Abstract: Bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco are characterised by a ‘tug of war’ in which economic interests prevail. The origin of their disagreements came with the frustrated Moroccan occupation of Perejil Island. Subsequently also, from Morocco’s demand for Spain and, correlatively, the European Union to recognise recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara, against its opponent, the Polisario Front. This conflict triggered successive UN Resolutions in search of a peaceful and just solution that recognised the Sahara’s right to self-determination against Moroccan interests. The United States’ support and acceptance of King Mohammed VI as the legitimate sovereign of the territory, motivated Morocco to lobby other States to recognise him as well. However, the admission of Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali to a Spanish hospital was considered a betrayal by Morocco, which has led to one of the biggest migratory crises ever to occur in Spain, while at the same time attacking the European border, using people as a method of extortion to force the European Union to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara.
Bottom-line-up-front: Morocco’s push for a migration crisis, used for a dual purpose: to punish Spain and as a mechanism to pressure the EU into recognising Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. It reflects the international strategy of extortion, recently employed by Belarus on the European border in Poland, aware that migration policy is the Achilles’ heel of the European community.
Problem statement: How to understand the background and use of migration as a weapon in the Spanish-Moroccan Crisis in the aftermath of decolonialization?
So what?: We consider that the most practical mechanism is giving the UN a mediating role through the granting of a truly binding power in its decisions. In contrast, endowing it with a power that, inexplicably, lacks a binding nature,makes it impossible for its resolutions, in the search for fair and unbiased solutions of the main international conflicts, to be put into practice. Thus, together with the consensus of all the countries that make it up, would avoid extortion, as is being faced by the EU, particularly its member States which are at the geographically at Europe’s frontier.
Source: www.shutterstock.com/Millenius
The Spanish-Moroccan Row
In recent years, we have seen how the bilateral relations between Morocco and Spain have been intensifying. This is a culmination of a tense relationship that began in 2002 with the Moroccan occupation of the island “Perejil”, becoming the first armed conflict between the two in this century. Perejil is an uninhabited islet located in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, 4 kilometers from Ceuta. On July 11, 2002, the Royal Moroccan Navy landed there, placing two national flags as an unequivocal sign of its sovereignty. This unannounced “occupation” translated into nine days of armed conflict.[1]
Morocco, encouraged by King Mohammed VI at the time, took the opportunity to reclaim from Spain the Spanish territories in Africa, see Ceuta and Melilla, in addition to demanding 90 million EUR per month for fishing in their waters. The result of this first conflict was the support of the European Union (EU) and NATO to Spain, considering it as an “unfriendly gesture”, which led to the intervention of the US government, in order to find a solution. The paradox of this situation was that the island was finally abandoned again, maintaining its “status quo”.[2]
Morocco, encouraged by King Mohammed VI at the time, took the opportunity to reclaim from Spain the Spanish territories in Africa, see Ceuta and Melilla, in addition to demanding 90 million EUR per month for fishing in their waters.
Decolonialisation and Independence Movement
In order to understand the reason for the Moroccan occupation of this islet, given the final result making it evident that its genuine interest was non-existent[3], we must go back to the 1970s. In particular to Western Sahara, for it is this region that is the motivation for its actions in foreign policy. It is a territory of almost 270,000 square kilometers, mainly of sand and practically uninhabited, which is located on the northwest coast of Africa and was a former Spanish colony until 1975.[4] In 1965, the United Nations (UN) requested its decolonisation. By then, Morocco had been claiming that territory as its own for centuries.
In 1973, the Moroccan aspirations found a counterpart to the independence movement in Western Sahara, called the Polisario Front. Faced with this situation, in 1974, Spain presented a plan to grant greater autonomy to the Saharans through a referendum on independence. In 1975, however, Spain abandoned its role as an active party, which meant that the referendum would not be held and that Morocco unilaterally proclaimed its annexation.[5]
To demonstrate its sovereignty, Morocco organised the so-called “Green March” with 350,000 Moroccans who crossed the border to push internationally for the kingdom’s claim.
This was due to the misleading interpretation by the then Moroccan King Hassan II of the judgment of the Hague Court in 1975: an essential part of the judgment was omitted, which stated that those links did not indicate legal ties of territorial sovereignty of Western Sahara with Morocco. However, the judgement did recognise links between the Moroccan Sultan and certain Sahrawi tribes, which showed some “authority” over them. However, It was, therefore, necessary to maintain the application of the principle of self-determination of the populations.[6]
Regarding the Polisario Front, following the departure of Spanish troops from its territory, it proclaimed itself the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). It established its operational bases in the camps of Tindouf, Algerian territory, and in the town of Tifariti, Sahrawi territory. From both bases, they began a diplomatic campaign supported by Algeria, which resulted in its by recognition of 46 countries between 1976 and 1980, as well as being added to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984. However, due to the entrenchment of the conflict, the Polisario Front was losing followers.[7] Despite all these achievements, it never played a decisive role in resolving the problem, as it was absent from the forums set up by the United Nations to seek solutions, showing clairvoyance and incongruity in the secondary role given to the Polisario Front.[8]
Regarding the Polisario Front, following the departure of Spanish troops from its territory, it proclaimed itself the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.
