Abstract: The withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan in August 2021 has left a vacuum in the region, which some expect will be filled by China. However, from Beijing’s perspective, the US withdrawal has brought opportunities as well as threats to China’s proximity to the West. To utilize the opportunities and effectively deal with the threats emanating from Afghanistan, China has employed a method of carefully calibrated outreach and engagement with the Taliban. However, on closer inspection, this Chinese outreach to the new rulers in Kabul might be similar to the traditional tactics used by Chinese dynasties in their dealings with nomadic ‘barbarians,’ including the Timurid Sultanate, living in the Western fringes of the Middle Kingdom. The current paper is an attempt to highlight the similarities between the approaches adopted by modern-day PRC towards the Taliban regime and the dealings of the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of yore with the nomadic ‘barbarians’ communities living in the western periphery of ancient Chinese empires comprising the current day territories of Xinjiang, Central Asia and Afghanistan. However, a question remains whether ancient strategies can deliver the same results in the present time’s changed contexts.
Problem statement: Does the People’s Republic of China’s reach towards Afghanistan serve its interests?
Bottom-line-up-front: Despite employing a multi-pronged approach, including an offer of investment and infrastructure development and promises of offering legitimacy, the Chinese government remains sceptical of the Taliban’s commitment towards a crackdown on ‘anti-Chinese’ Uighur militant organizations or not allowing Afghan soil to be used against Beijing. Complicating the overall picture is the emergence of new actors, such as Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), which would undermine Chinese interests in Afghanistan. Also worrying from Beijing’s perspective is the Taliban’s outreach to other countries like India.
So what?: It remains to be seen whether the Chinese strategy in Afghanistan offers the desired results to Beijing or draws it into the ‘graveyard of empires’ scenario like the Soviet Union and the US.
Source: shutterstock.com/jjaikla
A New Geopolitical Hotspot
After the hasty withdrawal of the US in August 2021 and the capture of Kabul by the Taliban, Afghanistan has become the centre of a new geopolitical churn and realignments, drawing the attention of regional powers, such as Russia, the Central Asian Republics, Iran, Pakistan as well as India. However, most international observers are more interested in the role of China in a post-US, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. China has begun seeing itself as the next superpower and successor to the US, whose hasty retreat from Kabul in 2021 only confirmed the general decline of Washington on the global stage from Beijing’s viewpoint. At the same time, this belief in China’s increased role was also voiced by Yang Xuetong, who believes that “China will be able to replace the US as the world’s leading state” as it is a “more responsible state than the US.”[1] In addition, China reached out to the Taliban, a group that Beijing considers a terrorist organization providing shelter to Uighur extremists, through the summit between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on July 28, 2021, weeks before the US withdrawal.[2] This can be seen or interpreted as signs of the Chinese plans to play a more active role than its earlier status as a secondary power to Washington in pre-2021 Afghanistan.
China has begun seeing itself as the next superpower and successor to the US, whose hasty retreat from Kabul in 2021 only confirmed the general decline of Washington on the global stage from Beijing’s viewpoint.
The Middle Kingdom Dealing With Barbarians
The traditional Chinese worldview consisted of China’s self-perception as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ (Zhongguo) or centre of Confucian civilization. This self-perception was based on the assumption of the superiority of Chinese Confucian culture and tradition as compared to neighbouring cultures and civilizations deemed relatively ‘lesser’ or ‘barbarous’ in nature.[3] Hence, from the Chinese perspective, unlike the Western colonial powers, it was not the job of the state or the emperor to spread its culture; rather faraway ‘lesser’ kingdoms came to the Middle Kingdom willingly drawn by the superiority of the latter’s culture and philosophy.[4] At the same time, the reception accorded to the other kingdoms depended on the latter’s attainment of Chinese cultural values and tradition, which determined their status in the Confucian hierarchical worldview of China as the Middle Kingdom followed by kingdoms lower in the hierarchy.[5] The Confucian hierarchical relationship between China and the other kingdoms was expressed through the tributary system, wherein the kingdoms, such as in Korea and Japan, sent tributary missions bearing gifts to the Celestial Chinese Court, and in turn, the emperor legitimized the newly ascended rulers of these kingdoms and sent tributary missions for the same.[6] However, tributary relations also existed with the nomadic ‘barbarian’ kingdoms. The relations were driven by the logic of security from the invasions staged by these nomadic communities living beyond the Great Wall.
The nomadic communities along China’s frontier regions had played an important role in developing the self-perception of the Middle Kingdom as a centre of civilization surrounded by un-civilized barbarians.[7] Given the constant nomadic invasions that threatened peace and harmony and had devastating effects on the Chinese empire, the latter adopted a method of ‘ruling them (barbarians) with a loose rein (ji mi).[8] Given the Chinese inability to subdue them militarily, the Celestial Court would try to ‘rule’ over them or keep them at bay by utilizing other methods. These methods included tying the nomadic kingdoms to the Chinese empire through trade and tributary missions. In this manner, the barbarians sent tributary missions acknowledging the symbolic superiority of the Chinese emperor. They availed the incentive of lucrative trade with the wealthy Chinese heartland and legitimacy granted to nomadic chiefs, which deterred the nomadic tribes from launching invasions.
