Abstract: Maritime chokepoints are central to NATO’s collective defence and economic stability, yet their strategic implications are often underexamined in alliance planning. This article evaluates the enduring and emerging significance of key global chokepoints through historical case studies and contemporary disruptions. It assesses how control, instability, or denial at these points shape NATO’s ability to project power and maintain deterrence. The analysis reveals that chokepoints governed by cooperative states tend to reinforce predictable legal regimes and operational access, whereas those in unstable or non-aligned regions expose systemic vulnerabilities.
Problem statement: How to better understand NATO’s dependence on its access to the global maritime domain?
So what?: NATO must strengthen resilience at global chokepoints by deepening partnerships with littoral states, ensuring local capacity and shared situational awareness. Allied nations must expand forward stockpiles near vulnerable transit routes to preserve operational continuity during disruptions. Finally, the Alliance should institutionalise chokepoint disruption into exercises, integrating blockades, cyber, and infrastructure-denial scenarios into training to ensure readiness across domains.
Controlling the Sea
NATO member states have historically recognised control over major maritime routes as a strategic means of constraining Russian, and before 1991, Soviet naval power. In 1985, the U.S. Naval War College Review detailed a strategy for Western mobilisation for conventional warfare, via maritime chokepoints.[1] The strategy explained five principles of maritime warfighting and their relevance to NATO’s foundational pillar of deterrence.
- An emphasis on non-nuclear weaponry;
- Sustained coalition warfare involving phased and rollback campaigns;
- Proactive efforts to secure and defend sea lines of communication (SLOCs);
- Leveraging maritime dominance to shape favourable conditions for conflict resolution; and
- Maintaining control of key maritime routes to enable large-scale military mobilisation.
In 1985, the U.S. Naval War College Review detailed a strategy for Western mobilisation for conventional warfare, via maritime chokepoints.
While these principles originally emerged to guide NATO member states away from total warfare and nuclear disaster with the USSR, they still hold strong relevance. Even forty years later, these principles of maritime warfighting guide NATO in deterring conflict, and they highlight some of the most helpful uses of maritime chokepoints for defence. Furthermore, states controlling chokepoints exert a profound influence on open ocean access, military occupation, and activities on sea routes.
The role of NATO in the global maritime arena will expand as globalisation increasingly interconnects diverse states and groups. Established partnerships with nations in the Middle East, Africa, the Levant, Central Asia, the Far East, and Oceania point to engagement outside of the traditional Article 6 boundaries.[2] Further, the lessons learned from distant chokepoints may apply to local chokepoints such as the Kattegat and English Channel. Global maritime trade alone has more than quadrupled over the past few decades, underscoring the strategic importance of maritime chokepoints.[3] By prioritising diplomacy, NATO may effectively deter conflict that may arise from Russia’s emerging interest in the Arctic routes and other maritime territories. Russia is heavily investing in its naval capabilities; with initiatives to include the planned acquisition of eight new strategic missile submarines, up to six nuclear-powered attack submarines, nine conventional submarines, fifteen frigates, and as many as twenty corvettes; according to the Atlantic Council, these acquisitions are largely meant for Russia’s occupational and military interests in the high north and Arctic Circle.[4] The question becomes, will the alliance act as one to provide meaningful engagement, or conduct deterrence operations surrounding Russian northern activities, or will internal friction leave the responsibility to those who are best able (U.S.) or geographically thrust (Norway, UK) into action?
Methodology
With an understanding of NATO’s goals for transatlantic defence, deterrence, and diplomacy, there are four primary criteria to evaluate the significance of maritime chokepoints to NATO’s interests. The extent to which a chokepoint satisfies each criterion directly correlates with its relevance to NATO’s maritime defence posture. Specifically, geographic proximity to NATO states or areas of interest to them; access to critical commodities; the political and economic importance of each; and the military utility of the chokepoint.
These criteria led to the identification of the following points as central to current NATO and allied interests: the Suez Canal, the Turkish Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles), the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, and the Panama Canal. Additionally, emerging Arctic maritime routes are increasingly critical to future defence and strategic planning due to their growing economic and geopolitical significance.
Results and Discussion
The article presents chokepoints first as current or emerging, and then alphabetically, without regard to their degree of importance or preference. The study of chokepoint history outside of NATO territory provides lessons that the alliance can apply to local chokepoints. In addition to the studied Northeast Passage, NATO maritime forces have direct interests in the Straits of Gibraltar, the Danish Straits, the English Channel, and arguably the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. More broadly, nearly every member nation is economically impacted by disruptions in any of the described chokepoints. Cases are presented based on the impact on the collective member states based on proximity and economic impacts on the largest number of states.