This duality of contrary actions led to a guerrilla movement that lasted 16 years and led to the Moroccan control -still present- of 80% of the territory, while the RASD has only 20% under its authority, mostly desert.[9] This uneven distribution resulted from the Moroccan approach of building concentric walls in the desert, to force the movement fighters out of the territory, where it had established control.[10]
However, undoubtedly, the greatest impact of all these years of conflict was the closure of the common border between Morocco and Algeria since 1994, which has generated between 100,000 and 200,000 Sahrawi refugees living in conditions of absolute precariousness in camps around the Algerian desert city of Tindouf.[11]
Why is Morocco Interested in an Inhospitable and Sparsely Populated Territory?
To understand Morocco’s eagerness for the occupation of the Sahara and, therefore, the main reason determining its relations with Spain, we must analyse what this territory implies in economic terms. It lies on the western edge of the Sahara Desert and extends along approximately 1,000 kilometers of the Atlantic coast, making it one of the wealthiest fishing banks in the world.[12] However, the center of its interest lies in the phosphorus reserves that it possesses since it is a scarce mineral that cannot be produced artificially. Therefore, it must be extracted from phosphoric rocks by mining processes.[13]
Its importance lies in the fact that it extracts phosphorus, vital for the body’s basic biochemical processes and crop fertilisers[14]. Given that the food requirements of the world’s population is expected to increase by 70% in the coming years, this Will have increasing their international relevance.[15]
What was the International Response to the Conflict?
Since 1960, the UN has identified the Sahara as a territory subject to colonial domination: that is, recognised its right to self-determination. It has nevertheless not been possible to implement the Peace Plan that it proposed in 1991, which envisaged the deployment of a United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).[16]
As a justification for this failure, the various UN Security Council Resolutions that have taken place since the end of 2000 considered that an effective solution to the conflict requires “the Government of Morocco was willing to offer or support the restoration of some governmental functions to the inhabitants of the Sahara, and that this measure be genuine and substantial and comply with international standards”.[17] That is why the UN’s action has been conditioned to achieve this objective: first with the projects that the then representative of the UN General Secretary for the Sahara, James Baker, proposed in order to give an intermediate solution to a problem that was and continues-, prolonging in time. The search for an equitable solution for both was the Framework Agreement of 2001[18]. However, it was rejected by the Polisario Front and Algeria in the face of the suspicion that the proposed Saharan Autonomous Government would be left without legal guarantees and become a hostage of Morocco[19].
“…the Government of Morocco was willing to offer or support the restoration of some governmental functions to the inhabitants of the Sahara, and that this measure be genuine and substantial and comply with international standards”.
In order to address these discrepancies, a second plan called the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the Inhabitants of Western Sahara was proposed in 2003[20]. Its outcome showed the difficulty of reaching a practical solution, since it was Morocco that rejected it, believing that this Plan really provided advantages for the international propaganda of its opponent.[21] This plan’s main objective was the reconciliation of both parties and the de-stigmatisation of some, as separatists and mercenaries and others, as colonialists and occupiers. It was envisaged that a judicial structure independent of the Sahara would be established with respect to that of Morocco[22].
However, despite successive proposals for understandings, it seems that the UN has declared a solution to the conflict impossible. Since 2008, Security Council resolutions no longer include the holding of a referendum, accepting de facto the Moroccan position, which offers limited autonomy to the Saharans under Moroccan sovereignty.[23]
Meanwhile, the climate prevailing in Western Sahara was devastating, with continuing human rights violations, especially against Saharan residents who spoke out against Morocco’s position[24]. Associations for the defence of human rights, supported by supporters of self-determination, such as the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA), and the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Human Rights Violations (ASVVDH)are still not recognised, despite being the active voice of denunciation of these situations[25].
Meanwhile, Spain, possibly pressured by social support for the Sahrawi population, opted for a formal position of “active neutrality.”It strictly defends what the UN stipulated while being aware that this organisation’s operational role was unreal[26]. In this way, despite disagreements such as those that occurred on Perejil Islet, Spain benefited since the prolongation of the conflict meant that Morocco focused its foreign activity on it, thus reducing the pressure it exerts on Ceuta, Melilla and the other Spanish territories in North Africa[27].
However, there has been a change of trend over the past decade, in favour of Moroccan sovereignty, in exchange for Morocco’s collaboration in the fight against jihadist terrorism, drug trafficking and irregular emigration.[28] This necessary cooperation gives Morocco the advantage of exercising any blackmail over the Spanish government to finally tip the balance in its favour. The Saharan cause was thus relegated to a residual humanitarian issue[29].
