Abstract: The manoeuvrist approach is, at its most elemental, a mode of thought for overcoming military challenges. By analysing historical and contemporary contexts and incorporating insights from emerging technologies, a manoeuvrist perspective can enhance strategic foresight, agility, and innovation. This study posits that the principles of the manoeuvrist approach underpin cognitive superiority, particularly in information manoeuvre within the OODA decision-making model; combined with appropriate strategic thought, it enables the assertion of interests in the 21st century.

Problem statement: How can understanding the principles of the manoeuvrist approach, to maintain mental manoeuvrability in particular, still help to solve contemporary complex situations?

So what?: Future leaders must conceive information as an Instrument of Power. Information manoeuvre is a means to act and generate effects in the cognitive, informational (virtual), and physical dimensions; it contributes significantly to cognitive superiority. The knowledge and application of information manoeuvre is an integral part of any leadership and targeting process.

Humans and the Power of Information

Manoeuvres, viewed as conscious and mindful movements to gain an advantage,[1] are indispensable in modern warfare. The traditional understanding of warfare has expanded beyond territorial control to exert a lasting influence on all stakeholders, especially the local population. In both arenas, the battle extends beyond physical dominance to encompass societal will and behaviour manipulation. Information emerges as a potent Instrument of Power (IOP) through information manoeuvre, striving for cognitive superiority.[2] As in chess, the pursuit of victory through strategic interplay, such as holding a position, attrition, and manoeuvring, has a cognitive basis—in this sense, victory is always a victory over the mind.[3]

Mental flexibility, creativity, and innovation are critical attributes in a dynamic landscape. Leaders are encouraged to integrate these qualities into their ongoing decision-making processes, as exemplified by the OODA loop model. The OODA loop, an acronym derived from the four phases of its cycle—(O)bservation, (O)rientation, (D)ecision, and (A)ction—serves as an iterative framework.[4] This model is designed to help leaders anticipate, adapt to, and manoeuvre effectively within dynamic and evolving contexts.

Charles Buxton’s adage that “in life, as in chess, forethought wins” underscores the importance of anticipation, adaptation, and strategic manoeuvring in both chess and warfare.[5]

Chess is war over the board. The object is to crush the opponent’s mind.

“Chess is war over the board. The object is to crush the opponent’s mind.”[6] (Bobby Fischer)

Manoeuvre – From Tactics to Strategic Thinking

“Tactic is knowing what to do when there is something to do. Strategy is knowing what to do when there is nothing to do.”[7] (Savielly Tartakower)

NATO defines manoeuvre as “the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.”[8] Originally, manoeuvre meant positioning troops favourably to defeat the enemy. Commanders like Napoleon excelled at using manoeuvre to outflank and surprise the enemy, as seen in the battles of Ulm and Austerlitz (1805).[9] Napoleon understood that success required a blend of manoeuvre, positional, and attrition warfare.[10]

During the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact’s strategy was characterised by massive rearmament, emphasising quantity over quality. In response, NATO aimed to counter this overwhelming force by manoeuvring and concentrating its forces at the decisive time and place, specifically targeting the enemy’s flanks and depth. The US Army formalised this approach as the ‘Maneuver Warfare Concept.[11] Manoeuvre warfare aims for psychological and physical advantage, using speed, momentum, and surprise to demoralise and defeat the enemy and ultimately break their will to fight.[12]

Clausewitz’s assertion that War is the continuation of politics by other means highlights the political objectives of military actions.[13] However, he also stressed that war represents just one aspect of pursuing interests, alongside politics and all instruments of power aimed at achieving strategic goals. The ultimate goal of warfare lies in the sphere of politics.[14] Beyond the battlefield, conflicts operate on multiple levels simultaneously. Taking a meta-level perspective underscores the importance of information manoeuvre and cognitive superiority in asserting interests and winning the battle for hearts and minds.

Manoeuvre warfare, rooted in teachings from military theorists like Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, emphasises the dynamic nature of conflict. It advocates for decentralised decision-making, rapid tempo, and synchronisation across domains. Central to this approach is disrupting enemy cohesion and decision-making through psychological and informational as well as physical actions, aiming to generate momentum and achieve strategic advantage. Physical existence, presence or movement of forces not only create effects in their original domain, but also in the information environment. This approach involves preparing the battlespace to gain an advantage even before battle. It focuses on attacking the adversary’s mind and shaping information to outmanoeuvre threats. The manoeuvrist approach acknowledges the chaotic nature of warfare, viewing the enemy as a system to destabilise and exploit for strategic advantage. This step is intended to generate momentum. In Colonel Boyd’s words: “tearing the enemy apart from the inside”.[15]

Adopting a societal perspective, modern conflict resolution involves negotiation across social subsystems. Economic performance is also critical, as armaments production supports military strength. Military successes are an important transmission belt for diplomatic and political successes.

The manoeuvrist approach focuses on gaining a positional advantage, outpacing adversaries, and disorienting them through shock and rapid adaptation in contested environments. It involves shaping information to outmanoeuvre threats and acknowledging the chaotic nature of warfare, viewing the enemy as a system to exploit for strategic advantage.[16]

Manoeuvre Warfare – Required Prerequisites

“Strategy requires thought, tactics require observation.” (Max Euwe)[17]

Strategy requires thought, tactics require observation.