The barbarians sent tributary missions acknowledging the symbolic superiority of the Chinese emperor.
Crucial to this method was the idea known as ‘five baits’, which was first formulated during the Han dynasty to manage the Xiongnu: ‘give them (nomadic tribes) elaborate clothes and carriages to corrupt their eyes; to give them music and women to corrupt their ears; to provide them with lofty buildings, granaries and slaves to corrupt their stomach…. as for those who come to surrender, the emperor shows them favour by honouring them…personally serve them wine and food to corrupt their mind’.[9] These five baits were used to bribe the invading nomads and lull them into accepting a somewhat settled and non-militaristic lifestyle. However, it is evident from Chinese history that these five baits could not completely save China from attacks. Hence, another classical Chinese strategy involved the maxim of ‘using barbarians to attack barbarians’.[10] For instance, in 648 CE, the Tang dynasty attacked the Central Asian kingdom of Kucha supported by a cavalry composed of troops from Eastern Turks and MongolsThis method aimed to prevent a coalition of nomadic communities in China’s borders that would threaten the Middle Kingdom.[11]
The Chinese view of defence and victory entailed the virtue of strategy or encirclement of the enemy rather than a zero-sum game of complete annihilation of the adversary. This was reflected in the Chinese game of weiqi or go, which involved building up the strength of one’s position by placing one’s pieces to encircle the pieces of the opposite side to render the latter into a position of relative weakness. At the end of the weiqi game, the opponents found themselves in a situation of marginal advantage with interlocking areas of strength. This was in contrast to the more popular game of chess, which involved a zero-sum principle of removing all or most of the ’opponent’s pieces and finally defeating the king of the other side.[12] Hence, concerning the neighbouring ‘barbarian’ kingdoms, China always sought security by sometimes encircling hostile communities with pro-Chinese or allied communities.
China And Afghanistan
Afghanistan was the land through which the famous Silk Routes passed in the ancient and pre-modern era, connecting China with South Asia, Central Asia, and Europe. It was through the areas in current-day areas of Afghanistan, such as Bamiyan, that the Chinese monk and traveller Xuanzang travelled to the Buddhist monastery of Nalanda in current-day India.[13] At the same time, relations existed between Chinese dynasties, such as the Ming and the polities based in Central or Inner Asia, such as the Timurids, where Afghanistan formed a part of the empire.
The Timurid empire emerged in the second half of the 14th century in an area encompassing Transoxiana, Khwarezm, Khurasan and Moghulistan under the leadership of the Central Asian conqueror Timur.[14] Contemporaneous with the Ming dynasty in China, the Timurids maintained diplomatic relations with the former and sent missions to the Ming Court, which the latter interpreted as the desire of the ‘lesser barbarian’ kingdom to accept Ming overlordship. However, this attitude was not accepted by Timur, who got the Chinese envoys arrested and even contemplated invading China.[15]
While the conflict regarding the ‘subservient’ position of the Timurids to the Ming remained, it did not lead to armed clashes as tributary trade relations between the two polities emerged.[16] The Ming saw the continuation of the tributary trade relations with the Timurids as stemming a ‘barbarian invasion’ through the use of trade incentives, as was stated by the Ming Ministry of Military Affairs, which viewed these missions as a method of ‘keeping the barbarians calm’[17] as well as gathering intelligence about the politics of these far away nomadic polities from merchants arriving as part of the tributary missions.[18]
The Ming saw the continuation of the tributary trade relations with the Timurids as stemming a ‘barbarian invasion’ through the use of trade incentives.
Coming to the current day, the negotiations between the Chinese and the Taliban could be seen in a similar light as to that between the Ming and the Timurids. The Chinese outreach to the Taliban, first during the 1996 Mullah Omar regime, and then in 2021, was primarily driven by the need for security, as was the case of the Ming dynasty’s missions to the Timurids. The primary concern for China was the emergence of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as a shelter for anti-Chinese terrorist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). This led to a reassurance from Mullah Omar in 2000 that the Taliban would not allow Afghan territory to be used against China[19] − Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar gave a similar assurance to Wang Yi on July 28, 2021, saying that the Taliban would “never allow any force to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China”.[20]
At the same time, the Chinese outreach to Afghanistan was also driven by the need to seek legitimacy of its interests in the region by gaining support from the domestic populace. It can be compared to the first Ming embassy to Timur, which the founder-emperor Hongwu sent to forge the legitimacy of his new dynasty by seeking the overlordship of these faraway polities.[21] Similarly, China has sought to build legitimacy in the eyes of Afghanistan, especially among the Taliban, as a power different from the US, whose interests lie in helping Afghanistan develop its economic and infrastructure capabilities. Hence, after the assurance from Mullah Omar, Chinese telecom companies such as ZTE and Huawei started operations in Afghanistan, followed by infrastructure and mining companies exploiting the country’s untapped mineral reserves.[22]
China has sought to build legitimacy in the eyes of Afghanistan, especially among the Taliban, as a power different from the US, whose interests lie in helping Afghanistan develop its economic and infrastructure capabilities.