Therefore, it is not surprising that Morocco decided to reactivate the war tension against the Polisario Front in November 2020, with the incursion of Moroccan troops at the Guerguerat border crossing. This is a demilitarised zone separating Mauritania from the areas controlled by Morocco[30]. The Polisario Front considered it a violation of the ceasefire signed in 1991 and declared a state of war throughout the territory. After all, Morocco did not have the opposition of any major player on the international scene who could condition its claims.[31]
It is not surprising that Morocco decided to reactivate the war tension against the Polisario Front in November 2020, with the incursion of Moroccan troops at the Guerguerat border crossing.
What was the Reason for the Spain-Morocco Crisis?
The main trigger that provoked the anger and the consideration of “betrayal” by the government of Spain to Morocco was none other than the admission of the leader of the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali, to a hospital in Logroño, last April, because of his poor health caused by the coronavirus[32]. To this end, Ghali entered Spanish territory with a false identity and at the request of Algeria, as the Spanish justice system accuses him of human rights violations. The justification given at the time by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Arancha González Laya, was that it was done for “humanitarian reasons”[33].
However, without a doubt, what Morocco does not forgive Spain is that they learned of Ghali’s entry through the media, which Foreign Minister Naser Bourita described as an attitude “contrary to the spirit of partnership and good neighbourliness”[34]. He added that “humanitarian considerations do not explain, either, the complicity of identity theft and passport forgery, with the intention of voluntarily evading the law”.[35]
However, the Moroccan counter-offensive was not limited to statements. It was a step further by encouraging the irruption of more than 10,000 immigrants to Ceuta, provoking a migration crisis that put at risk the lives of thousands of Moroccan citizens, including minors, in the search for better living conditions. It is induced by the facilities found by the Moroccan authorities at the border.[36]
The Moroccan counter-offensive was not limited to statements. It was a step further by encouraging the irruption of more than 10,000 immigrants to Ceuta, provoking a migration crisis that put at risk the lives of thousands of Moroccan citizens, including minors, in the search for better living conditions.
These immigrants constituted the punishment to be imposed on Spain. It reproached Spain for the requested cooperation in migration matters and for positioning itself in favour of Algeria and, consequently, of the Polisario Front on the question of the Sahara[37]. Without a doubt, the statement that perfectly sums up the Moroccan response was the one made by its ambassador in Madrid, Katima Benyaich, “there are acts that have consequences that must be assumed”[38].
Compared to the other mechanisms of pressure that it had previously used on Spain, the strength of its action can be understood by the well-known support that the US gave it. First during the Trump administration[39], recognising Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, and later, it was maintained with the new executive of Joe Biden[40]. Provided that Morocco approves the appointment of a new UN Special Envoy to Western Sahara and encourages the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Israel[41].
The Spanish response was swift, backed by the EU, which could not endanger its European border. Therefore, the first strategy of the Spanish executive was to remind Morocco that its trade and strategic negotiations with the EU must go through Spain, as President Pedro Sánchez said “There is no better or greater ally for Morocco within the EU than Spain[42]. Our relationship is strategic, we want the most constructive possible, but based on two axes: trust and respect”[43].
Morocco is aware of the importance of the EU for its economy, wanting to leave it out of controversy. It cannot afford to lose the Unions’s economic support associated, in one way or another, with the management of migratory flows[44].
Aware of the need for Morocco to maintain its relations with the EU, the EU has decided to take a step back, assuming a role of mere observer, to facilitate an understanding that it considers viable and fast. Therefore, it is not surprising to hear the words of the European Commission’s Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman, Nabila Massrali, “we support Spain, but we also believe that relations between Morocco and Spain are such that a positive solution to the crisis can be found. And I think we should watch the situation unfold and wait for the tone to be dropped from both sides”.[45]
“…we support Spain, but we also believe that relations between Morocco and Spain are such that a positive solution to the crisis can be found. And I think we should watch the situation unfold and wait for the tone to be dropped from both sides”.
The aim of Morocco with this crisis was to intimidate, coerce and condition the position of Spain concerning Western Sahara. They possibly believed that the support provided by the US was sufficient for both Spain and the EU to express their unanimous support for Moroccan sovereignty.
Morocco should have been aware that the EU can not openly express its support for Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara as it would be contrary to the principles of the rule of law on which its European community is based.[46]
Until then, the European strategy had been to position itself in favor of the different UN resolutions, such as 2548 of October 30 2020, which recognises the “self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”[47], but without more implications than mere demonstrations, because there was no real interest in enforcing human rights, nor was there any referendum[48]. In the meantime, it had concluded strategic trade agreements with Morocco concerning agriculture and fishing on the Saharan territory[49].
