Abstract: This essay examines Germany’s lack of strategic culture and its implications for deterrence and security policy. Written in the aftermath of the MSC 2025 and the context of growing geopolitical instability, it highlights how Europe’s reliance on the United States, combined with a weak defence mindset, undermines the ability to deter adversaries. The analysis compares Germany’s approach to security with that of France, the UK and smaller European states, demonstrating how strategic autonomy, societal resilience and military readiness contribute to credible deterrence. Additionally, it emphasises the need for a more proactive and engaged public discourse on security matters.
Problem statement: How can Germany and Europe develop a credible deterrence strategy in the face of geopolitical instability, hybrid threats and a historically weak strategic culture?
So what?: Without a credible and possibly joint strategic culture, Germany and Europe remain vulnerable to threats, reliant on the U.S. and unprepared for modern security challenges. Therefore, Europe must shift from reactive to proactive strategic resilience, integrating deterrence, societal awareness and autonomous defence capabilities into a coherent long-term strategy.
Changing Tides
The security landscape of Europe is in flux, with NATO facing new challenges, U.S. security guarantees becoming increasingly uncertain, and the continent grappling with the reality of war on its doorstep.[1] The fundamental question for Germany in terms of European security is whether it can establish a credible deterrence. The problem is not merely military capabilities but also the absence of a cohesive strategic culture—a factor that has historically shaped the ability of states to act decisively in matters of war and peace. While Europe’s economic and diplomatic influence is formidable, its strategic naivety and political reluctance to engage in power politics have undermined its ability to deter adversaries effectively.
The Deficiency of Strategic Culture in Germany
“Successful strategy is based upon clearly identifying political goals, assessing one’s comparative advantage relative to the enemy, calculating costs and benefits carefully, and examining the risks and rewards of alternative strategies.”[2]
Germany’s security apparatus and political leadership suffer from a profound lack of strategic culture.[3] The underlying understanding of strategic culture is the cumulative historical experience, institutional structures, and societal beliefs that define how a state approaches power politics, military development, and national security strategy.[4] In Germany, this culture has eroded due to historical sensitivities, institutional complacency, and a prolonged illusion of a “peace dividend.”[5]
Germany’s security apparatus and political leadership suffer from a profound lack of strategic culture.
The consequences of this strategic deficit have been apparent in recent crises. Germany’s role in Afghanistan highlighted the constraints of risk-averse decision-making, while its response to the war in Ukraine exposed a tendency toward reactive, rather than proactive, security policy. Despite years of warnings about Russian revisionism, Germany remained strategically passive, relying on economic ties rather than hard security considerations.[6] The Zeitenwende (turning point) – marked by Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s 2022 speech following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, signalling a shift toward greater military investment and geopolitical assertiveness – was intended to change this, yet German decision-making remains hesitant. Instead of proactively shaping its security policy, Germany has continued to respond incrementally and reactively. Although military aid and budget increases have signalled a shift in priorities, there has been no broad societal recognition of the need for a more profound transformation of strategic thinking.[7]
Deterrence – How It Should Be Read
An effective deterrence strategy comprises several key components: military capability, credible communication, and societal resilience.[8] While economic and diplomatic elements play roles, the current security landscape—marked by Russia’s war against Ukraine and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) growing geopolitical ambitions—underscores the paramount importance of the military dimension in deterrence today. Without a robust, ready, and technologically advanced armed force, any deterrence lacks credibility. However, even the most formidable military remains ineffective without an ingrained strategic culture and societal mindset. Following its Zeitenwende, Germany has allocated billions to the Bundeswehr, yet a lack of security policy awareness in politics and society hampers actual military effectiveness.[9] Deterrence doesn’t function through weaponry alone—it must be embedded in the minds of political leaders and the population.
These factors which make the lack of awareness problematic necessitate, at the very least, a strategic realism that clearly identifies adversaries—and Russia is one of them. The Russian leadership under Vladimir Putin pursued a long-term, revisionist policy aimed at dismantling the European security order. Russia’s nonlinear threats to Europe encompass not only the brutal aggression against Ukraine but also cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure, and targeted destabilisation efforts within Western societies. As long as Germany hesitates to identify Russia as the central threat to its security unequivocally, its deterrence policy remains half-hearted and inconsistent. The chance is now at hand, as Germany reorganises after the February 23, 2025, Federal elections. Countries like Finland and Poland, on the other hand, demonstrate that a resilient society complements and reinforces military deterrence.
