘Maitri’ in Hindi means ‘Friendship’) employed a silent form of diplomacy, circumventing US-China vaccine geopolitics by offering an impartial pathway to developing countries. While the preeminent states vied for hegemony through vaccine distribution, India used its vast manufacturing capability and independence to create a gainful environment for health cooperation for the world, never requiring itself to challenge either superpower overtly.[22], [23] Likewise, Switzerland’s “good offices” facilitate U.S.-Iran prisoner exchanges and humanitarian corridors, providing a safe venue for negotiations between adversaries. For example, Switzerland has protected U.S. interests in Tehran since 1979. In this regard, Switzerland provides valuable diplomatic cover for the superpower to negotiate and signal plausible deniability.[24] So, in these examples, i.e. India’s vaccine diplomacy and Switzerland’s humanitarian facilitation,[25] both provide examples of newly institutionalised neutrality surrogate diplomacy. Both countries leverage their own credibility as neutral states, creating global opportunities for cooperation when the major powers are constrained politically, and demonstrating the importance of neutral states as interveners in addressing transnational challenges.

Stage 3: Hybrid Multi-Actor Surrogacy occurs when public, private, and civil society actors work within their respective roles in a coordinated manner. The Colombian peace process, where Norway was the facilitator at the highest level of state, while the Carter Centre, Catholic Church, and other academic institutions provided converging but distinct surrogate functions, is one such example.[26] This stage accepts the multidimensionality of the knowledge and legitimacy required from various actors involved in the conflict.

Stage 4: Predictive Algorithmic Surrogacy involves the integration of artificial intelligence and big data analytics, enabling the identification of potential surrogate opportunities and the prediction of conflict development trajectories. The UN Global Pulse initiative is an early attempt at this type of activity, by analysing social media and economic conditions to reflexively shape preventative diplomatic responses.[27] At this stage, surrogate roles could be proactively assigned rather than reactively.

Stage 5: Systemic Network Surrogacy represents the permanent establishment of surrogate processes within the framework of international governance. Surrogacy becomes a normal, institutionalised process with accompanying systems and protocols, certifications, and formalised methods for coordination and communication in networks to identify and operationalise surrogate approaches rapidly. No complete system has yet exhibited Stage 5 surrogacy. Still, there are nascent elements in addressing consensus questions within ASEAN and aspects of the African Union’s methodologies for continent-level early warning processes.[28]

Empirical Analysis: Surrogate Diplomacy Across Conflict Parameters

The following cases are selected to represent major conflict domains (territorial, ideological, resource, cyber) and demonstrate different ASDF components in practice; each illustrates how surrogate diplomacy operates across diverse contexts.

Territorial and Sovereignty Disputes

Territorial and Sovereignty Disputes are conflicts over physical boundaries, land control, or legal jurisdiction between states, often involving competing claims to the same territory based on historical, ethnic, or strategic grounds.

The Ethiopia-Tigray conflict (2020-2022) exemplifies the limitations of surrogate diplomacy in managing a territorial dispute. Much of the principal attention came from humanitarian aid, but the African Union (AU), under the leadership of former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, helped to create a space for dialogue.[29] The AU had several strengths, as it was considered a legitimate African institution, had established good relationships with both sides to find solutions, and framed the dispute in terms of stability for the continent, rather than a territorial matter.

The Ethiopia-Tigray conflict exemplifies the limitations of surrogate diplomacy in managing a territorial dispute.

With these strengths in mind, Obasonjo’s mediation is a critical time to demonstrate new methods, engaging in talks with military and political leaders separately but together, taking initial steps to build confidence by opening humanitarian corridors before a political process, and exploring other ways for both sides to save face. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in November 2022 was not a direct government-to-government negotiation, but AU surrogate diplomacy allowed both parties to include important symbolic and practical elements for both sides.[30]

The Black Sea grain initiative, in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, represents another form of proxy warfare in a territorial dispute. Instead of simply assuming the role of a neutral mediator, Turkey created a functional arrangement which both addressed certain humanitarian needs and avoided having to resolve the territorial questions at the heart of the dispute.[31] The Turkish method demonstrated how surrogate actors geographically separate distinct issues within larger conflicts (in this case, silos for grain) to agree upon cooperative means of working together, even while pursuing fundamentally different visions.

