Abstract: Cornered by the U.S.-Israel airstrikes and left vulnerable by a mass uprising in early 2026, the Islamic regime in Iran will go through certain internal changes. These changes might weaken Tehran’s grip over the region. In this backdrop, its relation with neighbours, including India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, will shift. While India will be hoping for the emergence of a moderate regime that is open to talks with the USA, Pakistan will be hoping for a strong regime in Tehran that can put a hold on Baloch militants. On the other hand, an economically and militarily weaker government in Iran will be more inclined to cooperate with Afghanistan’s Taliban government on various issues, ranging from opium trade to water sharing.
Problem statement: What will be the impact of an unstable power centre in Iran on India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan?
So what?: The three eastern neighbours will be closely monitoring the shifting political dynamics in Iran and manoeuvring to shield their stakes. For the Pezeshkian Government, engaging with all three neighbours is as crucial as balancing domestic reform demands with the strong orthodox clergy.
Nationwide Protests
It is evident from history that empires are not at their weakest position during a conflict. Rather, they are at their weakest point right after a war. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been rocked by nationwide protests over crippling inflation and a severe depreciation of its currency, the Iranian Rial. Since the Revolution in 1979, the Ayatollah (Islamic cleric) regime in Iran has faced nationwide protests close to half a dozen times. However, the January 2026 protests were exceptional in the sense that they were more widespread, originated in the famous and influential Bazaars (markets) of Tehran,[1] and followed the air strikes by the U.S. and Israel in June 2025.[2] The protest turned violent in many cities of Iran, with young protestors rallying behind the Shir-i-Khorshid (Lion and Sun) flag, burning mosques, tearing down the Islamic Republic’s flag, clashing with law enforcement, and calling for the fall of the Ayatollah regime.[3] Although the regime will, in all probability, survive the unrest, as it has in the past, it has seldom looked as vulnerable as it does currently. If the Islamic regime in Iran weakens to a tipping point, the impact will trickle over its borders into the neighbouring countries.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been rocked by nationwide protests over crippling inflation and a severe depreciation of its currency, the Iranian Rial.
Afghanistan and the Possible Cooperation
In modern times, no issue has dominated relations between Iran and Afghanistan as much as water sharing. Both countries have vast areas of semi-arid geography, where management of limited water resources is essential to survival. The capital cities of both countries, Tehran and Kabul, are currently experiencing a severe water crisis, and the risk of running out of drinking water remains very high.[4]
The Helmand River, which flows from the Hindu Kush Mountains in Afghanistan and feeds the Hamoon (desert lake) system in Iran, is central to the water-sharing dispute between the two countries. Both countries came close to institutionalising a water-sharing mechanism through the 1973 Helmond River Water Treaty. However, neither Kabul nor Tehran ratified the treaty. As a result, there is currently no water sharing agreement between the two countries. While Iran has accused Afghanistan of violating the treaty provisions, the fact remains that the treaty has not been enforced by either side. The tensions have, at times, culminated in localised conflicts, as seen in 2023, when Iranian border guards clashed with Taliban fighters along the border in Sistan-Balochistan, killing two border guards and one Taliban fighter in the skirmish.[5]
Moreover, Iran has long objected to the illegal opium trade from Afghanistan, citing the creation of addiction and security issues inside its territory.[6] To some extent, the Taliban government has controlled this trade since its takeover of Afghanistan, signalling that it is capable of putting a stop to the illegal trade. However, such restrictions in Afghanistan have led to a boom in opium cultivation across the border into Iran, an issue that will require domestic law and order enforcement.[7] Moreover, the Taliban government still faces threats from terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP). Such groups often fund their activities through illegal trade, creating an alarming situation for both Kabul and Tehran. Therefore, opium cultivation and the problems it causes are a mutual concern for both governments.
Iran has long objected to the illegal opium trade from Afghanistan, citing the creation of addiction and security issues inside its territory.
Now that the government in Tehran has found itself vulnerable on both domestic and external fronts, it might not want to risk another public uprising due to the growing water crisis and the illegal opium entering its territory. Although both these issues primarily require domestic policy solutions, a weaker and more insecure regime in Tehran might still initiate and expedite negotiations with the Taliban government.