Suez Canal
As early as the 16th century, regional leaders recognised the geopolitical advantage of the Suez’s location.[5] The Suez Canal remains the most direct maritime route linking the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans, traversing the Strait of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean Sea, the narrow Isthmus of Suez, the Red Sea, the Bab el–Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. NATO member states Türkiye, Greece, France, and Italy maintain strong naval presences in the nearby Mediterranean. The Suez is responsible for 12% of annual global trade, notably oil and LNG.[6] Around 8-10% of global oil shipments and 8% of LNG trade pass through the canal, underscoring its pivotal role in NATO member states’ energy security.[7] Surprisingly, rather than economic interests, the Suez Canal is most relevant to NATO for its long history of disruption and the impact on the alliance’s ongoing economic activity.
The Suez Canal remains the most direct maritime route linking the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans, traversing the Strait of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean Sea, the narrow Isthmus of Suez, the Red Sea, the Bab el–Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden.
Most significant was the eight-year closure following the Egypt/Israel war in 1967.[8] During that time, maritime traffic was rerouted around Africa, driving up shipping costs and adding orders of magnitude to the energy shipment costs coming out of the Persian Gulf. The closure was a deliberate step by the controlling nation and not the result of a failed state. More recently, the world witnessed the large container ship Ever Given run aground in the canal, halting traffic for a week during recovery efforts. Economists estimate the daily impact on the global economy to be $9.6 billion. While the global economy recovered quickly from the brief closure, a longer disruption would have led to significant supply chain disruptions, potentially a shortage of shipping containers, higher insurance premiums for shippers, and inflationary pressures passed on to consumers.[9] The accidental nature of the Ever Given grounding, as well as the 2024 MV Dali crash in Baltimore, demonstrates that even in restricted waters with heightened navigational infrastructure, catastrophic accidents can occur.[10] In restricted chokepoints with narrow channels, authorities must consider the risk of both malign and accidental groundings and crashes.
The Turkish Straits
The Turkish Straits comprise the Bosporus Strait, Dardanelles Strait, and the Marmara Sea. They provide the only maritime connection between the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea, and much of their history and policy is controlled by the 1936 Montreux Convention.[11] Following the First World War, the document redefined regional and international control over one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints.[12] For Türkiye, the agreement asserted sovereignty and solidified the defensive rights that would become central to its foreign policy.[13] Black Sea littoral states received broad rights, while non-Black Sea nations faced strict limits on tonnage, duration of stay (21 days), and required advance notice before warship transits.[14]
The 1974 Cyprus conflict highlighted Türkiye’s strategic application of the Montreux Convention. Following a Greek-backed coup in Cyprus aimed at unification with Greece (enosis), Türkiye launched Operation Atilla, citing its rights as a guarantor under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. During the operation, Türkiye used its authority under the Montreux Convention to shift from a lax to strict enforcement on the passage of NATO warships, from non-Black Sea powers like the United States and the United Kingdom.[15]
The 1974 Cyprus conflict highlighted Türkiye’s strategic application of the Montreux Convention.
Although Türkiye did not formally close the Straits, it implemented more stringent interpretations of the Montreux Convention’s provisions, notably regarding tonnage and notification requirements. This indirectly limited NATO’s ability to project naval power into the Eastern Mediterranean, but more importantly, it strained Ankara’s relationship with Washington and NATO. Despite US criticism over Operation Atilla as well as Turkish poppy production, it became clear that conflict with Türkiye would benefit the Soviets to the detriment of the U.S. and NATO. The U.S. provided tacit approval of Türkiye’s military actions and worked to de-escalate tensions, responding only with a U.S. arms embargo in 1975.[16] Türkiye demonstrated its ability to assert strategic autonomy by leveraging international law to shield its regional ambitions.
Türkiye once again used Montreux’s provisions to pronounced effect during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Ankara declared the Russian activity a “war” and, in doing so, invoked Article 19 of the Convention, permitting the closing of the Straits during wartime. By limiting Russia’s ability to move forces into the Black Sea, Türkiye reduced escalation risk between the two nations having commercial and cultural ties to the Turkish state. It should be noted that under the treaty, Russia could return ships home ported in the Black Sea through the straits, but as that has yet to happen, Ankara has not had to commit to enforcing their proclamation.[17] The decision to stand up and publicly criticise Russia was part of the ongoing tight rope walked with fellow Black Sea nations and broader Western allies on one side, and an important trading partner and bellicose nation on the other.
The Montreux Convention enables Türkiye to function as a gatekeeper between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, granting it outsized strategic influence relative to its size. Whether during the Cold War or modern crises, their deft use of the Convention preserves sovereignty and shapes the regional balance of power. Türkiye’s custodianship of the Straits remains a powerful tool of geopolitical leverage in a volatile region prone to conflict (e.g., Cyprus in 1974, Russia–Georgia in 2008, Russia-Ukraine 2022-present).
