Abstract: The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz following joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian targets in late February 2026 has transformed a long-theorised energy security vulnerability into an energy redundancy gap. Maritime traffic through the Strait has declined by more than 90 per cent, removing approximately 17-20 million barrels of oil per day from global markets, potentially the largest single energy disruption in modern history. This monograph examines the United Arab Emirates’ cross-peninsula logistics corridor linking Sharjah Port Khalid on the Persian Gulf to the Port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman as the world’s only existing partial bypass of the Hormuz chokepoint.

Problem statement: How can the international community partially stabilise global energy markets during the current Strait of Hormuz closure?

So what?: The UAE government must immediately authorise emergency expansion of the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline with parallel capacity additions to connect to the Sharjah Port Khalid, creating a pipeline bypass. Gulf Cooperation Council member states must coordinate production re-routing inland via Sharjah through Fujairah. Also, an emergency council of GCC nations should convene to commission and support an inland maritime corridor, a canal connecting Fujairah Port to Sharjah Port Khalid (116 kms). The United States and allied navies must prioritise protecting the Gulf of Oman sea lanes connecting Fujairah to global shipping routes. International energy companies and sovereign wealth funds should fast-track investment in expanded corridor infrastructure. Global energy importers, particularly the People’s Republic of China, Japan, India, and South Korea, must actively engage in corridor security diplomacy to prevent the current crisis from escalating into a prolonged global economic shock.

When the Hypothetical Became the Emergency

The situation has developed from a theoretical status into urgent requirements as the U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iranian facilities, which have caused the Strait of Hormuz to be choked by Iran as a retaliatory move against the offensive operations since 28th, February 2026.[1] Now, the 116-kilometre UAE corridor, which could connect Sharjah (Port Khalid) with Fujairah via an inland maritime corridor, could become the only operational bypass, serving as a viable plan to handle one-fifth of the world’s daily oil supply.[2] An opportunity for the UAE to capitalise on this permanent solution.

The potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz has become an extreme situation that military simulations and geopolitical studies must have tested their boundaries against.[3] The situation has developed into a practical matter of clear and present danger now, since February 28, 2026.[4] On February 26, the U.S.-Israeli coalition forces targeted multiple military and strategic Iranian targets with missile strikes,[5], [6] which led to the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) of Iran calling the Strait of Hormuz dangerous because its waters would aid the U.S. fleet to strike deep in their territory. Maritime traffic through the chokepoint has declined by more than 90 per cent since then.[7] The disruption has continued for almost a month, and the world has already experienced severe consequences.[8]

The potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz has become an extreme situation that military simulations and geopolitical studies must have tested their boundaries against.

The world has experienced interruptions which affect 17 to 20 million barrels of oil per day,[9], [10] which equals almost one-fifth of the total global oil supply.[11] The oil-exporting nations of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and the UAE are pushed to reduce their oil production because their storage capacity has reached maximum limits and their tankers are unable to leave the region.[12], [13] The major importing economies, which include the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, Japan, and South Korea, now face rising fuel costs, leading to inflationary pressures, trade imbalances, and industrial slowdown in major importing economies. The oil price forecast shows that prices will exceed $120 per barrel, as they have already fluctuated between $105 and $119 in a single day.[14], [15] The economists predict that extended disruptions will cause a global economic recession.[16], [17] The crisis which energy analysts had predicted for many years now exists in reality.[18], [19]

The emergency situation demands a strategic outlook and seeks emergency support as an infrastructure asset which needs to be built either as a pipeline or a full-fledged canal, Suez canal style, across the UAE as a cross-peninsula corridor which connects Sharjah, Port Khalid, with the Port of Fujairah area near the Fujairah Corniche that exists on the Gulf of Oman. At approximately 116 kilometres, it could prove to be a viable bypass of the Strait of Hormuz. This may not look like a solution, but in a crisis of this magnitude engulfing the world, a partial solution for now, with even a small bypass capacity, adds redundancy, stabilises markets during disruptions, and buys time for oil-dry importing states to adjust through reserves, diversified supply, and alternative maritime routes.

From Threat to Reality

Iran’s doctrine of chokepoint deterrence was always premised on a credible threat that did not need to be executed to be effective. The fear of closure was enough to discipline global shipping, moderate Western military adventurism, and extract diplomatic leverage. That calculus changed during this conflict. After the strikes on Iranian targets, Tehran moved from threat to action. The IRGC warned ships they would be set ablaze if they entered the waterway.[20] Major shipping companies and their insurers needed no second warning.

