Abstract: This article takes a unique approach, comprehensively analysing two distinct social groups involved in electoral processes. Specifically, it examines the influence of non-state armed groups in Timor-Leste and pressure shock groups in Mozambique. The lens on the two countries also includes a review of youth-related public policies enacted by the members of the national parliaments of both countries. It reveals how youth groups have influenced electoral processes; however, their influence has not impacted levels of participation in parliament matching young voter numbers. In this context, the urgent and crucial need for more youth representation in legislative bodies is emphasised. Moreover, it uncovers a significant and concerning disconnect between elected members of parliament and the public policies they approve for the youth. It also underscores the pressing need for further electoral law reform, emphasising the urgency and importance of enhancing youth participation in electoral processes.

Problem statement: How can we better understand violent youth political participation in electoral processes?

So what?: It is recommended to both countries’ political decision-makers that the two electoral systems move to an open-list proportional representation system (OLPR) to contribute to increased youth representation. Furthermore, the electoral reforms in Mozambique should include a youth quota, reflecting the social reality that women and the youth are the majority of the Mozambican population. These reforms, if implemented, could significantly improve youth political representation.

A Catch-All Activity

Political participation is multifaceted, with various definitions and interpretations over time. For instance, Whiteley argues that political participation is a catch-all activity conducted by one or more persons to take citizenry needs to public officials and policy-makers.[1] Casteltrione and Pieczka define political participation as actions that aim to shape government policies and individual political habits.[2] On the other hand, Kaim claims that political participation encompasses traditional, such as voting in elections, and non-traditional participation, such as engaging in protests.[3] These varying sketch accounts illustrate the difficulty of settling on a definition of political participation. Heeding the broad spectrum of the debate on public participation, political participation is summarised as the “behaviour to influence government policies or support government and politics” by Milbrath and Goel.[4] This account addresses actions such as youth political involvement. Recent studies about the political participation of youth, focusing on Timor-Leste and Mozambique, such as those by Scambary, TLAVA and Pawelz have analysed the origins and security implications of the Timorese martial arts groups, while Tsandzana studied youth political participation in the 2019 elections in Mozambique. Portatadino examined how Mozambican youth analysed political violence and why they joined the opposition parties’ youth leagues, which were the basis for the youth pressure shock groups.[5]

Definition of Youth

There is no consensual definition of youth. For example, Jones argues that youth is a socially constructed concept linked to social and economic changes.[6] In contrast, Bessant, Pickard and Watts note that Bourdieu states that youth is a differentiator between young and old age.[7] Galland further argues that youth is the ‘continuity’ between adolescence and adulthood.[8] These definitions were chosen to reflect the ongoing debate on the definitions of youth. However, youth can be broadly defined as a socially constructed term to reflect expected physical, behavioural and cultural attitudes from a specific group cohort. Often, age is used to reflect this particular group. For example, in the United Nations, youth ages vary between 18 and 24. In 2008, the Government of Mozambique adopted the African Union African Youth Charter, which defined youth as 15 to 35.  In contrast, Timor-Leste adopted the United Nations definition of youth as 15 to 24 years old, including young men and women, regardless of marital status.[9]

Comparative Study of Timor-Leste and Mozambique

Youth in Timor-Leste are the catalyst for change; for example, the youth who were murdered by the Indonesian forces in the Santa Cruz massacre (November 12, 1991) were pivotal in the restoration of democratic rule in Timor-Leste.[10] In contrast, the Mozambican youth was very passive about political issues until recently, when, for the first time in Mozambique’s democratic history, they actively protested against electoral fraud in the 2023 municipal elections.[11] However, both youths share some similarities, such as high unemployment and illiteracy rates. Nonetheless, research on both countries is scant, with some exceptions; Dal Poz[12] analysed the exploration of natural resources, while Madaleno[13] analysed mental issues in both countries. These justify my selection rationale for analysing youth participation, representation and policy in Timor-Leste and Mozambique.

Youth in Timor-Leste are the catalyst for change; for example, the youth who were murdered by the Indonesian forces in the Santa Cruz massacre (November 12, 1991) were pivotal in the restoration of democratic rule in Timor-Leste.

