Abstract: Much has been made of the technical capability leap to Australia’s Military SATCOM that Joint Project 9102 (JP9102) aims to provide, particularly in facilitating the country to meet a changing grey-zone security environment in the Asia Pacific. However, the sovereignty requirement of the project is equally important, particularly from a geopolitical standpoint. It may be a trailblazer for the necessity of mid-tier powers to seek an ever greater and more independent capability in the space domain for security and economic purposes. The democratization of space security represented by JP9102, will profoundly affect the nature of Space Race 2.0, and astropolitics.
Bottom-line-up-front: Mid-tier states will increasingly need to look towards developing independent space capabilities, particularly in the SATCOM area, as modern economies become increasingly complex and fragile, just like the space infrastructure required to support them. Attendant to this will be the necessity to provide security to these assets from a growing array of threats. The increasing crowding of space by new space actors with independent security needs will complicate the zone as an operational and political domain, requiring greater attention as the 21st century progresses.
Problem statement: Why are mid-tier states increasingly seeking sovereign space capability, and how does Australia’s new JP9102 SATCOM requirements impact domestic and international contexts?
So what?: Mid-tier powers will require ever more extensive and sovereign space infrastructure to pursue their legitimate economic and security interests. This will drive competition among more actors for cutting-edge space infrastructure and securitization of these expensive assets. The need for a tighter and more modernized set of internationally recognized and agreed Space-related regulations should be agreed upon sooner rather than later.
Source: shutterstock.com/Inna Bigun
A Returning Player, But to a Very Different Space Race
Australia is a returning latecomer to spacefaring. It had been an early player in the Space Race.[1] In 1967 Australia became the seventh state to launch a military satellite.[2] However, by the 1980s, Australia’s lead, capability, and interest had significantly deteriorated and further space engagement had been rolled back or spurned.[3] In 2014 Australia terminated its small-scale Space Research Program, and until July 2018, it was one of only two OECD nations without a space agency,[4] the other being Iceland.[5]
Now though, Australia is taking the current fledgling Space Race 2.0 seriously for two key reasons.[6] Firstly, for its economic opportunities. Canada, with its comparatively modest space sector, generated AUS$5.7 billion in 2018.[7] Australia, by contrast, lagged, even though its geographic advantages could facilitate a highly lucrative space industry.[8] Particularly because Australia offers a multitude of locations where its vast open spaces of low population density, and less congested airspace, allow it to efficiently launch space infrastructure into a wide range of orbit types, including both geosynchronous equatorial and polar orbits without endangering the population.[9] Polar orbits are ideal for surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance satellites, while geosynchronous equatorial orbits are ideal for communication and weather satellites.[10] This makes Australia a highly competitive prospect potentially to a larger variety of space-interested companies by allowing diverse launch projects all from one country.
Likewise, Australia being surrounded by wide and comparatively empty ocean benefits the rocket stages, and any debris, safe landing, and recovery. By comparison Britain’s efforts for its own sovereign launch capability are limited to polar orbits and relying on the extremities of Scotland, though even here there has been set-backs as population density is high enough for there to be political push-back.[11]
To remedy its lack of capitalizing on these geographic advantages so far, Canberra has laid out a strategy to triple the size of Australia’s space sector by 2030.[12] Secondly, Australia acknowledges that space is increasingly integral to state security, as Australia’s 2020 force structure plan highlighted.[13] Space is also becoming an operational or even warfighting domain due to the increasing importance of space based infrastructure for both modern militaries operationality, and for the functioning of the state’s economy due to providing communications and internet access domestically and globally. This makes space assets increasingly a viable target for actors seeking to damage a state’s economy, society, and security apparatus, and do so without risking significant counter-action due to a lack of direct human casualties and the ability for cyber, electronic warfare, and kinetic attacks on space assets to be hard to detect, and attribute blame to.[14] Thus, Australia needs sovereign-controlled infrastructure to engage with this reality effectively.[15] Canberra has recognized this in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update and set aside AUS$7 billion over the next ten years to develop the foundations for required space capabilities.[16]
Space is also becoming an operational or even warfighting domain due to the increasing importance of space based infrastructure for both modern militaries operationality, and for the functioning of the state’s economy due to providing communications and internet access domestically and globally.