Pakistan and the Baloch Question
Pakistan and Iran have had a complicated relationship. In pre-Islamic Revolution Iran, under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran became the first nation to recognise Pakistan as an independent state in 1947, followed by the 1950 Treaty of Friendship between the two countries. Due to Cold War politics and rising Arab nationalism in West Asia, Iran supplied arms and ammunition to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak wars in 1965 and 1971.[8]
However, both countries soon developed differences on account of Iran being a Shia-majority country, as opposed to Pakistan, which is a Sunni-majority country – a difference that widened after the establishment of a Shia theocracy in Iran in 1979. Moreover, Pakistan’s consistently fragile economy prompted it to move closer to the Arab Kingdoms and the USA to support militancy in Afghanistan, something the anti-monarchy and anti-West Shia regime in Iran did not appreciate. Both during and after the Cold War, Pakistan has had close economic and military ties with the United States, widening the rift between the two countries.[9] Although Pakistan’s ties with the U.S. have been turbulent due to Pakistan’s sponsorship and sheltering of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, Iran’s suspicion of the Pakistani Army’s close U.S. ties has remained consistent.
Although Pakistan’s ties with the U.S. have been turbulent due to Pakistan’s sponsorship and sheltering of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, Iran’s suspicion of the Pakistani Army’s close U.S. ties has remained consistent.
Despite their differences, one issue where both countries have maintained a tacit understanding is Baloch separatism. The Baloch community resides on both sides of the Iran-Pakistan border, with approximately 8 million Baloch living in the Balochistan province of Pakistan, and around 4 million living in the Sistan-Balochistan province on the Iranian side of the border. Baloch communities on both sides of the border remain one of the most oppressed and poverty-stricken communities in the region, often facing exclusion and erasure of identity by their respective governments.[10]
Both nations have faced a long-drawn separatist insurgency based on Baloch nationalism. In Pakistan, Baloch nationalist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) have ramped up attacks on the armed forces and government agencies, opposing the extraction of Balochistan’s mineral wealth by the Pakistani government, which they deem exploitative.[11] Since the threat faced is mutual and common, both countries have ensured that their Baloch provinces remain one of the most militarised zones in the country, often resulting in mass arrests, extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances and massive human rights violations.[12] On the other hand, both Iran and Pakistan have also accused each other of supporting Baloch militias domestically, supporting insurgency across the border. These accusations reached the tipping point in January 2024 when both countries struck at ‘terrorists’ across the border, violating each other’s sovereignty in tit-for-tat airstrikes.[13], [14]
However, a weak centre in Iran after the protests can pave the way for rising ethno-nationalism and separatism in Sistan-Balochistan. Something similar was observed after the Israeli and U.S. strikes against Iran in 2025, when the anti-regime activities surged, and Jaish-al-Adl announced the creation of the People’s Resistance Front (PRF) against the Islamic regime.[15] In such a scenario, if the central government in Iran is unable to control the delicate security situation in the periphery of the country, Pakistan’s already troubled Balochistan province might witness an increase in cross-border support for insurgency, both in terms of arms and militia.
Moreover, if, in such a case, the Baloch militias in the south-eastern Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan manage to form a local parallel control out of the weak central government’s hold, smuggling of goods and oil from Iran by oil carriers, known locally as Sookthbar, into Pakistan, will increase manifold, creating a parallel economy, supporting the Baloch nationalist movement in Pakistan. Moreover, the Balochistan border has remained a busy smuggling route for Methamphetamine and opium-related drugs.[16] This parallel economy can further exacerbate the already grim drug trafficking situation in the border districts of both countries.
The Balochistan border has remained a busy smuggling route for Methamphetamine and opium-related drugs.
In 2025, Pakistan witnessed the single deadliest year in terms of deaths due to militancy, with Baloch groups contributing a significant share to the situation.[17] The situation may worsen with cross-border support for such groups. A possibility of weakening of the Islamic regime in Iran will increase the tendency of Baloch separatism in the region, something that will impact Pakistan disproportionately more than other countries where the Baloch community resides.
India and the Crucial Connectivity Link
Throughout their long history, India and Iran have successfully converted their civilisational ties into a robust diplomatic and economic partnership. In recent years, as Iran has sought to increase its engagement with the East, India has emerged as a key partner. Currently, the partnership between India and Iran centres on trade infrastructure. Iran is a key part of the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC), which will connect India to Europe via Iran and Azerbaijan.[18] Moreover, India operates Iran’s strategic Chabahar port, accessing Central Asia and Eurasia. Through Chabahar, Iran had given India an extraordinary opportunity to bypass unstable Pakistan. Chabahar is also the centre point in India and Iran’s vision for Afghanistan, wherein India built the Zaranj-Delaram highway connecting Chabahar to Afghanistan.[19]
However, recently, these projects have suffered a setback due to secondary American sanctions on Iran. Although India has been able to secure multiple concessions for the Chabahar port from the U.S. administration, the latest being a waiver until April 2026, Indian operations at the port still face uncertainty.[20] For India, Iran has been a stable ally in a volatile region. For Iran, India has been a partner that has consistently engaged with Iran, making balanced manoeuvres and extracting concessions amid American sanctions.
