Abstract: This essay examines the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies employed by apartheid regimes, with a focus on the Rhodesian Bush War (1964–1979). By analysing the intersection of racial ideologies, military tactics, intelligence, and international dynamics, this study explores the effectiveness and limitations of authoritarian COIN strategies in ideologically driven contexts. Despite achieving tactical successes, apartheid-era regimes often struggled to address the root causes of insurgency, ultimately undermining their long-term stability. The findings highlight the importance of legitimacy, integrated strategies, and international support in counterinsurgency efforts.

Problem statement: How do apartheid regimes’ counterinsurgency strategies, rooted in racial segregation and systemic repression, impact their effectiveness in addressing insurgencies?

So what?: Practitioners should prioritise building legitimacy by addressing political and social grievances, fostering inclusive governance, and reducing reliance on coercion. Military operations must be complemented with reforms targeting underlying inequalities and enhancing public trust. Lastly, securing broad international backing is vital to sustain operations and counter external support for insurgents.

Rhodesia and COIN

The Rhodesian Bush War, fought between 1965 and 1979, offers a critical case study of COIN strategies under authoritarian regimes. During this conflict, the white-minority Rhodesian government faced two nationalist insurgencies—ZANU’s Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZAPU’s Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)—backed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union, and neighbouring states. Despite demonstrating tactical innovation, such as fire force raids and pseudo-operations, the regime’s focus on coercive tactics rather than addressing systemic grievances ultimately undermined its efforts. Rhodesia’s failure to implement population-centric strategies, compounded by racial segregation and international sanctions, exemplifies the limitations of repression-based COIN approaches.

Authoritarian Counterinsurgency

The study of authoritarian COIN strategies reveals a distinct set of coercive approaches that prioritise repression and control over the population-centric methods typical of democratic regimes. Ucko identifies key features of authoritarian COIN, including the suppression of dissent, mass violence, and control-focused tactics. These regimes aim to repress insurgencies by amplifying the insurgent threat to the broader populace rather than fostering legitimacy or addressing grievances.[1] Zhukov highlights authoritarian regimes’ advantages in this context, such as greater freedom of action to employ invasive intelligence, population control, and overwhelming force.[2] However, Zhukov warns that reliance on coercive metrics, like body counts, often results in misjudged operational effectiveness and strategic missteps.

Reliance on coercive metrics, like body counts, often results in misjudged operational effectiveness and strategic missteps.

Hazelton builds upon these concepts with her “coercion theory,” which emphasises the importance of elite accommodation and population control in achieving COIN success. Hazelton argues that effective COIN requires military attrition to weaken insurgent forces, brute force to sever insurgent-civilian ties, and selective political incentives to co-opt rival elites.[3], [4] Similarly, Byman underscores the institutional advantages of authoritarian regimes, such as centralised surveillance and media control, which allow them to sustain prolonged repression.[5] Gawthorpe expands upon this analysis, noting that authoritarian COIN strategies rely on tools of coercion such as murder, torture, forced resettlement, and societal control.[6] Collectively, these studies underscore the tactical successes of coercive COIN strategies while highlighting their limitations, including their frequent inability to address the root causes of insurgencies or achieve long-term political stability.

While such measures may yield short-term operational gains, they often come at the cost of increased civilian grievances and diminished state legitimacy. Rhodesia exemplifies this approach. Following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from England in 1965, the Rhodesian regime adopted an “iron fist” strategy to combat ZAPU and ZANU insurgencies. The regime, facing economic sanctions, declining resources, and a growing insurgency, relied on brutal tactics such as pseudo-operations, forced relocations, and mass violence to inflict costs beyond the insurgents’ tolerance levels.[7], [8] However, as scholars like Hazelton and Valentino, et al. emphasise, such coercive measures often escalate violence and alienate civilian populations, leading to long-term strategic failure.[9], [10]

The Rhodesian case exemplifies the broader challenges of coercive COIN. Although the regime demonstrated tactical ingenuity and operational effectiveness, its reliance on repression, rather than addressing socio-economic and political grievances, ultimately undermined its efforts. This misalignment between tactical success and strategic objectives reflects a recurring theme in the literature: coercive counterinsurgency may win battles but often fails to secure sustainable peace.