Additionally, Timor-Leste and Mozambique share a common history as Portuguese colonies. In the postcolonial periods, these countries became a stage of Cold War proxy wars for almost three decades. With the end of the Mozambican civil war in 1992 and the end of the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste in 1999, both countries adopted multi-party democratic governance systems. Both countries were considered a success story for United Nations intervention in the countries post-conflict period. However, some commentators would argue that both countries became low-intensity liberal democracies after the conflict. The notion of low intensity highlights that multiparty elections are the most important expression of political participation in these countries.[14]

Since establishing democratic regimes, both countries have held national and local elections as constitutionally stipulated. Timorese political parties continuously court the significant youth vote through martial arts groups (MAGs). Pressure shock groups, also known as PSGs, are often used by Mozambican political parties to intimidate rivals and influence the political process. However, despite these two groups’ role in mobilising votes and intimidating political opponents, both countries lack policies to increase youth political participation. In Mozambique, pressure shock groups are shrouded in secrecy, while in Timor-Leste, they are often banned.[15]

Overview of Youth Policies in Timor-Leste and Mozambique

The two countries have incorporated youth into their constitutions, key strategies and some programmatic documents. The Mozambican constitution encourages youth initiatives to consolidate national unity, reconstruction, defence, and development. Moreover, the state formulates the national youth policy to promote professional training and first employment.[16] Likewise, the Timor-Leste constitution encourages youth initiatives to consolidate national unity, reconstruction, defence, and development. It also promotes education, health, and professional training within its capacities.[17] The documents in this table note the fundamental laws, plans, strategies and institutions created to address youth issues in the two countries.

However, a closer examination of the national parliaments’ composition and the political parties’ policies to foster the roles assigned to the youth reveals a stark contrast between rhetoric and reality. The above-quoted policies approved by the members of the national parliaments in both countries do little to broaden youth political participation.

The Role of Martial Arts Groups in Timor-Leste Elections and Politics

Timor-Leste, a small Southeast Asian Island nation, has a population of 1.34 million, 65 per cent of whom are under 30. It is hailed as Southeast Asia’s most democratic country. A significant aspect of Timor-Leste’s political landscape is the role of martial arts groups, of which thousands of Timorese youths are members. The roots of these groups are deeply entwined with the Indonesian occupation, a period during which many MAG members were clandestine supporters of guerrilla fighters, developing links with revered leaders of the struggle for independence.

Youth Participation

After the restoration of independence, MAGs received significant attention during the 2006 crisis sparked by disputes within the armed forces. The crisis was initiated when officers from the western part of the country accused the army leadership of bias towards their colleagues from the eastern side. The involvement of MAGs further inflamed the crisis. These groups were drawn into the conflict, escalating violence and political tension.[19] The responses enacted to address martial arts violence in Timor-Leste have been characterised by a cycle of legalisation and criminalisation. In 2008, to recognise the importance of MAGs in Timor-Leste, the government established the Regulatory Commission of Martial Arts (CRAM). This semi-autonomous institution is responsible for guaranteeing regulation, dissemination, and supervision of martial arts practice under the tutelage of the ministry responsible for youth, sports, arts and culture. However, governments in 2013 and 2023 banned martial arts groups, overlooking the profound political influence of these groups. An example of the power these youth organisations wield is the electoral manifesto made by Francisco “Lú Olo” Guterres, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) presidential candidate for the 2022 elections, who pledged to regulate martial arts activity and fund the construction of training centres for martial arts groups. This move was a political promise reflecting these groups’ significant role in shaping the political landscape. Later, the FRETILIN government approved 2.5 million dollars to establish the martial arts development fund a few months before the 2023 parliamentary elections.[20]

Governments in 2013 and 2023 banned martial arts groups, overlooking the profound political influence of these groups.

The rise of the martial arts group KORKA’s political wing, KHUNTO, is an example of a martial arts group’s growing political clout. KHUNTO claimed five seats in the National Parliament elections of 2017 and 2023. In the 2022 presidential elections, Berta dos Santos, KHUNTO presidential candidate, placed third ahead of well-known political parties, including the Democratic Party, and liberation struggle leaders such as Lere Anan Timur. The rise of KHUNTO was demonstrated in its pivotal role in forming a new government following the constitutional crisis sparked by debates over the president’s legal powers. After withdrawing from the coalition government in 2017, KHUNTO aligned with the FRETILIN and the Popular Liberation Struggle Party (PLP) in 2018 to form a new coalition government. KHUNTO support was rewarded with thirteen ministerial positions out of forty-six, corresponding to 28 per cent of these roles. This is disproportionate for a party with the least parliamentary seats, compared to PLP eight and FRETILIN 23 in the 2018-2023 legislature. Moreover, while in power, KHUNTO contributed to legalising martial arts groups. This is a clear testament to the significant role of the MAGs in shaping the political landscape of Timor-Leste.