The setting on the international scene, once again, of the conflict with the Sahara by Morocco, has forced the EU to reverse its contradiction, which is bound up with the recent rulings of the EU Court of Justice[50]. It rejected for the fifth time the attempts by the Council of the EU and the European Commission, which are jointly responsible for Community trade relations, to extend the provisions of the above-mentioned agreements with Morocco on the Saharan territory. In this way, EU fishers will no longer be able to fish in Saharan waters with Moroccan permits, while Moroccan exports from the territory will be excluded from EU preferential taxes[51].
This legal imposition of excluding the Sahara from its agreements with Morocco demonstrates what was known internationally but which the EU had intentionally ignored in its commercial interests; firstly, the status of Western Sahara as a “separate and distinct” territory from Morocco, which prevents the EU from recognising Moroccan sovereignty over the territory, and, secondly, the need to obtain the consent of the Sahara when agreements relating to its territory are concluded[52].
This legal imposition of excluding the Sahara from its agreements with Morocco demonstrates what was known internationally but which the EU had intentionally ignored in its commercial interests.
This policy of differentiation will inevitably influence other aspects of EU-Morocco bilateral relations, from funding programmes to research and development projects[53]. Faced with this, Rabat can only accept these conditions or risk losing the existing agreements and the new ones that can legally be concluded with the EU[54].
However, this decision of the Court not only affects the economic interests of Morocco. Spain has asked the European institutions to appeal these Court of Justice of the EU judgments to the General Court. Once the appeal has been granted, the Court of Justice may provisionally suspend the appeal until the final decision will be taken, which may take up to one year, this allows for the continued application of these agreements during that period[55].
With this positioning, Spain shows that the migratory crisis is relegated to the background, prioritising, in any case, the maintenance of economic interests with Morocco since it is a strategic partner on which it is interested in preserving these relations. After all, Morocco is a key destination for Spanish exports outside the European Union. Being the country with the largest number of Spanish exporting companies, after the United States, it is the only market, along with Portugal, in which Spain is the leading supplier. Likewise, until 2020, Spain was the second foreign investor, behind France, with 125 million euros invested, which confirms the importance of these commercial relations[56].
As far as population is concerned, Morocco is the second country, after Romania, with more foreign contributors in Spain[57]. 350 Spanish companies have a presence in Morocco, from bank branches to energy companies, law firms and agricultural companies. In addition, there are 781 Spanish companies with more than 10% of the capital of companies under Moroccan law and 674 companies under Moroccan law, which are subsidiaries of Spanish companies that own more than 50% of their share capital[58].
There is no doubt about the economic importance of both relations, but what has happened to the thousands of people who crossed the Moroccan border searching for better life opportunities? After the deployment of the Spanish army in the area, the Ministry of Interior had focused on returning as many immigrants as possible as quickly as possible[59].
These returnings have been carried out, on many occasions, without any formality, and collectively, through so-called “border rejections” or “hot returns,” even though these are only legally accepted at border posts, not when the migrant is already in Spanish territory[60]. All this, bearing in mind that the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits collective expulsions since in such cases they are expelled from the country without even knowing their personal circumstances[61]. For all those who have applied for asylum, they have been refused because in Morocco there is no persecution, bar in exceptional circumstances. They have been invited to leave the country voluntarily, if they fail to do so, an expulsion file will be opened, which prevents that person from visiting Spain again for 5 years.[62]
For all those who have applied for asylum, they have been refused because in Morocco there is no persecution, bar in exceptional circumstances. They have been invited to leave the country voluntarily.
Regarding unaccompanied minors, the Government Delegation in Ceuta was seeking a solution to return to their families. While those, whom their parents have not claimed, will be handed over to NGOs that can care for them in Morocco[63].
The Current Status
All these returns have been accepted by Morocco, following a rapprochement of positions between the two countries[64]. On the Spanish side, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arancha González Laya, replaced by José Manuel Albares, was dismissed to satisfy Morocco, who considers her to be primarily responsible for Ghali’s entry[65]. It has also proposed a complete review of its bilateral relations, clarifying the position of each in the most sensitive chapters and assuming its “interdependence” in economic matters, immigration and the fight against jihadism. Spain is trying to avoid is a false closure of the crisis and its repetition[66].
On the Moroccan side, King Mohamed VI has been optimistic about continuing working with the Sanchez government, “in order to inaugurate a new unprecedented stage in the relations between the two countries”, convinced of reviewing “fundamentals” and “determinants” of bilateral relations[67].
On the Moroccan side, King Mohamed VI has been optimistic about continuing working with the Sanchez government, convinced of reviewing “fundamentals” and “determinants” of bilateral relations.
