Abstract: This paper examines how external security cooperation (SC) can reshape the political economies of fragile states. Often framed as a neutral transfer of training and equipment, SC is inherently political-economic, redistributing rents, reconfiguring authority, and altering elite bargains. The paper advances a four-mechanism framework—patronage, veto players, deterritorialisation of authority, and legitimacy—to explain how assistance can produce political dislocation, where formal capacity increases while social legitimacy erodes. Drawing on cases from South Vietnam, Afghanistan, and West Africa, it shows how technocratic reforms are absorbed into patron-client networks, empower spoilers, and weaken accountability. The paper concludes that durable outcomes depend less on aid volume than on aligning programs with political realities and prioritising legitimacy alongside capacity.
Problem statement: Why does security cooperation that increases formal capacity so often fail to produce legitimate, durable security institutions in fragile states?
So what?: Security cooperation must shift from technocratic capacity building to a political-economy aware design that prioritises legitimacy and accountability. This responsibility falls primarily on external donors and advisors, who must map elite bargains, identify veto players, and adapt assistance to local authority structures rather than assume institutional neutrality.
Introduction
Security institutions are political projects. They represent the policies, resources, and ideals of the governments they represent. Often, they receive training, equipment, advising, and institutional support from external actors, called ‘security assistance’ or ‘security cooperation’,[1] but the political nature of those security institutions ensures those resources are never neutral. Although often presented as such, security cooperation redistributes rents, reconfigures elite bargains, and reshapes networks of authority. As William Reno demonstrates in his study of weak African states, rulers routinely treat access to external resources as private political projects, using foreign patronage and rents to consolidate patronage networks while deliberately weakening bureaucratic institutions.[2] Technocratic framing obscures this deeper reality: assistance is absorbed into political-economic processes shaped by patronage, incentives, and legitimacy dynamics.[3]
Political economy, broadly defined, studies how power and resources interact to shape institutions and outcomes. Political economy in this sense emphasises that the distribution of resources and the exercise of power are inseparable, and that external assistance inevitably enters these dynamics rather than standing apart from them. Applied to security cooperation, this perspective highlights that external assistance enters preexisting systems of patronage, rent distribution, and elite survival strategies, elements that are common in fragile states. SC not only redistributes resources but also reconfigures networks of authority. By creating new ties between donors, advisors, and local elites while weakening traditional brokers, SC alters political equilibria. These network effects have profound implications for legitimacy: Even when technical capability and capacity rises, repression could be strengthened, and local trust could be undermined.[4]
Political economy, broadly defined, studies how power and resources interact to shape institutions and outcomes.
Theoretical Foundations
The intellectual roots of political economy trace back to classical thinkers who highlighted the inseparability of markets, power, and social order. Adam Smith emphasised the productive potential of markets but also warned of distortions from monopolies and rent-seeking elites.[5] Karl Marx viewed economic relations as fundamentally conflicted, with class struggle shaping both political authority and institutional development.[6] Karl Polanyi, writing in the mid-twentieth century, underscored the social dislocations produced when markets are disembedded from society, requiring political counter-movements to restore balance.[7] Together, these foundations establish that economic arrangements cannot be analysed apart from their political context. Consequently, regarding security cooperation partners’ security arrangements, which, by their very involvement with external partners, become security markets.
Modern institutionalist approaches refine these insights by focusing on the rules that structure incentives. Douglass North and colleagues argued that long-run development hinges on the emergence of inclusive institutions that constrain elite predation and provide broad access to opportunity.[8] Acemoglu and Robinson similarly contrast inclusive and extractive systems, showing how elite bargains and path dependency shape divergent political-economic trajectories.[9] Institutions such as the Foreign, Commonwealth, & Development Office (FCDO), the British development organisation, and the World Bank emphasise that external assistance must grapple with domestic incentive structures rather than assume technocratic neutrality.[10] Reform efforts that ignore these dynamics risk being blocked, captured, or distorted by entrenched actors. Applied to fragile states, these frameworks suggest that reforms succeed only when they align with existing bargains among ruling coalitions.
Institutions such as the Foreign, Commonwealth, & Development Office, the British development organisation, and the World Bank emphasise that external assistance must grapple with domestic incentive structures rather than assume technocratic neutrality.