Racial Ideology and COIN Strategies

COIN strategies under apartheid regimes represent a distinct subset of authoritarian COIN, marked by their reliance on racial segregation and systemic repression. These regimes, typified by Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe) and South Africa during apartheid, faced insurgencies driven by demands for equality, self-determination, and decolonisation. Their COIN strategies combined military operations, psychological warfare, and population control measures, all deeply intertwined with racial ideologies.[11], [12]

COIN strategies under apartheid regimes represent a distinct subset of authoritarian COIN.

Racial segregation was central to the governance and COIN strategies of apartheid regimes. In Rhodesia, racial ideology shaped many aspects of counterinsurgency, from military operations to population control measures. The establishment of “protected villages” exemplifies this approach. Modelled after British strategies in Malaya, these villages forcibly relocated African populations into controlled settlements to isolate insurgents.[13] However, poor living conditions and the coercive nature of these relocations alienated the local population, strengthening insurgent recruitment efforts.[14]

Racial ideology also influenced recruitment and operational decisions. In Rhodesia, the elite Selous Scouts and Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) were predominantly white, with limited integration of African personnel.[15] This racial exclusivity hampered the regime’s ability to build trust and collaboration with local communities, a critical component of successful COIN.[16]

The Rhodesian Bush War

The Rhodesian Bush war pitted the white-minority government against two nationalist insurgencies: the ZAPU and its military wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), as well as the Zimbabwe ZANU and its military arm, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA).[17] ZAPU was influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideologies and received substantial support from the Soviet Union. ZANU, primarily Maoist in orientation, was backed by the PRC. Both movements were driven by the goal of ending colonial rule and establishing majority governance in Rhodesia.

ZAPU was influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideologies and received substantial support from the Soviet Union.

The conflict’s roots lay in the racial and economic inequalities entrenched by colonial rule, merging nationalist aspirations with socioeconomic grievances.[18] Following its UDI in 1965, Rhodesia became an international pariah. The state faced crippling sanctions, economic hardship, and diplomatic isolation, which exacerbated its reliance on coercive COIN tactics. Devoid of the resources or international support required for population-centric COIN strategies, the Rhodesian government opted for an “iron fist” approach. This strategy sought to brutalise civilians into compliance, suppress insurgents, and weaken their support networks through forced relocations, mass violence, and psychological warfare.[19], [20]

Despite notable tactical successes, like high numbers of insurgent casualties, Rhodesia’s COIN efforts ultimately failed to address the root causes of the insurgency: inequality and exclusion. The government’s reliance on coercion rather than legitimacy alienated local populations and intensified support for the insurgents.[21]

The stakes for Rhodesia were existential. As Byman explains, failure to maintain a monopoly on violence would signal the collapse of the white-minority regime and the privileges of white Rhodesians.[22] The regime’s anocratic nature—a blend of authoritarianism and illiberal democracy—enabled it to pursue repressive strategies but also exposed its structural vulnerabilities. Ultimately, the insurgents’ ability to mobilise international support and exploit local grievances contributed to the regime’s downfall. By 1979, the Rhodesian government capitulated, leading to the Lancaster House Agreement and the transition to majority rule.

The Rhodesian Bush War exemplifies the limitations of repression-based COIN strategies in addressing insurgencies rooted in deep-seated grievances. It highlights the importance of legitimacy, international alliances, and addressing systemic inequalities for achieving sustainable peace.[23]

Military Operations and Population Control

Rhodesian COIN operations were tactically effective, achieving significant military successes against ZANLA and ZIPRA insurgents. Innovative strategies, such as fire force raids, pseudo-operations, and cross-border strikes, enabled Rhodesian forces to maintain a high insurgent kill ratio, with an estimated 12,000 guerrillas killed during the conflict.[24] These operations showcased the adaptability and proficiency of units like the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) and Selous Scouts in intelligence-led strikes, rapid deployment, and small-unit tactics. For example, Operation Dingo, a large-scale assault on ZANLA bases in Mozambique in November 1977, dealt a devastating blow to insurgent leadership and infrastructure, killing over 1,000 insurgents at Chimoio alone.[25] Despite manpower and resource constraints caused by international sanctions, Rhodesian forces demonstrated consistent battlefield superiority through precision operations and innovative approaches.