As long as Germany hesitates to identify Russia as the central threat to its security unequivocally, its deterrence policy remains half-hearted and inconsistent.
In contrast, Germany’s strategic culture remains fragmented and indecisive, rendering even the most advanced weaponry ineffective in achieving the desired deterrent effect. And indeed, an important component is geography. The location defines the perspective here. Nevertheless, without a solidified strategic culture, any military investment ultimately becomes merely symbolic. Only by clearly identifying the adversary can effective deterrence be achieved.
Political Leadership and Institutional Fragmentation
A transformation of strategic culture does not occur in isolation but rather requires political leadership that actively shapes public discourse and aligns it with security realities. Political leaders are decision-makers and interpreters of strategic culture, responsible for defining national security priorities and engaging the public in these discussions. However, German political leaders have traditionally avoided direct and sustained debates about military engagement, fearing public opposition and political backlash.[10]
A significant challenge to Germany’s transformation of its strategic culture lies in the structural and political fragmentation of its decision-making process, particularly within the party system and the ministerial division of responsibilities. Unlike in more centralised political systems, where security policy can be shaped with relative continuity, Germany’s approach is often subject to party-specific agendas, coalition dynamics, and bureaucratic complexities.[11] This is especially evident when key ministries responsible for security and foreign policy—such as the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office—are controlled by different parties within a coalition government. Divergent party interests and ideological differences can lead to competing visions of security strategy, slowing down the development of a cohesive military doctrine.[12]
A clear example of this challenge is the lengthy process required to draft and approve strategic policy papers. Any proposal for a shift in military strategy must navigate multiple layers of negotiation—within the governing coalition, between ministries, and often with opposition parties that seek to influence policy direction. The delays in Germany’s National Security Strategy[13] exemplify this problem. Although in 2021, the governing coalition had agreed to present a comprehensive strategy within the first year of its term, internal disagreements prevented it from meeting this timeline. The Federal Foreign Office led the drafting process; however, coordination issues between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence resulted in repeated delays. The final version was only adopted in June 2023, well beyond the initial deadline.[14]
Another example of the impact of Germany’s indecisiveness is the ongoing debate about establishing a National Security Council. While such a body was considered during the drafting of the above-mentioned National Security Strategy, coalition partners could not reach an agreement on its structure and function. This failure reflects institutional and partisan obstacles to achieving a more coherent security framework. Proponents argue that a National Security Council could improve coordination across different governmental branches, but its implementation was ultimately abandoned due to internal disputes.[15]
A comparative perspective is useful here. Under Charles de Gaulle, France maintained military strategic autonomy through its Force de Frappe, ensuring a nuclear deterrent independent of U.S. guarantees.[16] The UK’s Integrated Review 2021 prioritised a global security role while maintaining deep NATO integration.[17] Poland’s Territorial Defence Forces Strategy focuses on national resilience, a model Germany could consider.[18] Furthermore, as early as 2016, Germany’s Bundeswehr White Paper highlighted the necessity of aligning military strategy with geopolitical realities.[19]
Under Charles de Gaulle, France maintained military strategic autonomy through its Force de Frappe, ensuring a nuclear deterrent independent of U.S. guarantees.
The OPLAN (Operationsplan) Germany initiative offers some hope for change, advocating for a clearer security framework and promoting an approach that encompasses the entire German society.[20] It is a comprehensive and classified military strategy developed by the German Armed Forces to coordinate Germany’s defence and support NATO operations in response to potential security threats, particularly from Russia. However, genuine strategic reform requires more than conceptual blueprints. It demands a cultural shift—one that integrates strategic realism into political and military decision-making. Generals and Admirals explaining security policy on morning television is a positive step. Still, the real responsibility lies with political leaders who must engage with long-term security planning beyond electoral cycles.[21]
Deterrence and the Future of European Security
Germany is not alone in its strategic complacency. Most European states have, to varying degrees, abandoned (military) strategic thinking in favour of economic efficiency and political convenience. Aside from a few exceptions—most notably France and the United Kingdom—Europe has relegated its security needs to the U.S. For decades, this reliance on the U.S. security umbrella was sustainable. However, recent geopolitical developments signal a turning point: Donald Trump’s stance on NATO has made it clear that Europe can no longer take U.S. protection for granted. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exposed Europe’s military vulnerabilities. The PRC’s growing influence and potential flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific demand Washington’s attention, possibly at the expense of European security interests.[22] Europe’s strategic dependence has left it vulnerable to shifts in U.S. policy. The assumption that NATO will always function as a one-sided guarantee is an illusion.