While the applications of the convention in 1974 ran counter to some Western interests, the application and respect for the rule of international law reiterated maritime norms and set a precedent for diffusing tensions through legal and diplomatic efforts, rather than military ones, in the future.
Emerging Chokepoint: Arctic Routes
Climate change has become a significant issue worldwide, leading to an increase in natural disasters. This has led to more environmental issues than ever recorded. However, countries like Russia and the PRC have seized a fantastic opportunity, namely the Arctic routes. Due to the ice melting in the Arctic, it has started to create new chokepoints. It is clear to the entire industry, “There are three major shipping routes through the Arctic.[18] The two main shipping routes are the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northeast Passage (NEP). The NEP, skirting the northern edge of arctic Russia, is navigable during the late summer months and drastically reduces shipment time between Asia and Western Europe. While the melting of ice within the Northeast Passage has helped this area become more accessible for trading, uncertainty and environmental concerns have limited large-scale utilisation.[19] “The NWP passes through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and consists of several potential routes between the Bering Strait in the west and Davis Strait in the east.”[20] The Northwest Passage has existed for years, but with warming trends, the Northwest Passage has become more accessible.
The Arctic routes have become increasingly useful and widely utilised over the past decade. In 2024, more than 3 million tons of cargo transited via the northern sea route,[21] which was one of the best years so far that the Arctic route has compared to any other record year. The 97 voyages (56 cargo, 41 ballast) indicate the fast-growing reliance on the Arctic route.[22]
The Arctic routes have become increasingly useful and widely utilised over the past decade.
Continued disputes over sovereign boundaries add complexity to passage through the Northeast Passage.[23] SLOCs access, in addition to other arctic resources (“13% of the world’s oil reserves and 30% of undiscovered natural gas”), amplify concerns over energy security.[24] Russia, the U.S., Canada, Norway, the PRC, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland all claim part of the Arctic, with differing visions regarding the movement of commerce, environmental protection, and natural resource utilisation.
To date, natural phenomena drive disruptions of Arctic routes. The most significant is the uncertainty of ice conditions, making it challenging for shipping companies that normally book schedules months or more in advance. When schedules rely on razor-thin time margins, many companies find the uncertainty of route availability to outweigh the risk levels not yet balanced by the potential time savings of the polar routes. Between national preparations and NATO exercises, the Arctic domain draws a significant level of interest, marked by regular exercises, material pre-positioning, and a defensive presence. Meanwhile, Russia has used it for research, the military, and transporting goods.
Bab el–Mandeb
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is the maritime entry to the Suez Canal from the south, controlling the flow of goods and military assets between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Additionally, this strait is adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz and politically unstable states, including Yemen and Somalia. Further, this geopolitical position means that the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is no stranger to piracy, terrorism, and regional conflicts that threaten NATO’s interests.[25] Regional instability surrounding the Strait could pose significant risks to global trade, particularly to NATO’s economic ties, including oil and energy exports. Nearly 9% of all global seaborne petroleum passes through the strait.[26] Thus, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait holds both economic and strategic importance, making it a relevant focal point for Allied naval operations.
The Strait’s history of allied naval operations remains long, diverse, and vast. After the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli War, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait’s importance became increasingly clear following its closure. The disruption of trade ships bound for the Israeli port of Eilat underscored the importance of this strait in shaping the regional countries’ interests and the security of the Red Sea in particular.[27] Since then, there has been significant geopolitical competition and ongoing foreign interest, with many powers vying for control and establishing bases in the region.[28] In the 2000s, the Bab el-Mandeb became increasingly important for economic and strategic interests. For example, in the early 2000s, maritime security concerns significantly increased in the waters surrounding the Strait, particularly in the Gulf of Aden. Terrorist attacks, such as the sinking of the French tanker MV Limburg and bombing of the USS Cole, and Somali piracy, prompted the deployment of NATO naval patrols in the Bab el-Mandeb.[29], [30], [31] These attacks, claimed by Al Qaeda, are a key part of why Al Qaeda and a smaller ISIS faction remain active concerns for maritime security.[32]
In response to the strategic maritime importance of both the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb, NATO member states have increased their naval presence in the surrounding waters. Approximately 14 nautical miles from the Strait lies Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which hosts joint international military forces focused on combating piracy.[33] NATO members, including the U.S., maintain a contingent of around 4,000 personnel there. Additionally, several countries, such as Russia, India, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, are seeking to establish military bases in Djibouti.[34]
In response to the strategic maritime importance of both the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb, NATO member states have increased their naval presence in the surrounding waters.