Rhodesian COIN operations were tactically effective, achieving significant military successes against ZANLA and ZIPRA insurgents.

Fire force tactics, developed in the mid-1970s, epitomised this military ingenuity. Combining heli-borne troops, paratrooper insertions, and close air support, these operations enabled Rhodesian forces to rapidly encircle and eliminate guerrilla fighters, often guided by intelligence from units like the Selous Scouts.[26] While these strategies inflicted heavy losses on insurgents, they ultimately failed to halt the insurgency, as manpower shortages and guerrilla recruitment increasingly outpaced Rhodesian efforts. Pseudo-operations, involving disguised government forces infiltrating insurgent-held areas, also achieved tactical success by undermining guerrilla cohesion and disrupting logistical networks.[27] However, their reliance on deception and targeted killings raised ethical concerns and alienated local populations, fostering distrust and resentment toward the regime.[28]

Despite their operational success, Rhodesian COIN strategies reflected the limitations of coercive approaches. The failure to integrate these military gains with broader political and social reforms, such as addressing socio-economic inequalities and political disenfranchisement, meant that tactical victories could not translate into strategic success. Ultimately, Rhodesia’s reliance on fear, violence, and repression alienated the civilian population, strengthened insurgent resolve, and undermined the regime’s legitimacy, contributing to its ultimate defeat.[29], [30]

Forced Population Resettlement Strategies under Authoritarian Regimes

Forced population resettlement has long been a hallmark of authoritarian COIN strategies. Rooted in the belief that insurgencies rely on civilian support, these strategies aim to sever the ties between guerrillas and local populations. The underlying principles of resettlement are straightforward: insurgencies thrive on the logistical, informational, and moral backing of local communities, and physical separation is necessary to deny these resources.[31]

The underlying principles of resettlement are straightforward: insurgencies thrive on the logistical, informational, and moral backing of local communities, and physical separation is necessary to deny these resources.

Authoritarian regimes often justify resettlement under the guise of improving civilian safety or quality of life. Still, the real purpose is to control populations and deny insurgents access to support networks.[32], [33] While this strategy can weaken insurgent operations temporarily, it often carries significant social and political costs. As Hazelton notes, forced resettlement frequently fosters deep resentment, politicising displaced populations and generating grievances that insurgents can exploit.[34]

During the war, the Rhodesian government adopted a population resettlement strategy as a key component of its coercive COIN campaign. The establishment of “protected villages” aimed to isolate rural civilians from insurgent forces, disrupting insurgent access to resources, supplies, and intelligence.[35] Officially, the Rhodesian government claimed these measures would enhance civilian safety and elevate living standards for rural Africans.[36] In reality, the program sought to exert control over displaced populations while denying insurgents access to the broader civilian base.

By 1978, approximately 11.5% of the black peasant population had been relocated to protected villages.[37] These villages were heavily surveilled, and residents faced significant restrictions on their freedom. Conditions in the resettlement areas were often poor, with inadequate resources, lack of security, and restricted access to livelihoods. The coercive nature of the resettlement process compounded grievances, stripping civilians of their cultural roots and traditional economic independence.[38], [39]

Rather than achieving its intended goal of undermining insurgent networks, Rhodesia’s resettlement strategy exacerbated civilian grievances. The harsh realities of forced relocation, combined with the regime’s overt racial policies, alienated the very populations the government sought to control. Civilians viewed protected villages as instruments of state oppression rather than protection, fueling resentment and disillusionment. Insurgents leveraged these grievances to recruit from within the displaced communities, embedding themselves and transforming protected villages into hotbeds of resistance.[40], [41]

The failure of Rhodesia’s resettlement strategy exemplifies the broader limitations of coercive COIN. While the approach disrupted guerrilla logistics temporarily, it also deepened societal fractures and undermined the regime’s legitimacy. As Hazelton observes, authoritarian COIN strategies that rely on force without addressing underlying grievances are inherently unsustainable.[42] In Rhodesia, the inability to reconcile tactical objectives with broader strategic goals further destabilised the region, ensuring that resettlement policies contributed to, rather than mitigated, the insurgency’s momentum.