In terms of Kashmir, a sensitive issue for India, Iran has eventually transformed its policy to be more balanced. From the days of supporting Pakistan’s claims on Kashmir under the Shah regime, Iran’s government has gradually come a long way to praise India’s secular approach, making it clear that the Kashmir issue remains a bilateral one between India and Pakistan.[21] Nevertheless, Iran’s criticism of India, although rare, comes from the hardliner clerics, including Ayatollah Khamenei, the objective being the mobilisation of Muslims, including Kashmiris, under one Islamic revolution, something periodically touted by the Islamic regime.[22] Moreover, whenever the hardline factions lean on such rhetoric, it is almost always followed by the Iranian government and diplomats clarifying their support for a bilateral solution in Kashmir.[23]
Iran’s criticism of India, although rare, comes from the hardliner clerics, including Ayatollah Khamenei, the objective being the mobilisation of Muslims, including Kashmiris, under one Islamic revolution, something periodically touted by the Islamic regime.
From India’s perspective, any government in Iran, whether the present Pezeshkian government or even a seemingly improbable Shah government, will remain open for cooperation with India. India will seek to benefit from two post-unrest possibilities: a stronger position for moderates, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, in the future regime, and a resumption of U.S.-Iran talks, a distant possibility that will benefit India-Iran trade, infrastructure, and connectivity projects. However, India shall remain wary of two possible changes – a weak post-unrest government in Tehran, which can jeopardise India’s infrastructure projects, and a stronger hold of hardliner Shia clerics in the government, which might translate to louder support for a global Islamic movement, mobilising militancy in Kashmir similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Looking Forward
After a brutal crackdown on its own population and near destruction of its nuclear facilities, the future regime can neither be expected to enjoy widespread domestic support nor negotiate with the U.S. from a position of strength. In such a scenario, the Iranian government will hope to combine domestic economic policies with active diplomacy to ease the economic and military pressure upon the country. While the regime undergoes internal changes, its neighbours and partners should remain prepared to manoeuvre through a wide range of possibilities.
For India, the strengthening of moderate factions in the Iranian regime and future U.S.-Iran talks might signal the beginning of a new and prosperous era in India-Iran trade relations. If, in the near future, the Iranian government can negotiate an easing of U.S. sanctions, it will not only improve Iran’s economic situation but also benefit Afghanistan by boosting trade with India and thereby circumventing the trade blockade imposed by Pakistan.[24] Additionally, for Afghanistan, a post-unrest Iranian government willing to cooperate on water sharing and drug trafficking issues would be a favourable outcome. Both countries have called for de-escalation and cooperation on these issues in recent years, but have been unable to reach a consensus. On the other hand, Pakistan would seek greater cooperation from the future government in Tehran against Baloch separatists. For Pakistan, a weak Iranian government in the centre is an enormous security concern.
If, in the near future, the Iranian government can negotiate an easing of U.S. sanctions, it will not only improve Iran’s economic situation but also benefit Afghanistan by boosting trade with India and thereby circumventing the trade blockade imposed by Pakistan.
However, Iran’s interactions with all three neighbours are not separated in watertight compartments. Rather, these relations sometimes have overlapping effects. For instance, stronger trade and connectivity between India and Central Asia, including Afghanistan, via Iran, can harm Pakistan’s export prospects to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Similarly, Ayatollah Khamenei’s occasional call to mobilise Kashmiri Muslims supports Pakistani attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue, acting as an irritant in Iran’s relations with India. Therefore, any strong stance on any such issue will disturb the fine balance Tehran maintains in relations with these neighbours. However, with domestic demands to meet and international pressure to withstand, the Iranian government will have to make economic and foreign policy reforms, possibly prioritising some relations over others.
[1] The Hindu, “Iran protests | The revolution will not be televised,” last modified January 18, 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/iran-protests-the-revolution-will-not-be-televised/article70519764.ece.