Manoeuvre warfare is inherently active and offensive, often employing covert or unexpected methods such as information campaigns or disinformation. On the conventional battlefield, successful manoeuvres and attacks on enemy weak points demand reconnaissance, speed, surprise, firepower, and lethality. Long-range attacks need logistical support to sustain momentum. The striking force must concentrate power at the decisive point, even when dispersed, making it vulnerable to enemy fire and air attacks. Staging and engagement areas are susceptible to counterattacks and require protection from reconnaissance and weapons effects. In the Second World War, acoustic and visual camouflage sufficed. However, subsequent technological advances have since made the battlefield more transparent.

Technological developments have also changed the way in which information is processed. Modern intelligence—from satellites to drones— may detect massed forces early, making conventional surprise attacks rare unless enemy reconnaissance is significantly disrupted. An example is the destruction of a Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) attempting to cross the Siverskyi Donets. In the example case, troops were concentrated on crossing the 80m wide river, which was detected and reconnoitred using drone reconnaissance on May 6 2022. The swift reaction and effectiveness of the information-based use of artillery led to high casualties on the Russian side.[18] Despite these technological advances and enhanced intelligence-gathering capabilities, the battlefield has not become a battlefield of glass.

On the contrary, the increased volume of information has led to an overload, making it more difficult to discern the essential details. The “fog of war” described by Clausewitz, originally caused by a lack of information, has evolved into a modern challenge of filtering relevant facts from the overwhelming flow of data. Discerning the chaff from the wheat in this information space is crucial in creating a sound basis for decision-making and action. Throughout Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Ukrainian military has used deceptive manoeuvres and disinformation to mislead Russian forces. A key example occurred in September 2022 during Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Ukraine created the impression of a large-scale attack in the southern Kherson region, prompting Russia to redeploy significant forces there. However, Ukraine’s actual offensive took place in the northeastern Kharkiv region, leading to the liberation of large areas under Russian control. This strategy, known as “maskirovka,” weakened Russian defences in the east and provided Ukraine with a tactical advantage.[19] Future militaries will need to achieve information superiority or regional dominance while simultaneously disrupting the enemy’s situational awareness to maintain freedom of movement on the battlefield.[20]

Examples of Manoeuvre Warfare Over Time

“Good positions don’t win games, good moves do.” (Gerald Abrahams)[21]

Good positions don’t win games, good moves do.

An example of manoeuvre warfare can be seen in the 2003 U.S.-led coalition attack from Kuwait against Iraq. Iraq, a 20th-century force under directive control, faced a 21st-century force operating under mission command. The US strategy (Joint Vision 2010 and 2020) relied on network-centric warfare integrating operations to disable critical command centres, establish air superiority, and enable ground manoeuvrability.[22] Coalition ground forces advanced over 200 km in two days. Sandstorms, logistical delays, and resistance from the Medina Division in the Karbala Gap temporarily halted the offensive. The Iraqis intended to counterattack the coalition’s flank with the Hammurabi and Nida Divisions.[23] Global Hawk drones and JSTARS[24] aircraft provided target data, allowing long-range weapon systems and the US Air Force to largely destroy the three Iraqi divisions within two days—long before they could contact coalition ground troops.[25]

Manoeuvre warfare transcends conventional operations, representing not just a tactical approach but the culmination of a dynamic movement whose success must be evaluated comprehensively. Recent examples highlight this evolution: in 2021, the U.S.-led coalition’s operations in Afghanistan underscored that military successes alone do not ensure regional pacification or stability, as evidenced by the hasty Western withdrawal. Similarly, the 2020 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh showcased the extensive use of drones like the Turkish Bayraktar TB2. Azerbaijan effectively employed drones to neutralise Armenian air defences and systematically dismantle Armenian ground forces. The increase in unmanned systems has necessitated advanced defences against drones, including electronic systems, laser weapons, and Radio Frequency Directed Energy Weapons (RFDEWs). Successful manoeuvre warfare today demands superior intelligence capabilities for swift target engagement while maintaining operational stealth.[26]

However, one must not forget that the success of Azerbaijan’s military operations was not solely due to the use of the Bayraktar TB2 drones. Turkey delivered an ‘all-inclusive package’ that went far beyond the provision of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This package included comprehensive training and education for Azerbaijani forces, strategic intelligence support, and the development of advanced intelligence processing capabilities. This holistic approach provided Azerbaijan with the tools and knowledge required to fully integrate the drones into their broader military strategy, enabling more effective and coordinated operations on the battlefield.[27] The TB2 was just one pillar of a multi-faceted strategy that combined cutting-edge technology with extensive operational support, demonstrating the importance of a well-rounded and fully supported military framework in modern warfare.

From the perspective of the manoeuvrist approach, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia illustrates key principles. After swiftly annexing Crimea in 2014, separatists in the Donbas region engaged in violent clashes with the Ukrainian Army. Initial manoeuvres ultimately led to a positional and attritional war. The conflict culminated in Putin’s recognition of the separatist territories and his commitment to support them against the alleged repression by Ukraine.[28] Russia launched an attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The initially planned “Blitzkrieg” failed due to Kremlin misjudgments and Ukrainian resistance. Ukraine’s effective use of reconnaissance and communication, especially via social media, extended the conflict beyond borders into a battle for “hearts and minds.”

While the initial manoeuvre warfare on the virtuous battlefield has shifted to positional and attrition warfare, both sides continue to employ manoeuvre warfare on other levels. Limited manoeuvre is not only caused by technical reconnaissance capabilities, such as drones and satellites, it also stems from a lack of infantry, the length of the front, numerous obstacles and barriers, and ultimately insufficient planning capacity and synchronisation.