Joint Project 9102 – Providing Australia’s Next Generation Military SATCOM
JP9102 is one such funded development.[17] This project is expected to cost approximately AUS$2-3 billion of Canberra’s total space capability investment.[18] It will be a cornerstone in fulfilling Australia’s developing security needs and its broader space economy goals.[19] It aims to provide the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with sovereign military satellite communications, replacing its JP2008 predecessor, which provides the current SATCOM capability.[20] This latter system rests on a decaying civilian-military hybrid communications satellite, Optus C1.[21] This satellite system lacks modern capacity in terms of bandwidth to meet the requirements of incoming ADF platforms and technologies having already been stretched during Australia’s Middle East deployments over the last decade.[22] It is also nearing the end of its operational lifespan.[23] Alongside this, Australia relies heavily on borrowing US Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS).[24]
Australia’s reliance on partners such as the US to provide SATCOM comes with increased vulnerability. Issues such as slower utilization and response times and the political risks that face Australia despite fully funding a WGS satellite, usage may be delayed, limited, or denied if interests are not aligned.[25] Such problems were highlighted by the UK reliance on a reluctant US for satellite coverage during the Falklands War.[26]
Setting New Standards for Mid-Tier Powers- JP9102’s Security Impact in High Orbit
In contributing to Australia’s security and economic needs, JP9102, looks set to develop several new standards in both these areas for Australia, and internationally despite being a mid-tier power.
This is a term that Australia has traditionally defined itself as, but a more detailed explanation of its usage is required to highlight the radical contributions JP9102’s requirements may have.[27] A “mid-tier” power is defined here as a state that is part of the G20, and is a regional power with the need, ambition, and ability to protect its immediate interests, but with limited will or ability to project hard or soft power independently.[28] This is opposed to “major powers” like the US, China or even the UK and France, who have significantly larger economies, global interests, and the need, ability, or at least will to project soft or hard power to protect or advocate those interests on a global scale.[29]
In astro-security terms, Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper recognized that its critical satellite infrastructure was vulnerable to direct and indirect attack.[30] The ramping up of Chinese cyber-attacks on Australia have only emphasized this point.[31] As Australia re-orientates its wider-defensive capability against China and its “grey-zone” strategies, JP9102 is thus specified as needing full-spectrum defensive capability to detect, avoid, or survive kinetic, jamming, and cyber threats. [32] Particularly as SATCOM has a pivotal role in mitigating grey-zone tactics.[33] Specifically, through facilitating the necessary agility to identify grey zone attacks in physical and cyber spaces such as social media based information warfare campaigns, illegal territorial incursions, or cyber-attacks. SATCOM further allows the gathering, tracking, and sending of large volumes of data and intelligence to the correct end-users (be that political, military, or civil leadership) and facilitates the analysis, coordination, and relaying of a proportional response to mitigate the grey zone attack and provide the flexibility for any real-time adaptations to the changing circumstances as required. SATCOM speed and reliability are essential here then to minimize and isolate the disruption to a state and its society that grey zone tactics seek to create.
Specifically, through facilitating the necessary agility to identify grey zone attacks in physical and cyber spaces such as social media based information warfare campaigns, illegal territorial incursions, or cyber-attacks.
