Abstract: Given the relevance, evolution, and proliferation of cognitive warfare in the modern age, it is necessary to delve deeper into the concept to gain an empirical understanding that can inform future policies and practices. Accordingly, a systematic literature review was carried out to define the concept in relation to six key aspects, namely its demarcation from adjacent fields, the actors involved, the targets of cognitive attacks, as well as the significance of cyberspace, the lawfulness, and the role of intent. Additionally, these aspects were analysed through the lenses of the two main schools of thought currently dominating cognitive warfare–namely a minimalist and maximalist approach. Even though both perspectives add valuable aspects to the conceptualisation of cognitive warfare, the maximalist interpretation is preferable due to its ability to reflect more accurately the current scope and understanding of what cognitive warfare entails.
Problem statement: How to reconcile the maximalist and minimalist approaches to defining cognitive warfare?
So what?: To move toward more precise legal interpretation, the ambiguity surrounding cognitive warfare must be reduced by defining its boundaries and articulating its core attributes. Developing a common language will require ongoing dialogue between academics, professionals, and policymakers.
A Transformation in Warfare
The emergence of cognitive warfare shows a profound transformation in the character of warfare. While traditional methods of warfare continue to dominate today’s conflicts, the strategic relevance of cognitive warfare grows continuously.[1] Despite this increased interest in the field, the discourse on cognitive warfare remains fragmented, with definitions often being incomplete and ambiguous. Moreover, its objectives, methods, and distinguishing characteristics are still undetermined.
The emergence of cognitive warfare shows a profound transformation in the character of warfare.
The development of advanced cyber capabilities, alongside the widespread use of the internet and social media platforms, has enabled State and non-state actors to exploit these technologies for malign purposes. Consequently, these actors can now influence large populations and, when desired, can destabilise political systems. Cognitive warfare is increasingly employed to gain strategic military advantages during peacetime and in armed conflicts.[2] The increasing relevance of cognitive warfare necessitates a collaborative response from professionals, policymakers, and academics. However, the current ambiguity does not contribute to a fruitful exchange of theories. It hinders not only the advancement of academic theory but also the development of coherent political and legal responses to this emerging field.
The Attributes of Cognitive Warfare
The earliest traceable publication using the term “cognitive warfare,” as revealed by a systematic conceptual review, dates back to 1996.[3] However, 94% of the scholarly literature on the topic has emerged since 2021, considering both the literature included in this systematic conceptual review and the 320 original references examined during the initial phase of the literature review. This trend corresponds with the incorporation of cognitive warfare frameworks into military manuals, most notably with a formal adoption within the NATO doctrine in 2020.[4] The novelty of the term certainly contributes to the existing ambiguity concerning the conceptualisation of cognitive warfare.
Nevertheless, the scholarly debate highlights several elements that are continuously discussed and associated with the conceptualisation of cognitive warfare. Key aspects often discussed include the demarcation of adjacent fields,[5] State and non-state actors,[6] the target audience of cognitive attacks,[7] the role of cyberspace in cognitive warfare,[8] the lawfulness of cyberspace interventions,[9] and the role of intent behind these actions.[10] These elements, while not always addressed in every academic source, are crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the current discourse on cognitive warfare.
Demarcation of Adjacent Fields
Cognitive warfare is frequently discussed alongside related fields such as information warfare, psychological operations, cyberwarfare, and hybrid warfare. While these domains share overlapping concerns, each remains conceptually distinct. Information warfare is typically associated with the strategic use of information to influence or disrupt an adversary, with a strong emphasis on the methods employed and the manipulation of informational content.[11] Psychological operations focus on shaping the beliefs and perceptions of individuals or groups, often through targeted messaging, persuasion, or propaganda.[12] Cyberwarfare refers to the use of digital attacks to disrupt, disable, or manipulate networks, systems, and information.[13] Hybrid warfare, by contrast, is a broad and often loosely defined concept that encompasses a combination of conventional, irregular, and cyber tactics employed in a coordinated and often ambiguous campaign.[14]
Information warfare is typically associated with the strategic use of information to influence or disrupt an adversary, with a strong emphasis on the methods employed and the manipulation of informational content.