In 2016, allied support in the Strait allowed the USS Mason to intercept and stop terrorist attacks using missiles, marking the first operational use of ship-based SAM intercepts in a live environment.[35] Allied forces continue to combat piracy and protect commercial vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb, due to the strait’s geopolitical proximity to ongoing conflicts and to protect NATO interests.
Today, ongoing conflicts in the Bab el-Mandeb’s surrounding regions, including the Gaza–Israel conflict, continue to determine the strait’s significance in maritime security. Fouad Muss’id describes ongoing hostilities as a “shadow war” involving navies and shipping in the Red Sea, not just between Israel and adversaries but also involving their great-power backers (US, Iran).[36]
Some commercial vessels have opted to avoid the Bab el-Mandeb, and many shipping companies have halted operations to avoid the conflict overflowing into the Strait.[37] Houthi militants claimed to have attacked more than 145 ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since October 2023.[38] While the Houthis have announced a cessation of maritime attacks on vessels not belonging to Israel, the Strait remains a chokepoint steeped in geopolitical tensions. Any major conflict risks economic instability and may pressure additional commercial activities to avoid the strait entirely.[39]
Broadly speaking, the Bab el-Mandeb and surrounding waters are and have been a hotbed of lawlessness, piracy, and rogue state activity. Past activities have focused on military presence to provide stability to the area, as economic and diplomatic engagements are unlikely to work in a lawless environment, or one where there is not an established governing entity.
Strait of Hormuz
Located at the southeastern edge of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime corridor that acts as the only direct sea passage linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and, beyond that, the Arabian Sea and wider Indian Ocean.[40] Hormuz’s proximity to numerous strategic areas and conflict zones is critical to the alliance’s geopolitical interests in the region; the most significant of which is its proximity to the adversarial nation of Iran and the flow point for strategic energy sources.[41] Several strategically positioned islands, including Hormuz and Larak, sit near the strait’s narrowest point off the Iranian coast and thus give Iran immense control over the chokepoint.[42]
Located at the southeastern edge of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime corridor that acts as the only direct sea passage linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and, beyond that, the Arabian Sea and wider Indian Ocean.
The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical chokepoint for global energy trade, due to the large volume of oil and natural gas that passes through it. On average, one-quarter of the global oil supply flows through Hormuz annually, alongside 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG).[43] The safe passage of resources through the Strait of Hormuz is vital to the global economy and the economic security of Gulf states, which rely on oil exports for nearly 80% of their budgets.[44]
The Strait of Hormuz has long been a geopolitical flashpoint, especially since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution ushered in a theocratic regime hostile to Western influence. Iran’s rivalry with the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Israel, rooted in political and religious divisions, has fuelled enduring regional instability.[45]
Although this strait has never been closed, it was the focal point of several incidents that highlight its significant global importance. The most notable instance of this came during the ‘Tanker War’ phase of the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, when both nations targeted oil tankers and merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf to damage each other’s economy. Although most attacks occurred just barely outside the Strait itself, the heightened risk within the strait led to an international panic, resulting in a worldwide increase in oil prices and prompting heightened US and UK naval patrols within the strait.[46] The rebalancing of naval assets to the straits put a demand on ship-sending nations and necessarily shifted focus from competing global priorities. With no alliance-wide consensus on the conflict, NATO did not engage as such; however, many member nations were directly impacted. Greece, Türkiye, Norway, the UK, and West Germany, all had at least four ships attacked.[47]
NATO maintains a significant presence in the region through military and political partnerships with nearby Gulf nations. Launched in 2004, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) serves as a framework for bilateral security cooperation between NATO and several Gulf states, aimed at enhancing security and stability across the broader Middle East. This bolstered the alliance’s military presence in the region.[48] The U.S. operates its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, headquartered at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, the only US permanent naval base in the Middle East, while also maintaining bases in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. Similarly, the United Kingdom operates a permanent naval base at Mina Salam Port outside Bahrain, while also maintaining an Air base in the UAE alongside France.
Panama Canal
The Panama Canal is a significant facilitator of maritime trade and allied naval mobility between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, making it one of the most notable chokepoints in the world. The canal moves 6% of international maritime traffic alone, totalling 14,000 ships and 500 million tonnes of cargo annually with an approximate value of $270 billion.[49] In the global context, in addition to Latin nations, the U.S. and NATO allies, as well as the Republic of Korea and Japan, to name a few, have a keen interest in canal stability. Each depends on the canal for substantial portions of its annual trade.[50]
The Panama Canal is a significant facilitator of maritime trade and allied naval mobility between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, making it one of the most notable chokepoints in the world.