Both target connections and supplies through technical measures (CEMA)[29] and infrastructure attacks. Ukraine strives to maintain and increase Western weapons and ammunition supplies for counterattacks. Conversely, Russia uses disinformation, propaganda, nuclear threats, and attrition to undermine Western public support for Ukraine. If successful, Russia could regain ground manoeuvrability.

Manoeuvre warfare now encompasses the entire operational environment, integrating all instruments of power to achieve strategic objectives. Reflection on past conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan reveals that despite initial military successes, failures stemmed from inadequate strategic assessments. It’s essential to critically examine the principles of war to determine their continued validity and adaptability. Firstly, manoeuvre is not merely a means to an end but essentially an end in itself.[30] Secondly, it encompasses not just the land and air domains but the entire operational environment.[31]

Manoeuvre and the Force-Space-Time Calculus

“When you see a good move, look for a better one.” (Emanuel Lasker)[32]

When you see a good move, look for a better one.

Manoeuvre is a technique for solving problems, requiring leadership in the dimensions of force, space, and time, with consideration of information. Adequately addressing socio-military issues of interest must reflect these dimensions, illustrating various cause-effect relationships.[33]

 

When asserting interests from a manoeuvrist approach, the key question is how force can be effectively applied to achieve objectives. Deciding on the type of force to employ in specific contexts against particular challenges hinges on information. Information is the foundational material for decision-making, a concept emphasised in discussions on cognitive superiority.[34]

The triad of force, space, and time provides an analytical framework essential for understanding various approaches toward conflict resolution: manoeuvre, positional, and attrition warfare.

Manoeuvre, Positional and Attrition Warfare

Applying a manoeuvrist approach to conflict resolution across society promises efficient, resource-conserving achievement of objectives through cognitive-informational superiority. In practice, however, phases of mobility often alternate with static (positional) or attritional phases. In Ukraine, these phases sometimes coexist and sometimes alternate. For instance, the recapture of the Kharkiv Oblast in September and October 2022 exemplifies manoeuvre warfare’s essence: achieving surprise with high operational and tactical tempo to produce combined physical and psychological effects.[36]

A comprehensive understanding is essential to harness the long-term benefits of the manoeuvrist approach. Understanding requires arranging the force component in space and time to maintain the necessary psychological-operational momentum. The challenge lies in sustaining this momentum amid phases like the attrition battles and heavy use of obstacles following Kharkiv and Kherson’s recapture, involving artillery and drones. Forces can exhaust and reach a culmination point, risking loss of momentum.[37]

In military practice, adopting an overall social perspective on modes of conflict is crucial. Holding positions and deliberately wearing down the enemy is integral to strategic concepts. A societal approach, such as a war of attrition, emphasises economic performance and social resilience/morale. One example is the debate about armaments in Europe and the ability to supply Ukraine with the necessary material,[38] especially in the event of a feared isolationist turn in U.S. politics.

Shifting conflict dynamics involves assessing the relative strength of systems like Ukraine and its allies against Russia at different levels. Positional and attritional warfare may precede a transition to manoeuvre, thus potentially reshaping the balance of power. From the triad perspective, this represents a rebalancing in favour of time.

Chess – A Manoeuvrist Approach

Time plays a crucial role in chess, which can serve as a metaphor for asserting interest in military conflicts despite the stark difference that real people die in wars. Garry Kasparov, one of the most famous world chess champions, has linked chess play with strategic thinking and action, continuing his strategic endeavours in politics after his chess career.[39] Manoeuvre is key to success in chess, but it must be skillfully blended with attrition and positional warfare while maintaining an overall perspective. Although the chessboard is limited to 64 squares, the operational environment in chess, like in conflict, is constrained. Understanding the current position and potential future combinations is essential. Each move opens new possibilities, and only attrition—reducing the number of pieces—simplifies the calculation of combinations.

Time plays a crucial role in chess, which can serve as a metaphor for asserting interest in military conflicts despite the stark difference that real people die in wars.

Kasparov, who defeated the chess computer Deep Blue in 1995, lost in 1997, and drew against X3D Fritz in 2023,[40] sees human success against computers in synthesis—the ability to combine creativity and calculation, art and science, into a whole greater than the sum of its parts.[41] Even though human computational power seems limited compared to a computer, experience and the conscious use of memory are the foundation for peak performance—evaluation precedes calculation.[42] Grandmasters sometimes make mistakes due to focusing on their plans and missing favourable opportunities, as illustrated by the double blunder between Sammy Reshevsky and László Szabó during the preparation for the 1953 World Championship in Zurich.[43] Both Reshevsky and Szabó were deeply engrossed in their strategic plans, leading to mutual oversights. Szabó missed a tactical opportunity; Reshevsky, fixated on his own strategy, failed to capitalise on Szabó’s error. This “double blunder” illustrates how even top players can falter under intense focus. The game ended in a draw, underscoring the importance of balancing long-term strategy with vigilance for immediate opportunities. This incident highlights the psychological challenges in high-level chess. It is a key example in discussions about chess strategy and psychology.[44]

In both chess and military confrontations, analysing the opponent’s preferences, strengths, and weaknesses is essential.[45] Analysis allows for formulating a strategy that tactics should follow. Identifying and observing feints while adhering to one’s strategy can weaken the opponent. Chess and the assertion of interests involve navigating an ever-changing map.[46]

Kasparov sees a close connection between the factors of material, time, and quality when considering the aspect of information, paralleling the triad of force, space, and time in military strategy.[47]

The basis of chess, as in life, is the available resources. In chess, both players start with equal resources. Through manoeuvring, they engage in positional play and, if seeking an advantage, attrition—exchanging material for time. In an attack, being one decisive move ahead is important.[48] Quality involves deciding whether to accept a tempting material advantage or to forgo it to preserve the advantage of time.[49]

Quality involves deciding whether to accept a tempting material advantage or to forgo it to preserve the advantage of time.