Along similar lines, China also made Afghanistan a part of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI)launched in 2017 and allowed tax-free entry of imports from Kabul.[23] All these actions aimed to not only benefit the Chinese economy but also portray Beijing as a more reliable friend who would not intervene in Afghanistan or Taliban’s internal affairs like the US. After the fall of Kabul in 2021, Beijing tried to further highlight its ‘non-interventionist’ credentials through statements by Wang Yi, such as ”China… has always respected Afghanistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity” and ”adhered to non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.”
Along with non-intervention, Chinese statements such as “Afghanistan belongs to the Afghan people, and its future should be in the hands of its own people” was a subtle reference to the newfound role of the Taliban as the leader of Afghanistan. This was more apparent in the following statement: ‘the Afghan Taliban is an important military and political force… and is expected to play an important role in the country’s peace, reconciliation and reconstruction process’.[24] In turn, Taliban statements such as China being ‘a trustworthy friend’ and the BRI being ‘conducive to the development and prosperity of Afghanistan and the region’[25] highlight the legitimacy given to China by the current regime in Afghanistan. Further, the Taliban’s support for China and the BRI legitimizes Beijing’s view of itself as a ‘more responsible power’ and enhances the Afghan populace’s perception of China[26] − similar to Hongwu’s mission to the Timurid court to bolster his domestic legitimacy.
In addition to seeking legitimacy, the Chinese state has also applied the ‘five baits’ strategy in their dealings with Afghanistan and the Taliban. China has tried to establish legitimacy by portraying itself as a friend whose association would benefit the Afghan people. However, the allure of developmental and infrastructural benefits offered by China could also be seen as Beijing’s application of the ‘five baits’ strategy to woo Afghanistan, and the Taliban in particular, to incentivize the latter to prevent unrest from spilling over into the neighbouring Xinjiang province. After the Obama administration announced the gradual withdrawal of the US-led Western forces from Afghanistan in 2011 and the ending of operations by the International Security Assistance Force in 2014, China saw an opportunity to increase its presence in the region. China sought to achieve this by making Afghanistan a part of the BRI in 2016. The then Ashraf Ghani government welcomed the BRI, which saw it as a project that would bring much-needed investment and infrastructure development to the country.[27] In addition, China allowed tax-free entry of imports from Afghanistan and established a China- Afghanistan air corridor in 2018.[28]
In the current Taliban regime, the importance of China for the Taliban can be gleaned from a statement by Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid, who described Beijing as ‘our most important partner’ as ‘it is ready to invest and rebuild our country’. At the same time, China is also the Taliban’s ‘pass to markets all over the world’.[29] These statements reflect the Taliban’s dependence on Beijing for help in the economic recovery of Afghanistan, providing some basis for the new regime to claim legitimacy from the international community. In addition, Beijing’s engagement with the Taliban is also viewed by the latter as a source of international legitimacy in itself.[30] This necessity of the Taliban was exploited by China as reflected in reports of Beijing’s apparent interest in projects such as a motorway from Peshawar to Kabul, the inclusion of Afghanistan as part of the BRI’s flagship China -Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as well as the development of a major road through the Wakhan Corridor passing through Afghanistan and onward to Pakistan and Central Asia.[31] Although there are apprehensions and reservations about the future and feasibility of such million-dollar projects in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan,[32] the allure of Chinese projects as a source of international legitimacy can be seen as an example of the ‘five bait’ strategy in the 21st century.
Beijing’s engagement with the Taliban is also viewed by the latter as a source of international legitimacy in itself.
Like the previous dealings by the Chinese Celestial Court with the ‘barbarian’ kingdoms in its vicinity, as well as the Ming Court’s continuation of tributary trade relations with the Timurids, Beijing’s current dealings with the Taliban are driven by the same logic —security. This includes economic, regional, and national security.
On the economic front, China’s objectives in Afghanistan revolve around the country’s untapped resources and crucial projects of the BRI, which pass through the region. Many of the corridors comprising the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ or the ‘Belt’ of the BRI connect China to Central Asia and Pakistan, especially the most important CPEC, which links the Xinjiang region to the port of Gwadar in Pakistan via an overland route that passes through Afghanistan.[33] The CPEC is of immense value to China as it allows Beijing to break free of the strategic ‘Malacca Dilemma,’ which refers to the maritime route passing through the Straits of Malacca in the Indian Ocean traditionally used by China to bring in around 80 per cent of its energy imports. The dilemma lies in the fact that given Malacca’s proximity to India, a regional rival and a key ally of the US in the Indo-Pacific, the Strait can be blocked to choke the Chinese economy in the event of a conflict.[34] Hence, the CPEC, which allows China to overcome the Malacca Dilemma, is seen as a means of ensuring Chinese energy security. However, incidents such as the suicide bombings killing nine Chinese workers and four Pakistanis in the Dasu hydropower project in July 2021, as well as the attack on a Chinese motorcade near the East Bay Expressway project in Gwadar in August 2021, highlight the fragile situation of the BRI’s most significant project.[35]
As China plans to diversify its energy supplies by building oil and gas pipelines from Russia and the Central Asian countries and extend the CPEC to Iran and the Middle East[36] − with Afghanistan as the crossroads of these projects – the need to deal with the Taliban has only increased. In addition, given Afghanistan’s reserve of untapped resources, such as copper mines in Aynak, the oil basin in Amu Darya,[37] and the reserve of Rare Earth Elements (REE) such as lithium,[38] which is vital for today’s critical and emerging technologies sector, and the gradual depletion of China’s REE reserves and production capacity from 70 per cent in 2000 to 38 per cent in 2021, there are several incentives for China to enter into positive relations with the Taliban regime.[39]
As China plans to diversify its energy supplies by building oil and gas pipelines from Russia and the Central Asian countries and extend the CPEC to Iran and the Middle East, the need to deal with the Taliban has only increased.