Finally, political economy scholarship has increasingly recognised the role of networks. Granovetter’s insight into the “strength of weak ties” demonstrated how social connections influence opportunities and information flows, while Burt highlighted the power of “structural holes” and brokerage positions.[11] Social network analysis has since been applied in international relations and development to map the connections among elites, advisors, and local actors. This perspective underscores that political economy is not only about formal institutions or resource flows but also about the relational structures through which power operates. More recent work has extended these network insights to the analysis of insurgent and criminal organisations. Granovetter’s formulations of embeddedness remain central to network theory. Empirical extensions by Krippner revisit embeddedness in economic sociology’s theoretical paradigm.[12] More recently, Nowak and Raffaelli demonstrate the continued relevance of embeddedness in political-economic contexts, and social capital research builds on Granovetter’s insights into bonding and bridging networks.[13]
Security Cooperation as a Political-Economic Activity
Security assistance and security cooperation involves the transfer of resources, either funding, training, equipment, or institutional expertise, from an external actor to a partner state. Though often portrayed as a neutral, technical process of capacity building, security cooperation is inherently political-economic. Every infusion of resources creates winners and losers, redistributes authority, and reshapes patronage networks.[14] For local elites, security cooperation is rarely about abstract institutional development; it is about survival, legitimacy, and the consolidation of power.
A central dynamic that must be considered is the integration of security cooperation into existing patron-client relationships. In many fragile and conflict-affected states, security institutions are not Weberian bureaucracies but sites of rent extraction and political loyalty. Practices such as “ghost soldiers,” inflated procurement contracts, or nepotistic promotions illustrate how security cooperation resources can be captured and diverted for elite gain.[15] From this perspective, external assistance does not flow into a vacuum but becomes embedded in previously made political bargains that determine who control rents and who benefits from their distribution.
A central dynamic that must be considered is the integration of security cooperation into existing patron-client relationships.
At the same time, security cooperation reconfigures those relational networks. By creating new ties between advisors and favoured officers, or between donor agencies and particular ministries, assistance empowers some actors while marginalising others. Social network analysis suggests that these shifts alter “degree centrality” (who has the most connections) and “betweenness centrality” (who controls access to key relationships) in ways that can strengthen or destabilise coalitions.[16] This networked lens highlights that security assistance is not only about institutions but about relational power, that is, who it is that sits at the junctions of information, resources, and authority.
Disturbing these dynamics generates what can be called political dislocation: reforms that appear technocratic on the surface can destabilise existing bargains, i.e. existing political distributions. When assistance bypasses traditional brokers, it can fracture networks of authority, creating openings for insurgents or spoilers to mobilise grievances. In this sense, security assistance and security cooperation is deeply intertwined with conflict: it alters not only state capacity but also the social and political fabric that sustains security institutions.
Mechanisms of Political Economy in Security Assistance
Security assistance and security cooperation reshapes fragile states through recurrent mechanisms of political-economic dynamics that unfold in patterned ways. External resources like training, weapons, or advisory presence rarely flow neutrally through bureaucratic pipelines. Instead, they are absorbed into patron-client networks in which elites use assistance to consolidate loyalty, distribute rents, reward loyalty, secure political support, or enrich kinship groups.
Studies of African militaries show how donor training slots or equipment are often reallocated along kinship or factional lines, embedding external programs in neo-patrimonial bargains rather than professional hierarchies.[17] William Reno’s comparative analysis reinforces this point, demonstrating that armed groups linked to capital-based patronage networks tend to behave in predatory ways, while those emerging from marginalised networks are constrained by local communities to act more protectively.[18] This variation underscores how the social embedding of assistance determines whether it deepens predation or sustains reciprocity.
One can observe this same phenomenon far away from Africa. The U.S. engagement with South Vietnam in the 1950s demonstrates how technocratic reform can collide with entrenched patronage structures. The Michigan State University Group (MSUG), contracted by the U.S. government, sought to modernise administrative and security institutions by introducing training in police administration, intelligence handling, and public finance.[19] The program reflected the prevailing belief that American expertise could transplant bureaucratic efficiency into a fragile state. Yet the reforms displaced existing Vietnamese brokers who mediated power through personal ties and patron-client relations. President Ngo Dinh Diem relied on networks of family, Catholic supporters, and loyal officials to consolidate his regime.[20] MSUG’s effort to depoliticise the police by standardising recruitment, promoting merit-based careers, and introducing forensic techniques undermined these networks. Rather than producing a neutral security force, reforms were selectively adopted and reshaped to strengthen regime survival. As Gareth Porter argues, Diem co-opted U.S. assistance to expand coercive capacity against political rivals, while rejecting measures that threatened his patronage.[21] The result was political dislocation: technical reforms unintentionally destabilised elite bargains, reinforcing authoritarianism rather than building legitimacy. These dynamics also empower veto players who can obstruct or capture reforms. Ministers who control procurement channels, generals with monopolies over logistics, or intelligence chiefs with opaque budgets occupy strategic choke points. Research on informal institutions and authoritarian coalitions shows how such actors exploit gatekeeping positions to block initiatives that threaten rents or convert reforms into new sources of patronage.[22] Security assistance directed through these chokepoints can be captured, producing reforms that reinforce spoilers rather than marginalise them. Regime insiders convert their positions within patronage networks to seize control of capital entry and militias when state institutions collapse.