The mechanism of closure has not required a single naval battle. Iran temporarily shut down the Strait through a combination of available missile systems, drone capacity, fast-attack boats, and evidence of Gulf tanker attacks from 2019 (Kokuka Courageous (Panama-flagged) and Front Altair (Marshall Islands-flagged),[21] which, together with rising war-risk insurance costs, created a new reality.[22] The current situation shows that hundreds of vessels have stopped operating and are waiting outside the region. The Strait is closed, in functional terms.[23]

Why the UAE Is the Only Country With an Answer

No other Gulf state possesses the UAE’s geographic fortune. The closest Indian Ocean access point to Saudi Arabia is more than 1,200 kilometres away from its Gulf coastal region. Kuwait,[24] Iraq, and Qatar all lie within the Persian Gulf,[25] but they lack access to the Indian Ocean.[26] The UAE controls the narrowest land passage between the Arabian Peninsula territories, which extends from Sharjah to Fujairah, a distance of 116 kilometres.

The UAE has already proved that the concept works.[27] The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, which extends 370 kilometres from Habshan Oil Fields to Fujairah,[28] operates as a complete system outside the Strait of Hormuz after costing more than 2.7 billion dollars to construct.[29], [30] The design team constructed the structure to handle this specific situation. It is operational now. The question is not whether the bypass concept is viable,but rather how rapidly it can be scaled.

The United Arab Emirates possesses a unique dual-coast geography that distinguishes it from all other Gulf exporters.[31]  Unlike Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Qatar, whose export infrastructure remains largely confined to the Persian Gulf, the UAE maintains direct access to both the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.[32]  The narrow land corridor between Sharjah and Fujairah, spanning approximately 116 kilometres, provides the only viable overland energy transit route in the region that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. This geographic advantage underpins the feasibility of a cross-peninsula export system and positions the UAE as the only Gulf state capable of developing a functional Hormuz bypass within its sovereign territory.[33]

From Strategic Asset to Emergency Hub

The Port of Fujairah is already one of the world’s largest bunkering ports,[34], [35] the third-largest globally by volume,[36] with enormous oil storage capacity and direct access to Indian Ocean tanker routes linking the Middle East to India, East Asia, and Europe.[37] In the current crisis, it has moved from a background strategic asset to a front-line logistics node. Tankers that can still operate are routing to Fujairah.[38], [39] Oil that was destined for Hormuz transit is being redirected, where infrastructure permits, through the Habshan pipeline.

This is precisely why Iranian strategists had long regarded Fujairah with unease even before the current hostilities. Iran’s chokepoint leverage rested on the assumption that Gulf exporters had no alternative. The existence of a functioning bypass, however limited in capacity, undermines that assumption in real time. Every barrel moving through the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline, also known as “Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP)” today, is a barrel that Iran’s closure cannot touch. At 1.5 million barrels per day, that is approximately 7 to 9 per cent of the disrupted flow,[40] insufficient to stabilise markets alone, but sufficient to demonstrate that the bypass concept is operational, scalable, and worth protecting. However, this is a limited resource and not sufficient or practical in the long term, not to mention costly. Here, the UAE can pursue a long-term yet opportunistic option to connect Jebel Ali to the Fujairah Port via a pipeline, or to connect Sharjah Port Khalid to the Fujairah Port via an inland maritime canal.

The Investment Case, Now Immediate, Not Hypothetical

In peacetime, cross-peninsula export infrastructure could be viewed as costly but justified strategic insurance against Hormuz disruption. The current crisis eliminates that ambiguity entirely. With maritime traffic severely disrupted, global oil markets have absorbed significant supply shocks and price volatility, imposing high costs on exporters and importers alike. Expanding bypass infrastructure, particularly pipeline capacity linking Gulf production to Fujairah, is now a strategic imperative rather than a planning exercise. Emergency measures such as debottlenecking existing systems, adding pumping capacity, and building parallel segments can increase throughput on compressed timelines, well short of the years required for greenfield construction. Bypass investments must therefore be evaluated not against routine construction economics but against the catastrophic cost of prolonged Hormuz closure.

In peacetime, cross-peninsula export infrastructure could be viewed as costly but justified strategic insurance against Hormuz disruption.