Ideological and Cultural Conflicts

Ideological and cultural conflicts are disputes rooted in fundamental differences over political systems, religious beliefs, values, or cultural identities that resist compromise because they involve core aspects of group identity and worldview. Ideological conflicts pose distinct challenges for surrogate diplomacy, as they involve fundamental identity issues and are unlikely to yield mutually acceptable compromises. Despite this, surrogate mechanisms can reshape ideological conflicts into more manageable matters and foster opportunities for gradual dismantling.

The Iran-U.S. prisoner exchange negotiations represent a sophisticated ideological conflict surrogate; Oman’s repeated, and ultimately successful, efforts to mediate the exchange of prisoners since each nation’s separation in 1980 are an example of how patient, relationship-based surrogate efforts may yield tangible results even amid hostility.[32] The Omani successes were achieved through consistently engaging with various U.S. administrations; uncoupling issues of prisoners from nuclear negotiations; and building trust through small gestures of goodwill.

Switzerland’s “protecting power” arrangements offer institutional mechanisms for sustainable, prolonged surrogate engagement in ideological conflicts. The Swiss representation of U.S. national interests in Iran since 1980 has provided permanent mechanisms for bilateral communication in Iran, which can be authorised and activated without in-depth negotiations during times of crisis.[33] Institutional continuity appears to be justifiably crucial for managing ideological conflicts; domestic political context often compounds or precludes direct engagement.

Resource and Economic Conflicts

Surrogate diplomacy is well-suited for resource conflicts because it involves technical expertise. There are opportunities for win-win options due to better management of the resource. Related to this is the consequence of issues like climate change and population growth. Surrogate diplomacy provides a nuanced understanding of the issue and addresses it in a flexible and innovative manner. Surrogate diplomacy involves multiple actors and open and adaptive dialogue, making it efficient for tackling multifaceted resource conflict. This distinction is important because traditional diplomacy does not entail these skills nor flexibility.

Surrogate diplomacy is well-suited for resource conflicts because it involves technical expertise.

The Nile Basin Initiative is a classic example of surrogate diplomacy in water resource conflicts. The World Bank’s facilitative role enabled technical discussions to continue, even as tensions among the states in the north and south remained high.[34] The Bank’s strategy of collecting and sharing data, engaging each party in modelling together, and building confidence incrementally created the momentum for cooperation.

Nonetheless, the collapse of consensus around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam reflects the limits of surrogate diplomacy when an essential national interest is perceived to be threatened. Ethiopia’s disengagement from World Bank mediation and subsequent attempts to negotiate directly with Egypt are examples of how surrogate diplomacy can become all the more entangled in a larger conflict, as compared to the traditional model.[35]

The Arctic Council, as a showcase of surrogacy use between competing territorial claims, is a more successful example of resource conflict surrogacy. By developing cooperative sovereignty through technical cooperation in areas such as environmental monitoring and maritime safety, the Council was better equipped to establish functional mechanisms of cooperation, fostering practical interdependencies while avoiding direct confrontations over territorial claims.[36]

Cyber and Hybrid Conflicts

New avenues of conflict open new opportunities and challenges for surrogate diplomacy. Cyber-based conflicts further complicate diplomatic notions surrounding sovereignty and attribution, and novel surrogate means will likely present themselves to fill the resulting voids.

New avenues of conflict open new opportunities and challenges for surrogate diplomacy.

In 2007, when Russian hackers incapacitated Estonia, the country transformed vulnerability into institutional authority. It developed resilient regulatory systems, trained cyber-security experts from around the world, and engaged in successful advocacy to be awarded NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn.[37] Today, Estonia continues to play a neutral role for NATO States in facilitating dialogue and cooperating in cyberspace, while also serving as an informal conduit for superpower relationships and digital security for Western interests.[38] This process exemplifies how technical skills can shape surrogate authority and serve as power through gravitas, rather than just capabilities based on traditional military or economic capital.