Similarly, in military conflict, positions are often held with significant losses (positional and attrition warfare) to tie down enemy forces and gain time for other actions, as seen in the nine-month battle for Bakhmut in the 2022/2023 Ukraine-Russia conflict.[50] Quality also means positioning forces tactically according to strategy, whether as a holding or blocking position or for manoeuvrability. Pieces can be sacrificed to clear the path for a subsequent manoeuvre. In chess, material can be invested in time and vice versa, or both can be invested in quality.[51] Napoleon’s victories, such as his 1796 campaign in Italy, were achieved through the speed, surprise, and flanking manoeuvres of his smaller force, illustrating the superiority of timing and quality over sheer numbers.[52] This principle remains valid today, emphasising the importance of concentrating quality and time over mass. Such effectiveness is achieved through manoeuvre, even more depending on high-quality information, highlighting the critical role of information in modern conflict.

The factors force-space-time, like material-time-quality, are dependent on information. Information is central to perception, interpretation, decision-making, and implementation in chess, discussions, negotiations, and warfare. This requires a plan based on accurate information.

The Cuban José Raúl Capablanca, the third World Chess Champion, approached the three phases of any chess game as follows: “In order to improve your game, you must study the endgame before everything else. For whereas the endings can be studied and mastered by themselves, the middle game and opening must be studied in relation to the end game.”[53] To be successful, all phases and sequences of the game must be mastered, especially the transition from one to the next. Strategy involves analysing the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses to establish an overall plan and assessing and drawing conclusions during preparation and confrontation. Viewing situations from a meta-level, drawing on experience, and implementing tactics effectively are crucial.

The OODA Loop as a Decision Framework

Feedback loops are critical for driving change and adaptation in dynamic systems by linking outputs back to inputs. The OODA loop, developed by Colonel John Boyd,[54] offers a structured approach to decision-making in fast-paced and uncertain environments and serves as a fundamental concept in military leadership and strategic decision-making. This framework, characterised by its four iterative phases—Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act—offers a systematic approach to navigating dynamic and fluctuating environments. By continuously cycling through these phases, individuals and organisations can maintain situational awareness, swiftly assess evolving conditions, and execute timely and decisive actions.

Balancing Speed and Decision Quality

While rapid decision-making is essential in dynamic and high-risk contexts, the efficacy of the OODA loop hinges not merely on speed but also on the quality of the decisions rendered. Speed alone cannot compensate for poor decision-making; hasty or ill-informed choices can lead to strategic failures and undermine the effectiveness of the OODA loop. Mastery of the OODA loop in rapidly evolving and fluctuating environments thus requires a delicate balance between swift execution and sound judgment. Each phase—particularly the ‘Decide’ phase—must be underpinned by thorough observation and analysis to integrate both speed and decision quality. This equilibrium enhances strategic foresight, agility, and overall effectiveness, enabling leaders to retain the initiative and outmanoeuvre adversaries while preserving the integrity of their decisions.

Speed alone cannot compensate for poor decision-making; hasty or ill-informed choices can lead to strategic failures and undermine the effectiveness of the OODA loop.

Furthermore, a deliberate focus on the cognitive dimension is critical to improving decision quality. Utilising the OODA loop as a structured analytical tool allows for the decomposition of the decision-making process into discrete steps, facilitating targeted improvements. This structured approach not only supports rapid reactions but also fosters high-quality strategic decision-making.

Application in Modern Warfare

In contemporary military operations, the OODA loop is central to both strategic and tactical decision-making. Its value in modern warfare stems from its emphasis on flexibility, speed, and continuous adaptation—qualities indispensable in unpredictable and rapidly changing combat scenarios, such as those witnessed in the Ukraine-Russia conflict.[55] The OODA loop’s iterative and structured nature provides a strategic advantage by continuously disrupting the adversary’s decision-making cycle, combining analytical rigour with intuitive insights.

As Brown elucidates, Boyd’s approach to conflict emphasises that national survival relies not on sheer material strength but on the capacity to perceive, think, and adapt. Boyd’s historical evidence suggests that success in warfare arises not from overwhelming numbers or advanced weaponry—but from a profound understanding of the human element.[56]

As Brown notes, “(…) Boyd introduced a concept of conflict that grounded national survival not in materiel strength but in the ability of a nation’s people to perceive, think, and adapt. He supported this concept with evidence dating back to the earliest written records of warfare that was tried and tested in the laboratory of history. And he concluded that success came not through overwhelming numbers or advanced weaponry, but through a deep understanding of the human element.”[57]

Applying the Analytical Framework

Define the Strategic Objectives and Key Stakeholders Involved in the Conflict

In analysing the Ukraine-Russia conflict through the lens of the OODA loop, understanding the strategic objectives and key stakeholders is paramount. Russia’s principal aims include the annexation of Ukrainian territories such as Crimea and Donbas, the establishment of pro-Russian governance structures, and the diminution of NATO and EU influence in Eastern Europe. These objectives reflect Russia’s broader ambitions for territorial expansion and regional dominance.[58]

Conversely, Ukraine’s strategic objectives focus on safeguarding its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The primary aim is to defend its internationally recognised borders and reclaim territories impacted by Russian aggression, including Crimea and Donbas. Regaining control over these areas is vital for Ukraine’s national unity and stability.[59]

Securing international support is another critical objective for Ukraine. By aligning with Western nations and organisations such as the European Union and NATO, Ukraine aims to bolster its defence capabilities, deter further aggression, and strengthen its diplomatic position globally.[60]

Additionally, Ukraine is committed to implementing economic and political reforms to enhance resilience and stability. Addressing corruption, improving governance, and fostering economic development are essential to solidifying international backing and reinforcing national security.[61]

Centred on defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity, Kyiv’s aims include garnering international support to bolster defence capabilities, reclaiming occupied territories, and countering Russian influence.