Security assistance directed through these chokepoints can be captured, producing reforms that reinforce spoilers rather than marginalise them.
Recent history in West Africa, in Nigeria and Mali, highlights another dimension: how security assistance, by empowering factions, can exacerbate neo-patrimonial politics and undermine civilian trust. In Nigeria, the U.S., and British programs to professionalise the military were layered onto an institution already embedded in patronage and ethnic balancing. Political leaders distributed command positions across ethnic lines, ensuring loyalty but perpetuating fragmentation.[23] External training and equipment often benefited select units, creating disparities within the force that mirrored broader elite rivalries.
In Mali, French and U.S. assistance expanded after 2001, focusing on counterterrorism and border security. Yet as Isaline Bergamaschi notes, reforms were filtered through neo-patrimonial logic in which ruling elites used external resources to consolidate their networks.[24] Security units that received training were sometimes redeployed for regime protection, whereas untrained units remained idle. The 2012 coup revealed how fragile these arrangements were: junior officers, excluded from patronage flows, revolted against both the regime and its external partners. Here, SC unintentionally deepened divisions within the military while doing little to build legitimacy with civilian populations, who perceived foreign-supported forces as predatory rather than protective.
The concept of inserting foreign advisors and embedded trainers further alters the territorial locus of authority. Decision-making often shifts into hybrid arenas in which international donors and technical experts become indispensable brokers. This deterritorialization of authority, observed in many contexts of transnational governance, displaces sovereignty and blurs accountability.[25] Reno’s discussion of Sierra Leone highlights how cross-border patronage ties—such as the Revolutionary United Front’s dependence on Charles Taylor in Liberia—severed connections to local communities and freed commanders from social reciprocity, enabling more predatory forms of violence.[26] Preferred units and commanders who have received extensive security assistance training and equipment can deflect local criticism and anger towards donor states, while continuing to act with impunity. Security cooperation risks producing similar dynamics when external advisors or foreign sponsors become the decisive patrons.
Afghanistan after 2001 represents a more extreme case of security assistance being absorbed into patronage and corruption. Billions of dollars in U.S. and NATO assistance flowed into the Afghan National Army and Police, ostensibly to build capable forces. Yet much of this aid became rents captured by elites. The phenomenon of “ghost soldiers”—personnel listed on payrolls but absent in reality—illustrates how commanders extracted resources by inflating numbers.[27] Procurement contracts were likewise riddled with kickbacks, while politically connected officers secured promotion through factional loyalty rather than competence.[28]
From a network perspective, these practices created what might be called “phantom nodes”, which are actors who existed on paper, sustained by flows of external resources, but who did not contribute to effective capacity. Such phantom nodes preserved the appearance of a functioning security sector, satisfying donor metrics, while hollowing out the actual force. The political economy of assistance in Afghanistan thus reinforced a rentier system: elites distributed aid as patronage to maintain fragile coalitions, while external actors often prioritised short-term stability over structural accountability.[29] The eventual collapse of Afghan forces in 2021 revealed how deeply assistance had been captured and how little legitimacy had been generated at the societal level.
All these effects affect security legitimacy, which depends on how reforms are socially perceived. When external assistance strengthens coercive tools without improving accountability, technical capacity may rise while public trust erodes. Conversely, when programmes broaden access, increase transparency, or align with local norms, they can build legitimacy. Studies of police-community relations and rebel governance highlight how legitimacy emerges from everyday interactions and social trust.[30] Reno’s contrast between Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front and the Kamajor militias illustrates this dynamic: while both drew on impoverished youth, the Kamajors were disciplined by chiefs and religious leaders embedded in local society, which anchored a measure of legitimacy. The RUF, by contrast, was tied to distant patrons, abandoned local constraints, and relied on coercion.[31] These mechanisms—patronage, veto players, deterritorialisation, and legitimacy—show how assistance interacts with existing bargains and social contexts. Reno’s contribution highlights that variation matters: programmes channelled into entrenched, capital-based networks empower predators, while those that recognise community-based structures can reinforce reciprocal accountability. Ignoring these dynamics invites political dislocation and empowers spoilers; recognising them provides a more realistic foundation for designing sustainable security cooperation.