However, despite assurances from Taliban leaders, Chinese experts and the business community have welcomed the new situation and these assurances with scepticism. This was apparent in the views of economist Mei Xinyu, associated with the think tank China Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, who believed that “China must not indulge in a dream-like revelry” given the country’s history of instability as well as the dubious value of the commitments of the Taliban regime and the latter’s ability to ensure stability in the region. Hence, as per Mei, the million-dollar Chinese contracts in Afghanistan might not bear fruit given the present conditions. Accordingly, Mei instead advised Beijing to begin with small-scale aid and consumer goals in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and go slow on the much-touted BRI projects.[40]
More important than energy or economic security for China is the question of national and regional security, especially in the sensitive Xinjiang region.[41] Since the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 2021, a main concern for China has been the danger of extremism and instability rearing its head in the restive province of Xinjiang, which borders Afghanistan and is connected via the narrow Wakhan corridor. This concern was evident in the speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2014, who, regarding the aftermath of a US withdrawal, warned that ”terrorist organizations positioned on the frontiers of Afghanistan and Pakistan may quickly infiltrate into Central Asia…East Turkestan’s terrorists, who have received real-time war training in Syria and Afghanistan, could at any time launch terrorist attacks in Xinjiang”.[42]
This importance of the geographic proximity between Afghanistan and Xinjiang has also led Beijing to acquire its second overseas base in the China, Afghanistan and Tajikistan tri-junction of the Wakhan Corridor, staffed by members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) from Tajikistan as per a deal in 2021. At the same time, China has also started conducting joint patrols with Pakistan along the Xinjiang-Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) border, and similar patrols were carried out with Tajik forces.[43] All these actions and statements emphasize the central importance of the security of the Xinjiang region, which in turn increases the significance of the Western regions, especially Afghanistan.
Over the years, the increasing application of the Chinese strategy of pacifying a region by initiating demographic change through encouraging Han Chinese migration and settlement in the areas has resulted in the marginalization of the native Uighur population, now reduced to a minority, in political, economic and social spheres. These circumstances led to a heightening of ethnic tensions, resulting in the riots of 2009 in Urumqi, the provincial capital,[44] and the knife attacks by Uighur miscreants in Kunming in 2014 (dubbed as China’s 9/11), leading the Communist Party to launch its own ‘war on terror’.[45] This was manifested in the transformation of Xinjiang into a ‘security zone’ and the imposition of measures such as the mass internment of around 1 million Uighurs in ‘re-education’ camps dubbed as ‘voluntary vocational camps,’ which, in reality, were detention and torture centres. This came to international attention in 2017.[46]
The increasing application of the Chinese strategy of pacifying a region by initiating demographic change through encouraging Han Chinese migration and settlement in the areas has resulted in the marginalization of the native Uighur population.
The Chinese ‘war on terror’ was also aimed at the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), now re-christened as the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uighur extremist group that had links with the Al- Qaeda and possessed bases in Afghanistan from which Uighur militants sought to enter Xinjiang to create unrest.[47] Hence, the engagement with the Taliban can be seen as Beijing’s attempt to secure a commitment from the latter, not allowing the ensuing instability in the region to be exploited by the TIP in return for Chinese investment and aid in gaining international recognition. This understanding was also expressed in statements wherein Taliban leaders, such as Baradar, promised to prevent anti-Chinese groups from flourishing on Afghan soil. Also, the increasing Chinese economic engagements with Afghanistan and the Central Asian region through investments and the BRI were driven by security concerns, aiming that stability and prosperity in these Western regions would prevent the eruption of conflicts in Xinjiang.[48]
The dealings with the Taliban regarding combatting the TIP and other anti-Chinese elements can be seen as reminiscent of the ‘using barbarians against barbarians’ strategy. The Chinese outreach to the Taliban with the expectation that they “will make a clean break with all terrorist organizations including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and resolutely and effectively combat them…”,[49] and the attempt to woo the new Afghan regime with the ‘five bait strategy’ of economic aid and international recognition to incentivize them to make good on their commitments, can be perceived as a way of using the Taliban, a terrorist organization (barbarian), to counter the TIP (another barbarian). These assurances have resulted in the Taliban claiming to remove Uighur fighters from areas bordering China, which, in turn, has led to more than 2,000 second-generation Uighur citizens of Afghanistan fearing deportation to China.[50]
Despite these actions, there remains deep scepticism within Chinese circles given the previous Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda’s links with the ETIM, as well as the presence of a pro-Uighur faction within the Taliban, which harboured sympathies for the ETIM’s goal of establishing an Islamic state in Xinjiang.[51] At the same time, despite the Taliban’s claims of permanent removal, the Uighur militants have only been relocated to the Eastern provinces such as Nangarhar. Along with the Taliban’s hesitancy in handing them over,[52] Chinese suspicions regarding the sincerity of the new Kabul regime have only increased, leading them to turn towards another key regional player — Pakistan. The new situation in Afghanistan has only increased China’s reliance on its ‘iron brother’ Pakistan.[53]
Chinese suspicions regarding the sincerity of the new Kabul regime have only increased.