Panama’s democratic stability is increasingly under scrutiny following its 2024 presidential election, where persistent corruption scandals eroded public trust, despite its moderate governance index in the BTI 2024 Country Report.[51] Under the current Carter-Torrijos treaty, Panama is responsible for increasing the amount of canal security, with the U.S. returning many of its earlier responsibilities, raising legitimate concerns regarding the canal’s neutrality and the protection of SLOCs.[52] The absence of a traditional military[53] in Panama compels reliance on foreign military support, complicating Panama’s capacity to respond to geopolitical threats from regional adversaries both inside and outside its borders.[54] This dependency further burdens U.S. security commitments. While this understandably concerns Panama, there are other security issues that affect Western allies.
Since joining the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017, Panama has opened its canal infrastructure to Chinese firms, including bridges, water systems, energy facilities, and surveillance networks.[55], [56] In 2016, CK Hutchison of Hong Kong took control of key operations at Balboa and Cristóbal ports, arousing US concerns over potential Chinese intelligence access.[57] These fears prompted BlackRock to acquire Hutchison’s port interests in 2025, signalling a strategic pivot by the U.S. and its allies.[58], [59] A joint DHS-House report in 2024 cautioned that Chinese-made ship-to-shore cranes and surveillance cameras could serve as covert conduits for espionage, highlighting the broader security implications of foreign-influenced port infrastructure.[60] Thus, the Panama Canal remains a point of instability regarding foreign influence on the canal infrastructure by competitor states.
More complex is the environmental threat to canal operations. Dry conditions over the past several years have lowered the lakes that feed the lock operations. Operators have reduced the draft limits to permit lock operations with less water, effectively reducing the PANAMAX dimensions.[61] This is driving shippers to take the much longer southern route through the Straits of Magellan or using multi-modal land transportation to move products across the isthmus.
The Panama Canal faces unique challenges. The Panamanian government is ineffective, the economy is struggling, and environmental impacts are immediate rather than distant threats. The canal is a critical part of the Panamanian economy, but is at risk from a multitude of multidimensional challenges that are making exploitation of the resource harder, not easier.[62] Political vulnerabilities, including concerns over corruption and the absence of a formal military, create governance gaps that would result in inadequate crisis response to malign actions.
Straits of Malacca and Singapore
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMAS) are a narrow waterway between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, and has the highest traffic levels of any of the chokepoints examined. In 2016, 30% of all maritime crude oil trade moved through the South China Sea.[63] Of that, researchers estimate that 90% transited the Strait of Malacca, the shortest sea route between Gulf suppliers and Asian markets, making the Strait one of the main oil transit routes for global trade.[64]
In 2016, 30% of all maritime crude oil trade moved through the South China Sea.
Since the 2000s, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have cooperated through Operation Malsindo to conduct joint anti-piracy naval patrols, focusing on regional control while allowing some support from outside powers.[65]
Despite the navigational risk of high-traffic waterways, piracy is the greatest threat to Malacca shipping. Recent data from the 2024 United Nations’ International Maritime Organisation (IMO) reported 91 incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, marking a 7% increase from the previous year.[66] Furthermore, the IMO notes that the global areas most affected by piracy are still the Straits of Malacca within Southeast Asia. Though some attacks focus on crew possessions rather than cargo (labelled as category four or ‘opportunistic’ in nature), the theft of cargo, scraps, engine parts, and cash is an increasing threat that impacts shippers’ risk decisions when planning their routes. Moreover, piracy also impacts regional governments that rely on the waterway for revenue. While Indonesia’s GDP only reports 7% from maritime trade, Malaysia relies on the Strait of Malacca for almost half of its GDP.[67] Therefore, any disruptions to ship traffic will negatively impact national economies. The extreme impacts of such disruption can be seen in recent examples, such as Egypt’s loss of $90 million in revenue during the Ever Given Grounding, and the nearly $12 billion lost by Ukrainian farmers during Russian blockades in the Black Sea.[68], [69]
The primary law enforcement efforts are managed by the littoral states of the region, with operations such as the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP), a “set of practical co-operative measures undertaken by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand to ensure the security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore”.[70] The U.S. also maintains a regular naval presence in the Straits, with recent satellite imagery showing the USS Nimitz and other warships.[71]
With increasing incidents, it is questionable whether the current system is sufficient to stop attacks, such doubt has been a driver of the recent partnerships between the U.S. and Indo-Pacific countries. At the 6th International Maritime Security Symposium, US Admiral Steve Koehler reported, “The U.S. Pacific Fleet continues to collaborate with our allies and partners to support freedom of navigation and international law. The series of Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activities in the Philippines is one example of that.”[72]
The U.S. Pacific Fleet continues to collaborate with our allies and partners to support freedom of navigation and international law. The series of Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activities in the Philippines is one example of that.
