Source: shutterstock.com/Longfin Media
Source: shutterstock.com/Longfin Media
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Resilient Diplomacy Against The Populist Capture

Abstract: Prof. Kisilowski, in his article on Verfassungsblog, advocates for a militant public administration in Poland and other countries to defend against populist takeovers. Examples from Austria, Italy, and the U.S. demonstrate that resilient civil servants can effectively hinder populists’ efforts to reshape public administration. The global rise of populism threatens public institutions, including the civil service. Populists typically politicise and replace professionals with loyalists. Kisilowski suggests that a militant public administration, characterised by strong legal frameworks and ethical standards, can better counter authoritarian encroachments. These differences highlight the importance of militant diplomacy, as populists succeed where diplomacy is weak and fail where it is strong.

Problem statement: Amidst the global rise of populism, can militant diplomacy and resilient public institutions effectively counter the rise of populist takeovers?

So what?: Navigating contemporary shifting international relations demands skilled diplomats supported by the professional apparatus. Creating a diplomacy resilient to populist capture should be a top priority for any democratic government. This diplomacy should consist of professional and career people with strong ethical and organisational foundations to cope with populists’ takeover.

Source: shutterstock.com/Longfin Media

Source: shutterstock.com/Longfin Media

A Populist Takeover

Prof. Kisilowski, in his latest text in Verfassungsblog [Constitutional Blog], argued for the militant public administration in Poland (and elsewhere), which should be vigilant and could take more defensive actions against the populist takeover.[1] Evidence from other countries, provided by researchers such as Daniel W. Drezner and Cristian Lequesne, shows the more resilient the civil servants, the less populists could do to revolutionary change the public administration fit into their particular political needs. In Austria, Italy and the U.S., a specific institution of international relations within public administration – diplomacy – expressed resilience to the populists’ efforts to capture it.

As the world is facing populist ideologies and strategies (be it left or right-wing) to take power in democratic countries, public institutions also face the menace of takeover. From Prime Minister Modi to Prime Minister Orban, and even President Trump, populists have grown stronger and more confident in their actions against the established public institutions. Within these institutions are public administration and civil service, which are the first to be captured. The modus operandi of populists is quite similar – politicisation and replacement of the professionals for the loyalists. In Hungary and Poland amidst the first decisions of the new governments (Fidesz and PiS)[2], [3] were the acts of the civil service, which eliminated transparent contests for higher positions within the public administration and made possible the appointment (and an appeal) of the loyalist managers without justification. The changes in the requirements of qualifications quickly followed.

As the world is facing populist ideologies and strategies to take power in democratic countries, public institutions also face the menace of takeover.

A Democratically Militant Public Administration

Kisilowski argues that a democratically militant public administration would be better prepared to fend off authoritarian encroachment from elected politicians. By this term he means strong public servants, with a robust legal framework, ethical morals and code, actively responding to the erosion of institutions.[4] Following Sutor,[5] diplomacy could be understood as skilled, professional staff (foreign service) with an organisational apparatus (ministry and diplomatic missions abroad). In most states, the foreign service is located within the civil service; however, with greater prestige and responsibilities, diplomats represent states in the international area.

Christian Lequesne argues that populists are structurally in conflict with diplomatic institutions, which are elitist and function in a strictly professional manner. This is in contrast to populists, who paint themselves as the representatives of „pure people” and follow personal, centralised politics.[6] Thus, diplomacy, formed of elite professionals, is usually an ideal target for populists. This argumentation against the diplomats happened in Hungary,[7] Poland[8], [9] and the U.S.,[10] being the examples. However, the success of populist takeovers has varied, with their attempted capture of diplomacy and other institutions being weakened or even failing in some cases.