Following the KHUNTO experience, another MAG was active in the elections. For example, Cornelio Gama “L-7,” founder of the martial arts group Sagrada Familia, was instrumental in mobilising youth support for the PLP, which won 8 seats in the 2017 elections. Another party, the Greens Party, affiliated with the martial arts group 7-7, narrowly missed the threshold for the National Parliament in the 2022 elections. These instances indicate the MAG’s political relevance. They underscore the need for a more comprehensive understanding of the role of martial arts in Timorese elections.

The findings presented above beg the question of what reasons may explain martial arts youth participation in electoral campaigns. Elections in Timor-Leste celebrate their hard-won victory against Indonesia. However, it is relevant that the Government Decree 6/2015, with its approval of fixed-term contracts for the public sector, has significantly increased the recruitment of martial arts group members as national advisers and political staff. Furthermore, the following year, the government approved Decree-Law 27/2016, again investing discretionary powers to ministers to recruit at their will for their ministerial offices. This law has allowed for the overstaffing of party supporters, including martial arts group members. As evidence, there is a discernible pattern in Timor-Leste, where political parties utilise employment positions as a form of reward. This practice, known as patronage democracy, is marked by the state being the primary source of services and jobs and office-holders enjoying discretionary power to allocate them to voters. Politicians leverage the state machinery and allocate jobs and services to voters who contribute to their victory at the polls.[21] This is a significant aspect of Timor-Leste’s political landscape, particularly impacting the youth’s active involvement.

Youth Representation

While the age to vote and be elected to the National Parliament is 17 and the minimum electable age for the position of President is 35, it is important to note that the composition of the National Parliament is currently dominated by members born during or before the Indonesian occupation. The oldest member is 71, and the youngest member of parliament in the 2018 legislature was 31, highlighting the dominance of older members in the Parliament.

According to disaggregated data of the 2018-2023 legislature, out of 65 members of the National Parliament, there were only two parliament members under 35 (both female, one from KHUNTO and one from FRETILIN) and one aged 35 from the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (male from CRNT).

The figure below shows that youth representation was utterly absent in the 2023-2028 legislature, with no elected parliament member in the age bracket established by the Political Parties Law.

This underrepresentation should raise concerns about the need for more youth empowerment in the political sphere. The age composition of the Timor-Leste National Parliament runs contrary to the fact that the youth are the bulk of the Timorese society, and they often participate as electoral staff and political monitors in electoral processes.

Furthermore, electoral laws’ inconsistencies further aggravate this scenario. For example, the Political Parties Law defines youth as those between 17 and 35, while the Community Leaders Elections defines youth as those between 17 and 30.[24] These contradictions in the definition of ‘youth’ in electoral laws must be revised to ensure a more accurate and inclusive representation of the youth in the political sphere.

Opportunity for Electoral Reform

One way to improve youth representation in elected chambers is to reform the current electoral system of closed-list proportional representation system (CLPR), which allows only political parties or coalitions to field candidates and elect them according to their position in their party, with open-list proportional representation (OLPR). In contrast with OLPR, voters can vote for their preferred party and candidate in the party list combined. This OLPR proposal advocates for continuing women and youth quotas to prevent them from being hijacked by wealthy candidates and parties, thus hindering inclusiveness. This system should also enable independent candidates or independent candidates lists with an electoral active capacity to submit candidacies, ensuring a fair and just representation for all.[25]

This representation system has limitations, such as the frequent formation of coalition governments in Timor-Leste politics, as seen since the 2007 elections. This common trend can further weaken party institutionalisation, referring to how a political party is entrenched in society by its sample of behaviour, viewpoints or heritage.[26] Nevertheless, the OLRP can contribute to increased accountability and proximity between elected candidates and their constituencies because they would depend more on voter preferences rather than party machinery for their election. In the case of Timor-Leste, as in Mozambique, members of legislative bodies can lose their seats if they violate their parliamentary bench discipline, creating harmful consequences for consolidating democracy.[27]

Nevertheless, the OLRP can contribute to increased accountability and proximity between elected candidates and their constituencies because they would depend more on voter preferences rather than party machinery for their election.

Given the potential implications of the representation system, it is imperative to conduct a thorough analysis and consult with stakeholders, including a broad spectrum of youth organisations, regardless of their affiliation. This will provide a comprehensive understanding of the situation and ensure that all perspectives are considered, fostering a more inclusive and effective political environment.