This reliance was evident in the ‘joint actions’ by China and Pakistan concerning Afghanistan, which were announced in the press conference in Chengdu: prevention of the eruption of full-scale civil war, supporting ‘political reconciliation’, crackdown on terrorist groups like the ETIM and the ‘promotion of coordination and cooperation among the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan’.[54] For these purposes, Beijing views Pakistan as a crucial ally, especially in counter-terrorism and the prevention of instability through Islamabad and Rawalpindi’s sway over the Taliban. The former has been realized through the efforts of the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in removing Uighur terror camps from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and joint Chinese-Pakistan patrol along the China-Pakistan border.[55] The importance of Islamabad’s influence over the Taliban regime can be gleaned from the words of Beijing’s new envoy to Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong, who emphasized that “Pakistan, as an important regional country and a neighbour of Afghanistan, has a very important role to play in resolving the Afghan issue….”
Finally, the Chinese attitude towards the new situation in Afghanistan, and the suspicions and scepticism regarding the Taliban, have led it to indulge in the encirclement of the latter similar to the game of weiqi. China’s reservations regarding the Taliban were first expressed in Beijing’s actions of maintaining contacts with the Ghani-led Afghan government, even amid the outreach to the Taliban in Tianjin in July 2021. In a phone call to Ghani, Xi stressed China’s belief in the ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ peace process, while the former praised China’s role in pushing for a political solution.[56] This apparent bonhomie with the Ghani government highlighted the Chinese attitude of not placing all its bets on one actor. China was not entirely pleased with the complete victory of the Taliban. In Beijing’s eyes, a post-US withdrawal Afghan government comprising various factions of Afghanistan would have served its interest better. This would have allowed China to establish contacts with the other parties and acquire more leverage in its dealings with the Taliban, which would have been ‘constrained’ by other parties.[57] Such a situation would have given Beijing an advantage over the Taliban by encircling it with China-backed factions of the government, which, in turn, would be supported against the Taliban, thereby pressurizing it to make good on its commitments. However, given the Taliban’s complete victory and dominance, such Chinese hopes were dashed. In such a situation, the encirclement strategy has been played out by increasing bilateral engagements with the areas surrounding Afghanistan.
In Beijing’s eyes, a post-US withdrawal Afghan government comprising various factions of Afghanistan would have served its interest better.
The China-Pakistan axis has only deepened with Beijing’s investment and aid in the region and through projects like the CPEC.[58] At the same time, like Pakistan, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have also played an important role in the Chinese security calculus regarding Xinjiang. Given the long-standing historic ties of culture and other ties between Central Asian states and neighbouring Xinjiang province, China has sought to maintain robust relations with the former by establishing strong ties of trade, aid and infrastructure investment through BRI.[59] Even before the launch of the BRI or the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in Kazakhstan by Xi Jinping in 2013, China had early on realized the importance of the CARs as part of its ‘neighbourhood policy’ (zhoubian waijiao), which was based on the importance of these countries’ proximity to China’s security, political and energy as well as economic interests.[60] The CARs were storehouses of oil and gas reserves needed for the burgeoning Chinese economy and potential markets for Chinese goods, especially those from the Xinjiang province.[61] However, more than energy or economy, the security and stability of the Xinjiang province is the most valuable aspect for Beijing regarding its relations with the CARs.[62]
This was reflected in the birth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001, which began as an informal process — known as ‘Shanghai Five’ — in 1996 to settle border disputes between China and the newly independent countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, which, along with Russia, negotiated as a united front with Beijing to stabilize the frontier areas. The SCO emerged to combat the three evils of ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’ – issues that heavily impinged on the security of all its members as a result of the presence of cross-border drugs and arms trafficking as well as the links between the Islamic extremist movements in Central Asia and Xinjiang and groups such as Al Qaeda and Taliban based in Afghanistan.[63] The importance of the CARs has only increased following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. This was reflected in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s participation in the third Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s Neighbouring Countries held on March 31 and April 01, 2022, and organized by China.[64] The SCO has become a platform for strengthening already existing coordination and cooperation ties among its members, most of whom share borders with Afghanistan, through the organization’s bodies, such as the SCO Regional Anti Terror Structure (RATS), which provide a platform of coordinating the collective efforts of members to address the ‘three evils’ identified above, while also improving bilateral relations between China and the other member states under the aegis of SCO.[65], [66] In addition to the SCO, China has also struck bilateral security deals with the neighbouring CARs to manage the potential security situation spillover from Afghanistan. For instance, there have emerged reports of Chinese having helped the Tajik authorities built border posts in 2016.