Strategic Challenges and Limitations of Coercive COIN

Racial Ideology

The Rhodesian regime was deeply rooted in white supremacist ideology, which significantly shaped its counterinsurgency strategies, often to its detriment. As former Rhodesian SAS operator Andre Sheepers notes, this supremacist hubris undermined the regime’s ability to effectively address the socio-political dynamics fueling the insurgency: “Steeped in a supremacist culture, I am not sure many of our leaders really understood the African or the social dynamics of the time”.[43] White Rhodesians largely viewed insurgent factions as mere proxies of global communism—a perception not entirely unfounded, given ZAPU and ZANU’s Marxist ideologies and support from the PRC and the Soviet Union.[44] However, this narrow framing ignored the insurgency’s deeper roots in systemic racial inequalities and the marginalisation of black Rhodesians.

White Rhodesians largely viewed insurgent factions as mere proxies of global communism.

This racial myopia was reflective of a broader colonial mindset. As Christopher Othen observes, European colonisation in Africa was often justified under the guise of moral and civilisational imperatives, such as ending slavery or bringing the rule of law. At the same time, the primary motivation remained economic exploitation.[45] For Rhodesia, the fear of replicating the chaos and violence of post-colonial states further entrenched its resistance to majority rule. Rhodesians witnessed the political and economic collapse of newly independent African nations and were particularly haunted by the atrocities committed in the Belgian Congo during the early 1960s. These events, Pringle argues, catalysed the rise of the right-wing Rhodesian Front, which capitalised on fears of racial and political upheaval to consolidate power.[46]

Ultimately, the Rhodesian regime’s racial biases hindered its ability to recognise and address the legitimate grievances of the black majority. This failure alienated large segments of the population and bolstered insurgent narratives, exacerbating the very conflict the regime sought to suppress.

International Isolation

Rhodesia’s openly racist regime, which upheld white-minority rule and institutionalised racial segregation, attracted widespread international condemnation, leading to its diplomatic isolation and the imposition of economic sanctions. International sanctions imposed on Rhodesia following its UDI in 1965 had profound and far-reaching consequences for its counterinsurgency efforts. UDI led to severing diplomatic and economic relations with the United Kingdom and much of the international community, resulting in sanctions that aimed to force the Rhodesian state into negotiating an internal settlement with nationalist leaders.[47] These sanctions created three critical second-order effects that constrained Rhodesian COIN strategies.

First, international isolation contributed to the emergence of an anocratic regime in Rhodesia, combining elements of democracy and autocracy. Second, sanctions weakened the economy and drove significant emigration of white, middle-class Rhodesians, further reducing the state’s resources and manpower. In 1965, Rhodesia’s white population stood at approximately 250,000, but between 1976 and 1980, about 20% emigrated to South Africa and beyond.[48] The Central Intelligence Agency highlighted the detrimental economic effects of this demographic shift.[49] The Rhodesian Security Forces could rely on only 2,300 white conscripts for national service by the war’s end.[50] This drastic decline in manpower undermined the traditional counterinsurgency axiom, requiring a 10-to-1 ratio of counterinsurgent to insurgent forces; Rhodesia managed only a one-to-one ratio throughout much of the conflict.[51] As Lindsey O’Brien, a Troop Leader with the BSAP Support Unit, observed, “The SF [Security Forces] had not been defeated; they had simply run out of people”.[52]

In 1965, Rhodesia’s white population stood at approximately 250,000, but between 1976 and 1980, about 20% emigrated to South Africa and beyond.

Third, international condemnation and sanctions created opportunities for insurgents to gain expanded support from the Soviet Union, the PRC, and the Front Line states. ZANLA and ZIPRA insurgents benefited from training, resources, and safe havens provided by these external actors, further bolstering their campaigns against the Rhodesian state. This external support, coupled with declining manpower and resources, forced Rhodesia to adopt coercive COIN strategies as a matter of necessity.