All this chain of agreements and disagreements between the two, with the use of people as “coercion”, and without entailing any real repercussions for the instigator of this dark geopolitical strategy, makes us predict the current mechanisms of international extortion, which can serve as a model for other countries to advance their interests. We find a clear example of this in Turkey when in 2015, it agreed to give asylum to millions of Syrian refugees, who were fleeing absolute poverty, devastated by war. In return, they would receive billions from the EU to keep the refugee population on their territory and greater economic cooperation and the modernisation and enlargement of the Customs Union. The EU wanted Turkey to serve as a “hindrance country” to prevent these refugees from entering the European community. In the years that followed, Turkey has continued to blackmail, seeking the economic gain of those millions of refugees, who are a real problem for Europe.[68]
In Morocco’s case, as we have seen, their desire was the recognition, both of Spain and of the EU, of their sovereignty over Western Sahara. Even though events have not taken place as expected, they have shown Europe what they are capable of, knowing that immigration is the “Achilles’ heel” of a community of 27 member States, with very different ideologies and aspirations in this area.
In Morocco’s case, as we have seen, their desire was the recognition, both of Spain and of the EU, of their sovereignty over Western Sahara.
In this respect, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said during the State of the Union address 2021[69], the need to achieve common ground with the member states to be able to manage migration, otherwise, their opponents, such as recently Belarus or Morocco, will continue to attack them on this flank.
How can we not avoid the scruples of those governments, which have no objection to following this trend of extortion? We consider that the most practical mechanism is giving the UN a mediating role, through the granting of a truly binding power in its decisions. Endowing it with a power that, inexplicably, lacks and that makes it impossible for its resolutions, in the search for fair and unbiased solutions of the main international conflicts, be put into practice. Thus, and together with the consensus of all the countries that make it up, would avoid extortion, such as the ones the EU is facing, particularly its member States, because of its geographical location, and which, in the future, could be correlative for other States.
Paz Ramírez Rodríguez is an International Relations Analyst. She has a degree in Law, is an expert on the European Union, and is currently studying Geopolitics and Intelligence. Paz’s interests cover issues such as human rights, democracy and immigration. She collaborates with several online media, writing articles such as: What should be the solution for Nicaragua or Afghanistan: A new haven for international terrorism?. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of The Defence Horizon Journal.
[1] Gemma Robles, “Así fue la crisis de Perejil: España y Marruecos se enfrentaron por un islote hace 19 años,” El Periódico, 18 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20210518/crisis-perejil-espana-marruecos-enfrentaron-11738049.
[2] Gemma, Robles, “Así fue la crisis de Perejil: España y Marruecos se enfrentaron por un islote hace 19 años,” El Periódico, 18 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20210518/crisis-perejil-espana-marruecos-enfrentaron-11738049.
[3] Gemma, Robles, “Así fue la crisis de Perejil: España y Marruecos se enfrentaron por un islote hace 19 años,” El Periódico, 18 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20210518/crisis-perejil-espana-marruecos-enfrentaron-11738049.
[4] Bernabé López García, “España ante el problema del Sáhara: por una solución magrebí,” Taller de Estudios Internacionales y Mediterráneos, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/eee13-2014-lopezgarcia-espana-ante-problema-del-sahara-por-solucion-magrebi.
[5] Bernabé López García, “España ante el problema del Sáhara: por una solución magrebí,” Taller de Estudios Internacionales y Mediterráneos, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/eee13-2014-lopezgarcia-espana-ante-problema-del-sahara-por-solucion-magrebi.
[6] Bernabé López García, “España ante el problema del Sáhara: por una solución magrebí,” Taller de Estudios Internacionales y Mediterráneos, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/eee13-2014-lopezgarcia-espana-ante-problema-del-sahara-por-solucion-magrebi.
[7] Bernabé López García, “España ante el problema del Sáhara: por una solución magrebí,” Taller de Estudios Internacionales y Mediterráneos, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/eee13-2014-lopezgarcia-espana-ante-problema-del-sahara-por-solucion-magrebi.
[8] Equipo de Redacción, “Sáhara Occidental: 5 claves para entender este conflict olvidado,” BBC News, 27 de diciembre de 2020, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-55350989.
[9] Equipo de Redacción, “Sáhara Occidental: 5 claves para entender este conflict olvidado,” BBC News, 27 de diciembre de 2020, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-55350989.
[10] Equipo de Redacción, “Sáhara Occidental: 5 claves para entender este conflict olvidado,” BBC News, 27 de diciembre de 2020, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-55350989.
[11] Bernabé López García, “España ante el problema del Sáhara: por una solución magrebí,” Taller de Estudios Internacionales y Mediterráneos, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/eee13-2014-lopezgarcia-espana-ante-problema-del-sahara-por-solucion-magrebi
[12] Equipo de Redacción, “Marruecos, el país que controla las mayores reservas de un mineral esencial para la vida ( y por qué están envueltas en un conflicto internacional),” BBC News, 8 de febrero de 2020, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-51283951.
[13] Equipo de Redacción, “Marruecos, el país que controla las mayores reservas de un mineral esencial para la vida ( y por qué están envueltas en un conflicto internacional),” BBC News, 8 de febrero de 2020, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-51283951.
[14] Nelton Abdon Ramos Rojas, ¿Qué beneficios aporta el fósforo a la salud?, 21 de julio de 2021, Mejor con Salud, https://mejorconsalud.as.com/que-beneficios-aporta-el-fosforo-a-la-salud/.