While cognitive warfare is often grouped with these categories, its conceptual foundation is different. Unlike information warfare, cognitive warfare shifts the focus from the tools and channels used to the cognitive impact on individuals and societies. It is not confined to messaging, systems disruption, or digital platforms but targets the underlying processes of perception, reasoning, and decision-making. Compared to psychological operations, which tend to concentrate on producing specific, often short-term psychological effects, cognitive warfare adopts a more systemic and long-term strategy aimed at shaping or degrading cognitive autonomy. Cyberwarfare remains too limited in scope, bound to a specific technological domain, while hybrid warfare, due to its vagueness and overextension, lacks the precision needed to frame cognitive operations adequately. As a result, cognitive warfare emerges as a distinct realm that demands its own conceptual and strategic frameworks.
This distinctiveness has sparked a nuanced but critical debate about how cognitive warfare should be understood in relation to these adjacent fields.[15] At the heart of this discussion lies the question of whether cognitive warfare ought to be defined by the means through which influence is exerted, or by the cognitive effects it seeks to achieve. Unlike information warfare or psychological operations, cognitive warfare does not prioritise the mechanisms employed; rather, it is oriented toward the intended impact on human cognition.[16] As Bernard Claverie and François du Cluzel argue, “the cognitive effect is not a by-product of action, but its very objective.”[17] This perspective marks a significant conceptual shift. It detaches the definition of cognitive warfare from any specific method or technology, and instead anchors it in the disruption, shaping, or manipulation of cognitive processes. Moreover, cognitive warfare takes a broader view than psychological operations, which are often constrained by their reliance on propaganda and information warfare techniques and tend to focus narrowly on immediate means and effects, overlooking their long-term influence and overall strategic impact. In contrast, cognitive warfare targets expansive and systemic cognitive influence, making it fundamentally distinct.
Claverie and du Cluzel further distinguish cognitive warfare from other fields by noting that while psychological operations aim to reinforce or redirect existing attitudes, cognitive warfare is more disruptive in nature, aiming to impair or disable critical thinking altogether.[18] This characterisation presents cognitive warfare as a more insidious and comprehensive form of influence, representing a significant evolution in the tactics and objectives of contemporary conflict.
While psychological operations aim to reinforce or redirect existing attitudes, cognitive warfare is more disruptive in nature, aiming to impair or disable critical thinking altogether.
Furthermore, by removing method-specific criteria from its definition, the concept becomes more adaptable to future developments. This abstraction enables a more robust and future-proof conceptual framework, ensuring that new techniques, whether neurotechnological, digital, or behavioural, can be incorporated without necessitating a redefinition of the concept. This is a vital consideration given that national and international regulatory frameworks are still in the process of development. A method-independent definition helps safeguard the term’s relevance and coherence as technological capacities evolve, allowing for more consistent legal and policy responses over time.
Ultimately, the shift from defining cognitive warfare by its methods to focusing on its cognitive objectives and its greater effects marks a significant and necessary evolution in understanding modern conflict. While psychological operations and information warfare remain grounded in the means of influence and its short-term effects, cognitive warfare is increasingly recognised as a distinct phenomenon, defined by its direct engagement with mental processes. Although this approach may create some ambiguity by broadening the range of applicable methods and its focus on larger strategic outcomes, it provides a more resilient and future-oriented framework that can accommodate the diverse and evolving methods through which cognitive influence can be exerted.
State and Non-State Actors
Academic discourse on cognitive warfare has predominantly centred on states as both the primary actors and targets. While this reflects traditional security paradigms, recent developments suggest that non-state actors are playing an increasingly significant role. These include ideological movements, terrorist organisations,[19] politically motivated networks[20] as well as individual social media influencers[21] and media and news platforms[22] that actively shape narratives, disrupt information environments, and are themselves targeted. However, their growing relevance has not yet been systematically integrated into dominant theoretical frameworks.
Empirical evidence from recent conflicts and influence operations shows that non-state actors frequently play central roles in cognitive warfare.[23] Compounding this complexity is the role of states in either covertly supporting or indirectly enabling such groups and privately-owned companies. States often instrumentalise non-state actors to generate cognitive effects while avoiding direct attribution and circumventing legal constraints.[24] This use of proxies allows states to operate in the grey zone between lawfulness and unlawfulness, responsibility and plausible deniability.[25] These complex relationships blur lines of accountability and challenge existing legal and policy frameworks.