Youth Policies

Besides these inconsistencies, only three policies that directly relate to youth have been approved since the restoration of independence on May 20, 2002: the National Youth Policy, the Youth National Action Plan, and the Integrated Approach to Youth Development. The FRETILIN coalition government approved the last two policies, which may reflect the growing importance of the youth vote.[28]

These policies are essential. However, they have never addressed the issue of promoting youth representation in elected bodies. Moreover, they were formulated and developed without consultation with the martial arts groups or other youth groups and need more support from research-based evidence. For instance, the CRAM mandate contributes to standardising martial arts activity. It has been instrumental in disbursing the 2.5 million dollars from the martial arts development fund for martial arts trainers’ capacity building and construction of training sites. Nevertheless, it was not explicitly recognised as an institutional partner in these policies.[29]

In the author’s view, this communication failure is a significant barrier to developing inclusive policies that address their needs and concerns. It underscores the urgent need for effective youth representation in policymaking, which must be completed on time.

The Role of Pressure Shock Groups in Mozambique Elections

Like the Timorese youth, the Mozambican youth are active participants in the electoral processes but remain underrepresented in the Mozambique legislative body, the National Assembly. However, in contrast, they are not organised in martial arts groups like Timor-Leste but in pressure shock groups. These pressure shock groups (PSGs) are youth members of political parties with parliamentary representation: the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the longest-ruling party which governed the country since independence from Portuguese rule in 1975; the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO); and the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM). Until now, the only information available on PSGs is from Mozambican newspapers.[30]

Youth Participation

The PSGs are active throughout the electoral cycle, exercising different tasks. Unlike in Timor-Leste, these PSGs do not herald a strong presence in Mozambique’s social fabric. The pressure shock groups in the electoral context aim to prevent the realisation of political opponents’ election-related activities. The FRELIMO party pressure groups enjoy unparalleled protection from the security forces and secret services nationwide and operate mainly in the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, Cabo Delgado, and Tete. In contrast, RENAMO shock groups are based in Nampula and Quelimane. Meanwhile, the MDM groups operate in Beira and Gurué. The opposition parties’ PSGs are implicitly protected by the security forces in the areas where their parties have solid voter support and hold elected offices, such as the municipal council.[31]

Mozambique, like Timor-Leste, is a low-intensity liberal democracy where elections are the key indicator of a multiparty system. Nonetheless, compared to Timor-Leste, Mozambique’s election processes are compared to the “diabolic” problem of politicisation, ethnopolitical violence, and the absence of democratic institutions to support the electoral process.[32] Electoral violence descends into the physical elimination and burning of political opponents. At the same time, there is no clarity regarding the youth involvement in these acts; nevertheless, the pressure shock groups, with their political antics, are a standard fixture in Mozambican elections.[33]

Youth Representation

Mozambique, a nation where the youth constitute a substantial part of the population,[34] has yet to witness significant initiatives to empower its young citizens in elected offices. The electable age to become a member of parliament is 18, and a minimum of 35 years is required to be elected president. The Mozambican Republic Assembly or the ‘escolinha de barulho’ literally means the noisy kindergarten. Likewise, Timor-Leste is a unicameral body, but in contrast, it consists of 250 members.[35]

A comprehensive review of electoral laws reveals a glaring absence of youth quotas in electoral frameworks, including political party laws.[36] This lack of youth-reserved quotas in electoral laws places the destiny of youth representation in the hands of political party selectors, who can manipulate these quotas at their discretion. From data collected on the 197 members of the eight-legislature Mozambican Republic Assembly, out of 250, 29 are within the youth age bracket distributed as 20 from FRELIMO, 11 are females and nine males, seven from RENAMO distributed with four males and three females, and two males from MDM.[37]

The data, disaggregated by age, shows that the majority of the parliament members from the 2015 to 2019 legislature were in the 36-46 age bracket. This leads me to conclude that the remaining 53 members whose information needs to be included would not adversely change the scenario.