This requirement then is a clear upgrade on Optus C1, which lacks updated military-grade defences. It likely will become a standard consideration for future military and commercial satellites, given the increasing prevalence of grey-zone utilization against space infrastructure.[34]
Setting New Standards for Mid-Tier Powers- – JP9102’s Security Impact on the Ground
JP9102 sets new standards in terrestrial security. While concrete technical specifications are fluid as its tender will run until December 2021.[35] It is clear from the current requirements that Australia expects vastly increased SATCOM “Agility”—the ability to adapt in minutes to changing requirements.[36]
This is opposed to the nearly 24 hours it took for Australia to gain WSG usage during the 2020 bushfire emergency under the current SATCOM capability.[37] The further specification for Machine learning (ML) capability to facilitate this increased agility makes JP9102 a bleeding-edge technology project, that being a platform that is at the very forefront of technological development with all the risks and heavy development costs that implies.[38] This is because it raises universal standards and expectations for mid-tier powers as ML SATCOM development is still in its infancy and would see Australia join far wealthier states like the US.[39]
JP9102 will provide a significant coverage upgrade compared to Optus C1. The latter is limited to covering the Oceania, South-East Asia, and parts of the Western Pacific.[40] JP9102 however, will be able to supply operational support across the globe from Alaska to Germany and potentially beyond.[41] This coincides with a further requirement that JP9102 be able to encompass both military and commercial satellite usage.[42] This may take form possibly in a Hybrid Adaptive Networking (HAN) framework.[43] Regardless of the framework, a military-commercial focus may increase overall resilience and affordability and provide even greater coverage for military usage and the civilian economy. Australia is one of a handful of states who are actively taking this approach.[44] The HAN framework reinforces a growing international appreciation for SATCOM redundancy capacity in the new grey zone-centric environment as a universal requirement.[45]
A Radical Change for Mid-Tier Powers- the Requirement for Sovereign Control and Its Usefulness.
However, the most radical standard being set is Australia, through JP9102, becoming one of the first states to confirm the essentiality of mid-tier powers having a degree of sovereign control, capability, and ownership over their space infrastructure through JP9102’s sovereignty requirement.[46] In doing so, Australia is joining the ranks of major-power states, such as the UK and France, who are attempting to push for a significant degree of sovereign control and capacity over their space assets. Australia is then paving the way for this as a basic requirement for any 21st-century state who want strategic autonomy.[47] Such capability will strengthen foreign policy credentials and adaptation to grey-zone engagement.[48]
While Australia has no official definition of what sovereign space-capability entails, as Airbus’s tender submission for JP102 highlighted, the degree of sovereignty depends on post-tender developments—essentially, how much Australia is willing to pay.[49] Its requirement means at basic direct control of JP9102 which for security aids its agility and resilience through Australia being the prime user and solely responsible for its defence.[50] This, however, requires a further degree of concept and production ownership to develop and maintain JP9102 which will facilitate Australia to quickly replace or utilize redundancy capacity in case of its loss.[51] This ownership would aid broader Australian requirements for space sovereignty as JP1902 is seen as an integral contributor to developing Australia’s commercial and industrial space capacity.[52] Which has previously been identified as currently lacking.[53] It requires such state-funded projects for Australia’s state governments and private-sector to cultivate the industrial base needed for its space economy strategy.[54]
Australia and JP9102 – Pathfinding the Necessity for Mid-Tier Actors to Seek Space Capability and Sovereignty and its longer-term geopolitical consequences.
JP1902 is set to create new technical security and sovereignty standards for military SATCOM’s and more comprehensive space infrastructure, specifically for mid-tier states.
Through this, geopolitically it broadly may contribute significantly to the normalization of the expectancy for a degree of sovereign space capability among non-major powers. This will facilitate a widening of space participation as mid-tier powers follow Australia’s example and look to mitigate modern security threats, particularly from space, while seizing its new economic opportunities.