Expanding the analytical lens to include non-state actors improves understanding while simultaneously raising questions about legal responsibility and regulatory clarity. Opaque relationships make attribution difficult, risking a concept of cognitive warfare that is too diffuse for practical interventions.[26] Nevertheless, recognising non-state actors as both perpetrators and targets is essential for bridging the theory and current practice of cognitive warfare. A broader, inclusive approach more accurately reflects operational realities, supports interdisciplinary understanding, and strengthens the foundation for effective legal and policy frameworks in the future, despite current definitional and regulatory challenges.
That said, a significant gap remains in the critical examination of the actors involved — both perpetrators and targets. The absence of a sustained analysis of the diverse range of actors operating within cognitive warfare contributes to an under-theorised field in which the complexity of real-world developments is not adequately reflected in academic or policy frameworks. A more comprehensive understanding of cognitive warfare, therefore, requires a rigorous investigation into the multiplicity of actors engaged in its practice and should hence include both State and non-state actors.
Target Audience
Although the intended target audience of cognitive attacks is rarely examined in depth within the existing literature, it represents a crucial factor in understanding the full scope of cognitive warfare. Only a small number of sources that address definitional questions explicitly engage with the issue of target populations. Scholars such as Pollpeter, Tsai and Herlevi,[27] Casey-Maslen,[28] and Miller[29] argue that cognitive warfare extends beyond military personnel, targeting both civilians and soldiers.[30] This view is further supported by case studies of cognitive attacks, which identify a diverse set of victims, including military personnel, state infrastructure and its employees, as well as civilians.[31] Taken together, these findings indicate a broad scholarly consensus that the victims of cognitive warfare are not limited to military actors but often include, and in some cases even prioritise, civilians and public sector employees.
Cognitive warfare extends beyond military personnel, targeting both civilians and soldiers.
Some scholars have described this as a “whole-of-society” phenomenon, but such terminology is misleading and should be rejected. The phrase suggests that society, as a whole, actively engages in these operations, when in reality most individuals are targets rather than aggressors.[32] A more precise conceptualisation emphasises that operations are directed at broad civilian populations, often on a mass scale, without presuming their active participation in offensive activities. This framing captures the asymmetrical nature of cognitive warfare, in which large segments of society are subjected to influence or disruption. At the same time, only a limited number of actors conduct the attacks. Rejecting the “whole-of-society” label, therefore, supports a clearer and more accurate definition of cognitive warfare while still accurately describing the diversity of victims of cognitive warfare.
Cognitive Warfare in Cyberspace
The roots of cognitive warfare demonstrate that the manipulation of perception and decision-making is not a new phenomenon. As early as the fourth century BCE, Sun Tzu[33] emphasised the value of defeating adversaries without direct combat, laying the foundation for the cognitive dimensions of conflict. In the modern context, these practices remain central, but the rise of cyberspace has transformed the scale and speed at which influence can be exercised. Digital technologies provide powerful tools for shaping perception and behaviour, drawing sustained attention in academic discourse and policy.[34]
Debates in the literature reflect two predominant perspectives on how cognitive warfare should be understood. On the one hand, scholars such as Seumas Miller[35] and Chris Bronk[36] tie cognitive warfare closely to cyberspace, portraying digital infrastructures as the defining feature of contemporary operations. By enabling influence at scale, cyber platforms are seen as the core domain in which cognitive warfare unfolds. On the other hand, cognitive warfare is situated within a broader and more enduring tradition that is enhanced rather than defined by cyber tools.[37], [38] From this view, psychological, cultural, and informational practices remain central and operate across both digital and non-digital domains.[39]
Cognitive warfare is situated within a broader and more enduring tradition that is enhanced rather than defined by cyber tools.
This tension has significant implications. A narrow focus on cyberspace risks reducing cognitive warfare to a technical subset of cyber conflict, underrepresenting the diversity of tools used by state and non-state actors and overlooking the political, cultural, and economic dimensions through which influence is exercised.[40] Cognitive operations are not confined to digital platforms; they intersect with and often depend on older forms of persuasion and manipulation. Recognising this multidimensional character is vital for understanding operational realities.