Furthermore, the data collected on 244 members of parliament, a significant portion of the current IX legislature, provides a clear picture of the 2020-2024 period. The table below indicates a decrease from 29 young members in the previous parliament to 17 members, of whom 10 are females from FRELIMO, one female from RENAMO, and the remaining six are males from FRELIMO.  From the analysis of age distribution in both countries, the youth in Mozambique, like Timor-Leste, are underrepresented in the national legislative body.[38]

Opportunity for Electoral Reform

Timor-Leste and Mozambique have adopted a closed-list proportional representation system (CLPR). However, the electoral reforms in Mozambique, initiated after the first multiparty elections in 1994, and those in Timor-Leste, following the restoration of independence, have not aimed to broaden inclusiveness by proposing variations in their current election systems to increase voter power over candidate election to legislative bodies. As previously mentioned, Mozambique and Timor-Leste are both low-intensity democracies, where elections are the leading indicator of a multiparty system, and both countries’ legislators are under substantial party discipline control. Thus, reform of the electoral system OLPR with possible variations of open candidacies can contribute to increased youth representation. It is important to note that these electoral reforms must be tailored to the specific context to achieve the best possible outcome for the electoral system design and objectives.

Furthermore, electoral reform legislation in Mozambique should include integrating a youth quota in the Political Parties Law, reflecting the social reality that women and the youth are the majority of the Mozambican population. Although the parties with parliamentary seats have internal quotas, as earlier noted, these quotas are not legally established. Nonetheless, these reforms are not the only tools to improve youth political representation or the Mozambican systemic electoral politicisation problem. Therefore, it is crucial to emphasise strengthening democratic institutions to support the electoral process.

Youth Policies

An analysis of the Mozambican constitution is warranted to answer this question. Examining the Mozambican fundamental law reveals that youth issues have been encapsulated in promoting youth associations and national policy to foster vocational training, first employment, and intellectual and physical development. This mandate conforms to the fundamental objectives of the State Policy outlined in the constitution, which is the backbone of Mozambican governance and has informed the nation’s annual presidential report for the last ten years.[39]

The 2023 presidential yearly report followed the same State Policy guidelines and, by doing this, failed to mention the unprecedented level of youth political engagement demonstrated in the most competitive municipal elections since 1998 held that same year.[40] Policies and practices reveal that, like Timor-Leste, the political elites perceive youth political participation as confined mainly to voting, participating in electoral campaigns, as political party monitors and polling staff during elections in electoral processes.

Policies and practices reveal that, like Timor-Leste, the political elites perceive youth political participation as confined mainly to voting, participating in electoral campaigns, as political party monitors and polling staff during elections in electoral processes.

Scrutinising the 2019 election manifestos of the three political parties with parliamentary representation further confirms this observation. The FRELIMO manifesto, for instance, focuses on promoting youth associations. However, it is unclear which specific issues these associations are meant to address or how they will interact with the state. This lack of clarity in the policies underscores the urgent need for more comprehensive solutions. The RENAMO platform, on the other hand, highlights housing access programs for the youth, while the MDM program proposes the election of public university chancellors by the university community. Nevertheless, it is unclear if this election would involve university students or be limited to academics. The other proposals include youth housing schemes and hostels for youth.[41] These campaign-based manifestos, however, do not offer concrete strategies for encouraging youth political participation in electoral processes.

Given the findings above concerning the malaise of youth political participation in Mozambique, the PSGs’ involvement with political parties might seem somewhat paradoxical. Still, it can be understood under the lens of an analysis of factors related to electoral patronage. The Mozambican economy is dominated by a large state whose decision-makers influence the implementation of public policies at their discretion for the benefit of their supporters. For example, The FRELIMO PSGs, unlike the other two political parties during elections, are rewarded with personal motorcycles, fuel and money.[42] This behaviour raises concerns over sources of campaign funding. It is also an opportunity for those involved in Mozambican electoral reform to formulate measures for political parties to disclose the origin of the financing during elections to enhance transparency.

Another way in which FRELIMO PSGs are rewarded is through the preferential allocation of accommodation in state-sponsored housing programs to address the youth housing crisis, such as the Olympic Village, where most houses were given to FRELIMO youth league members. Moreover, they also have preferential treatment in career advancement, study opportunities, public procurement, and exploration of natural resources.[43] The remaining two parties cannot offer these rewards to their youth because they do not control state resources. However, they offer money and opportunities to be included in party lists for legislative, provincial and local elections and to ascend to higher positions within the party.[44]

While promoting youth within party ranks and in elected bodies is a welcoming practice, this should not result from violent behaviour from political youth wings but rather from established rules requiring political parties to promote youth participation within their ranks. The electoral governance bodies should have invested powers to examine whether these rules are being implemented.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite youth groups’ participation in electoral processes—mobilising votes, fielding candidates for parliament, acting as the pivotal party for coalition government formation, and intimidating political opponents—governments in Mozambique and Timor-Leste have not delivered adequate youth-oriented policies to broaden political participation and representation. Instead, they provided patronage, well-paid government positions, and other financial benefits to individual members of the two groups.