The Case for Reviving Strategic Culture
If Germany and Europe want to achieve credible deterrence, they must restore and institutionalise strategic thinking. This is not about embracing militarism but about recognising the realities of global power politics. Those who fail to think strategically will inevitably become subjects of those who do. A renewed strategic culture could focus on four key areas:
Strategic Education and Leadership Training
Strategic studies must be a core part of officer training and political education. Germany’s Bundeswehr and civilian security institutions need to integrate strategic thought deeper into their curricula. Diplomatic and political leaders must develop a broader understanding of security affairs. This means reforming foreign ministry training programs to include a rigorous education in, of course, not only military strategy and power dynamics.
Societal Resilience Against Hybrid Threats
A functioning deterrence strategy depends not only on military strength but also on societal resilience. The ability to withstand hybrid warfare, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion is as crucial as physical defence capabilities. Germany and Europe must strengthen their resilience against foreign information warfare. The speech by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference highlighted the increasing role of state-sponsored misinformation campaigns aimed at undermining social cohesion.[23] Russia and the PRC, among other actors, have actively engaged in such efforts. Media literacy and critical thinking must become pillars of education policy. A well-informed population is more difficult to manipulate and less susceptible to external attempts at societal division. Cybersecurity and counterintelligence measures must be prioritised to protect against espionage, election interference, and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.
The Societal Acceptance of Armed Forces and Defence Readiness
In many European countries, including Germany, military service and defence capabilities, as well as a particularly strong leading European nation, are viewed with scepticism.[24] However, deterrence requires weapons, and a society must be willing to use them if necessary. Rebuilding the societal perception of the military as an essential institution is crucial. The Bundeswehr needs public backing to recruit and retain skilled personnel. A professional and well-equipped armed force requires public investment and support. Defence spending should not be seen as a burden but as an essential investment in national and European security.[25]
The Personnel Challenge: Demographics vs. Economic Growth
A key issue for European militaries is the challenge of recruiting and retaining personnel in the face of demographic decline and economic competition for skilled labour. Germany and Europe must create a sustainable personnel strategy that balances military needs with economic demands. Innovative service models, including part-time military careers or national service incentives, could address personnel shortages while maintaining workforce flexibility. A strong economy and a strong military are not mutually exclusive. Strategic investment in defence industries can stimulate economic growth while ensuring the availability of high-tech capabilities.
Strategic Crossroads
Europe and Germany stand at a crossroads. The post-Cold War illusion of permanent peace is over. The war in Ukraine, the uncertainty of U.S. security commitments, and the resurgence of global power competition have exposed the fragility of Europe’s strategic position. The strategic deficit is not just a military problem; it is a cultural and political failure. Without a clear sense of strategic purpose, Europe will continue to drift, reacting to crises rather than shaping its own security environment. However, the crisis presents an opportunity. If Germany and Europe embrace strategic culture, they can transform their weakness into strengths. By thinking and acting strategically, they can build credible deterrence, reduce dependence on external actors, and secure their future within the NATO alliance. Europe must decide whether to be a geopolitical actor or merely a geopolitical subject. Strategic culture is not a luxury—it is a necessity for survival.
How Other Nations Maintain Strategic Culture
The absence of a strategic culture is not a European necessity—it is a choice. The aforementioned countries, France and the United Kingdom have shown that military power and strategic thinking can coexist with democratic governance and economic prosperity. Their approach to defence and deterrence offers valuable lessons for Germany and Europe.
France has consistently pursued strategic autonomy, even within NATO.[26] This has been achieved through:
- A nuclear deterrent that ensures national security independent of American guarantees;
- A strong defence-industrial base that enables Paris to maintain a high degree of self-reliance in weapons development;
- A willingness to engage militarily abroad to project power and maintain strategic influence.
This contrasts with Germany’s reluctance to define its strategic role. While Berlin remains deeply integrated into NATO and the European Union, it lacks a clearly defined national security doctrine beyond its multilateral commitments. If Germany wishes to contribute meaningfully to European security, it must clearly define its role in deterrence and power projection. This is not coinciding with a call for German nuclear arms, but nuclear is on the agenda again and always has to be integrated into any conceptual approach.