Therefore, a comprehensive framework must integrate both digital and non-digital methods and account for the interaction between traditional and emerging techniques. Such an approach not only captures the full scope of cognitive warfare but also future-proofs the concept against new domains and technologies that may arise, thereby providing a more durable basis for analysis, policy, and strategy.
Lawfulness
Few sources directly address the lawfulness of cognitive attacks, and among those that do, the topic remains contested. The debate centres on the permissibility of techniques and the legitimacy of intended outcomes, complicated by the absence of clear international standards. The most represented view adopts a context-specific approach, assessing legality on a case-by-case basis. Lawfulness depends on factors such as the tactics used, the scale of effects, and the situational context.[41] Advocates of the context-specific approach argue that cognitive warfare exists in a legal grey area,[42] where nuanced, situational judgments are the most credible means of determining compliance.[43]
However, minority perspectives diverge; some scholars argue that cognitive warfare is broadly lawful, citing the absence of explicit prohibitions and longstanding state practice.[44] Others maintain it is inherently unlawful, emphasising its aggressive character and potential violations of sovereignty, human dignity, and the prohibition of coercion.[45] Concerns over the risks posed by cognitive operations have prompted some countries, such as Germany and the U.S., to introduce national legislation combating the distribution of disinformation and or the usage of hate speech on social media, highlighting the current limitations of adopted international law. [46]
Concerns over the risks posed by cognitive operations have prompted some countries, such as Germany and the U.S., to introduce national legislation combating the distribution of disinformation and or the usage of hate speech on social media.
Across these debates, there is broad recognition that existing frameworks are insufficient, as a narrow focus on methods often overlooks broader outcomes and strategic intentions. To address this gap, a structured framework should be developed that distinguishes between methods, goals, and aims, capturing both individual actions and overarching strategies. While legal ambiguity persists, this approach provides a clearer foundation for evaluating lawfulness and informing policymaking.[47]
Overall, the legal status of cognitive warfare remains unsettled, but the prevailing view favours context-specific, nuanced assessments. By incorporating methods, goals, and aims, legal and policy evaluations can better reflect the complexity of operations, clarify normative boundaries, and support coherent responses in an increasingly complex operational environment. Further research is needed to develop a clearer understanding of how international law can address cognitive warfare, establish more precise standards, and provide guidance for States navigating this evolving domain.
Intent
The theoretical discourse surrounding cognitive warfare significantly lacks discussions on the role of intent. Additionally, the few sources addressing intent exhibit great divergence in their evaluation and perceived importance of intent. While Lin and Kerr[48] assert that cognitive warfare can involve deliberate and purposeful actions, distinguishing it from incidental cognitive effects that may occur during conventional military or information operations, most of the literature does not consistently emphasise this aspect. Claverie and du Cluzel,[49] similar to Lin and Kerr,[50] highlight conscious attempts to influence perception, belief systems, and decision-making processes, arguing that such operations are designed to exploit psychological and informational vulnerabilities rather than occurring randomly or passively. These analyses demonstrate that, in certain instances, cognitive warfare can be a proactive and calculated endeavour.
Nevertheless, intent remains a secondary feature in understanding cognitive warfare as a whole. Much of the academic debate continues to focus on tools, mechanisms, and observable effects, with limited attention to underlying motivations. Although recognising intent can add analytical nuance and is relevant for legal and ethical assessment,[51] particularly regarding compliance with international norms or the deliberate disruption of cognitive autonomy, not every operation is driven by explicit intent. The impact of cognitive warfare often arises from the effects themselves rather than the purpose behind them.[52] As a result, while intent can inform analysis, it should not be overemphasised relative to the broader characteristics that define cognitive warfare.
Minimalist and Maximalist Perspectives on Cognitive Warfare
The existing literature on cognitive warfare reflects a fragmented and evolving discourse, with no dominant or widely shared understanding among academics and practitioners. The systematic conceptual review, however, reveals recurring themes around which the debate has gradually come together. These include the overarching aim of cognitive warfare, rather than its specific methods; the scope of actors involved, including both state and non-state actors; the diversity of potential targets; the role of cyberspace; the question of lawfulness; and the role of intent.