To date, no request or mandate has prompted NATO to engage in policing in the area. However, with the growing partnerships between allied members and nations in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, as outlined in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, there may be opportunities to enhance law and order through bilateral engagements. Moreover, the Strait significantly reduces transit time for warships travelling from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Western Pacific, making it absolutely key for NATO actors within the region.[73] Given the ongoing concerns over PRC expansionism, the ability to quickly redistribute maritime assets should be a top priority for NATO.
Conclusion & Recommendations
Maritime chokepoints are indispensable to NATO’s strategic posture, serving as economic throughfares and essential military corridors. Several themes emerge. Chokepoints governed by strong and cooperative states (Turkish Straits under Montreux) can be used to enforce predictable legal regimes that NATO may navigate or influence; in contrast, chokepoints surrounded by lawless zones or non-allied actors (e.g., Bab el-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, Panama Canal) increase exposure to risks outside of allied nations’ control.
While control is often not within NATO’s grasp, alliance cohesion and preparedness can mitigate risks. The increasing engagement of non-allied and sometimes hostile actors (especially the PRC and Russia) in sensitive global areas further highlights the urgency of NATO-wide coordination on maritime policy.
Considering broad policy recommendations, both for chokepoints discussed as well as more broadly (Kattegat, Dover Straits, Lombok), we recommend the following actions:
- Codify a Chokepoint Risk Monitoring Framework to institutionalise a process to continuously monitor, assess, and rank chokepoint vulnerabilities using shared intelligence, focusing on factors like traffic volume, political stability, maritime security threats, and allied reliance;
- Enhance maritime domain awareness with satellite surveillance, cooperative sensor networks, and data-sharing agreements, particularly in areas prone to piracy (Strait of Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb) or espionage (Panama Canal under Chinese infrastructure control);
- Strengthen regional partnerships with littoral states controlling key chokepoints through joint training, defence diplomacy, and basing agreements. Expand and continue to fund NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and similar frameworks;
- Stockpile resources and develop alternative routes through investment in pre-positioned logistics and warfighting materiel near strategic chokepoints. Additionally, invest in overland or maritime alternatives (developing resilience to Panama Canal closures by improving South American transhipment capacity); and
- Include chokepoint disruptions at various levels of alliance exercises. Scenarios such as cyberattacks on port infrastructure, natural disasters, state-sponsored blockades, or grey-zone tactics force leaders to consider the impacts on the movement or support of forces.
While chokepoints represent strategic opportunities, they are also systemic vulnerabilities. An effective NATO strategy should be anticipatory, flexible, and grounded in alliance cohesion, multilateralism, and commitment to maritime norms. Furthermore, while Article 6 defines their reach, given the vast economic forces, NATO’s vision must be global.
[1] F. J. West, “Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence,” Naval War College Review 38, no. 5 (1985): 4–19, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44637070.
[2] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “NATO’s Partnerships,” NATO, May 12, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm.
[3] Atlantic Council, “The Naval Alliance: Preparing NATO for a Maritime Century,” Atlantic Council, February 4, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-naval-alliance-preparing-nato-for-a-maritime-century/#importance.
[4] Magnus Nordenman, “The Naval Alliance: Preparing NATO for a Maritime Century,” Atlantic Council, July 13, 2015, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-naval-alliance-preparing-nato-for-a-maritime-century/#importance.
[5] S. S. Bhattacharya, “Strategic Importance of the Suez Canal,” Strategic Analysis 5, no. 12 (1982): 686–693, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700168209427575.
[6] “Tariffs Could Impact Suez Canal Traffic, Experts Warn,” Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide, May 13, 2025, https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/tariffs-could-impact-suez-canal-traffic-experts-warn/.
[7] Marwa Rashad, Robert Harvey, and Natalie Grover, “How Would the Red Sea Attacks Affect Gas Shipping?” Reuters, December 19, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/how-would-red-sea-attacks-affect-gas-shipping-2023-12-19/.
[8] Scott Neuman and Jackie Northman, “How a Long Shutdown of the Suez Canal Might Have Roiled the Global Economy,” National Public Radio (NPR), March 29, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/26/981600153/heres-how-a-long-shutdown-of-the-suez-canal-might-roil-the-global-economy.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Erin Cox et al., “Baltimore Bridge Collapse Recovery Team Finds Victims’ Likely Vehicles,” The Washington Post, March 27, 2024.
[11] Paul Pryce, “Let Me Get This Strait: The Turkish Straits Question Revisited,” Center for International Maritime Security, June 1, 2020, https://cimsec.org/let-me-get-this-strait-the-turkish-straits-question-revisited/.
[12] Yücel Güçlü, “Regulation of the Passage through the Turkish Straits,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 6, no. 3 (2001): 25–39.