When external assistance strengthens coercive tools without improving accountability, technical capacity may rise while public trust erodes.
Taken together, this shows that legitimacy erosion is not an accidental by-product of security cooperation but the cumulative outcome of interacting political-economic mechanisms. In South Vietnam, technocratic reform displaced local brokers and was absorbed into patronage networks, increasing coercive capacity while severing ties between security institutions and society. In Afghanistan, patronage capture combined with deterritorialised authority to produce phantom institutions accountable upward to donors rather than downward to citizens. In Mali and Nigeria, assistance empowered veto players and factional gatekeepers, fragmenting forces and reinforcing perceptions of predation. Across these contexts, patronage redirected resources toward elite survival, veto players blocked or reshaped reform, and deterritorialised authority blurred responsibility and accountability. The result was a consistent pattern of political dislocation: capacity appeared to rise on paper, but security institutions lost social credibility, reinforcing public mistrust and undermining legitimacy precisely where external actors sought stability.
Recognising legitimacy loss as the cumulative effect of a political economy framework reframes security cooperation as a political problem first, requiring policies that prioritise accountability, network awareness, and alignment with local bargains rather than further technocratic expansion.
Policy Implications
Across these cases, the pattern is clear and underscores the argument that security assistance and security cooperation cannot be understood apart from political economy.[32] If security cooperation is shaped less by technical design than by political economy, then policy must begin with a clearer recognition of the structures into which assistance is introduced. The first priority is to map the political economy of partner states. This requires identifying elite bargains, veto players, and informal institutions that govern the distribution of rents. Instead of assuming that security institutions function as bureaucratic hierarchies, donors should treat them as arenas where elites negotiate power. Mapping these bargains makes it possible to anticipate who will gain or lose from reforms, and where resistance or capture is likely to emerge.[33]
Second, policymakers should apply social network analysis (SNA) to security institutions. Rather than evaluating forces only by size or formal organisation, SNA can track the flow of promotions, procurement contracts, or training opportunities. These data illuminate where patronage hubs exist and who functions as brokers or spoilers within the system. Identifying such positions allows external actors to design programmes that do not unintentionally reinforce power monopolies. For instance, analysing the networks behind officer promotions can reveal whether assistance is broadening professional opportunity or deepening factionalism.
Third, security cooperation programmes must elevate legitimacy as an operational objective alongside capability. Training or equipping a unit is of little value if that unit is perceived as a predatory arm of regime control. Legitimacy can be built through measures such as transparent recruitment, accountability to civilian authorities, and meaningful engagement with local communities. By embedding legitimacy into programme objectives and evaluation metrics, donors can avoid the trap of strengthening capacity while eroding public trust.[34]
Security cooperation programmes must elevate legitimacy as an operational objective alongside capability.
Operationalising the political economy of security institutions also pays dividends for the irregular warfare community of practice. Irregular Warfare (IW) campaigns turn not only on kinetic capability but on the ability to understand and shape the social networks, elite bargains, and legitimacy structures that sustain conflict. While ambitious, embedding political economy analysis and network mapping into security cooperation creates a transferable analytic capacity—one that equips practitioners to anticipate how assistance will intersect with contested authority and to design measures that mitigate spoilers. In this sense, institutionalising political economy approaches within SC policy can bridge communities: it grounds day-to-day programme design in the same social understanding that underpins successful IW.
Finally, external actors must recognise the limits of influence. No matter how well-designed, assistance cannot fully override local incentives or re-engineer political bargains. The goal should be to mitigate risks of capture, not to impose ideal-typical institutions. Recognising these limits tempers expectations and encourages a focus on achievable reforms: improving transparency at the margins, strengthening nodes of accountability, and reducing opportunities for rent capture. Durable outcomes emerge not from technocratic transfer, but from aligning assistance with the political and networked realities of fragile states.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that security cooperation is not a neutral exercise in capacity building but an inherently political-economic and networked process. Every infusion of external resources reshapes incentives, redistributes rents, and reconfigures relationships among elites, advisors, and local actors. To treat SC as a purely technical transfer of training and equipment is to risk overlooking the political bargains and informal institutions that determine its trajectory.
Ignoring these dynamics produces familiar pathologies. Programmes detached from political realities suffer from technocratic drift, i.e. yield reforms that look coherent on paper but collapse in practice. Political dislocation emerges when reforms destabilise existing bargains, empowering spoilers rather than building legitimacy. In the worst cases, SC increases capacity for repression while eroding public trust, creating hollow institutions vulnerable to collapse.