One can observe a general split in the current debate, whereby authors either discuss cognitive warfare in more restrictive or extensive ways, referred to as minimalist or maximalist positions, respectively. The minimalist perspective is characterised by a narrower, more stringent understanding, whereas the maximalist perspective adopts a broader, more inclusive approach. While much of the extant literature still tends to gravitate toward minimalist definitions, current and emerging practices demonstrate a discernible trend toward maximalist conceptualisations.
Minimalist Positions
Minimalists typically interpret cognitive warfare as a subset of information warfare or psychological operations. For instance, Lin and Kerr,[53] Jayamaha and Matisek,[54] and Brittain-Hale[55] emphasise that cognitive warfare primarily revolves around the manipulation of information, particularly through disinformation campaigns. While Jayamaha and Matisek[56] focus on social media influence, Brittain-Hale[57] highlights the broader manipulation of perceptions and decision-making processes, with social media constituting only one component of this larger framework. Lin and Kerr[58] similarly underscore disinformation and misdirection as central mechanisms.
Although minimalists often appear to blend cognitive warfare with information warfare, they do establish an important distinction. Rather than focusing on the type of information or methods used, they emphasise intended outcomes, namely, the psychological and behavioural consequences of disinformation campaigns. This interpretation differentiates cognitive warfare from information warfare. While the latter centres on controlling or manipulating the flow of information, the former prioritises the cognitive and psychological effects of such manipulation.
Minimalist positions tend to extend across several thematic aspects. In terms of actors, they often emphasise states as the primary or even sole participants. Regarding targets, minimalists usually associate vulnerability with military personnel, while giving less attention to wider societal groups. In relation to cyberspace, cognitive warfare is frequently framed as closely tied to it , with limited consideration of its operation beyond it. On the question of lawfulness, minimalist perspectives often oscillate between categorising cognitive warfare as either inherently lawful or inherently unlawful, which leaves little room for contextual nuances. Ultimately, minimalists generally consider intent as a crucial condition for cognitive warfare to occur.
Maximalist Positions
In contrast, maximalists share the minimalist focus on outcomes but adopt a significantly broader understanding of the methods, actors, and domains involved. They regard cognitive warfare as an independent field that extends beyond information warfare and psychological operations, encompassing both kinetic and non-kinetic dimensions.[59] Beyond disinformation, maximalists incorporate emotional manipulation, social engineering, situational influence, and even physical operations designed to shape cognitive outcomes.
From this perspective, the pool of actors is not limited to states; rather, it also includes non-state actors such as insurgent groups, terrorist organisations, and transnational networks. Similarly, the scope of potential targets expands well beyond military personnel to include civilians, state officials, and entire societies. In terms of cyberspace, maximalists acknowledge its centrality but stress that cognitive warfare can operate independently of the digital domain. Lawfulness is treated as context-specific, to be judged according to the intent, means, and consequences of particular operations. Finally, intent itself is decoupled from definitional boundaries. While it remains significant for evaluating lawfulness, cognitive warfare can theoretically occur without explicit intent.
The pool of actors is not limited to states; rather, it also includes non-state actors such as insurgent groups, terrorist organisations, and transnational networks.
Among practice-based sources, NATO’s emerging doctrine reflects this maximalist approach. Ben Norton describes NATO’s portrayal of cognitive warfare as a “battle for the brain”,[60] extending beyond digital information operations to encompass kinetic methods and the weaponisation of brain science.[61] Similarly, Cornelis van der Klaauw[62] emphasises the diverse range of techniques that fall within the scope of cognitive warfare, ranging from disinformation campaigns to more extreme tactics such as physical disruption of brain function.[63] Collectively, these perspectives highlight the increasing convergence of cognitive warfare with broader, multi-domain strategies aimed at destabilising decision-making processes at both the individual and collective levels in practice.[64]
Implications
The definitional debate between minimalist and maximalist positions underscores a central tension in contemporary understandings of cognitive warfare. Minimalist definitions provide conceptual clarity and continuity with established doctrines, but they risk overlooking the increasingly diverse and sophisticated methods employed in modern conflicts. By contrast, the maximalist framework captures the multi-faceted and evolving character of cognitive warfare, incorporating not only informational and psychological manipulation but also emotional, technological, and kinetic dimensions.