Low-violence, population-centric strategies—hallmarks of “hearts and minds” approaches—were deemed too costly and time-consuming to prevent the imminent collapse of the Rhodesian state. As Downes notes, such approaches require significant material resources and extended timelines, which Rhodesia lacked.[53] Instead, the regime pursued a more cost-effective coercive strategy, relying on high insurgent-kill ratios to weaken the opposition.[54] Attrition became the cornerstone of Rhodesian COIN, with an obsessive focus on body counts and kill ratios until the very end of the war.[55]

Ultimately, the Rhodesian state faced a battle for its own existence. When an insurgency threatens a regime’s survival, escalation and coercive measures often become more appealing, as the costs of violent strategies seem minimal compared to the potential political and economic losses.[56] However, these strategies, while temporarily effective in inflicting insurgent losses, failed to address the structural issues at the root of the conflict, sealing the fate of the Rhodesian regime.

Lessons Learned

Importance of Legitimacy

The Rhodesian Bush War underscores the dangers of relying on coercive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies while neglecting efforts to win the hearts and minds of the black majority population. Although the Rhodesian government employed innovative military tactics such as fire force raids and pseudo-operations to target insurgent forces, these measures were not paired with meaningful political or social reforms, a failure that eroded the regime’s legitimacy and ultimately strengthened insurgent resolve.[57], [58] Repressive tactics, such as forced relocations into protected villages, further alienated civilian populations, stripping them of autonomy and livelihoods, and reinforcing insurgent narratives.[59]

Repressive tactics, such as forced relocations into protected villages, further alienated civilian populations.

Legitimacy is a critical component of sustainable COIN, achievable through political inclusion and addressing grievances, yet the Rhodesian regime’s racial segregation policies and refusal to engage meaningfully with marginalised populations exacerbated resentment and resistance.[60] Instead, the regime focused on a coercive, attrition-based strategy, designed to inflict pain and suffering that exceeded the population’s tolerance for supporting guerrillas.[61] While this approach achieved short-term tactical successes, it failed to address the root causes of the insurgency, including socio-economic inequalities and political disenfranchisement.[62], [63]

As an anocracy—mixing democratic and authoritarian elements—Rhodesia faced significant constraints, including international sanctions and economic challenges, which further limited its COIN options.64 Hearts and Minds strategies, requiring significant resources, were deemed too costly. Instead, the regime prioritised repressive measures, such as pseudo-operations, which created widespread fear and confusion among civilians while undermining the regime’s long-term strategic objectives.[65], [66]

Ultimately, the Rhodesian government’s inability to balance military operations with political inclusivity and economic reform doomed its counterinsurgency campaign. Successful COIN requires both tactical effectiveness and legitimacy, achieved by addressing insurgents and their support base through reforms and governance. Rhodesia’s failure to integrate these elements demonstrates the limitations of repression-based strategies, as they often alienate civilian populations and bolster insurgent movements.

Role of International Support

The Rhodesian Bush War underscores the critical influence of international dynamics on counterinsurgency strategies. Situated within the Cold War context, the conflict saw insurgent groups like the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) gain substantial external support from the PRC, the Soviet Union, and FRELIMO-led Mozambique. This external backing provided insurgents with critical resources, training, and safe havens. Conversely, Rhodesia’s reliance on apartheid South Africa exposed the regime’s vulnerability to diplomatic isolation and underscored the importance of diversified alliances.[67]

International sanctions played a pivotal role in constraining Rhodesia’s military and economic capacity. Imposed to pressure the government into negotiating with nationalist leaders like Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, these sanctions limited Rhodesia’s access to vital resources and military equipment. As Bax recounts, “Given the equipment we needed to train with simply didn’t exist, we had to rely solely on our vivid imaginations”.[68] While some argue that the material shortages were exaggerated by the regime, the overall impact of sanctions forced the Rhodesian government into increasingly desperate measures to sustain its COIN efforts.[69] The regime’s reliance on South Africa for imports and its covert export routes to Zambia further highlighted the challenges of operating under severe economic and diplomatic pressure.