[13] Harry N. Howard, “The 1945 Crisis over the Turkish Straits,” Balkan Studies 1 (1960): 65–90.
[14] Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, Montreux, July 20, 1936.
[15] U.S. Naval Institute, “Crisis at the Turkish Straits,” Proceedings, August 1988.
[16] George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1977).
[17] Isil Sariyuce and Arwa Damon, “How a 1936 Treaty Could Force Turkey to Take Sides in the Ukraine War,” CNN, March 1, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/28/middleeast/mideast-summary-02-28-2022-intl.
[18] Shengda Zhu et al., “Socio-Economic Impacts of Shipping along the Northwest Passage: The Cost to Locals,” Marine Policy 153 (2023): 105647.
[19] Da Wu et al., “Statistical Modeling of Arctic Sea Ice Concentrations for Northern Sea Route Shipping,” Applied Sciences 13, no. 7 (2023): 4374.
[20] Shengda Zhu et al., “Socio-Economic Impacts of Shipping along the Northwest Passage: The Cost to Locals,” Marine Policy 153 (2023): 105647.
[21] M. Grzybowski, “China and Russia, France and Belgium on the Arctic Route,” Cluster Collaboration Platform, February 15, 2025, https://www.clustercollaboration.eu/content/china-and-russia-france-and-belgium-arctic-route.
[22] Ibid.
[23] L. Kozera and R. Klaczyński, “The Role and Importance of the Arctic and Its Sea Route in International Economic Relations,” Grassroots Journal of Natural Resources 8, no. 1 (2025): 709–736, https://doi.org/10.33002/nr2581.6853.080130.
[24] Ibid.
[25] A. Aguilera Raga, “The Bab el-Mandeb Strait: Geopolitical Considerations of the Strategic Chokepoint,” Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE), 2020.
[26] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “The Bab el-Mandeb Strait Is a Strategic Route for Oil and Natural Gas Shipments,” Today in Energy, August 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073.
[27] A. Labib, “Bab El-Mandeb Strait and Its Impact on Red Sea Security and Stability,” North Coast Center for Middle Eastern Studies, February 9, 2024, https://en.ncmes.org/3360/.
[28] Ibid.
[29] U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: The Attack on USS Cole,” October 23, 2002, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/15028.htm.
[30] Federal Bureau of Investigation, “USS Cole Bombing,” May 19, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/uss-cole-bombing.
[31] Alexander Lott, “Maritime Security Threats and the Passage Regime in the Bab el-Mandeb,” The NCLOS Blog, Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea, March 18, 2021.
[32] N. Cigar, The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2017).
[33] K. P. Adhithyan, “Djibouti: A Strategic Choke Point in the Bab el-Mandeb Region,” Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies 5, no. 2 (2024): 283–288, https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2024.5211.
[34] Ibid.
[35] T. Rogoway, “US Destroyer Attacked by Anti-Ship Missiles Fired from Rebel-Controlled Territory in Yemen,” The War Zone, October 10, 2016, https://www.twz.com/5497/us-destroyer-attacked-by-anti-ship-missiles-from-rebel-controlled-yemeni-territory.
[36] F. Muss’id, “Impact of the War on Gaza on Regional and International Security in the Southern Red Sea,” Abaad Studies and Research Center, December 3, 2023, https://www.abaadstudies.org/index.php/en/policy-analysis/topic/60079.
[37] T. Denamiel et al., “The Global Economic Consequences of the Attacks on Red Sea Shipping Lanes,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 22, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-economic-consequences-attacks-red-sea-shipping-lanes.
[38] B. Toomey, “Houthis Violate U.S.-Houthi Ceasefire with Deadly Attacks in Red Sea,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, July 9, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/07/09/houthis-violate-u-s-houthi-ceasefire-with-deadly-attacks-in-red-sea/.
[39] J. Drennan, “The Gate of Tears: Interests, Options, and Strategy in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait,” Center for International Maritime Security, January 30, 2018, https://cimsec.org/gate-tears-interests-options-strategy-bab-el-mandeb-strait/.
[40] The Strauss Center, “Strait of Hormuz: Assessing the Threat,” Strauss Center Publications, n.d., https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-assessing-the-threat/.
[41] Faik Oztrak, “The Gulf Crisis and Global Energy Markets,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly Economics and Security Committee, November 20, 2020, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2020-11/034%20ESCTER%2020%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20-%20GULF%20CRISIS.pdf.
[42] The Strait of Hormuz: A Maritime Lifeline in the Persian Gulf, MaritimeEducation.com, 2023, https://maritimeducation.com/the-strait-of-hormuz-a-maritime-lifeline-in-the-persian-gulf/.
[43] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” U.S. Department of Energy, June 25, 2024, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints.