The reasons why politically violent youth groups in Timor-Leste and Mozambique have become increasingly crucial in electoral periods are complex. However, electoral patronage practices appear to be deeply installed in both countries. The two electoral systems should move to an open-list proportional representation system (OLPR) to contribute to increased youth representation. Furthermore, the electoral reforms in Mozambique should include a youth quota, reflecting the social reality that women and the youth are the majority of the Mozambican population. Nonetheless, these reforms are not the only tools to improve youth political representation. Therefore, it is crucial to emphasise strengthening democratic institutions to support the electoral process. Electoral reforms such as OLPR alone will not suffice to prevent violent youth groups from engaging in electoral violence. However, they can offer them a platform to participate in the political sphere that otherwise would be difficult if the system of electoral representation remains unchanged.

The reasons why politically violent youth groups in Timor-Leste and Mozambique have become increasingly crucial in electoral periods are complex.

These findings and recommendations provide valuable insights for shaping youth policies and programs and upholding the constitutional mandate for youth involvement in political and electoral processes. Nonetheless, more studies are required to analyse the role of MAGs and PSGs and to assess the impact of previous electoral reforms in both countries in reducing electoral violence.

 

---

Helena Manuela Ferreira Igreja, a seasoned professional with a Licentiate degree in Law (Mozambique), Master’s in Public Administration (The Australian National University), and Master’s in Electoral Policy and Administration (The Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Italy). She has served as an electoral law adviser at the Timor-Leste National Elections Commission (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Elections (STAE). Her professional experience and interests include legal analysis and drafting, gender mainstreaming, public sector strengthening, and electoral reform. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent those of past or current employers.

---

[1] Paul Whiteley, Citizenship education longitudinal study: Second literature review: Citizenship education: The political science perspective, (Essex: University of Essex, 2005), 6.

[2] Isidoropaolo Casteltrione and Magda Pieczka, “Mediating the contributions of Facebook to political participation in Italy and the UK: the role of media and political landscapes,” Palgrave Communications 4, no. 56 (May 2018):2, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0109-5.

[3] Marcin Kaim, “Rethinking Modes of Political Participation: The conventional, unconventional, and alternative,” Democratic Theory 8, no.1, (2021): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/dt.2021.080104.

[4] Lester Milbrath and Madan Lal Goel, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1977), 2.  This definition from 1977 represents a broad definition of political participation that focuses on the key element in this article of influence and support. Weiss notes that the decades-long debate on the definition of political participation has produced many small-scale definitions. The (few) broader definitions seem to be more helpful, even when considering that there is no independent definition of youth political participation. See Julia Weiss, “What Is Youth Political Participation? Literature Review on Youth Political Participation and Political Attitudes”. Frontiers in Political Science 2, (2020), 1-13. 10.3389/fpos.2020.00001.

[5] Michele Portatadino, “Moçambique Para Todos (?). Mozambique and Political Violence: the Opinions of the Opposition Youth,” Altre Modernità 16 (2016), 10.13130/2035-7680/7889.

[6] Gill Jones, The Youth Divide: Diverging Paths to Adulthood (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2002), 1.

[7] Judith Bessant, Sarah Pickard, and Rob Watts, “Translating Bourdieu into Youth Studies,” Journal of Youth Studies 23, no. 1, (2019): 76-92, https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2019.1702633; Pierre Bourdieu, La jeunesse n’est qu’un mot, Questions de sociologie, (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1984): 143-154.

[8] Olivier Galland, “Adolescence, Post-Adolescence, Youth: Revised Interpretations,” Revue française de sociologie, 44, (2003): 185, https://doi.org/10.3917/rfs.445.0163.

[9] The African Union, African Youth Charter, accessed May 05, 2024, https://au.int/en/treaties/african-youth-charter; The United Nations, “Definition of Youth”, accessed May 05, 2024, https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth-definition.pdf.

[10] Amnesty International, “East Timor, The Santa Cruz Massacre,”November 14, 1991, https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/asa210231991en.pdf.