The regime’s reliance on South Africa for imports and its covert export routes to Zambia further highlighted the challenges of operating under severe economic and diplomatic pressure.

Sanctions also highlighted the broader decline in Western support for counterinsurgency during this period. American backing for such efforts diminished significantly between 1968 and 1980, as international pressure from the United States and Britain intensified to push Rhodesia toward settlement negotiations.[70], [71] Despite the regime’s tactical successes on the battlefield, the combined effects of economic isolation and insurgent external support eroded Rhodesia’s ability to sustain the war.

The Rhodesian Bush War demonstrates that international legitimacy and diversified alliances are critical components of successful COIN. The regime’s failure to navigate these dynamics ultimately contributed to its downfall. A counterfactual consideration—had Rhodesia survived into the Reagan administration’s era of more aggressive anti-communist policies—raises intriguing questions about how external support might have reshaped its COIN strategies and broader geopolitical alignment.

Severe Limitations

The counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies of apartheid regimes, exemplified by Rhodesia, provide critical insights into the limitations of repression-based approaches in addressing insurgencies. While Rhodesia demonstrated tactical ingenuity through operations such as fire force, pseudo-operations, and cross-border raids, these military successes failed to achieve long-term stability. The regime’s reliance on coercion, forced relocations, and psychological warfare—hallmarks of authoritarian COIN—secured short-term disruption but exacerbated grievances among the rural population. As Ucko and Zhukov emphasise, authoritarian regimes often pursue control through force while neglecting the socio-political conditions that fuel insurgencies, ultimately undermining their strategic goals.[72], [73]

A key shortcoming of Rhodesia’s COIN strategy was its inability to address the root causes of the conflict: systemic inequality, exclusion, and land dispossession. Policies like the protected villages, designed to sever guerrilla support, instead alienated local populations and strengthened insurgent recruitment efforts. This misalignment between tactical successes and broader strategic objectives highlights the enduring importance of legitimacy in counterinsurgency.[74] As Hazelton argues, sustainable COIN success requires addressing grievances, fostering inclusion, and winning political legitimacy rather than relying solely on military coercion.[75]

Additionally, Rhodesia’s diplomatic isolation and overreliance on apartheid South Africa underscore the role of international support in shaping COIN outcomes. Insurgent groups like ZANLA and ZIPRA, backed by external actors such as the PRC, the Soviet Union, and FRELIMO-led Mozambique, leveraged international aid to sustain their operations. In contrast, Rhodesia’s inability to secure broader international legitimacy left the regime vulnerable to sanctions and external condemnation, highlighting the importance of balancing military actions with diplomatic engagement and international alliances.[76]

Rhodesia’s diplomatic isolation and overreliance on apartheid South Africa underscore the role of international support in shaping COIN outcomes.

Ultimately, the Rhodesian experience demonstrates that counterinsurgency strategies rooted in repression and exclusion are inherently unsustainable. While military innovation and operational successes can disrupt insurgent movements, they cannot replace the need for comprehensive, integrated strategies that address political, social, and economic grievances. Modern COIN efforts must prioritise legitimacy, balance force with meaningful reforms, and engage international partners to achieve lasting stability. The Rhodesian case serves as a cautionary tale, illustrating that the failure to address root causes and secure popular support can turn short-term tactical victories into long-term strategic defeats.

 

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Matthew P. Arsenault holds a PhD in political science and has worked on issues of political violence across academia, government, and the private sector. He has been published in Small Wars Journal, RealClearDefense, and National Identities. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.

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[1] David Ucko, “‘The People Are Revolting’: An Analysis of Authoritarian Counterinsurgency,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 1 (2016): 61.

[2] Yuri Zhukov, “Examining the Authoritarian Advantage in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Russia’s North Caucasus,” Security Studies 16, no. 3 (2007): 406–408.

[3] Jacqueline Hazelton, “The Hearts and Minds Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” International Security 42, no. 1 (2017): 80–90.