The United Kingdom has long maintained a dual-track approach to defence:[27]
- Deep integration within NATO as a key player in transatlantic security;
- Maintaining independent strategic capabilities, including nuclear deterrence, rapid deployment forces, and a robust intelligence network.
London’s Integrated Review of Security and Defence policy prioritises a “Global Britain” vision, ensuring the country remains a military and strategic actor beyond the confines of Europe. In contrast, Germany frankly lacks a clear global security outlook despite its economic reach. Countries such as Sweden, Finland, and Estonia, on the other hand, offer lessons in societal resilience and hybrid threat resistance:
- Finland: Maintains a competent conscription-based military and a resilient civil defence network, ensuring rapid mobilisation in times of crisis.[28]
- Sweden: Has reinstated conscription and prioritises cyber resilience to counter hybrid threats.
- Baltic States: Have developed multi-layered deterrence strategies, including robust national guard units, cyber-defence policies, and close military cooperation with NATO.
Germany and other large European nations can learn from these models—not necessarily by copying them, but by integrating elements of resilience, civilian readiness, and military deterrence. The mentioned robust European countries cannot be strong alone; it is a joint effort. This requires a holistic approach and cross-society discussions. Deterrence fails if a government or its military lacks societal backing. Military readiness alone is insufficient if political divisions or economic instability undermine national resolve. A resilient civil society must accompany a robust defence posture.[29]
How Germany and Europe Must Adapt
Hybrid warfare or nonlinear action—blending conventional military force with cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and political subversion—has become the preferred strategy of revisionist powers like Russia and the PRC. Europe must recognise this as a permanent feature of 21st-century conflicts. Russia has weaponised information and social division to weaken European cohesion.[30] Tactics include election interference (e.g., support for anti-EU parties and far-left/far-right movements), state-sponsored propaganda through outlets like RT and Sputnik, social media manipulation (e.g., spreading conspiracy theories about NATO and COVID-19) and energy blackmail (as seen with gas supply disruptions in response to European sanctions). Moreover, there is the repeated disruption of seabed data links in the Baltic Sea by suspected Russian-linked ships,[31] naturally all denied by the Kremlin. A defensive information strategy is, therefore, critical. Germany and the EU require an effective counter-disinformation tool to identify and dismantle false narratives, as well as public education campaigns to enhance media literacy, and even stronger cybersecurity laws to prevent foreign hacking and election interference.
Germany and the EU require an effective counter-disinformation tool to identify and dismantle false narratives, as well as public education campaigns to enhance media literacy.
While the PRC is less overtly aggressive in military terms, it employs economic and technological leverage.[32] But again, this might also be a question of perspective within their neighbouring regions. Massive investments in critical infrastructure (e.g., European ports and telecom networks), cyber espionage targeting European industries and political institutions and influence campaigns in academia and media aim to shape narratives favourable to Beijing. Germany, as the EU’s largest economy, is particularly vulnerable. It must take a more assertive stance on economic security, including screening Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, reducing dependency on Chinese supply chains for strategic goods, and enhancing cooperation with allies on technological resilience.
Change in Public Engagement and Strategic Communication
A major weakness in European security policy is the failure to communicate defence priorities to the public, especially in “easy language”. Without broad public support, deterrence lacks credibility. There is a severe need for honest cross-bench political communication. To implement resilient defence structures, politicians must clearly communicate the necessity of military investments and preparedness. In the German case, that means explaining why Germany supports Ukraine—not just in moral terms, but based on national interest (e.g., preventing Russian expansionism, upholding the European order) and discussing the realities of deterrence—that credible defence capabilities reduce the risk of war rather than increase it. Disinformation thrives where there is a vacuum of reliable information and needs to be countered actively. On the one hand, you have to communicate what you want to defend, but on the other hand, you decisively have to promote the societal values for which you want to fight.[33] Effective deterrence requires aligning strategic objectives with societal values. Without this alignment, deterrence policies risk losing legitimacy or public support, making them vulnerable to external and internal challenges.