While private sector surrogacy in the context of cyber conflicts is a particularly new development, Microsoft’s proposals to enact a Digital Geneva Convention and engage in diplomacy with relevant states to realise this goal set a precedent for how multinational corporations can act as surrogates in the development of international cyber norms. In state-based formal diplomacy and decision-making processes, possessing technical expertise and traversing borders are significant attributes in facilitating discussions and advancing the development of cyber norms and protocols, which are often impossible when using formal political and state-based processes, because they are slow, rigid, limited by national interests, lack technical expertise, and exclude essential non-state actors needed for effective resolution.[39]

This analysis presents patterns that demonstrate the efficacy of surrogate diplomacy, which are replicated when three conditions are met viz. suitable surrogate selection, trust, expertise, and neutrality; clear mandate definition, balancing flexibility with accountability; and protracted engagement, with an emphasis on establishing relationships over place-holding, figurative third party, rather than one that could actually offer a concrete solution. These conditions prevail in cases of territorial disputes, ideological disputes, resource competition, and emerging domains such as cybersecurity and climate governance.

Current Debates and Limitations

Legitimacy and Accountability Questions

Surrogate diplomacy faces ongoing dilemmas of democratic legitimacy and accountability. Critics argue that surrogate arrangements can hinder democratic oversight, which justifies the need for a fixed, stable ideology to ensure compliance. The world is left with democracies as the beacon for resolving conflicts; hence, surrogate diplomacy must adhere to that singular ideology. Also, they transport negotiations to informal spaces dominated by unelected actors.[40] This critique is especially salient when surrogate actors pursue activities that diverge from the government’s articulated positions, or when private actors engage in surrogate diplomatic activity to influence public policy.  Importantly, trust and effectiveness, rather than democratic credentials, often determine the viability of surrogates. In contrast, democratic oversight is desirable where applicable; authoritarian or non-democratic actors can also function as trusted surrogates when perceived as neutral or competent.

Critics argue that surrogate arrangements can hinder democratic oversight, which justifies the need for a fixed, stable ideology to ensure compliance.

The accountability deficit is more pronounced in surrogacy in Stage 4 and Stage 5, where algorithmic decision-making and the network effects of non-thoughtful digital activity can obfuscate responsibility for their outcomes. Recent scholarship on algorithmic governance raises concerns about transparency and democratic control in automated diplomatic spaces.[41]

Defenders of surrogate diplomacy contend that this activity is more likely to promote rather than inhibit democratic values by generating opportunities for dialogue that elected officials may otherwise be unable to pursue per their electoral politics. The Northern Ireland peace process is an example of how surrogate arrangements can ultimately lead to the democratic ratification of agreements that were previously impossible to negotiate through normal political processes in real time.[42]

Effectiveness and Measurement Challenges

Evaluating the effectiveness of surrogate diplomacy poses serious methodological dilemmas. Traditional metrics of success for diplomatic activity, such as formal agreements and treaties, may not accurately reflect the significant, long-term contributions to managing or preventing conflict that surrogate diplomacy has achieved.[43]

Surrogate mediation, representation, or facilitation will likely produce actionable outcomes, prompt reductions in physical harm, and improve channels of communication, all of which can increase trust that, although not easily codified, may ultimately be paramount to the long-term settlement of conflict. The issue becomes more complicated when surrogate action fails to achieve its objectives in preventing the escalation of conflict, leading us to question whether alternative action could have been successful.

Surrogate mediation, representation, or facilitation will likely produce actionable outcomes, prompt reductions in physical harm, and improve channels of communication.

New efforts to develop nuanced measurement frameworks are encouraging. In 2018, the University of Edinburgh created The Peace Agreements Database project as part of the Political Settlements Research Program to support academics, policymakers, and mediators in understanding peace agreements and conflict resolution. This was partially motivated by the failure to represent informal agreements and process outcomes, which could have led policy practitioners to develop improved approaches to better account for surrogate intervention in complex diplomatic processes.[44] Additionally, network analysis enables policymakers to create a methodology that provides a more accurate measurement of the influence of surrogate actors on the diplomatic process.