Identify the Relevant Operational Environments

• Physical Dimension

The operational environments in the Russia-Ukraine conflict are defined by a complex interplay of physical, cognitive, and informational dimensions, each of which is crucial to the conduct of military operations. In the physical dimension, the conflict is centred on key regions in Eastern Ukraine, particularly Donetsk and Luhansk, where intense combat operations are ongoing. These regions hold both strategic and symbolic significance, making them focal points of engagement. Urban warfare is especially critical in major cities such as Kharkiv and Mariupol, where control over infrastructure and population centres is essential for both operational success and broader strategic objectives. Additionally, logistics routes that facilitate the movement of supplies, reinforcements, and humanitarian aid are of paramount importance. Disruption of these can critically impair military operations. Furthermore, the control or destruction of strategic targets, such as bridges, power plants, and communication networks, plays a decisive role in shaping the operational capabilities of both sides.

• Cognitive Dimension

In the cognitive dimension, both Russia and Ukraine engage in extensive propaganda and psychological operations aimed at influencing public opinion, boosting morale, and undermining the adversary’s resolve. These efforts are crucial for shaping the narrative of the conflict. Media coverage and social media amplify these cognitive operations, playing a significant role in shaping global perceptions, influencing international support, and affecting the morale of both combatants and civilians. Cyber warfare is an integral aspect of this dimension, with both parties employing cyber tactics to disrupt information systems, conduct espionage, and spread disinformation. These operations are designed to weaken the adversary’s command and control structures, thereby impacting their overall operational effectiveness.

• Information Dimension

The information dimension is equally critical, where effective intelligence gathering and dissemination are vital for both tactical and strategic decision-making. Accurate intelligence enables timely and informed responses to rapidly changing battlefield conditions. Electronic warfare capabilities are deployed to intercept and disrupt enemy communications, providing a significant edge in the information domain. Advanced reconnaissance capabilities, including the use of drones and satellite imagery, enhance situational awareness on the battlefield, facilitating more precise and effective military operations.

Comparative Analysis of Strengths and Weaknesses

A comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Russia and Ukraine reveals distinct operational advantages and vulnerabilities. Russia’s military is characterised by its size, technological sophistication, and significant cyber capabilities, which together create a formidable presence on the battlefield. However, Russia faces substantial logistical challenges, particularly in maintaining long supply lines and sustaining extended operations. Additionally, economic sanctions imposed by the international community exert significant pressure on Russia’s resources and operational sustainability.

In contrast, Ukraine benefits from high morale among its populace and military, reinforced by substantial Western support in terms of material aid and diplomatic backing. Ukraine’s familiarity with local terrain and environmental conditions offers a tactical advantage in specific engagements. However, Ukraine’s heavy reliance on foreign aid underscores its vulnerability, and the extensive infrastructural damage caused by the conflict constrains its ability to sustain prolonged military operations independently.

Analysing the Adversary’s Decision-Making Processes and Operational Tempo

The decision-making processes and operational tempo of Russia and Ukraine can be effectively analysed through the OODA loop framework. Each phase reveals the distinct strategic priorities and approaches of both adversaries in Ukraine.

• Observe

Russia’s observation focuses on monitoring Ukrainian military movements, international diplomacy, and sanctions, using advanced reconnaissance and cyber espionage to gather critical intelligence. Ukraine, in contrast, tracks Russian troop movements, Western aid, and public sentiment, leveraging real-time intelligence and local knowledge to remain agile on the battlefield.

• Orient

Russia processes this intelligence with a focus on territorial expansion and political influence, orienting its military strategy toward exploiting Ukrainian vulnerabilities. Ukraine, however, orients itself around asymmetric warfare, integrating Western support and exploiting Russia’s logistical challenges while maintaining domestic and international backing.

• Decide

In decision-making, Russia opts for strategies that maximise territorial gains while managing escalation risks, leading to aggressive actions like missile strikes and cyber attacks. Ukraine prioritises defending key positions and planning counterattacks, with decisions influenced by battlefield conditions and the need for sustained international support.

• Act

Russia’s actions involve coordinated military operations aimed at overwhelming Ukrainian defences through missile strikes, ground offensives, and cyber warfare. Ukraine, on the other hand, focuses on defensive operations, guerrilla tactics, and securing international aid to prolong the conflict and increase pressure on Russia.

The OODA loops of both Russia and Ukraine shape the conflict’s strategic and tactical dynamics. Russia prioritises rapid decisions and coordinated actions to expand territory while avoiding international escalation. Ukraine, meanwhile, adopts a more adaptive approach, focusing on asymmetric warfare and maintaining support. The ongoing interplay between these loops drives the conflict’s pace and outcomes as each side seeks to outmanoeuvre the other through continuous observation, decision-making, and action.

Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Manoeuvrist Strategies and Cognitive Warfare Tactics

The effectiveness of manoeuvrist strategies and cognitive warfare tactics is evident in the contrasting approaches of Russia and Ukraine. Russia’s strategy involves rapid advances and targeted attacks on infrastructure to destabilise Ukrainian defences. At the same time, its disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks aim to erode Ukraine’s ability to respond effectively. On the other hand, Ukraine employs mobile defence and guerrilla tactics to complicate Russian advances, countering disinformation with factual reporting to sustain international support and domestic morale. The ongoing interaction between these strategies and tactics continues to shape the trajectory of the conflict.

Assess the Impact of External Factors on the Conflict Dynamics

International sanctions and diplomatic efforts by NATO and the EU impact Russia’s economy and support for Ukraine. Technological advancements like drones and cyber warfare influence communication and control on both sides.

Conclusions and Insights

This analysis demonstrates that modern warfare increasingly relies on cyber and information tactics, highlighting the importance of analysing the cognitive dimension. Sanctions and diplomatic pressure shape conflict dynamics, influencing military engagements. Asymmetric and urban warfare requires adaptability and resilience. As an analytical framework, the OODA loop effectively accommodates the dynamic nature of decision-making. This comprehensive approach offers valuable insights for future military strategies and enhances geopolitical understanding.

Implications for Future Operations

Future military operations must prioritise robust cyber defences and effective counter-disinformation strategies. Coalition-building for international support and adaptation to hybrid warfare tactics will be crucial. By systematically analysing the Ukraine-Russia conflict through this framework, we gain a comprehensive understanding of its strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions, offering valuable insights for future military and geopolitical strategies. The means and methods for pursuing interests have become more rapid and complex due to technological advancements. The strategic synchronisation of all instruments of power in the Operational Environment, particularly in relation to and interaction with the Informational Environment, has attained utmost significance through strategic communication.

Information Manoeuvre – The New Manoeuvrist Approach?

Undoubtedly, information is central to all decisions and serves as a means to an end. For example, an aircraft carrier group can exert power and influence simply by its presence. Thus, information is a crucial instrument of power alongside Military, Political, Economic, and Civilian (MPECI).[62] Information permeates all domains—Land, Air, Sea, Cyber, Space, and the Information Environment—and through Information Manoeuvre, it achieves effects across physical, informational (virtual), and ultimately the cognitive dimensions of the Information Environment.[63]

Undoubtedly, information is central to all decisions and serves as a means to an end.

Only the UK and the Netherlands have adopted the term “Information Manoeuvre,” with both nations emphasising its use in influencing audiences.[64] From the authors’ perspective, “Information Manoeuvre” is a comprehensive approach that addresses both friendly and adversarial elements. It serves to motivate one’s forces while simultaneously influencing opponents and from the author’s side, defined as followed:

“Information Manoeuvre entails directing and executing activities that transcend the cognitive, virtual, and physical dimensions of the Information Environment. It encompasses the comprehensive coordination of activities within the Operational Environment, integrating all instruments of power across every dimension. The objective is to affect the behaviour of all target groups effectively and secure the advancement of one’s own interests.”[65]

Information Manoeuvre is a critical instrument that operates through the informational dimension to implement actions in the physical and cognitive dimensions. Utilising virtual capabilities and all physical elements of power, not just the military, it achieves strategic objectives based on a comprehensive “targeting plan”. The aim is to achieve desired informational (non-kinetic) effects in the cognitive dimension and induce behavioural change. This can be achieved through cognitive warfare, PsyOps, disinformation campaigns to influence adversaries, or positive emotional framing to enhance the motivation and cognitive resilience of one’s society and partners.

It Always Starts and Ends With Information

“Knowledge must become capability.“ (Carl von Clausewitz)[66]

Knowledge must become capability.

Manoeuvres depend on meeting one’s information needs while disrupting the opponent’s. This now includes cyber, space, and the information environment beyond traditional military domains. Information—central to all decisions—must be critically examined for alterations. Information itself is the tool, and Information Manoeuvre is the toolkit. Manoeuvres occur in the mind, requiring a meta-level view to assess changes, beneficiaries, and conditions. Strategic manoeuvres are essential for tactical and operational effects, necessitating coordinating all power instruments to achieve strategic goals. Comprehensive understanding and seizing opportunities are prerequisites for chess and global affairs success.

As Kasparov suggests, one must ask what is new, how it resembles the past, and what conditions have changed.[67] Creativity, initiative, and innovation are crucial for effectively combining manoeuvre, attrition, and positional warfare. Mobility, flexibility, and distraction are essential to disrupting balance and seizing the initiative.[68] “To make fire, one must kindle.“[69] Victory hinges on manoeuvre, and cognitive superiority relies on information manoeuvre. This tool orchestrates all power instruments to create cognitive effects through physical and virtual actions, ultimately guiding behaviour in the desired direction.

 

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Bernhard Schulyok has research interests in Security Policy and Military Capability Development. He has written three handbooks and numerous individual articles in the journal “Truppendienst“ and in the online journal “The Defence Horizon Journal”. He is also the National Director of the multinational platform: Military Capability Development Campaign (MCDC).

Lukas Grangl has research interests in Security Policy, International Politics, and Military Policy. He has published work on the application and implementation of modern control concepts (e.g. New Public Management). He is a member of the Reserve Forces of the Austrian Armed Forces. He works for a global tax consulting, auditing, and consulting company.