Specifically, for Australia, and providing the inspiration perhaps for a widening of mid-tier sovereign space requirements, JP9102 is likely to both increase Australia’s diplomatic leverage with partners. Through allowing it to contribute more to multinational security groups like the Five-Eyes, and through lending out its new satellite capability, which would be of great interest to non-US partners. Specifically, the UK and France who in their separate Pacific tilts seek to develop a stable and secure military and political presence in the Indo-Pacific, in the face of strained budgets.[55]
It also may attract greater foreign investment, which further expands Australia’s domestic space sector capabilities, turning the industry into a potentially lucrative engine for Australian growth. While strategically turning Australia’s isolated geographic position in the global economy into a space-related advantage that could help overcome its traditional distance-based economic constraints, through solidifying Australia as an attractive alternative space hub.[56] Both these factors would directly and indirectly enhance Australia’s soft power capability in an increasingly multipolar world. This competition however, particularly with other regional powers like China and India, not to mention contributing to the breaking of the US and Russia’s traditional dominance for space innovation and launches by a comparatively smaller power may ruffle feathers and see tensions based on its geoeconomic advantages grow, particularly in an increasingly protectionist global economy and as the space industry expands.[57]
While strategically turning Australia’s isolated geographic position in the global economy into a space-related advantage that could help overcome its traditional distance-based economic constraints, through solidifying Australia as an attractive alternative space hub.
Likewise, space since the end of the Cold War was somewhat distanced from earth-bound geopolitics, cooperation continuing around the International Space Station for instance, between NASA and Russia’s Roscomos throughout the 2014 Ukraine crisis.[58] However this has been changing, Russia is pulling out in 2025 to pursue its own space station citing US sanctions as the cause.[59] Australia’s mid-tier sovereignty precedent will splinter the potential for international cooperation further by it reinforcing a shift away from multilateralism, promoting deglobalization, and so increasing the potential for space competition to take a more cut-throat, self-interested form as mid-tier states become increasingly willing to pay to match each other, and larger powers, in securing an element of sovereign control over space assets for the ability to pursue their individual space-based interests more effectively, rather than minimizing costs through international cooperation.[60]
Such a landscape does not bode well for the already difficult task of creating an internationally agreed set of modernized rules to regulate the nature of the fledgling space economy and current Space Race. Attempts like the Artemis Accords are already struggling to gain traction due in part to national interests weighing heavily in the consideration for both signatories and non-signatories.[61] If the increasing prioritization of national concerns and the sovereign capability to facilitate them continues, it’s likely there will be no such agreement possible to alleviate the potential free-for-all in space exploitation and development, ensuring the creation of an international relations and astropolitical flashpoint in the future.
Samuel Jardine is the Head of Research at London Politica, and a Fellow of the Arctic Spring College: Geopolitics Intensive 2021 program. He has a master’s in modern history from King’s College London, and specializes in Space, Polar, and Asia-Pacific geopolitics, security, and climate conflict. He has a growing list of publications, his latest being on UK Space policy, and including several upcoming papers tackling Arctic geopolitics and security. The views contained in this article are the authors alone.
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[3] Kerrie Dougherty, “Sixty years of Australia in space”, Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, 153, no.477/478 (June 2020): 46-57; Kerrie Dougherty, “Lost in space: Australia dwindled from space leader to also-ran in 50 years”, The Conversation, September 21 2017, https://theconversation.com/lost-in-space-australia-dwindled-from-space-leader-to-also-ran-in-50-years-83310.
[4] “About the Australian Space Agency”, Australian Government Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, accessed 18 August 2021, https://www.industry.gov.au/about-us/about-the-australian-space-agency.
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[6] Robin McKie, “The moon, Mars and beyond… the space race in 2020”, The Guardian, January 5 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/jan/05/space-race-moon-mars-asteroids-commercial-launches.
[7] Document prepared for the Australia Space Agency, “The economic contribution of Australia’s space sector in 2018-19”, alphabeta Australia, February 2021, https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-02/the-economic-contribution-of-australias-space-sector-in-2018-19.pdf; “Canadian space industry”, Government of Canada, accessed 20 August 2021, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/082.nsf/eng/home.
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[9] Rami Mandow, “Southern Launch Australia Ready to Rocket Into Polar Orbit”, Space Australia, July 21 2020, https://spaceaustralia.com/index.php/news/southern-launch-australia-ready-rocket-polar-orbit; Hillary Mansour, “Australia is well positioned for space launches”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 27 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-is-well-positioned-for-space-launches/.