The SCO has become a platform for strengthening already existing coordination and cooperation ties among its members.
Along with border infrastructure construction aid, coordination and contacts have also increased between the Chinese People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the border defense forces of CARs such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This resulted in bilateral exercises, such as the ‘Tian Shan’, between Chinese and Kyrgyz troops in 2002.[67] Bilateral defense ties have been strengthened by Beijing’s sales of defense equipment to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in exchange for hydrocarbon resources. For example, Ashbagat and Tashkent are reported to have used natural gas to pay for FD-2000/HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile systems.[68]
Ties between China and its neighbouring countries bordering Afghanistan have also been buttressed by multilateral forums such as the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordinaton Mechanism (QCCM). This forum involves Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and China “to coordinate with and support each other in a range of areas, including study and judgement of the counter-terrorism situation, intelligence sharing, joint anti-terrorist training and anti-terrorist capability building.” The importance of the QCCM for China can be gauged from the fact that all QCCM member states have joined due to their proximity with the narrow Wakhan Corridor between Afghanistan and Xinjiang, the security and defense of which is paramount in the eyes of Beijing.[69] This, along with other initiatives, such as the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) and the Afghanistan-Pakistan-China Trilateral Dialogue of 2012,[70] highlight the importance of neighbouring countries in Beijing’s strategy to contain the situation within Afghanistan.
In this way, by strengthening ties with Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, China is encircling the Taliban from all sides, with countries enjoying deep economic and security links with Beijing. In light of Washington’s souring relations with Tehran and Moscow, the weiqi strategy now includes Iran and Russia as well, which has led them to deepen their strategic relationship with Beijing.[71] Evidence of the same could be found in the proclaimed ‘No Limits Partnership’ between China and Russia[72] and the 25-year Iran-China Strategic Cooperation Agreement signed in 2021.[73] Iran and Russia are important players in Afghanistan, given Tehran’s geographical proximity and other ties with the country and Moscow’s history of involvement and concerns with the region, especially regarding drug trafficking and transnational jihadist links between Al-Qaeda and Chechen separatists threatening the Caucasus region of Russia.
Given its stakes in a stable post-US Afghanistan, Russia has been involved in several initiatives with China, such as the ‘Extended Troika’ (Russia, China, US, and Pakistan) and the ‘Moscow Format’, which was launched in 2017 and included the ‘Extended Troika’ members along with Afghanistan, India, and Iran, for establishing an inclusive and stable administration in Kabul.[74] In addition, Moscow has emerged as an important partner for the Taliban, given the latter’s interest in purchasing Russian oil and food products[75] and the fact that Russia is the only country allowing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) to open an embassy in Moscow in 2022.[76] Given the newfound importance of Russia for the Taliban, the ‘no-limits partnership’ can be used by Beijing to put some pressure on the new Afghan regime through Moscow. Like China, Iran faces similar challenges involving concerns regarding Baloch separatists based near the common borders of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as well as the formation of an only-Taliban regime inimical to Shia beliefs and interests. Hence, along with Pakistan, Tehran has emerged as an important partner in China’s quest to manage Taliban 2.0 and exert diplomatic pressure on the latter to toe the line as ordained by Beijing.[77] The strategic encirclement of the Taliban by neighbouring states, including some like Tajikistan, Russia, and Iran, has put Beijing in an advantageous position to exert some amount of pressure on the group.
Like China, Iran faces similar challenges involving concerns regarding Baloch separatists based near the common borders of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as well as the formation of an only-Taliban regime inimical to Shia beliefs and interests.
Conclusion
Post-US Afghanistan has emerged as a new projection site for China, while at the same time, it has ‘remained largely a land of threats, real, potential and imagined, rather than one of opportunities’.[78] The dual presence of opportunity and threat has led to the formation of a Chinese strategy, the roots of which can be traced to ancient Chinese empire’s dealings with nomadic ‘barbarians’ living near its borders.
The first part involves building legitimacy for China in the Taliban’s eyes as a friend and dependable power. The second part entails wooing the Taliban with the ‘five bait’ strategy of infrastructure development, trade, investment and international recognition. The security logic of Xinjiang drove the Chinese outreach to the Taliban. This restive province shared borders with Afghanistan, with the secondary economic concern of protecting its regional projects and tapping REE reserves. Then, the ‘barbarian against barbarian’ strategy is seen in Chinese attempts to ask the Taliban to crackdown on ETIP or Uighur extremists in Afghanistan in return for aid, investment and international recognition. However, Beijing also seeks to indirectly achieve this with the help of Pakistan using its sway over the Taliban, pushing them to make good on their commitments. While China had hoped to encircle the Taliban using the weiqi strategy in the case of a multi-factional government in Afghanistan, this was instead realized through intensifying security and economic ties with Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, thereby allowing Beijing to hem the Taliban from all sides and exert indirect pressure on it.