Markus Gruber has research interests in International Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis, Diplomacy, Systems Theory (in International Relations), and Conflict and Security analysis. He is a member of the Reserve Forces of the Austrian Armed Forces and business unit manager of an Austrian scale-up for access management and control.

The views contained in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence.

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[1] Oxford Dictionary, “Manoeuvre,” in https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/manoeuvre_1?q=manoeuvre, accessed March 3, 2024.

[2] Judith T. van de Kuijt, Naomi Keja and Jacoline C. Slaager (2023), The Concept of Information Manoeuvre. Winning the Battle of Perceptions, The Hague Centre of Strategic Studies. Paper 3 of the Information-based behavioural influencing and Western practice paper series (May 2023), in: https://hcss.nl/report/the-concept-of-information-manoeuvre-winning-the-battle-of-perceptions/, accessed March 05, 2024.

[3] About chess and strategy e.g.: Garry Kasparov, Strategie und die Kunst zu leben. Von einem Schachgenie lernen, München: Piper, 2007.

[4] Frans P.B Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (Strategy and History), London: Routledge, 2007 and Robert Coram, Boyd, The fighter pilot who changed the art of war, Hachette Book Group, New York, 2010.

[5] Eliana Bane (2024), Patience and Forethought in Chess and in Life, in: https://premierchess.com/uncategorized/patience-and-forethought-in-chess-and-in-life#:~:text=Charles%20Buxton%20was%20a%20philanthropist,order%20to%20win%20the%20game, accessed March 07, 2024.

[6] https://www.chessable.com/tactics-training-bobby-fischer/course/9993/, accessed September 01, 2024.

[7] https://www.sgmi.ch/en/st-gallen-centers/center-for-strategic-management/, accessed September 01, 2024.

[8] NATO (2022), AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.

[9] Amos C. Fox (2018), A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver-Warfare Doctrine, in: https://www.moore.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2017/Fall/4Fox17.pdf, accessed June 03, 2024.

[10] Idem.

[11] Idem.

[12] NATO (2022), AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.

[13] Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Hamburg: Nikol Verlag, 2008, 47.

[14] Ibid., 37-38.

[15] Marinus (2020), Marine Corps Manouver Warfare, in: https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Marine-Corps-Maneuver-Warfare.pdf, accessed March 17, 2024.

[16] John Kiszely, The meaning of manoeuvre, RUSI Journal, 2008, 36-40; Robbin Laird (2019), The Manoeuvrist Approach: Past, Present and Future, in: https://sldinfo.com/2019/11/the-manoeuvrist-approach-past-present-and-future/, accessed March 17, 2024.

[17] https://www.resourcestrategies.com/Approach/Strategies.aspx.

[18] Die Presse, “Russische Katastrophe bei Flussüberquerung,“ in: https://www.diepresse.com/6138252/russische-katastrophe-bei-flussueberquerung, accessed June 17, 2024.

[19] John Hardie, Ukraine’s Counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson and the Road Ahead, FDD´s Long War Journal, September 16, 2022, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/09/ukraines-counteroffensives-in-kharkiv-and-kherson-and-the-road-ahead.php, accessed September 01, 2024.

[20] James Reed, Modern Fog and Friction, Small Wars Journal, Jannuary 23, 2012, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/modern-fog-and-friction, accessed September 01, 2024.

[21] https://www.chessmugs.co.uk/product/gerald-abrahams-quote/#:~:text=This%20chess%20mug%20features%20a,win%20games%2C%20good%20moves%20do, accessed September 01, 2024.

[22] Klaus Naumann, Wendepunkt Golfkrieg II, last modified May 06, 2003, https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article692410/Wendepunkt-Golfkrieg-II.html [21.05.2024].

[23] Idem.

[24] JSTARS = Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System.

[25] Klaus Naumann, Wendepunkt Golfkrieg II, last modified May 06, 2003, in https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article692410/Wendepunkt-Golfkrieg-II.html, accessed May 21, 2024.

[26] Hülya Kınık and Sinem Çelik, The Role of Turkish Drones in Azerbaijan’s Increasing Military Effectiveness: An Assessment of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Insight Turkey Fall 2021/Volume 23 Number 4, Updated: Tuesday, December 14, 2021, https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/the-role-of-turkish-drones-in-azerbaijans-increasing-military-effectiveness-an-assessment-of-the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war, accessed September 01, 2024.

[27] Idem.

[28] Ivan Katchanovski (2017), The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-Up of Ukraine?, in: Ukraine in Crisis, Chapter 5, Routledge, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313360283_The_Separatist_War_in_Donbas_A_Violent_Break-Up_of_Ukraine [09.09.2024].

[29] CEMA = Cyber and Electro Magnetic Activities

[30] Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age, New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2000, 54.

[31] Ibid., 79.

[32] Edward Scimia, 10 Inspiring Chess Quotes From the Masters, The Spruce Crafts, updated on December 07, 2019, https://www.thesprucecrafts.com/great-chess-quotes-611216, accessed September 01, 2024.

[33] Georg Kunovjanek and Georg Maier, Von der Trinität der Führung, Wien: Armis et Litteris 37, 2022, 61-62.

[34] Bernhard Schulyok, Lukas Grangl and Markus Gruber(2023), A Primer on the Functional Trinity of the Information Environment, in: https://tdhj.org/blog/post/trinity-information-environment/, accessed March 22, 2024.

[35] Amos C. Fox (2018), A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver-Warfare Doctrine, in: https://www.moore.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2017/Fall/4Fox17.pdf, accessed June 03, 2024.