Another part of public engagement includes whether Germany needs its own military strategy. Whether Germany requires an independent military strategy when most of its forces are embedded in NATO defence frameworks includes key considerations like the fact that Germany currently operates under a single set of forces (integrated into NATO/EU structures).[34]
Germany and Europe face a demographic and recruitment crisis threatening military and economic resilience. The challenge is twofold, as armed forces require new personnel to maintain operational capability, and the civilian economy competes for the same skilled workforce, particularly in high-tech and engineering fields. Solutions for personnel shortages could be found in flexible military service models (e.g., short-term conscription, part-time reserve forces), enhanced career incentives for military personnel, making service attractive beyond patriotism, and closer cooperation between the defence and civilian industries to allow dual-career paths (military personnel transitioning into high-tech sectors). However, the real game changer would be a holistic approach to security and economy. The defence sector can drive economic growth, particularly in high-tech industries (AI, cyber, space security). A strong military-industrial base enhances security without weakening the broader economy. Germany should recognise that economic and military strength are interdependent—security enables prosperity, and prosperity funds security. But this needs communication in all directions—as already stated. And within that communication lies the key to functioning deterrence.
The Need for Strategic Maturity
Germany and Europe cannot afford strategic complacency. The world is becoming more competitive, unstable, and unforgiving of security naivety. The failure to develop a holistic strategic culture has already weakened Europe’s ability to deter threats. However, the current crisis also presents an opportunity. A more assertive, strategically conscious Germany could strengthen both NATO and the EU. Societal resilience, hybrid warfare defences, and public engagement must become key pillars of European security. The right balance between military strength and economic prosperity can be achieved through smarter policies, not passive dependence. Europe must decide if it will become a strategic player, shaping its own future, or remain a subject of external powers.
To achieve this in the long term, a core element of deterrence is public confidence in national security policies. If societies lack understanding or trust in defence strategies, adversaries can exploit these weaknesses through hybrid warfare. Governments must actively shape the security narrative rather than reacting to misinformation. This shaping requires regular public briefings on security matters, ensuring transparency in defence planning, and clear explanations of military commitments, including Germany’s role in NATO, the EU, and Ukraine. Engagement with civil society, the media, and educational institutions can help build resilience against disinformation. This is demonstrated in Finland, which has one of Europe’s most effective national security communication strategies.[35] Public involvement in security planning goes hand in hand with regular civil defence exercises. Education on hybrid threats, including school programs on media literacy, should be considered. Active collaboration between government, private sector, and citizens aims to combat cyber threats.
Germany and Europe must adopt similar strategies to ensure a well-informed, security-conscious population. Germany’s historical reluctance to engage in militarised discourse has created a strategic communication vacuum. This vacuum leads to a weak public understanding of defence policies, with many citizens unaware, for example, of NATO obligations or national interests in security. Furthermore, it boosts a vulnerability to anti-defence narratives, where opponents of military spending exploit societal pacifism to weaken defence initiatives. There is limited public engagement in security matters, unlike in countries with conscription or territorial defence forces.
Germany and Europe must adopt similar strategies to ensure a well-informed, security-conscious population.
To counter these trends, Germany must normalise defence discussions in public discourse, treating security not as a taboo but as an integral part of national policy. A look towards the Baltic region could also help Germany with one of the partial aspects lacking in its security discourse. The Baltic states and Eastern European nations have been at the forefront of resisting hybrid warfare, and their experiences offer valuable lessons for Germany and Europe. Estonia has suffered repeated Russian cyberattacks, notably the 2007 attack on its government infrastructure.[36] In response, Estonia developed the world’s first cyber-defence league, integrating civilian cybersecurity experts into national defence; established NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn; and implemented advanced digital identity systems to safeguard national infrastructure. Lithuania has also been a key target of Russian propaganda and political interference, especially regarding NATO troop deployments.[37] Key countermeasures include strategic media monitoring units, detecting and debunking fake news in real-time. Active public education programs also promote critical thinking skills and community-based resilience initiatives and aim to ensure that disinformation campaigns do not fracture social cohesion.
Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education (BPB) could play a more significant role in integrating security literacy into educational curricula, thereby making disinformation resistance a societal priority. Poland, for example, has emphasised national resilience through territorial defence units and public engagement.[38] Creating volunteer-based military units that strengthen national defence readiness, combined with a massive investment in modernising armed forces, make Poland a key NATO frontline state. Furthermore, there are government-led security awareness campaigns fostering a proactive defence mindset.