[4] Monica Duffy-Toft and Yuri Zhukov, “Denial and Punishment in the North Caucasus: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Coercive Counter-Insurgency,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 6 (2012): 785–800.

[5] Daniel Byman, “The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 1 (2015): 79.

[6] Andrew Gawthorpe, “All Counterinsurgency Is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 28, no. 4-5 (2017): 839–852.

[7] Richard Shultz, “Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare,” The Western Political Quarterly 32, no. 2 (1979): 444–466.

[8] Daniel Byman, “The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 1 (2015): 62-93.

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[13] Henrik Ellert, “Intelligence and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia,” in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, ed. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (London: James Currey, 1995), 87–103.

[14] J. K. Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

[15] Ron Reid Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Alberton, South Africa: Galago Publishing, 1982).

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[20] Richard Shultz, “Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare,” The Western Political Quarterly 32, no. 2 (1979): 444–466.

[21] Daniel Byman, “The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 1 (2015): 79.

[22] Daniel Byman, “The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 1 (2015): 68.

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[25] Ian Pringle, Dingo Firestorm: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War (Warwick, United Kingdom: Helion and Company, 2013), 92-93.

[26] C. Cocks, Fireforce: One Man’s War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry (United Kingdom: Helion & Company, 2012).

[27] Ron Reid Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Alberton, South Africa: Galago Publishing, 1982).

[28] Luise White, “Racial Policies and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia,” Comparative Politics 43, no. 3 (2011): 345–370.

[29] Jacqueline Hazelton, “The Hearts and Minds Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” International Security 42, no. 1 (2017): 80–90.

[30] Luise White, “Racial Policies and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia,” Comparative Politics 43, no. 3 (2011): 345–370.

[31] Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 100.

[32] S. Plakoudas, “Population Transfers in Counter-Insurgency: A Recipe for Success?,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 27, no. 4 (2016): 681–701.

[33] Daniel Byman, “The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 1 (2015): 77.

[34] Jacqueline Hazelton, “The Hearts and Minds Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” International Security 42, no. 1 (2017).

[35] Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer M. Taw, and David Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991).

[36] A. K. H. Weinrich, African Nationalism in Rhodesia (London: Oxford University Press, 1977).

[37] David Caute, Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1983), 68.

[38] A. K. H. Weinrich, African Nationalism in Rhodesia (London: Oxford University Press, 1977).

[39] Munyaradzi Bryn Munochiveyi, “The Political Lives of Rhodesian Detainees during Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 46, no. 2 (2013): 283.

[40] Luise White, “Racial Policies and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia,” Comparative Politics 43, no. 3 (2011): 345–370.

[41] Luise White, “Heading for the Gun: Skills and Sophistication in an African Guerrilla War,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51, no. 2 (2009): 236–259.

[42] Jacqueline Hazelton, “The Hearts and Minds Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” International Security 42, no. 1 (2017): 80–90.

[43] Hannes Wessels with Andre Scheepers, We Dared to Win: The SAS in Rhodesia (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2018), 169.

[44] Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer M. Taw, and David Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991), v.

[45] Christopher Othen, Katanga 1960-63: Mercenaries, Spies, and the African Nation That Waged War on the World (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: The History Press, 2015), 20.

[46] Ian Pringle, Dingo Firestorm: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War (Warwick, United Kingdom: Helion and Company, 2013), 7-8, 13-14.

[47] Timothy Bax, Three Sips of Gin: Dominating the Battlespace with Rhodesia’s Famed Selous Scouts (Warwick, U.K.: Helion and Company, 2013), 420.

[48] David Caute, Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1983), 29.

[49] Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia: The Economic, Military, and Demographic Situation in Mid 1979, 1979.

[50] Luise White, “Civic Virtue, Young Men, and the Family: Conscription in Rhodesia, 1974-1980,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 37, no. 1 (2004): 103–120.

[51] Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer M. Taw, and David Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991), 146.

[52] Lindsey O’Brien, Bandit Mentality: Hunting Insurgents in the Rhodesian Bush War, a Memoir. (West Midlands, England: Helion & Company, 2017): 129.

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