[15] Rodrígo Duque Estrada, “La geopolítica del conflicto en el Sáhara Occidental,” Ritimo, 1 de abril de 2016, https://www.ritimo.org/La-geopolitica-del-conflicto-en-el-Sahara-Occidental.
[16] Jesús A. Núñez, “El conflicto del Sáhara: por qué empezó y por qué sigue sin resolverse,” El Diario, 6 de junio de 2021, https://www.eldiario.es/internacional/conflicto-sahara-empezo-sigue-resolverse_129_8005624.html.
[17] Naciones Unidas Mantenimiento de la Paz, “Minurso Ficha Informativa”.
[18] Equipo de Redacción, “El Plan Baker para el Sáhara Occidental deja para 2008 el referéndum de autodeterminación,” La Vanguardia, 10 de marzo de 2003, https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20030310/51262771100/el-plan-baker-para-el-sahara-occidental-deja-para-2008-el-referendum-de-autodeterminacion.html.
[19] Bernabé López García, “España ante el problema del Sáhara: por una solución magrebí,” Taller de Estudios Internacionales y Mediterráneos, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/eee13-2014-lopezgarcia-espana-ante-problema-del-sahara-por-solucion-magrebi.
[20] Juan Soroeta Liceras, “El Plan de Paz del Sáhara Occidental, ¿Viaje a ninguna parte?,” Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, (2005): 10-12.
[21] Juan Soroeta Liceras, “El Plan de Paz del Sáhara Occidental, ¿Viaje a ninguna parte?,” Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, (2005): 14-15.
[22] Juan Soroeta Liceras, “El Plan de Paz del Sáhara Occidental, ¿Viaje a ninguna parte?,” Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, (2005): 16-17.
[23] Jesús A. Núñez, “El conflicto del Sáhara: por qué empezó y por qué sigue sin resolverse,” El Diario, 6 de junio de 2021, https://www.eldiario.es/internacional/conflicto-sahara-empezo-sigue-resolverse_129_8005624.html.
[24] Equipo de Redacción, “Adelante exige al Gobierno que condene el ataque de Marruecos a la población saharaui,” La Vanguardia, 13 de noviembre de 2020, https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20201113/49425028480/adelante-exige-al-gobierno-que-condene-ataque-marruecos-a-poblacion-saharaui.html.
[25] Bernabé López García, “España ante el problema del Sáhara: por una solución magrebí,” Taller de Estudios Internacionales y Mediterráneos, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/eee13-2014-lopezgarcia-espana-ante-problema-del-sahara-por-solucion-magrebi.
[26] Jesús A. Núñez, “El conflicto del Sáhara: por qué empezó y por qué sigue sin resolverse,” El Diario, 6 de junio de 2021, https://www.eldiario.es/internacional/conflicto-sahara-empezo-sigue-resolverse_129_8005624.html.
[27] Luis Méndez Urich, “Situación por el Sáhara Occidental amplía la tensión entre Marruecos y España,” France24, 1 de junio de 2021, https://www.france24.com/es/europa/20210601-espana-marruecos-sahara-occidental-tension.
[28] Fernando Reinares, Carola García-Calvo, “Cooperación antiterrorista entre España y Marruecos,” Real Instituto Elcano, 31 de marzo de 2015, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/terrorismo+internacional/ari18-2015-reinares-garciacalvo-cooperacion-antiterrorista-entre-espana-y-marruecos.
[29] Jesús A. Núñez, “El conflicto del Sáhara: por qué empezó y por qué sigue sin resolverse,” El Diario, 6 de junio de 2021, https://www.eldiario.es/internacional/conflicto-sahara-empezo-sigue-resolverse_129_8005624.html.
[30] Francisco Peregil, “El ejército de Marruecos y el Frente Polisario intercambian disparos en el sur del Sáhara Occidental,” EL PAÍS, 13 de noviembre de 2020, https://elpais.com/internacional/2020-11-13/el-ejercito-marroqui-entra-en-el-sur-del-sahara-para-romper-el-bloqueo-del-frente-polisario.html.
[31] Equipo de Redacción, “Sáhara Occidental: 5 claves para entender este conflict olvidado,” BBC News, 27 de diciembre de 2020, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-55350989.
[32] Redacción El HuffPost, “La clave del enfado de Marruecos con España se llama Frente Polisario,” Huffpost, 18 de mayo de 2021, https://www.huffingtonpost.es/entry/la-clave-del-enfado-de-marruecos-con-espana-se-llama-frente-polisario_es_60a3538ae4b063dcceadae63.
[33] Ana Alonso, “Claves para entender el por qué Marruecos y España viven en crisis intermitente,” El Independiente, 19 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elindependiente.com/espana/2021/05/19/claves-para-entender-por-que-marruecos-y-espana-viven-en-crisis-intermitente/.