Programmes detached from political realities suffer from technocratic drift, i.e. yield reforms that look coherent on paper but collapse in practice.
The broader takeaway is sobering: insurgents and spoilers thrive where SC fractures networks of trust. Recognising this fact does not eliminate risk, but it provides a more honest foundation for designing programs that seek sustainable security in fragile states. Security cooperation succeeds only when it builds not just capacity but legitimacy—and that requires treating it as a political economy, not as technical assistance.
[1] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-20: Security Cooperation (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), quoted in Taylor P. White, “Security Cooperation and the Art of Influence,” Joint Force Quarterly 72 (2014): 106–108, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72_106-108_White.pdf.
[2] William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
[3] Thomas Carothers and Diane de Gramont, Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 3–20, 21–54; see also Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 18–21.
[4] Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 1360–80; see also Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 18–20.
[5] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: Books I–III (London: Penguin Classics, 1982).
[6] Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), 280–83, 873–76.
[7] Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2nd Beacon Paperback ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 3.
[8] North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, chap. 1.4–1.5 (21–27) and chap. 2.2 (32–41).
[9] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 74–76, 102–10.
[10] Department for International Development (DFID), Political Economy Analysis: How to Note (London: DFID, July 2011), https://media.odi.org/documents/5866.pdf; and Carothers and de Gramont, Development Aid Confronts Politics, 125–56.
[11] Granovetter, “Strength of Weak Ties,” 1362; Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,” Sociological Theory 1 (1983): 201–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/202051; Burt, Structural Holes, 18–20, 30–34.
[12] Greta R. Krippner, “The Elusive Market: Embeddedness and the Paradigm of Economic Sociology,” Theory and Society 30, no. 6 (2001): 775–810, https://www.jstor.org/stable/658117.
[13] Vicky Nowak and Paola Raffaelli, “The Interconnected Influences of Institutional and Social Embeddedness on Processes of Social Innovation: A Polanyian Perspective,” Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 34, nos. 3–4 (2022): 319–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/08985626.2022.2049376; see also Michael Woolcock and Deepa Narayan, “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy,” World Bank Research Observer 15, no. 2 (2000): 225–49.
[14] Carothers and de Gramont, Development Aid Confronts Politics, 157–94.
[15] North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, chap. 2.4–2.6 (49–55).
[16] Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 253–84.
[17] Leonardo R. Arriola, “Patronage and Political Stability in Africa,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 10 (2009): 1,177–1,204; see also Mats Utas, ed., African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks (London: Zed Books, 2012), 7–9.
[18] William Reno, “Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups,” Civil Wars 9, no. 4 (December 2007): 324–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240701699409.
[19] Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 139–51; see also Robert Scigliano and Guy H. Fox, Technical Assistance in Vietnam: The Michigan State University Experience (New York: Praeger, 1965), 24–30.
[20] Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 172–217.
[21] Gareth Porter, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 69–107.
[22] Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds., Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 13–17; see also Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 145–96.
[23] Henrik Angerbrandt and Anders Themnér, “Above Politics? Ex-Military Leaders in Nigerian Electoral Politics,” Democratization 28, no. 4 (2021): 782–800.
[24] Isaline Bergamaschi, “The Fall of a Donor Darling: The Role of Aid in Mali’s Crisis,” Journal of Modern African Studies 52, no. 3 (2014): 347–78.
[25] Niagale Bagayoko, Eboe Hutchful, and Robin Luckham, “Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice and Legitimate Public Authority,” Conflict, Security & Development 16, no. 1 (2016): 1–32; see also Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann, Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 46–48.
[26] Reno, “Patronage Politics,” 330.
[27] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, April 30, 2016), 9, https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Quarterly-Reports/2016-04-30qr.pdf; see also Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Pentagon Asked to Explain Reports of Afghan ‘Ghost Soldiers’ on Payrolls,” October 7, 2016; and Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Afghanistan’s ‘Ghost Soldiers’: Thousands Enlisted to Fight Taliban Don’t Exist,” Guardian, May 17, 2016.
[28] Jonathan Goodhand and Aziz Hakimi, Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 37–43.
[29] Astri Suhrke, “Statebuilding in Afghanistan: A Contradictory Engagement,” Central Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (2013): 271–86.
[30] Justice Tankebe, “Viewing Things Differently: The Dimensions of Public Confidence in Policing,” Criminology 51, no. 1 (2013): 103–35; see also Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly, eds., Rebel Governance in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 74–75.
[31] Reno, “Patronage Politics,” 332.
[32] Carothers and de Gramont, Development Aid Confronts Politics, 255–60.
[33] North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 49–55, 148–52.
[34] Polanyi, Great Transformation.