Cultural and Normative Challenges

The effectiveness of surrogate diplomacy varies significantly depending on particular cultural contexts, suggesting that it is not universally applicable and is more closely tied to specific cultural practices than to broad regional categories. For example, in societies that are more formalistic and rely on institutional processes (such as Germany’s consensus-building mechanisms), surrogate arrangements may require a different set of legitimacy structures than in societies that prioritise interpersonal relations (such as the guanxi relationship in China).[45] However, successful surrogate diplomacy often does not make those distinctions, as evidenced by Norway’s success in mediation across various cultural contexts in the Middle East.[46]

The notion of “face” within East Asian diplomatic cultures presents particular hurdles for surrogate situations, as fulfilling diplomatic needs through indirect engagement may be viewed as disrespectful or as manipulation. Undertaking effective surrogate diplomacy requires careful consideration of protocols, as well as frequent collaboration with surrogate actors who are culturally appropriate for the situation.[47]

Religious and ideological diversity among surrogate actor options is another layer of complexity to consider. Religious organisations often provide unique moral authority and transnational networks. Still, they may further exacerbate existing sectarian tensions or appear to endorse specific violence or outcomes relative to particular interpretations of the situations.[48]

Technological Disruption and Future Challenges

Digital technologies and artificial intelligence present both opportunities and challenges for surrogate diplomacy, although their practical application has been largely theoretical, with few existing examples. Advocates maintain that analysing economic data and leveraging social media with AI will refine early warning systems and assessments of interventions.[49] However, there aren’t any known cases that feature the systematic application of such technology in the context of surrogate diplomacy. Most AI that we observe in practice is disconnected from diplomatic activities and limited to applications such as translation and scheduling rather than strategic analysis.

There aren’t any known cases that feature the systematic application of such technology in the context of surrogate diplomacy.

The idea that surrogate arrangements are privacy-driven depends on the context. Several productive surrogate diplomatic activities are conducted transparently, such as mediating on behalf of the Middle East by Norway, protecting power arrangements in Switzerland, and intervening for peacemaking purposes by the Vatican. These are apparent surrogate diplomatic activities.[50] Some issues that involve sensitive communications through back-channel negotiation may require confidentiality.

In terms of surveillance concerns, there is some evidence of increased awareness of digital issues, following the 2013 Snowden disclosures.[51] However, there is limited evidence of actual changes in diplomatic practice. There are a few anecdotal stories suggesting that some diplomatic actors may be increasingly interested in face-to-face meetings; however, systematic research documenting changes in surrogate diplomatic practice related to surveillance concerns has not been conducted.

Observers, practitioners, supporters, proposers, and proponents need to study the connection between technological capabilities and the effectiveness of diplomatic (state) actors, rather than concluding a causal relationship. Future research should investigate whether and how surveillance technologies alter the nature of different surrogate arrangements, examining both theoretical concerns and actual operational impacts.[52]

Another challenge facing surrogate actors involves the development of digital manipulation technologies that affect surrogate credibility. Communication that is either authentic or artificial may begin to coalesce in such a way that surrogate actors may have to create different verification mechanisms and trust-building protocols.[53]

Future Trajectories and Emerging Applications

This section bridges the ASDF analysis into developing areas where surrogate diplomacy has not been fully legitimised but is ripe for future development. It is based on the last two future-facing stages (4 & 5) of the maturity model. It identifies three crucial emerging areas of climate diplomacy, digital governance, and economic security, where surrogate mechanisms are being applied but require further theorising and policymaking. The context of these arenas is important for examining how surrogate diplomacy can adapt to the new challenges of shaping geopolitics and new technologies beyond current mechanisms.

Climate Diplomacy and Environmental Surrogacy

Climate change is producing far-reaching expectations for international cooperation that disrupt more conventional diplomatic approaches, as the scale and urgency of expected responses extend beyond what formal intergovernmental processes can deliver, producing openings for innovative surrogate styles of climate diplomacy. City networks and subnational governments can serve as surrogates for climate diplomacy, facilitating climate action at the local level when national governments are unable or unwilling to implement international commitments.[54] C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group is a clear example of how urban governments can act as surrogates of national climate commitments and build momentum towards national-level policy changes.

City networks and subnational governments can serve as surrogates for climate diplomacy, facilitating climate action at the local level when national governments are unable or unwilling to implement international commitments.