Given these developments, the maximalist interpretation appears analytically and strategically more compelling. It ensures that the broad array of methods and effects observed in contemporary practice is encompassed within the definitional scope of cognitive warfare. Consequently, while minimalism continues to dominate parts of the academic literature, the trajectory of both conceptual and operational developments clearly signals an expansion of the field that aligns more closely with maximalist understandings.
Definition
A review of the existing literature reveals a persistent tension between minimalist and maximalist perspectives on cognitive warfare. Minimalist approaches emphasise narrow definitions, focusing on state actors, military targets, and information-based methods. In contrast, maximalist approaches adopt a broader view, incorporating multiple actors, diverse targets, and both kinetic and non-kinetic methods. Considering both the trajectory of academic debate and emerging military practice, a maximalist framework provides the most comprehensive and analytically useful understanding of cognitive warfare. Therefore, the working definition should reflect this broader, outcome-focused perspective.
Within this framework, cognitive warfare is characterised primarily by the wide range of methods employed, with emphasis placed on the effects achieved rather than on the specific tools used. It involves both state and non-state actors and targets not only military personnel but also civilians and officials, reflecting the broad scope of contemporary conflicts. Secondary aspects, while not essential for the definition, remain significant. Intent plays a key role in evaluating ethical and legal considerations, and cyberspace enhances the reach and effectiveness of operations without limiting the concept to the digital domain.
Intent plays a key role in evaluating ethical and legal considerations.
Considering these findings, the following definition of cognitive warfare is proposed: Cognitive warfare describes the influencing and interrupting of the cognitive realm of civilians and military personnel by state and non-state actors through both kinetic and non-kinetic means to achieve a strategic advantage.
Conclusion
Cognitive warfare represents a fundamental shift in modern conflict, moving beyond traditional military methods to directly target human cognition through a range of strategic approaches. The academic discourse, while fragmented and often favouring narrow, minimalist definitions, reveals recurring themes around actors, targets, methods, cyberspace, lawfulness, and intent. A maximalist perspective offers the most comprehensive understanding, capturing both state and non-state actors, diverse targets, and kinetic and non-kinetic means, while considering secondary aspects such as intent and the digital domain to inform ethical and legal evaluations. By emphasising cognitive effects rather than specific tools, this framework provides a resilient and future-oriented foundation for research, policy, and practice, allowing for a shared conceptual understanding and more coherent responses to the evolving challenges of cognitive warfare.
Despite these advances, the academic literature remains limited in its engagement with state practice and policy responses to cognitive warfare. The absence of systematic analyses of concrete cases constrains the ability to test theoretical propositions and assess the practical implications of competing conceptual frameworks. Greater integration of empirical evidence and comparative case studies would strengthen the analytical foundation of the field and support the development of well-informed policy recommendations. Furthermore, much of the current discourse is shaped predominantly by Western perspectives. As the field matures, incorporating insights from a broader range of geopolitical, cultural, and strategic contexts will be essential to ensure that scholarship captures the full diversity of global approaches to cognitive warfare. This analysis is further limited by the fragmented and inconsistent nature of the available sources. While reviewing over 300 entries allows for broad coverage, the lack of established definitions, theoretical frameworks, and agreed-upon terminology makes it difficult to synthesise findings in a meaningful way. Moreover, it required interpreting and translating the material into a shared vocabulary to construct a common framework for categorising the expression of the relevant elements as either minimalist or maximalist.
The absence of systematic analyses of concrete cases constrains the ability to test theoretical propositions and assess the practical implications of competing conceptual frameworks.
Future research should focus on three key areas. First, the relationship between cognitive warfare and technological change, particularly in cyberspace, has significantly expanded its scope, with emerging tools such as artificial intelligence poised to amplify its effects. Second, the legal status of cognitive warfare remains ambiguous, requiring further investigation into how international and national frameworks can address its distinctive features. Third, while intent is not essential for definition, it carries important ethical and legal implications, as it distinguishes deliberate actions from incidental effects. Advancing research in these areas would contribute to a more nuanced and operationally relevant understanding of cognitive warfare.
Elisabeth Dick is a PhD researcher at the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda, The Netherlands. She has a specific research interest in cognitive warfare and its accompanying legal consequences. Elisabeth holds a master’s degree in Law and Politics of International Security from the Free University, Amsterdam. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the Dutch Ministry of Defence.
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