The arithmetic is stark. A 90-day disruption threatens $21 billion in UAE export value alone, before accounting for oil above $100 per barrel, soaring freight costs, and inflationary spillover across Asia. Against that exposure, a $4 billion pipeline expansion is not an investment decision; it is an emergency expenditure with transformative ROI. For the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and their partners, the question is no longer whether to build, but how fast.

Beyond pipelines, the crisis has renewed serious examination of a more ambitious solution: an inland canal connecting Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman with Port Khalid in Sharjah, a 110- to 125-kilometre route functioning as a Gulf-region Suez Canal. Benchmarked against the Suez Canal expansion,[41] the Dubai Arabian Canal,[42]  and the Saudi Salwa Canal, and accounting for the geological challenges of the Hajar Mountain range[43], construction costs are estimated at $70-100 billion, with timelines of six to eight years under standard conditions, potentially compressible to four to six years under wartime mobilisation. The project ranks among the most demanding civil engineering endeavours of the modern era, but the sustained closure of Hormuz makes its strategic and economic case increasingly difficult to dismiss.

The Strategic Case for the Sharjah-Fujairah Energy Corridor

One critical pathway stands central to worldwide fuel distribution. Through it flows roughly 20 to 21 million barrels each day, a volume matching nearly one-fifth of total daily oil demand across nations, while accounting for about 20 per cent of global maritime petroleum movement. These supplies originate primarily from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Despite its narrow reach on maps, its influence spreads far beyond regional boundaries. Where geography concentrates traffic, economic ripple effects follow unpredictably. The energy flows to Asian economies, which use large amounts of energy, and the PRC, India, Japan, and South Korea are their main markets. The narrow navigational channel, which has its narrowest point at 33-39 kilometres, serves as the maritime route through which more than $500 billion in annual energy trade moves between two restricted geographic areas. Such concentration creates a single-point systemic vulnerability, which energy economists call a global vulnerability affecting the entire global energy system.

The Gulf states face economic risks because their economies depend heavily on the Strait, which serves as their main export route for hydrocarbons. Approximately 70-75 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s oil exports, 98 per cent of Iraq’s exports, nearly all of Kuwait’s exports, around 70 per cent of UAE exports, and roughly 90 per cent of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas shipments pass through the Strait.[44] Gulf economies would lose between $1 and $ 1.2 billion in daily revenue at an oil price of $100 per barrel if 10 million bpd of exports were disrupted. The export revenue loss over six months would reach between $180-220 billion, while the annual losses for the UAE would exceed $20-30 billion.[44] The economic risks that exist today demonstrate that energy export corridors that operate independently of the Strait of Hormuz have become essential for strategic development.

Within this context, the proposed Sharjah-Fujairah energy corridor represents a pragmatic attempt to diversify export routes by exploiting the UAE’s dual-coast geography. The 48-inch crude oil pipeline, which travels through this route, will have the capacity to move between 1.5 million and 2 million barrels per day. The UAE will achieve an export capacity of 3 to 4 million barrels per day, using the existing Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which currently transports 1.5 to 1.8 million barrels per day.[45] The capacity, which will operate at 15 to 20 per cent of current oil flows through Hormuz, will provide substantial support to regional energy operations during times of geopolitical unrest. The pipeline corridor and the inland maritime canal function as separate systems, each with specific capacity requirements and cost structures.

Capacity Assessment: Pipeline Corridor vs. Inland Maritime Canal

The corridor development process will enable incremental construction progress for the pipeline system and the inland maritime canal system. A single pipeline capable of transporting 2 million bpd would likely require an investment of $4-6 billion, while twin pipelines could expand capacity to 4 million bpd at a cost of $8-10 billion.[46] Theoretical research indicates that multi-pipeline systems can achieve greater export capacity through four pipelines, which would deliver 8 million barrels per day (mbpd) of outgoing shipments. A pipeline network that fully replaces Hormuz throughput would require approximately 20 million bpd of capacity. This network requires ten pipelines, which will demand between $40 billion and $60 billion in total investments. The table below compares the two principal infrastructure options against the current Hormuz throughput:

Immediate Crisis Actions (0–6 months)

The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) will increase its capacity to handle between 1.8 and 2.0 million barrels per day. The expanded storage capacity at Fujairah, which will reach 10 to 20 million barrels, enables partial restoration of disrupted exports. This restoration process will be completed within a brief operational period. The restored exports will help stabilise prices in the near future.[47]

Medium-Term Resilience (1–7 years)