[34] Ana Alonso, “Claves para entender el por qué Marruecos y España viven en crisis intermitente,” El Independiente, 19 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elindependiente.com/espana/2021/05/19/claves-para-entender-por-que-marruecos-y-espana-viven-en-crisis-intermitente/.
[35] Ana Alonso, “Claves para entender el por qué Marruecos y España viven en crisis intermitente,” El Independiente, 19 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elindependiente.com/espana/2021/05/19/claves-para-entender-por-que-marruecos-y-espana-viven-en-crisis-intermitente/.
[36] Miguel González, Francisco Peregil, “España y Marruecos negocian una revision complete de sus relaciones bilaterales,” EL PAÍS, 27 de julio 2021, https://elpais.com/espana/2021-07-27/espana-y-marruecos-negocian-una-revision-completa-de-sus-relaciones-bilaterales.html.
[37] Ana Alonso, “Claves para entender el por qué Marruecos y España viven en crisis intermitente,” El Independiente, 19 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elindependiente.com/espana/2021/05/19/claves-para-entender-por-que-marruecos-y-espana-viven-en-crisis-intermitente/.
[38] Redacción, “Abucheos, insultos y golpes al coche de Pedro Sanchéz al llegar a Ceuta,” Guada News, 18 de mayo de 2021, https://www.guadanews.es/noticia/66101/en-portada/abucheos-insultos-y-golpes-al-coche-de-pedro-sanchez-al-llegar-a-ceuta.html.
[39] Redacción, “Trump reconoce la soberanía marroquí del Sahara Occidental y anuncia la normalización de las relaciones entre Marruecos e Israel,” BBC News, 10 diciembre de 2020, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-55267560.
[40] J.M. Zuloaga, “Estados Unidos mantiene el apoyo a la soberanía de Marruecos sobre el Sáhara Occidental,” La Razón, 2 de julio de 2021, https://www.larazon.es/internacional/20210702/e2mntlvy55a7rky5rjlfnvsgca.html.
[41] Javier Ansonera, “Biden mantendrá el reconocimieto del Sáhara Occidental como soberanía de Marruecos,” ABC Internacional, 2 de julio de 2021, https://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-biden-mantendra-reconocimiento-sahara-occidental-como-soberania-marruecos-202107021705_noticia.html.
[42] Pablo R.Suanzes, “Sánchez advierte a Marruecos desde Bruselas de que es su “principal aliado” en Europa,” El Mundo, 24 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2021/05/24/60abf26ae4d4d8d9078b4593.html.
[43] Ahmed Charai, “Marruecos-España: El respeto y la confianza son fundamentales,” La Razón, 23 de junio de 2021, https://www.larazon.es/espana/20210623/3etoam3nqradfejxsmcsoqro5m.html.
[44] José Miguel Zaldo, “La importancia de Marruecos para España y para Europa,” El Economista, 22 de mayo de 2021, https://www.eleconomista.es/opinion-blogs/noticias/11228495/05/21/La-importancia-de-Marruecos-para-Espana-y-para-Europa.html.
[45] Redacción El HuffPost, “La UE y la ONU avisan a Marruecos de que no van a cambiar su posición sobre el Sáhara,” HuffPost, 2 de junio de 2021, https://www.huffingtonpost.es/entry/la-ue-y-la-onu-avisan-a-marruecos-de-que-no-van-a-cambiar-su-posicion-sobre-el-sahara_es_60b7148ae4b001ebd46b88c3.
[46] Redacción, “La UE no reconoce la soberanía de Marruecos sobre el Sáhara,” Sahara Press Service, 10 de julio de 2020, https://www.spsrasd.info/news/es/articles/2020/07/10/26669.html.
[47] Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, “Resolución 2548: Sahara Occidental,” 30 de octubre de 2020.
[48] Redacción El HuffPost, “La UE y la ONU avisan a Marruecos de que no van a cambiar su posición sobre el Sáhara,” HuffPost, 2 de junio de 2021, https://www.huffingtonpost.es/entry/la-ue-y-la-onu-avisan-a-marruecos-de-que-no-van-a-cambiar-su-posicion-sobre-el-sahara_es_60b7148ae4b001ebd46b88c3.
[49] Lionel Poussery, “Sáhara Occidental: la justicia europea cancela dos acuerdos entre Marruecos y la UE,” France24, 29 de septiembre de 2021, https://www.france24.com/es/%C3%A1frica/20210929-sahara-occidental-marruecos-pesca-ue.
[50] Andrés Gil, “La justicia europea anula los acuerdos de pesca y aranceles de la UE y Marruecos que incluyen al Sáhara Occidental,” El Diario, 29 de septiembre de 2021, https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/justicia-europea-anula-acuerdos-arancelarios-pesqueros-ue-marruecos-incluyeron-sahara-occidental_1_8348289.html.