[36] Amos Fox (2017), A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver-Warfare Doctrine, in: https://www.moore.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2017/Fall/4Fox17.pdf, accessed March 22, 2024; Österreichs Bundesheer (2022), The Ukrainian Offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv, in: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9-NER8aFJ4, min 4:30. Col. M. Reissner vividly describes the workings of the triad of force-space-time in the case of the reconquest of the Kharkiv Oblast.

[37] About points of culmination an warfare see: Edward Luttwak, Strategie. Die Logik von Krieg und Frieden, Lüneburg: zu Klampen-Verlag, 2003, 55–77.

[38] DerStandard (05.03.2024), EU will eigene Rüstungsindustrie massiv ausbauen, in: https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000210378/eu-kommission-will-in-den-aufbau-von-eu-r252stungsindustrie-investieren?ref=rss, accessed March 22, 2024.

[39] Garry Kasparov, Strategie und die Kunst zu leben, München: Piper Verlag GmbH, 2007, 11-13.

[40] Spiegel Netzwerk (2003), Kasparov vs X3D Fritz, in: https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/mensch-gegen-maschine-kasparow-vs-x3d-fritz-a-272657.html, accessed May 31, 2024.

[41] Garry Kasparov, Strategie und die Kunst zu leben. Von einem Schachgenie lernen, München: Piper, 2007, 33.

[42] Ibid., 98.

[43] Ibid., 238-239.

[44] Idem.

[45] Ibid., 42.

[46] Ibid., 78.

[47] Ibid., 121-148.

[48] Ibid., 128.

[49] Ibid., 130.

[50] Christian Mölling and András Rácz, Warum Bachmut um jeden Preis verteidigt wird, ZDFheute, last modified March 30, 2023, in: https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/bachmut-verteidigung-selenskyj-ukraine-krieg-russland-100.html , accessed June 01, 2024.

[51] Garry Kasparov, Strategie und die Kunst zu leben. Von einem Schachgenie lernen, München: Piper, 2007, 151.

[52] Ibid., 156.

[53] Yury Markushin, 10 Great Endgame Tips by Jose Capablanca, The Chess World, August 29, 2014, https://thechessworld.com/articles/general-information/10-great-endgame-quotes-by-capablanca/, accessed September 01, 2024.

[54] Ian T. Brown (2018), A new conception of war: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and maneuver warfare, Marine Corps University (U.S.) Press; Boyd, John (1976), Destruction and Creation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a6/Destruction_%26_Creation.pdf, accessed June 2024; John Boyd, (2005), Patterns of Conflict, Defense and the National Interest, Atlanta, The original 1986 version, with pen-and-ink changes as dictated by Col Boyd, is available in PDF format at http://www.d-n-i.net.; Robert Coram, (2010), Boy, The fighter pilot who changed the art of war, Hachette Book Group, New York.

[55] Stanley McChrystal, David Silverman, Tantum Collins, and Chris Fussell, Team of teams, New York: Portfolio Penguin, 2015; Ian T. Brown, A new conception of war: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and maneuver warfare, Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2018.

[56] Ian T. Brown, A new conception of war: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and maneuver warfare, Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2018, 74-86.

[57] Ibid., 120.

[58] Ioannis E. Kotoulas and Wolfgang Pusztai, Foreign Affairs Institute: Geopolitics of the War in Ukraine, Report June 2022, accessed September 01, https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2022/geopolitics-war-ukraine.php.

[59] Dan Smith, Introduction: International stability and human security in 2023, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2024: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), accessed September 02, 2024, from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB24%2001%20Intro.pdf, 9-10, and President of Ukraine, 2022, Speech by the President of Ukraine at the General Debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly, accessed September 02, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-77-yi-sesiyi-77905.

[60] Tracey German and Andriy Tyushka, Ukraine’s 10-point peace plan and the Kyiv Security Compact – An assessment, In-Depth Analysis, European Parliament, 2024, accessed September 02, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2024/754444/EXPO_STU(2024)754444_EN.pdf.

[61] Ibid., 18-19.

[62] Bernhard Schulyok, Lukas Grangl and Markus Gruber (2023), “A Primer on the Functional Trinity of the Information Environment,” in: https://tdhj.org/blog/post/trinity-information-environment/, accessed May 22, 2024.

[63] Peter B-M. J. Pijpers and Paul A.L. Ducheine, “If You Have a Hammer: Shaping the Armed Forces´ Discourse on Information Maneuver,” in: https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/144697157/If_You_Have_a_Hammer_Shaping_the_Armed_Forces_Discourse_on_Information_Maneuver.pdf, accessed June 03, 2024.

[64] Judith T. van de Kuijt, Naomi Keja and Jacoline C. Slaager (2023), “The Concept of Information Manoeuvre. Winning the Battle of Perceptions,” The Hague Centre of Strategic Studies, Paper 3 of the Information-based behavioural influencing and Western practice paper series (May 2023), in: https://hcss.nl/report/the-concept-of-information-manoeuvre-winning-the-battle-of-perceptions/, accessed March 05, 2024.

[65] Defintion by the authors.

[66] Steven W. Knott, “Knowledge Must Become Capability”: Institutional Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation, https://www.academia.edu/6168526/_Knowledge_Must_Become_Capability_Institutional_Intellectualism_as_an_Agent_for_Military_Transformation, accessed September 01, 2024.

[67] Ibid., 331.

[68] Garry Kasparov, Strategie und die Kunst zu leben. Von einem Schachgenie lernen, München: Piper, 2007, 228-230.

[69] Ibid., 230.