The Gulf bypass infrastructure, which includes existing facilities and planned projects, together with the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline and Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline system, provides 6 mbpd of export capacity, which ongoing expansions will increase over the coming years. The systems can only provide partial relief for the 20 million barrels per day which passes through the Strait of Hormuz because their strategic importance and operational boundaries determine their capabilities.[48]

The Proposed Long-Term Strategic Option (10–15 years)

The Strait of Hormuz carries approximately 20 million barrels per day of global oil flows, yet existing overland bypass infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE provides only 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day of alternative capacity, leaving a substantial structural gap. The 110 to 120 kilometre inland canal system can transport 20 to 25 million barrels per day, which equals the total Hormuz shipping capacity. The project requires 70 to 100 billion dollars in funding to be completed within a 10 to 15 year period, because it needs continuous political commitment to become functional.

Engineering Constraints and Realistic Timelines

Policy discussions on energy matters need to recognise that constructing extensive energy systems will take longer than they currently believe. A 116-kilometre-long, large-diameter crude oil pipeline crossing mixed desert and mountainous terrain would normally require feasibility studies and environmental assessment (6-12 months), engineering design and procurement (6-12 months), construction and installation (18-24 months), and testing and commissioning (3-6 months). The complete project would take between four and six years, even when using faster strategic methods.[49]

The main barrier to the construction of a trans-Emirates canal is the Hajar Mountains, which rise to heights above 1,800 metres and consist mainly of ophiolite rock formations. The uneven material and fault-line arrangements of these rocks create major difficulties for tunnelling operations.[50] A canal designed to handle large crude carriers requires a 200-300-metre-wide channel that must reach a depth of 20-25 metres, and it requires excavation of over 2-3 billion cubic metres of rock and sediment. This makes the project one of the largest civil engineering projects in modern times. Technologically feasible using proven megaproject engineering; funding ($70–100B) within sovereign capacity. [51] However, extreme geology, scale (2–3 billion m³ excavation), and timelines (10–15 years) make execution highly complex, resource-intensive, and risk-prone. However, the expansion of the Suez Canal took one year to complete an additional 72-kilometre channel, a 35-kilometre parallel channel, and to deepen and widen a 37-kilometre section of the existing canal, totalling 72 kilometres of improvements, in 2015, while the Panama Canal lock expansion took almost nine years to finish in 2016.[52] The geological conditions of the UAE interior pose additional challenges, which will extend the construction time for a Sharjah-Fujairah maritime canal to 10-15 years. Engineering evaluations indicate that pipeline corridors have a higher likelihood of success than maritime canals over the medium-term planning period.

Canal Construction Timeline

The construction of an inland maritime canal between Fujairah and Port Khalid, capable of handling VLCC tanker traffic and achieving the same shipping capacity as the Strait of Hormuz, would constitute one of the most ambitious infrastructure endeavours in the Middle East. The proposed 110-120 km canal, which runs through the United Arab Emirates, would require 10-15 years to construct under standard operational conditions. The project will start with 2-3 years of feasibility and environmental studies, followed by, or in parallel, 1-2 years of engineering design and financing work, before entering the 7-10-year period of major excavation work, which will take place throughout the Hajar Mountain regions.[55]

The emergency response, which includes ongoing construction work, quick funding, and international engineering support, can decrease the timeline to 5-7 years. However, the project may still face major challenges due to geological and engineering constraints. The project will involve moving 2-3 billion cubic metres of earth and developing extensive new facilities at both Fujairah and Port Khalid. The canal will not end the immediate crisis. However, it could potentially enable the transport of 20-25 million barrels of oil daily, significantly reducing global reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, given the expected long-term, chronic nature of conflict with Iran.[56]

Route Optimisation, Environmental Considerations, and Financing

A synthesised geospatial interpretation based on existing infrastructure patterns to the proposed corridor connects the UAE’s existing infrastructure, which links Sharjah industrial zones, including Sajaa, with Fujairah energy export facilities through its inland transport system. The corridors begin in low-population desert areas, including Al Madam, and then cross the Hajar Mountains through specially built tunnels, connecting to Masafi, the main border between the interior and the eastern seaboard. The routing design shows planning decisions that seek to minimise city disturbance while utilising existing distribution centres and areas with low population density.[57]