Corporate climate leadership is also another form of environmental surrogate. The Science-Based Targets initiative offers private sector actors an opportunity to make legally binding commitments that can either complement or supplement government action.[55] The new level of environmental commitment blurs the boundaries between public and private diplomacy, producing new forms of accountability.

Digital Governance and Cyber Surrogacy

The lack of global systems of international governance leads to opportunities for “surrogate actors” to forge paths of functional cooperation. Technical standard-setting organisations, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), increasingly function as de facto diplomatic entities, making jurisdictional and authoritative decisions that shape the architecture of the global digital commons.[56]

Multi-stakeholder governance examples, such as those generated by ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), serve as designs for surrogate diplomatic engines in digital spaces. These models enable governance processes that involve governments, private sector actors, civil society actors, and technical experts, without the hierarchical structures typically found in governance.[57]

Digital surrogacy also brings new uncertainties regarding sovereignty and democratic control. When private platform companies make content moderation decisions that affect the international flow of information, they are performing quasi-diplomatic functions without procedural accountability and without the constraints of the traditional diplomatic system.[58]

Digital surrogacy also brings new uncertainties regarding sovereignty and democratic control.

Economic Security and Trade Surrogacy

Rising economic nationalism, accompanied by trade conflicts, creates a demand for alternative mechanisms that can maintain commercial relationships amid political turbulence. Examples of such surrogates include business councils and trade associations, which function as relatively close surrogates of traditional diplomacy, maintaining economic corridors of cooperation when government-to-government relationships dissolve.[59]

Regional development banks and multilateral financial institutions increasingly function as economic diplomacy surrogates; for example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank maintain European members in spite of US conflict, which shows how new multilateral institutions can serve as surrogates for alternative economic relationships.[60] Cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies provide new forms of economic surrogacy that may circumvent traditional financial institutions and government controls. Their potential is still in the early stages, but even so, they may significantly alter the relationship between economic power and political power in international relations.[61]

These examples illustrate that surrogate diplomacy is more than a theoretical possibility; it is already a practically applied incognito mechanism across economic sectors. This analysis does not present a normative argument for the adoption of surrogate diplomacy. Still, rather it illustrates that observers have already begun to see surrogate diplomacy develop organically, indicating that it is accepted and greatly respected as a method of international relations.

Towards a New Diplomatic Architecture

This analysis demonstrates that surrogate diplomacy is more than a tactical response to new challenges; it represents a paradigmatic shift to a networked and multilayered approach to international relations, providing a means to overcome the structural constraints inherent in traditional state-to-state diplomacy. The ASDF proposed provides tools, both theoretically and practically, for understanding and realising surrogate mechanisms in a variety of conflict domains.

The maturity model analysis shows that surrogate diplomacy is maturing towards systematic integration into existing international governance structures. Currently, most examples of surrogate diplomacy are at Stages 2-3 (institutionalised neutrality, hybrid multi-actor approaches), but contemporary and emergent technologies, as well as governance challenges, will push the maturity of surrogate diplomacy to Stages 4-5 (predictive algorithmic-surrogacy and systemic network surrogacy). The maturation of this process will require careful consideration of the legitimacy, accountability, and cultural concerns raised in the discussions surrounding surrogate diplomacy.

The maturity model analysis shows that surrogate diplomacy is maturing towards systematic integration into existing international governance structures.

Future applications of surrogate diplomacy in climate diplomacy, digital governance, and economic security stand a potential to demonstrate the adaptability of the proposed framework in emerging and challenging domains. However, successfully navigating these examples will require further study, theorising, empirical analysis, and piloting new inquiries, as they will all involve a level of uncertainty and risk, requiring careful design of accountability mechanisms and adaptive protocols to ensure credibility of surrogate engagements. Future research programmes would greatly benefit from ongoing documentation of surrogate interventions over time, the development of more sophisticated measures of efficacy, and understanding the cultural and context-based factors that influence outcomes.

For practitioners, this analysis presents several key recommendations that directly stem from the ASDF framework and case study evidence. First, ensure that diverse surrogate networks are established in advance of potential crises, which may in part rely on structural mechanisms, where operational patterns across formal, semi-formal, and informal collaboration and implementation are informed (e.g., Oslo Channel,[62] AU in Tigray[63]).