[44] F. A. Gerges, The Economic Consequences of Gulf Insecurity (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019).
[45] Martin Beck, “The Aggravated Struggle for Regional Power in the Middle East: American Allies Saudi Arabia and Israel versus Iran,” Global Policy 11, no. 1 (2020): 84–92.
[46] Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran–Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988 (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
[47] Ronald O’Rourke, “The Tanker Wars,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, May 1988, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988/may/tanker-war.
[48] “NATO Review: The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative at 15,” NATO Review, December 16, 2019.
[49] Northern Trust, “Weekly Economic Commentary,” March 21, 2025, https://www.northerntrust.com/content/dam/northerntrust/corporate/global/en/documents/web/pdf/2025/weekly-economic-commentary/tariff-questions-panama-canal-feds-balance-sheet-0321.pdf.
[50] Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, “Statistics,” July 15, 2025, https://pancanal.com/en/statistics/.
[51] Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024: Panama, BTI Transformation Index, 2024, https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-dashboard/PAN.
[52] U.S. Department of State, “Panama Canal Treaty of 1977,” accessed July 15, 2025, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rlnks/11936.htm.
[53] “Panama Abolished Its Military in the Early 90s; Security Is Handled by the Panamanian Public Forces, Which Is More of a Law Enforcement Organization.”
[54] R. Sylvia and C. Danopoulos, “Civil-Military Relations in a Civilized State: Panama,” SJSU ScholarWorks, July 2005, https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=pols_pub.
[55] A. Sanders and R. C. Berg, “Panama: From Zoned Out to Strategic Opportunity,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/panama-zoned-out-strategic-opportunity.
[56] Council on Strategic and International Studies, “Testimony before the House Subcommittee on ‘Strategic Port Investments in the Western Hemisphere,’” February 11, 2025.
[57] J. Jun and H. Ziemer, “Surveying Hutchison’s Portfolio in Latin America: Strategic Vulnerability or Business as Usual?” CSIS, April 17, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/surveying-hutchisons-port-folio-latin-america-strategic-vulnerability-or-business-usual.
[58] “Panama Canal Boss Warns MSC Ports Deal Threatens Principle of Neutrality,” Financial Times, June 10, 2025.
[59] “Panama Risks Boiling Over as Donald Trump’s Threats Supercharge Protests,” Financial Times, June 3, 2025.
[60] R. C. Berg et al., “Chinese Ports in Panama Come under New Management,” CSIS, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-ports-panama-come-under-new-management.
[61] Cdr. Y. Hemanth Kumar, “The Panama Canal’s Battle Against Climate Change,” in India’s Blue Economy Transition (2024), 183.
[62] Ira Sohn, “Economic and Financial Reform in Panama: Challenges and Opportunities to 2025,” Journal of Applied Business & Economics 18, no. 1 (2016).
[63] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “More Than 30% of Global Maritime Crude Oil Trade Moves through the South China Sea,” Today in Energy, August 27, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36952.
[64] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” U.S. Department of Energy, June 25, 2024, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints.
[65] Koh Swee Lean Collin, “The Malacca Strait Patrols: Finding Common Ground,” RSIS Commentary, April 20, 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CO16091.pdf.
[66] International Maritime Organization, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report – 2024 (MSC.4/Circ.269), April 17, 2025, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/MSC.4-Circ.269_Annual%202024.pdf.
[67] A. A. Priadi, “Maritime Sector Anchors 7 Percent of Indonesia’s GDP, Says Official,” ANTARA News, May 26, 2025, https://en.antaranews.com/news/356613/maritime-sector-anchors-7-percent-of-indonesias-gdp-says-official.
[68] David Osler, “Marine Insurers Dismayed by $1bn Claim for Suez Canal Block and Seizure of Vessel,” Lloyd’s List, April 14, 2021.
[69] Susanne Wengle and Vatalii Dankevych, “Black Sea Blackmail: Ukrainian Food Exports in War Conditions,” Ponars Eurasia Policy Memo no. 813, November 21, 2022, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/black-sea-blackmail-ukrainian-food-exports-in-war-conditions/.
[70] Singapore Ministry of Defense, “Fact Sheet: The Malacca Straits Patrol,” April 21, 2015.
[71] Dzirhan Mahadzir, “USS Nimitz Operating near Malacca Strait, Chinese Amphibious Group in Philippine Sea,” USNI News, May 19, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/05/19/uss-nimitz-operating-near-malacca-strait-chinese-amphibious-group-in-philippine-sea.
[72] Adm. Steve Koehler, “Remarks during the 6th International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS),” U.S. Pacific Fleet, Bali, Indonesia, February 17, 2025.
[73] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” U.S. Department of Energy, June 25, 2024, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints.