Germany would not explore similar territorial defence models. However, particularly within a European framework, ensuring decentralised resilience against hybrid threats and other issues, the creation of the new Heimatschutz is only one first step to a resilient ensurance for the Drehscheibe Deutschland. This becomes even more decisive as Germany sees itself as the major logistic hub for NATO operations on its eastern flank.[39] However, a coherent strategic culture and societal mindset are essential for effective deterrence. Without these, even well-defined military objectives may fail to achieve the desired political outcomes.[40]
Honesty, Public Engagement and Hybrid Defence
For deterrence to be effective, it must be supported by both military capabilities and societal resilience. This requires a well-informed public capable of resisting hybrid threats, government transparency in security affairs, and ensuring democratic legitimacy. In addition, stronger cybersecurity, media literacy, and strategic communication initiatives will lay the path. Germany and Europe can no longer afford strategic complacency. If Germany and its allies fail to take hybrid threats and the shift in the global security architecture seriously, they risk becoming easy targets for adversaries who excel in exploiting division and uncertainty.
Germany and Europe can no longer afford strategic complacency.
Societal cohesion is crucial for the credibility of deterrence. A state’s ability to project deterrence depends not only on military strength but also on its population’s resilience and willingness to support national security efforts. Public perception influences how adversaries interpret the signals of deterrence.[41] The future of European security depends not just on military deterrence but also on the ability of its societies to resist hybrid warfare and external threats. Without understanding and fostering a robust strategic culture, Europe will remain vulnerable to external manipulation. Strategic thinking is crucial for both national security and political stability. Germany and European states risk making reactive, short-sighted decisions that can lead to disastrous outcomes without a coherent strategy.[42] Time is running out. Therefore, the choice is clear: adapt or remain a passive target in a world shaped by strategic competition.
Fabian Dilly is currently attending the General Staff and Admiral Staff Course (National) 2024 at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College in Hamburg, Germany. Throughout his career, he has held several operational and leadership roles within the German Navy, NATO, and multinational maritime operations. He earned a Master of Letters (M.Litt.) in War Studies from the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom, and a Master of Arts (M.A.) in History from the Helmut Schmidt University/Bundeswehr University Hamburg. This is his first publication. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the German Armed Forces.
[1] Emma Ashford and Jennifer Kavanagh, “Europe isn’t ready for Trump 2.0,” Foreign Policy, January 23, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/23/trump-eu-nato-europe-defense-spending-troop-deployments-burden-sharing/.
[2] Joseph A. Maiolo and Thomas G. Mahnken, Strategic Studies – a reader (New York: Routledge, 2010) , 2.
[3] Andrea Rotter, „Kein Selbstläufer: Der notwendige Wandel Deutschlands strategischer Kultur,“ FourNine Security, February 02, 2023, https://fourninesecurity.de/2023/02/08/kein-selbstlaeufer-der-notwendige-wandel-deutschlands-strategischer-kultur.
[4] Frank L. Jones, U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Jun. 1, 2012, pp. 287-305, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12027.23.
[5] Johanna Schehl andKarl Heinz Hausner, „Das Ende der deutschen Friedensdividende,“ Wirtschaftswoche, April 05, 2022 https://www.wiwo.de/politik/konjunktur/denkfabrik-das-ende-der-deutschen-friedensdividende-/28216448.html
[6] Tagesschau, “Sicherheitsstrategie beschlossen: Scholz stellt neue Leitlinien vor,“ Tagesschau.de, June 14, 2023, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/nationale-sicherheitsstrategie-104.html.
[7] Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, “FDP-Außenpolitiker Lambsdorff: Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie ein ‘politischer Minimalkonsens’,” interview by “Das Parlament,” Bundestag.de, June 16, 2023, https://www.bundestag.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/2023/pm-230616-vorab-dasparlament-lambsdorff-953546.
[8] Andrea Grillo, “Decoding Deterrence: the Essentials of the Art of Persuation, ”Deep in Security, January 18, 2024, https://www.deepinsecurity.com/decoding-deterrence/#:~:text=Deterrence%20Persuasion%20is%20an%20intricate,balance%20between%20Peace%20and%20Conflict.
[9] Sabine Siebold, “‘50% battle-ready’: Germany misses military targets despite Scholz’s overhaul,” Reuters, February 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/50-battle-ready-germany-misses-military-targets-despite-scholzs-overhaul-2025-02-13/.
[10] Rotter, “Kein Selbstläufer.”
[11] Mark Galeotti, We Need to Talk About Putin: Why the West Gets Him Wrong (London: Ebury Press, 2019).
[12] Lambsdorff, interview.