For practitioners, this analysis presents several key recommendations that directly stem from the ASDF framework and case study evidence.

Second, agree upon the surrogate selection process, operational and sanctuary mandates, and accountability and oversight procedures, which relate to operational choice in cases where they were ambiguously defined. Where sanctions were clearly mandated by actors (e.g., Switzerland’s protecting power role), they provided needed legitimacy.

Third, keep your minds open, as changes to surrogacy agreements may emerge from adaptive protocols and advances in process maturity models. This demonstrates that engagement with changing environments is key for actors with or under surrogate association to be effective, e.g., UN Global Pulse.[64] Fourth, we should consider the cultural and normative phenomena that may be at play in sensemaking and the legitimacy of surrogation, as indicated by East Asian diplomacy’s concept of “losing face.” Additionally, religious authority should be taken into account, and if we misinterpret local cultural dynamics, we could completely delegitimise a surrogate. Finally, conceptualise surrogate interventions as part of a contemplative, other diplomatic scheme, not as a last resort utility, which is reflective of the case domain in this study (territorial, ideological, resource, cyber, and climate) that reveals systemic rather than exceptional instances of perspectives on surrogacy.[65]

Against the backdrop of fragmentation in the international system and the emergence of new challenge domains, surrogate diplomacy is not only useful but also necessary to safeguard global stability and cooperation. As traditional diplomatic institutions are often found to be unable to address complex, multi-actor conflicts, surrogate mechanisms can provide the means for sustained engagement, gradual trust-building, and creative problem-solving that may help avoid crises escalating into more lethal conflicts.

There’s no central repository (data) to compare quantitative evidence of surrogate diplomacy to traditionally inveterate state-to-state diplomacy. What this paper does show is a clear ‘qualitative trend’ toward increased use and acceptance of surrogate engagements and subsequent surrogate activities in an increasing number of arenas (territorial disputes, ideological, competition for economic or resource, cyber, and climate). Surrogate engagements include serving as a protecting power to broker ceasefires, hosting peace talks, diplomatically representing a diplomatically absent state, and facilitating peace talks on behalf of third-party states. By contrast, surrogate activities include proxy diplomatic missions, humanitarian organisations delivering aid in restricted development, and intelligence sharing or covert operations, which unwittingly bring about an indirect influence on the dynamics of the conflict. Recent examples like Oslo, AU in Tigray,  Black Sea Grain Initiative, C40 Cities, ICANN, AIIB, etc. show how surrogate mechanisms are growing. They reflect a shift in IR models from traditional state actors and power to flexible, expert, and non-state actors handling new challenges.

Recent examples like Oslo, AU in Tigray,  Black Sea Grain Initiative, C40 Cities, ICANN, AIIB, etc. show how surrogate mechanisms are growing.

Effectively utilising surrogate diplomacy will be a significant aspect of approaching 21st-century geopolitics in a more structured manner, as it transitions from its past ad-hoc usage to an institutionalised mainstay. It is likely to become an essential tool, rather than replace the traditional practice of diplomacy.

In conclusion, the evolution of surrogate diplomacy from a haphazard response to crises to a systematic manner of engagement with the international community represents one of the most innovative developments in diplomatic practice today, and the vocational development of regularised surrogate diplomacy will determine the extent to which the international community can effectively address unprecedented pressing challenges in a multipolar world that emerges from the increasing interconnectivity of global society.

Vipul Tamhane is a geoeconomic expert specialising in Counter Terrorism, Anti-Money Laundering, and combating the Financing of Terrorism. He holds an MBA in International Business from Symbiosis International University and an LLM in International Commercial Law from Northumbria University. His research interests are in the fields of Multilateral Defence, National Security, Counter-Terrorism, Geo-politics, Diplomacy, Financial Crime, Money Laundering, and Terrorism Financing. He works with financial institutions, regulatory agencies, and law enforcement to enhance financial crime risk management and compliance systems. Vipul serves as visiting faculty at Pune University’s Department of Defence and Strategic Studies and trains officers at premier police academies viz, CPR and MIA in India. His strategic commentary appears in global journals. He is a columnist at The South Asia Times, U.S. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.

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