Environmental factors will influence how work unfolds. The Hajar Mountains shelter fragile natural systems, whereas underground water reserves in arid zones may be disturbed when construction begins. Because heat levels are high across the area, metal decay and structural weakening along pipelines become more probable. To respond, methods such as precision boring beneath terrain, using alloys that resist rust, installing digital monitoring for spills, and replanting native species to restore damaged land appear necessary. Paying for the route might come from state-backed financial entities, global development lenders, and alliances within the power industry. Core capital could come from Emirati public holdings. The UAE’s major sovereign wealth funds, its industrial growth arm, including the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Mubadala, and ADQ, could provide core capital, all of which are capable of anchoring large-scale investment.[61-58] Sovereign wealth funds together with institutional investors and global asset managers now fund energy and transport infrastructure projects through their partnerships with national oil companies, which include ADNOC. These partnerships create diverse ownership structures which distribute financial risks while also enabling stakeholders to pursue shared business goals throughout the energy value chain.[59] When crises occur, faster progress could depend on government-supported energy security instruments, collaborative funding groups or international investment consortia.

The Hajar Mountains shelter fragile natural systems, whereas underground water reserves in arid zones may be disturbed when construction begins.

Geopolitical Implications and Long-Term Energy Geography

As for broader consequences tied to power balances and future energy routes, building a route around the Strait of Hormuz brings shifts that unfold alongside its advancement. Such projects might be seen by Iran as moves to weaken its influence over sea-based fuel transport. Shifting trade flows may offer Oman new revenue streams, while Saudi Arabia might respond by accelerating pipelines to the Red Sea. The international energy security doctrine acknowledges energy transport route diversification as an essential method for reducing systemic risk; there is widespread diversification of energy transport routes worldwide.

The Sharjah-Fujairah corridor will help establish global energy market stability through its full implementation. The establishment of a 2 million bpd alternative export route will reduce the intensity of emergency price spikes by maintaining additional export capabilities beyond those controlled by the Strait of Hormuz. The corridor will provide Asian energy importers with greater supply security, as their economies rely on Gulf oil resources. The export route will reduce maritime insurance costs and shipping hazards arising from geopolitical conflicts by operating in non-confrontational maritime areas.

The project will reshape the energy landscape of West Asia throughout its extended life. The UAE will create a permanent Hormuz bypass system through its dual-coast export system, thereby enhancing Fujairah’s capabilities as an oil storage and export facility. The existing storage facilities in Fujayah will enable the emirate to become the largest oil storage and trading hub which exists beyond the Strait of Hormuz, thus establishing its new position in international energy distribution. Such structural diversification would dilute the geopolitical leverage of maritime chokepoints and contribute to a more resilient, diversified global energy system.

Asian Demand and the Scale of Structural Dependency

The assessment of Gulf export bypass corridors needs to consider the energy requirements of major Asian countries, including the PRC, Japan, and South Korea, which are their primary importers. Daily, the PRC takes in 11-12 million barrels of crude oil, with roughly 40-45 per cent sourced from Gulf producers.[60] From Japan comes a flow of nearly 3.2 to 3.5 million barrels each day, most – nearly nine-tenths – traced back to the same region. South Korea brings in around 2.8 to 3.0 million barrels daily, with seven out of ten coming from those exporters. Combined, these nations use between 10 and 12 million barrels of oil from the Gulf, accounting for much of what flows through the Hormuz Strait. This Strait holds weight since its shipments mostly head eastward: eighty-four per cent land on Asian shores.[61]

Due to these patterns, alternate routes gain quite significance here. With a spare route capable of carrying 2-4 million barrels daily, output flows continue even when main paths halt, limiting delivery gaps to Asian buyers. Far from replacing Hormuz, this route is one piece of a shifting framework meant to steady energy flows under pressure.

Fujairah as a Strategic Target

Any serious analysis of the UAE corridor must grapple with the Iranian strategic response. Iran’s closure of the Strait derives from its asymmetric control of a chokepoint, a posture that has defined its deterrence doctrine for decades. The emergence of a functioning Hormuz bypass directly erodes this leverage. For every barrel that exits through Fujairah rather than the Strait, Iran’s most powerful geopolitical instrument loses potency. It is therefore not merely plausible but strategically logical to anticipate Iranian action against the corridor itself.