[10] Malcom Davis, “Australia one step closer to sovereign launch capability” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 15 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-one-step-closer-to-a-sovereign-launch-capability/; “Types of orbits”, The European Space Agency, March 30 2020, https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Transportation/Types_of_orbits.
[11] Samuel Jardine, “The UK’s Shaky Space Strategy”, London Politica, June 21, 2021, https://londonpolitica.com/euroasia/ukspacestrategy.
[12] Bulletin from Australian Government, “Australian Space Agency opens in Adelaide”, Australian Government Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, February 19 2020, https://www.industry.gov.au/news/australian-space-agency-opens-in-adelaide.
[13] “2020 Force Structure Plan”, Australian Government Department of Defence, July 1 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2020-force-structure-plan.
[14] Alexandra Stickings, “Space as an Operational Domain: What Next for NATO?”, RUSI, October 15 2020, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/space-operational-domain-what-next-nato; Statement made by General John W. “Jay” Raymond, “US Space Force Chief: Space Is ‘A Warfighting Domain’”, Forces Net, October 28 2020, https://www.forces.net/news/head-us-space-force-space-warfighting-domain.
[15] Malcom R. Davis, “Australia confronts a contested space domain and a rising China”, China Aerospace Studies Institute, September 18 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/opinion/australia-confronts-contested-space-domain-and-rising-china.
[16] “2020 Force Structure Plan”, Australian Government Department of Defence, July 1 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2020-force-structure-plan.
[17] HANSARD, “Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade”, Parliament of Australia, June 25 2021, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/commjnt/c32725df-99a8-4351-a1c9-46e5ae5a8210/&sid=0001; Mike Yeo, “JP 9102- ADF To Acquire Next Generation Satellite Technology”, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, July 16 2019, https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/jp-9102-adf-to-acquire-next-generation-satellite-technology/.
[18] “Integrated Investment Program”, Australian Government Department of Defence, February 25 2016, https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/.
[19] HANSARD, “Standing Committee on Industry, Innovation, Science and Resources”, Parliament of Australia, April 20 2021, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/commrep/006fcf0b-21f6-44a8-b471-29d824c42358/&sid=0004.
[20] Rob Napier, “Protecting the protectors”, Australian Defence Magazine, July 28 2021, https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/protecting-the-protectors.
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[22] Max Blenkin, “Sovereign SATCOM”, ADBR, February 23 2021, https://adbr.com.au/sovereign-satcom/.
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[26] Keith Mitchell, “Skynet: the real communication satellite system”, The National Archives, October 24 2019, https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/skynet-the-real-communication-satellite-system/#note-45779-6.
[27] Andrew Carr, “Is Australia a middle power? A systematic impact approach”, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 68, no.1 (2014), 70-84
[28] Stephen Kuper, “Navigating the development of power projection as a middle power”, Defence Connect, April 9 2019, https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/maritime-antisub/3854-navigating-the-development-of-power-projection-as-a-middle-power.
[29] For instance, a comparison of the UK and Australian economies highlights the significant difference in scale- “Country Comparison Australia vs United Kingdom”, Country Economy, accessed September 9 2021, https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/australia/uk?sector=Annual+GDP+at+market+prices&sc=XE33#tbl; Likewise despite some controversy the UK and France still retain both the will and ability to significantly project diplomatic leverage or smart power projection at the global scale independently if necessary, while Australia cannot do so significantly- James Rodgers, “Audit of Geopolitical Capability: An Assessment Of Twenty Major Powers”, Henry Jackson Society, January 2019, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/HJS-2019-Audit-of-Geopolitical-Capability-Report-web.pdf.
[30] “2016 Defence White Paper”, Australian Government Department of Defence, February 25 2016, https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/.
[31] Georgia Hitch and Andrew Probyn, “China believed to be behind major cyber attack on Australian governments and businesses”, ABC News, June 19 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-19/foreign-cyber-hack-targets-australian-government-and-business/12372470.