[2] The Hindu, “U.S.’s heavy duty attack on Iran’s nuke sites,” last modified June 25, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/uss-heavy-duty-attack-on-irans-nuke-sites/article69731601.ece.
[3] Firstpost, “‘47 years of rage’: Iran’s mosque set on fire as protestors chant slogans amid uprising | Watch,” last modified January 10, 2026, https://www.firstpost.com/world/47-years-of-rage-irans-mosque-set-on-fire-as-protestors-chant-slogans-amid-uprising-watch-13967403.html.
[4] Al Jazeera, “‘End is near’: Will Kabul become first big city without water by 2030?” last modified July 5, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/7/5/end-is-near-will-kabul-become-first-big-city-without-water-by-2030.
[5] Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, “Afghanistan’s Water Fight with Iran,” last modified August 14, 2023, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/afghanistans-water-fight-with-iran/.
[6] BBC News, “Iran’s drug problem: Addicts ‘more than double’ in six years,” last modified June 25, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40397727.
[7] Nikkei Asia, “Opium cultivation booms in Pakistan, Iran as Taliban bars Afghans,” last modified November 11, 2025, https://asia.nikkei.com/economy/trade/opium-cultivation-booms-in-pakistan-iran-as-taliban-bars-afghans2.
[8] India Today, “When Iran supported Pakistan with arms in wars against India,” last modified January 19, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/history-of-it/story/iran-pakistan-war-india-arms-military-relations-news-balochistan-history-1971-1965-iranian-revolution-2490681-2024-01-19.
[9] Indian Council for World Affairs, “Pakistan and Iran – Changing Dynamics and Challenges,” last modified July 7, 2017, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=1907&lid=1035.
[10] Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, “West Balochistan,” accessed January 2026, https://unpo.org/member/west-balochistan/.
[11] Chatham House, “The hijacking of a train marks a watershed in the Balochistan insurgency,” last modified April 16, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/hijacking-train-marks-watershed-balochistan-insurgency.
[12] Amnesty International, “Forced Disappearances in Pakistan: The Case of Mahrang Baloch,” last modified February 21, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/country-specialists/forced-disappearances-pakistan-case-mahrang-baloch.
[13] BBC News, “Iran admits carrying out deadly strike on Pakistan territory,” last modified January 17, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67999465.
[14] NDTV, “‘Sole Objective of Today’s Act Was…’: Pak after air strikes on Iran,” last modified January 18, 2024, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-air-strikes-in-iran-after-strikes-pakistan-says-had-info-on-large-scale-terror-activities-in-iran-4884384.
[15] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Separatist Group Jaish al-Adl rebrands as wider Iranian opposition,” last modified December 12, 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/jaish-al-adl-new-group-iran-opposition/33621554.html.
[16] Xinhua, “Pakistani authorities seize 30 kg of crystal meth in Balochistan,” last modified November 19, 2025, https://english.news.cn/20251119/0a14bf2a1ede4be48ca61601f3e6e7f8/c.html.
[17] The Japan Times, “Pakistan has deadliest year in decade as Taliban ties worsen,” December 31, 2025, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/12/31/asia-pacific/pakistan-violence-taliban/.
[18] Impact and Policy Research Institute, “International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), 2000: Boosting India–Central Asia trade relations,” last modified September 28, 2025, https://www.impriindia.com/insights/instc-2000/.
[19] Times of India, “India hands over Zaranj–Delaram highway to Afghanistan,” last modified January 22, 2009, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-hands-over-zaranj-delaram-highway-to-afghanistan/articleshow/4016669.cms.
[20] The Hindu, “India gets six-month waiver on U.S. sanctions against Chabahar: MEA,” last modified October 30, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-six-month-waiver-us-sanctions-on-chabahar-port/article70220724.ece.
[21] The Hindu, “The pragmatist’s pivot to India,” last modified January 17, 2017, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/The-pragmatist%E2%80%99s-pivot-to-India/article17046244.ece.
[22] Atlantic Council, “Iran issues rare criticism of India over Kashmir,” last modified August 30, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-issues-rare-criticism-of-india-over-kashmir/.
[23] Times of India, “Iran offers India olive branch on Kashmir,” last modified December 31, 2002, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Iran-offers-India-olive-branch-on-Kashmir/articleshow/32880145.cms.
[24] Kabul Now, “Afghanistan–Pakistan trade drops 40% amid prolonged border closure,” last modified January 2025, https://kabulnow.com/2026/01/afghanistan-pakistan-trade-drops-40-amid-prolonged-border-closure/.