Any serious assessment of the UAE energy corridor must account for Iran’s likely response. For decades, Tehran’s deterrence has rested on its ability to threaten the Hormuz chokepoint. The presence of bypass infrastructure will not remove this control, but it will decrease its effectiveness over time because it becomes a primary objective during conflict. The Iranian government can use diplomatic methods and cyber operations, or create disasters through proxy forces, conduct maritime attacks, or execute missile and drone assaults. The 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais attacks on Saudi Aramco demonstrated this capability, and Iran’s drone swarm techniques, grey-zone SCADA sabotage, and proxy networks in the Gulf of Oman have only grown more sophisticated since.[62]

The military implication is clear: the Fujairah corridor cannot be treated as a civil engineering project alone. The system needs both active air defence and pipeline sections built to withstand attacks, operational storage facilities, and safety measures that protect its maritime routes.

The Coalition Forming Around Fujairah

The operational viability of the Fujairah corridor depends not only on infrastructure but also on sustained external security support. The U.S. and its partners are likely to assume a central role in safeguarding sea lanes in the Gulf of Oman, given their established naval presence and interest in maintaining uninterrupted energy flows. At the same time, major Asian importers, including the PRC, India, Japan, and South Korea, have strong incentives to support corridor stability through diplomatic engagement and selective security involvement, reflecting their structural dependence on Gulf energy supplies. While a formal coalition framework remains unlikely, the convergence of these interests points to a pattern of parallel, overlapping security efforts around Fujairah, driven by shared economic imperatives.

The Corridor Is No Longer a Contingency

Almost 2 centuries ago, the construction of the 193 km Suez Canal lasted from 1859 to 1869 (10 yrs);[63] back then, this wasn’t easy, as the project faced labour challenges, limited technology, and disease. In these modern times, the strategic insight embedded in the UAE’s dual-coast geography is no longer theoretical. With the Strait of Hormuz sealed off, GCC nations are bearing heavy losses, and weeks have passed without relief. Ship movements collapsed, falling below 90% of normal levels. Prices responded sharply: crude climbed past $100 a barrel.[64], [65] Production declines across Gulf exporting regions stem from terminal capacity limits alongside vessel delays. What once appeared in forecasts only as an extreme outcome now emerges as a visible outcome, causing market shifts.

Here, the stretch linking Port Khalid (Sharjah) to Fujairah, measuring 116 kilometres, has shifted in role due to changing demands. Once seen as a strategic advantage, it now supports daily operations by carrying crude oil. Flow through the pipeline originating in Abu Dhabi continues without interruption. Fujairah is receiving redirected cargoes. However, 1.5 million barrels per day is approximately 7 to 9 per cent of the disrupted flow, a pressure valve in a system that needs a dam! Expanding the corridor, adding parallel pipeline capacity, and building strategic reserves at Fujairah are not long-term infrastructure proposals. They are emergency actions whose economic justification was established in the first week of the closure itself.[66]

The stretch linking Port Khalid (Sharjah) to Fujairah, measuring 116 kilometres, has shifted in role due to changing demands.

The situation at the Strait of Hormuz may eventually return to normal. Diplomatic pressure, military exhaustion, or a negotiated pause could restore some traffic within weeks. However, the crisis has demonstrated, with brutal clarity, that the global economy had no redundancy built into its most critical energy route. The UAE corridor may be the world’s most viable answer. It must be expanded, hardened, and protected, not after the next crisis, but during this one.

The permanent resultant will be a historically altering one for The UAE, as the pipeline system with an estimated capacity of 1.5 to 2 million bpd and the canal system which can handle 20 to 25 million bpd will enable the country to establish a primary export system that could reduce dependence on Hormuz over the long term, but would remain a high-risk megaproject requiring detailed feasibility assessment.

The system would create a new energy corridor, thereby decreasing the likelihood of blockades in the Hormuz Strait and altering the region’s geopolitics completely. For the UAE, it would become more than a transportation channel because it would develop into a central energy hub, enabling it to control its own energy supply routes. The development of such infrastructure will reduce regional adversaries’ ability to control key passageways, while it will protect Asian countries’ energy supplies and establish the UAE as a crucial energy market stabiliser during global crises emerging from the region, especially due to its oil resources.

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[1] USNI News, “UPDATED: U.S., Israel Launch Strikes against Iran, Tehran Retaliates across Region,” February 28, 2026, https://news.usni.org/2026/02/28/u-s-israel-launch-operation-epic-fury-against-iran-tehran-retaliates-across-region.

[2] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “The Strait of Hormuz Is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” last modified 2023, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61002.

[3] M. Zafra and J. McClure, “Maps and Charts of the Iran War,” Reuters, March 19, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-CRISIS/MAPS/znpnmelervl/#gulf-oil-producers-scramble-to-bypass-hormuz-as-iran-locks-down-the-strait.

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