[32] HANSARD, “Standing Committee on Industry, Innovation, Science and Resources”, Parliament of Australia, April 20 2021, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/commrep/006fcf0b-21f6-44a8-b471-29d824c42358/&sid=0004; HANSARD, “Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade”, Parliament of Australia, June 25 2021, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/commjnt/c32725df-99a8-4351-a1c9-46e5ae5a8210/&sid=0001; Peter Layton, “Australia’s Defence Strategic Update: It’s All About China”, RUSI, August 3 2020, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/australias-defence-strategic-update-its-all-about-china; Unclassified presentation notes from Australian Defence Force Joint Capabilities Group, “Australian Defence SATCOM System (ASDSS) Brief to MilCIS 2018, Canberra (Session 1.6a-1:30pm)” Australian Defence Force Headquarters Joint Capabilities Group, November 13 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5274112ae4b02d3f058d4348/t/5c09a5608a922d7754c8f6a8/1544136043688/2018-1-6ab.pdf.
[33] “2020 Force Structure Plan”, Australian Government Department of Defence, July 1 2020, https://www1.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2020-force-structure-plan; “2020 Defence Strategic Update”, Australian Government Department of Defence, July 1 2020, https://www1.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2020-defence-strategic-update.
[34] Malcom R. Davis, “Australia confronts a contested space domain and a rising China”, China Aerospace Studies Institute, September 18 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/opinion/australia-confronts-contested-space-domain-and-rising-china.
[35] Aus Tender, “Current ATM View- JSD/NOT/12477/12”, Australian Government, April 9 2021, https://www.tenders.gov.au/Atm/Show/14a0fe25-62bb-4de1-ad0c-dd4035126dde.
[36] Unclassified presentation notes from Australian Defence Force Joint Capabilities Group, “Australian Defence SATCOM System (ASDSS) Brief to MilCIS 2018, Canberra (Session 1.6a-1:30pm)” Australian Defence Force Headquarters Joint Capabilities Group, November 13 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5274112ae4b02d3f058d4348/t/5c09a5608a922d7754c8f6a8/1544136043688/2018-1-6ab.pdf; Max Blenkin, “Sovereign SATCOM”, ADBR, February 23 2021, https://adbr.com.au/sovereign-satcom/.
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[38] “Australian companies, Defence, beef up space operations with new deals”, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, November 25 2020, https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/australian-companies-defence-beef-up-space-operations-with-new-deals/.
[39] Statement by Hughes Network Systems on new contract with U.S. Army to develop Machine Learning SATCOM, “U.S. Army Awards Hughes $11 Million R&D Contract for Enhancing Military Satellite Communications”, July 24 2019, https://government.hughes.com/resources/press-releases/us-army-awards-hughes-11-million-rd-contract-enhancing-military-satellite; Miquel Angel Vazquez et al, “Machine Learning for Satellite Communications Operations”, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Communications Magazine, 59, no.2 (February 2021), 22-27
[40] Satellite details and tracker, “Optus C1”, N2YO.com, accessed 20 August 2021, https://www.n2yo.com/?s=27831.
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[43] “For Global Operations, the AFD Needs An Adaptable Satellite Communications Network”, Defence Connect, September 30 2020, https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/6924-for-global-operations-the-adf-needs-an-adaptable-satellite-communications-network.
[44] Press Release, “Viasat selected to showcase its satellite-based hybrid adaptive networking capabilities at the U.S. Air Force Event: AFWERX Vegas”, Viasat, July 22 2019, https://www.viasat.com/about/newsroom/press-releases/viasat-selected-showcase-its-satellite-based-hybrid-adaptive/.
[45] HANSARD, “Standing Committee on Industry, Innovation, Science and Resources”, Parliament of Australia, April 20 2021, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/commrep/006fcf0b-21f6-44a8-b471-29d824c42358/&sid=0004; Ben Scott, “Australia Must Enter The Grey Zone To Counter Threats Of The Future”, Lowy Institute, July 6 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-must-enter-grey-zone-counter-threats-future.
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