[51] Hugh Lovatt, “Western Sahara, Morocco, and the EU: How good law makes good politics,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 30 de septiembre de 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/western-sahara-morocco-and-the-eu-how-good-law-makes-good-politics/.
[52] Hugh Lovatt, “Western Sahara, Morocco, and the EU: How good law makes good politics,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 30 de septiembre de 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/western-sahara-morocco-and-the-eu-how-good-law-makes-good-politics/.
[53] Alejandro Tena, “Estas son las consecuencias económicas del fin del acuerdo comercial entre la UE y Marruecos,” Público, 29 de septiembre de 2021, https://www.publico.es/sociedad/son-consecuencias-economicas-acuerdo-comercial-ue-marruecos.html.
[54] Hugh Lovatt, “Western Sahara, Morocco, and the EU: How good law makes good politics,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 30 de septiembre de 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/western-sahara-morocco-and-the-eu-how-good-law-makes-good-politics/.
[55] Miguel González, “España quiere que la UE recurra las sentencias que anulan los acuerdos comercial y pesquero con Marruecos,” EL PAÍS, 29 de septiembre de 2021, https://elpais.com/espana/politica/2021-09-29/espana-quiere-que-la-ue-recurra-la-sentencia-que-anula-los-acuerdos-comercial-y-pesquero-con-marruecos.html.
[56] Olga Rodríguez, “España- Marruecos: dos socios comerciales en mitad de un conflicto político,” El Independiente, 22 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elindependiente.com/economia/2021/05/22/espana-marruecos-dos-socios-comerciales-en-mitad-de-un-conflicto-politico/.
[57] Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo de España, “Relaciones económicas y comerciales de España con Marruecos”.
[58] Olga Rodríguez, “España- Marruecos: dos socios comerciales en mitad de un conflicto político,” El Independiente, 22 de mayo de 2021, https://www.elindependiente.com/economia/2021/05/22/espana-marruecos-dos-socios-comerciales-en-mitad-de-un-conflicto-politico/.
[59] María Martín, “Qué está pasando en Ceuta: claves de la crisis migratoria entre España y Marruecos,” EL PAÍS, 20 de mayo de 2021, https://elpais.com/espana/2021-05-19/que-esta-pasando-en-ceuta-claves-de-la-crisis-entre-espana-y-marruecos.html.
[60] Icíar Gutiérrez, Gabriela Sánchez, “Cientos de personas devueltas en caliente a Marruecos: ¿puede España expulsar a migrantes sin control?,” El Diario, 19 de mayo de 2021, https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/cientos-personas-devueltas-caliente-marruecos-espana-expulsar-migrantes-control_1_7949140.html.
[61] María Martín, “Qué está pasando en Ceuta: claves de la crisis migratoria entre España y Marruecos,” EL PAÍS, 20 de mayo de 2021, https://elpais.com/espana/2021-05-19/que-esta-pasando-en-ceuta-claves-de-la-crisis-entre-espana-y-marruecos.html.
[62] Antonio Sampere, “Más de 100 marroquíes vuelven a su país desde Ceuta semanalmente,” El Mundo, 2 de julio de 2021, https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2021/07/02/60df128cfdddff16638b4682.html.
[63] Antonio Sampere, “Más de 100 marroquíes vuelven a su país desde Ceuta semanalmente,” El Mundo, 2 de julio de 2021, https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2021/07/02/60df128cfdddff16638b4682.html.
[64] Carmen Echarri, “Marruecos acepta la devolución de todos los inmigrantes que cruzaron a Ceuta,” El Faro de Ceuta, 20 de mayo de 2021, https://elfarodeceuta.es/marruecos-acepta-devolucion-inmigrantes-cruzaron-ceuta/.
[65] Miguel González, “Guiños a Rabat en el relevo al frente del Ministerio de Exteriores,” EL PAÍS, 12 de julio de 2021, https://elpais.com/espana/2021-07-12/guinos-a-rabat-en-el-relevo-al-frente-del-ministerio-de-exteriores.html.
[66] Miguel González, Francisco Peregil, “España y Marruecos negocian una revision complete de sus relaciones bilaterales,” EL PAÍS, 27 de julio 2021, https://elpais.com/espana/2021-07-27/espana-y-marruecos-negocian-una-revision-completa-de-sus-relaciones-bilaterales.html.
[67] Álvaro Carvajal, “El rey de Marruecos abre una “nueva etapa inédita” con España basada en la “confianza”,” El Mundo, 21 de agosto de 2021, https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2021/08/20/61201f96fc6c83da728b462a.html.
[68] Jaume Masdeu, “la UE relanza sus relaciones con Turquía, pero fija condiciones,” La Vanguardia, 7 de abril de 2021, https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20210407/6632256/ue-turquia-relaciones-erdogan-von-der-leyen.html.
[69] Ursula von der Leyen, “State of the Union address,” 15 de septiembre de 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategic-planning/state-union-addresses_en.