The recent developments in Afghanistan, particularly the rise of rival extremist groups and support for Uighurs, may result in cracks in the Chinese strategy. Groups, such as the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), have emerged as challengers to the Taliban, carrying out a spate of attacks in Kabul, including the blast in Gurudwara Karte Parwan, and the blasts in Mazar-e Sharif,[79] thereby leading to questions about the Taliban’s ability to hold good on its promise of stability and security. Along with the ISKP, Afghanistan continues to host Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Moreover, given the increasing Taliban-China outreach, Uighur militants have found a new ally in the ISKP, which seeks to draw the TIP away from the Taliban by highlighting the Chinese crackdown on Islam in Xinjiang and presenting itself as an alternative to the latter.[80] Such conditions do not bode well from the Chinese perspective of the security of Xinjiang or its projects in Afghanistan. It also inhibits Chinese companies from realizing the region’s mineral extraction and exploitation opportunities.
The recent developments in Afghanistan, particularly the rise of rival extremist groups and support for Uighurs, may result in cracks in the Chinese strategy.
A more serious problem is the emerging rift between the Taliban and China’s ‘iron brother’ Pakistan concerning the long-vexed boundary issue of the Durand Line, as well as the recent conflict over the price of coal exports from Afghanistan to Pakistani industries. The Taliban has increased the rate of coal and customs duties by 30 per cent.[81] Additionally, the recent warning of supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada regarding interferences by the outside world in Afghanistan’s internal affairs[82] only highlights the growing divide between two of China’s crucial partners in its Afghanistan strategy, which has adverse implications for Chinese interests in the region.
At the same time, the Taliban’s outreach to other countries like India can be seen as the new Kabul regime’s attempt at overcoming the weiqi encirclement of China. Andrew Small describes the Chinese position in Afghanistan as a ‘strategic trap’ referring to the duality of the situation in the aftermath of the Taliban’s conquest. Despite the withdrawal of the US forces being viewed as a positive development by Beijing, yet the hasty nature of the American retreat and the resultant chaotic situation next door has resulted in renewed Chinese concerns of ‘the graveyard of empires’, which might next swallow up China.[83] In addition, some Chinese scholars hold the view that the Americans left behind a mess for the Chinese to clean up, hoping to drag it into a similar quagmire of ‘long wars’ as Washington re-focuses its ‘pivot’ to Asia- Pacific.[84] The most important aspect that China must be wary of is the possibility of getting ‘sucked into a serious role’, whereby it might have to divert more resources, including military resources, to protect its interests against an unstable Afghanistan. Hence, it remains to be seen whether Beijing’s current strategy with ‘ancient Chinese characteristics’ of dealing with the new ‘barbarians’ will bring fortune or misfortune for the ‘Middle Kingdom’.
Anuraag Khaund is a student of International Politics (IP) at the Central University of Gujarat (CUG). He has published opinion pieces in the Eleventh Column, Deccan Herald, and the Kashmir Observer. His interests include History, International Relations, East Asia, and the Middle East. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of CUG.
[1] Ananth Krishnan and Stanly Johny, The Comrades and the Mullahs− China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, Gurgaon: Harper Collins, 2022, 104.
[2] Ibid., 110.
[3] Amitav Acharya & Barry Buzan, Reimagining International Relations- World Orders in the Thought and Practice of Indian, Chinese and Islamic Civilizations, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022, 73-74.
[4] Henry Kissinger, On China, London: Penguin Group, 2011, 2012, 17.
[5] Ibid., 19.
[6] Acharya & Buzan, Reimagining International Relations- World Orders in the Thought and Practice of Indian, Chinese and Islamic Civilizations, 75-76.
[7] Shyam Saran, How China sees India and the World- The Authoritative Account of the India- China Relationship, New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2022, 42.
[8] Kissinger, On China, 20.
[9] Ibid., 21.
[10] Ibid., 20.
[11] Kissinger, On China, 20-21.
[12] Ibid., 23.
[13] Krishnan & Johnly, The Comrades and the Mullahs− China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, 92.
[14] Rajkai Zsombor Tibor, The Timurid Empire and Ming China: Theories and Approaches Concerning the Relations of the Two Empires, DoctorateDissertation, 2007, 16.
[15] Tibor, The Timurid Empire and Ming China: Theories and Approaches Concerning the Relations of the Two Empires, 52.
[16] Ibid., 55.
[17] Ibid., 56.
[18] Ibid., 53.
[19] Krishnan & Johnly, The Comrades and the Mullahs− China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, 98.
[20] Ibid., 112.