[11] AllAfrica, “Mozambique: 25 Years of Electoral Fraud, Protected By Secrecy,“ February 20, 2024, https://allafrica.com/stories/202402200238.html; Freedom House, “Mozambique: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report,” accessed July 14, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/country/mozambique/freedom-world/2023.

[12] Alberto Dal Poz, ‘‘Buying Peace’ in Timor-Leste: Another UN-success Story?,” Peace Human Rights Governance 2, no.2, (2018): 185-219. 10.14658/pupj-phrg-2018-2-3.

[13] Isabel Madaleno, “How Do Remote Southern Hemisphere Residents Perceive the World? Mental Maps Drawn by East Timorese and Mozambican Islanders,” Scottish Geographical Journal 126, no. 2, (2010): 112–36. 10.1080/14702541003712895.

[14] Victor Igreja, “Memories as Weapons: The Politics of Peace and Silence in Post-Civil War Mozambique,” Journal of Southern African Studies 34, no. 3, (2008): 539–56. 10.1080/03057070802259720; 15; M. Lundahl and F. Sjöholm, “The oil resources of Timor-Leste: curse or blessing,” The Pacific Review 21, no.1, (2008): 67-86.10.1080/09512740701868898.

[15] Pawelz, “Security, Violence, and Outlawed Martial Arts Groups in Timor-Leste”; Tsandzana Dércio, “The Political Participation of Youth in Mozambique’s 2019 General Elections;”  TLAVA. Groups, Gangs, and Armed Violence in Timor-Leste,  https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/groups-gangs-and-armed-violence-timor-leste-tlava-issue-brief-2. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Austcare), 2009.

[16] “Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique,” section 123, Wipo Lex, accessed on August 03, 2024, https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/21389.

[17] Ibid., section 19.

[18] “Mozambique,” UNFPA, accessed July 14, 2024, https://mozambique.unfpa.org/en/news/youth-empowerment-action-influencing-mozambiques-national-development-strategy; “Timor Leste,” UNFPA, accessed 14.07.2024, https://timor-leste.unfpa.org/en/publications/national-youth-policy-nyp-2016.

[19] James Scambary, “A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Timor-Leste. A report commissioned by Australia’s Agency for International Development, AusAid,” 15.09.2006, 2, Etan.org, accessed on February 19, 2015, https://www.etan.org/etanpdf/2006/Report_Youth_Gangs_in_Dili.pdf.

[20] Lù Olo, situasan seguransa rai-laran hakmatek,” Facebook, 16.07.2020, https://www.facebook.com/289592191492394/posts/956794801438793/?paipv=0&eav=AfaN3uiHgZGYLtA2a_fBmHMko1rtEn8Yk79GVTu1sM30iVYNL1A6njU-jbA9Gi965Qs&_rdr; Council of Ministers, “Government determines the suspension of teaching, learning and practice of martial arts and the adoption of measures to ensure public order,” accessed 15.01.2024, http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=35076; Council of Ministers, “Measures aimed to guarantee public order and state internal security,” accessed 15.01.2023, https://www.mj.gov.tl/jornal/public/docs/2011/serie_1/serie1_no45a.pdf.

[21] Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no 2 (2005): 235-252, 10.1017/S1537592705050188.

[22] “Timor Leste”, IPU Parline, accessed July 14, 2024, https://data.ipu.org/parliament/TL/TL-LC01/.

[23] Idem.

[24] Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste – National Parliament, Law No.2/2004 on Political Parties, https://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Laws/Law-2004-3.pdf, and Decree-Law No.5/2004 of 14 April 2004 on Community Authorities, https://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Laws/Law-2004-3.pdf.

[25] Dylan Difford, “What’s the difference between open and closed list proportional representation?,” Electoral Reform Society, November 15, 2021, https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/whats-the-difference-between-open-and-closed-list-proportional-representation/.

[26] V. Randall and L. Svasand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” Party Politics 8, (2002):12, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068802008001001.

[27] Dennis Shoesmith, “Party Systems and Factionalism in Timor-Leste,” Southeast Asian Affairs 39, no. 1, (2020): 176, https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103419889759; Carlos Shenga, The Mozambique legislature in comparative perspective: legislative development, performance and legitimacy (Thesis), Cape Town: University of Cape Town, 2014, http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13003.

[28] “Meeting of the Council of Ministers on March 22nd, 2023,” Government of Timor-Leste, https://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=32477&lang=en.

[29] Council of Ministers, “Measures aimed to guarantee public order and state internal security;” Lù Olo, situasan seguransa rai-laran hakmatek,” Facebook; Shoesmith, “Party Systems and Factionalism in Timor-Leste”.