[13] Bundesregierung, Wehrhaft. Resilient. Nachhaltig. Integrierte Sicherheit für Deutschland – Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie (Berlin: Bundesregierung, 2023), https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5636374/38287252c5442b786ac5d0036ebb237b/nationale-sicherheitsstrategie-data.pdf
[14] Tagesschau, “Sicherheitsstrategie beschlossen.”
[15] Lambsdorff, interview
[16] Charles de Gaulles, The Edge of the Sword (London: Faber & Faber 1960).
[17] UK Government, Integrated Review 2021: Global Britain in a Competitive Age (London: UK Government, 2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641d72f45155a2000c6ad5d5/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf.
[18] Polish Ministry of National Defence, Territorial Defence Forces Strategy (Warsaw: MOD Press 2020), https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf.
[19] German Ministry of Defence, White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2016), https://www.bundeswehr.de/resource/blob/4800140/fe103a80d8576b2cd7a135a5a8a86dde/download-white-paper-2016-data.pdf
[20] German Armed Forces, Operationsplan Deutschland – Eine gesamtstaatliche und gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe. Deutschland. Gemeinsam. Verteidigen (Berlin: German MOD, 2025), accessed February 22, 2025, (https://www.bundeswehr.de/resource/blob/5761202/5101246ca9de726f78c4d988607532fc/oplan-data.pdf).
[21] Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 376-379.
[22] Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).
[23] J.D. Vance (Vice President USA), “Transcript of the Speech That Stunned Europe U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference,” Foreign Policy, February 18, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/18/vance-speech-munich-full-text-read-transcript-europe/.
[24] Prof. Herfried Münkler, „Europa besitzt ein angeborenes Misstrauen gegenüber Führung“, The Pioneer, June 07, 2024, https://www.thepioneer.de/originals/others/articles/europa-besitzt-ein-angeborenes-misstrauen-gegenueber-fuehrung
[25] Danyal Bayaz, Moritz Schularick and Claus Ruhe Madsen, “Gastkommentar: Milliarden für Verteidigung schaffen Milliarden für das BIP,” Handelsblatt, January 27, 2025, https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbeitraege/gastkommentar-milliarden-fuer-verteidigung-schaffen-milliarden-fuers-bip/100108494.html.
[26] de Gaulles, The Edge of the Sword.
[27] UK Government, Integrated Review 2021.
[28] Finnish Government, Comprehensive Security Strategy (as updated in January 2025) (Helsinki: Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2025), https://www.defmin.fi/en/topical/press_releases_and_news/finland_s_comprehensive_security_reinforced_through_new_security_strategy_for_society.14801.news.
[29] Milan Vego, Military Strategy and Operational Art (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
[30] Digital Forensic Research Lab, “Undermining Ukraine: How Russia widened its Global Information War in 2023,” Atlantic Council, February 29, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine-how-russia-widened-its-global-information-war-in-2023/.
[31] The Conversation, “Suspected Baltic Sea Cable Sabotage by Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet’ is ramping up Regional defence,” The Conversation, January 27 2025, https://theconversation.com/suspected-baltic-sea-cable-sabotage-by-russias-shadow-fleet-is-ramping-up-regional-defence-248241.
[32] Seth G. Jones, “The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 30, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/tech-revolution-and-irregular-warfare-leveraging-commercial-innovation-great-power.
[33] Milan Vego, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013).
[34] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Adopted by Heads of State and Government
at the NATO Summit in Madrid 29 June 2022),” accessed on February 23, 2025, https://www.act.nato.int/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.
[35] Finnish Government, Comprehensive Security Strategy.
[36] Anna-Maria Osula, “National Cyber Security Organisation: Estonia,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 2015, accessed on February 23, 2025, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CS_organisation_ESTONIA_032015_1.pdf
[37] Vytautas KerŠankas, “Deterring Disinformation? – Lessons from Lithuania’s countermeasures 2014,” Hybrid COE Paper 6, 2021, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210427_Hybrid-CoE-Paper-6_Deterring_disinformation_WEB.pdf
[38] Polish Ministry of National Defence, Territorial Defence Forces Strategy.
[39] German Armed Forces, Operationsplan Deutschland.
[40] Milan Vego, “Converting a Political- to a Military-Strategic Objective,” Joint Force Quarterly 112, no. 1 (2024), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3680005/converting-a-political-to-a-military-strategic-objective/.
[41] Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2009).
[42] Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy, 213-215; Beatrice Heuser, The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 45-47.