[21] Tibor, The Timurid Empire and Ming China: Theories and Approaches Concerning the Relations of the Two Empires, 52.
[22] Raffaello Pantucci & Alexandros Petersen, Sinostan- China’s Inadvertent Empire, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, 217.
[23] Krishnan & Johnly, The Comrades and the Mullahs− China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, 101-106.
[24] Ibid., 111.
[25] Ibid., 107-108.
[26] Ibid., 103.
[27] Ibid., 100.
[28] Ibid., 106-107.
[29] Ibid., 108.
[30] Ibid., 117.
[31] Ibid.,. 123.
[32] Ibid., 124- 125
[33] Ibid., 102.
[34] Ibid., 105.
[35] Ibid., 114-115.
[36] Ibid., 106.
[37] Ibid., 116.
[38] Neha Mishra, “China needs Madagascar, Afghanistan to save its rare earth empire. Its monopoly is in danger,” The Print, July 12, 2022.
[39] Mishra, “China needs Madagascar, Afghanistan to save its rare earth empire. Its monopoly is in danger.”
[40] Krishnan & Johnly, The Comrades and the Mullahs− China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, 124-125.
[41] Pantucci & Petersen, Sinostan- China’s Inadvertent Empire, 205.
[42] Krishnan & Johnly, The Comrades and the Mullahs− China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, 151.
[43] Ibid., 152-153.
[44] Ibid., 159.
[45] Ibid., 163-165.
[46] Ibid., 167.
[47] Ibid., 138.
[48] Ibid., 109.
[49] Ibid., 111.
[50] ‘Taliban ‘Removing’ Uighur Militants from Afghanistan’s Border with China’, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, October 05, 2021.
[51] Krishnan & Johnly, The Comrades and the Mullahs− China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, p. 150.
[52] “Taliban ‘Removing’ Uighur Militants from Afghanistan’s Border with China.”
[53] Krishnan & Johnly, The Comrades and the Mullahs− China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, 173.
[54] Ibid., 173.
[55] Ibid., 181.
[56] Ibid., 114.
[57] Ibid., 129.
[58] Ibid., 177.
[59] The Editors, “Why Central Asia? The Strategic Rationale of Indian and Chinese Involvement in the Region,” in Marlene Laruelle, Jean- Francois Huchet, Sebastien Peyrouse and Bayram Balci (eds.), China and India in Central Asia – A New “Great Game”?, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 1-8, 1.
[60] Weiqing Song, “Interests, Power and China’s Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),” Journal of Contemporary China, 2013, vol. 23, no. 85, 85-101, 88.
[61] Song, “Interests, Power and China’s Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),” 88.
[62] Pantucci & Petersen, Sinostan- China’s Inadvertent Empire, 42.
[63] Song, “Interests, Power and China’s Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),” 90-91.
[64] “China Organises the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s Neighbouring Countries,” Middle East Political and Economic Institute, March 23, 2022.
[65] Pantucci & Petersen, Sinostan- China’s Inadvertent Empire, 187.
[66] “SCO terror meet begins with officials from China, Pakistan and Russia in Delhi,” The Hindu, May 16, 2022.
[67] Pantucci & Petersen, Sinostan- China’s Inadvertent Empire, 185-187.
[68] Ibid., 191-192.
[69] Ibid., 226-227.
[70] Ibid.,221-225.
[71] Aadil Brar, “Russia- Ukraine war has brought Putin to the negotiating table. China has new plans for BRI,” The Print, July 20, 2022.
[72] “‘No limits partnership’: Xi and Putin’s economic priorities,” Al Jazeera, March 21 2023.
[73] William Figueroa, “China and Iran Since the 25 Year Agreement: The Limits of Cooperation,” The Diplomat, January 17, 2022.
[74] Kalol Bhattacherjee, “The Moscow Format- Chasing Elusive Peace,” The Hindu, November 20, 2022.
[75] “Taliban eyes Russian oil purchases in Moscow Talks,” Energy Intelligence, August 17, 2022.
[76] “Russia hands over Afghan Embassy in Moscow to Taliban,” April 15, 2022.
[77] Manish & Prashant Kaushik, “China’s Interest in Afghanistan: An Assessment Post US Withdrawal,” China Report (2023), SAGE Publications, 1-22, 16.
[78] Krishnan & Johnly, The Comrades and the Mullahs− China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, 109.
[79] “Islamic State claims responsibility for Karte Parwan Gurudwara attack in Kabul,” The Economic Times, June 19, 2022.
[80] “Al- Qaeda still present in Afghanistan, Indians among its recruits, says UNSC report,” The Print, February 08, 2022.
[81] “Taliban hikes price of coal that Pakistan wants to import, shows who pulls the strings,” The Print, July 01, 2022.
[82] “‘Stop interfering in Afghanistan’ says Taliban leader in rare appearance,” The Hindu, July 01, 2022.
[83] “China will not get drawn into serious security role in Afghanistan,” The Hindu, August 22, 2021.
[84] Andrew Small, The China- Pakistan Axis- Asia’s New Geopolitics, New York: Oxford, University Press, 2015, 163.