[30] Machado da Graça, “Grupos de choque,” Reflectindo sobre Moçambique, 02.10.2014, https://comunidademocambicana.blogspot.com/2014/10/grupos-de-choque.html; Ibraimo Assamo, “Há grupos de choque criados para inviabilizar a nossa campanha,” OPais, 01.10.2023, https://opais.co.mz/ha-grupos-de-choque-criados-para-inviabilizar-a-nossa-campanha/; Sala da Paz, “Agitação e tiro na caravana de Daviz Simango em Gaza Está difícil para o candidato presidencial do MDM, Daviz Simango, trabalhar na província,” Facebook, 30.09.2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2375787426022659; “Desconhecidos ateiam fogo a viatura protocolar do Director do STAE em Quelimane” Carta de Moçambique, 19.10.2023, https://cartamz.com/index.php/sociedade/item/15108-desconhecidos-ateiam-fogo-a-viatura-protocolar-do-director-do-stae-em-quelimane.

[31] Idem.

[32] Weber, 1988, cited in Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler, The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance— An Introduction, International Political Science Review 23, no. 2, (2002): 5–27, 10.1177/01925121020230010.

[33] Machado da Graça, “Grupos de choque,” Reflectindo sobre Moçambique, 02.10.2014, https://comunidademocambicana.blogspot.com/2014/10/grupos-de-choque.html; Ibraimo Assamo, “Há grupos de choque criados para inviabilizar a nossa campanha,” OPais, 01.10.2023, https://opais.co.mz/ha-grupos-de-choque-criados-para-inviabilizar-a-nossa-campanha/; Sala da Paz, “Agitação e tiro na caravana de Daviz Simango em Gaza Está difícil para o candidato presidencial do MDM, Daviz Simango, trabalhar na província,” Facebook, 30.09.2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2375787426022659; “Desconhecidos ateiam fogo a viatura protocolar do Director do STAE em Quelimane” Carta de Moçambique, 19.10.2023, https://cartamz.com/index.php/sociedade/item/15108-desconhecidos-ateiam-fogo-a-viatura-protocolar-do-director-do-stae-em-quelimane.

[34] Instituto Nacional de Estatística, “Statistics”, accessed on July 10, 2024, https://www.ine.gov.mz/en/.

[35] IPU Parline, “Global data on national parliaments,” accessed July 14, 2024, https://data.ipu.org/parliament/TL/TL-LC01/.

[36] “Mozambique,” ACE-project, https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/MZ, and “Timor-leste, ACE-project, both accessed on August 03, 2024, https://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/TL.

[37] República de Moçambique, “Boletim da República, Quarta-Feira, 24 de Março de 2015,” https://archive.gazettes.africa/archive/mz/2015/mz-government-gazette-series-i-dated-2015-03-25-no-24.pdf.

 

[38] República de Moçambique, “Boletim da República, Quarta-Feira, 11 de Março de 2020,” https://archive.gazettes.africa/archive/mz/2020/mz-government-gazette-series-i-dated-2020-03-11-no-48.pdf.

[39] “Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique,” WIPO Lex, section 11 and section 158-b.

[40] “Moçambique/Eleições: Participação de jovens nas marchas de contestação de resultados é “extremamente positiva,” — ONG,” Visão, October 14, 2023, https://visao.pt/atualidade/mundo/2023-10-24-mocambique-eleicoes-participacao-de-jovens-nas-marchas-de-contestacao-de-resultados-e-extremamente-positiva-ong/.

[41] Michel Cahen, “Programas, sim, mas para fazer o quê? uma análise dos manifestos eleitorais dos partidos políticos para as eleições moçambicanas de 15 de Outubro de 2019,” (Conferência do IESE 10° Aniversário da Publicação “Desafios Para Moçambique” Dez Anos Pensando no País, Maputo, 19-20 de Setembro de 2019), IESE, 2020, https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Conf2019_MCahen.pdf.

[42] Da Graça, “Grupos de choque”; Assamo, “Há grupos de choque criados”.

[43] “FRELIMO youth wing serves as a launchpad for possible Nyusi third term,” Africa Intelligence, July 15, 2022, https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2022/07/15/frelimo-youth-wing-serves-as-launchpad-for-possible-nyusi-third-term,109799642-ar2.

[44] Interview of the author with political party interlocutor, anonymous, 15.06.2024.