Daniel W. Dresner, in his research on the Department of State under President Trump, showed that the presidential administration only managed to weaken the Department of State by omitting the diplomats from the decision-making process thereby using budget cuts and politically motivated personnel moves that winnowed the senior ranks of the diplomatic corps.[11] Those from the latter tried to correct the actions of the President and expressed their willingness to resign.[12] Christian Lequesne, in the examples of Austria and Italy, showed moreover that populists (FPÖ and Lega & M5S) faced resistance to political ambassadorial nominations and trials to influence the diplomatic institutions (both legal and informal resistance). As a result, populist governments in those countries halted their efforts to politicise diplomacy.[13]

The examples of Austria and Italy showed, moreover, that populists faced resistance to political ambassadorial nominations and trials to influence diplomatic institutions.

On the other hand, swift changes in Hungary and Poland proved that diplomacy could be powerless against the populists. In both countries, the diplomats, whose allegiances and loyalty were questionable or were allegedly linked to the communist regime or Russia, were swiftly fired, replaced or moved to lesser positions.[14], [15], [16] Some career diplomats (at that time, actual or former) tried to protest, the Conference of Ambassadors in Poland being the example, however, without great results.[17] The leadership in both countries was highly politicised thereafter, with politicians such as Minister Szijjártó or Waszczykowski/Rau, with minor professionals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) leadership. Then, PiS adopted a law under which to be granted a diplomatic position, including that of the ambassador, one should not have a diplomatic career or qualifications, and the ambassadorial role would be strictly political. In Poland and Hungary, a replacement of career diplomats with people with political backgrounds was implemented.[18], [19], [20], [21], [22] Moreover, populist governments dislocated some of the MFA’s power to the Offices of the Prime Minister, EU affairs included.[23], [24] The public administration had no desire or willingness to stop it. Moreover, even though the law changes were directed at politicisation and centralisation of the decision-making process, the fired diplomats didn’t pay much attention to it.

In contrast to the other mentioned countries, the reason behind the disruptive changes in Hungary and Poland could lie in the lack of militant public administration—both legally and informally.

Defend and Inform

In Austria, Italy and U.S., the diplomacies, both the foreign service and MFAs, are institutions of an established, respected tradition and prestige that come from the legal framework, skills, education and responsibilities. They were eager to defend their position and to inform public opinion about the populists’ capture efforts. On the other hand, in both Hungary and Poland, diplomatic tradition was still on its way to being established, as both countries suffered under the communist regime for about 40 years. Many treated the capture as just another political affair.[25] Moreover, diplomacy could have been seen as a non-transparent elite, in the Polish case, with alleged post-communist ties, thus, a great target for populists. PiS and Fidesz used these connotations to point out the lack of transparency and service to the „people”. Easily targeted, with no public support and a lack of established formal and informal tradition, Hungarian and Polish diplomacy couldn’t defend itself in the face of an imminent populist takeover.

Navigating ever-shifting international relations nowadays, however, demands skilled diplomats supported by the professional apparatus.

Populists believe they can conduct foreign policy personally on their own, replacing career diplomats for their people and capturing the organisation. Navigating ever-shifting international relations nowadays, however, demands skilled diplomats supported by the professional apparatus. With the ultimately brutal aggression of Russia on Ukraine, struggling to uphold democratic values all around the globe is harder than ever before in the 21st century. Thus, creating diplomacy that is resilient to populist capture should be a top priority for any democratic government these days.

 


Jakub Drożdż, a lawyer by education, PhD student at the University of Warsaw, studies about Politics and Administration discipline, Graduate of many international courses, including the European Academy of Diplomacy. Manager with experience in business, NGOs and public administration (including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Professional in public administration, public affairs, public diplomacy and public relations. Main research interests: diplomacy, international relations, public administration. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.


[1] M. Kisilowski, “Militant Public Administration,” Verfassungsblog, Last accessed June 12, 2024,  https://verfassungsblog.de/militant-public-administration/.

[2] P. Müller and D. Gazsi, “Populist capture of foreign policy institutions: the Orbán government and the De‐Europeanization of Hungarian foreign policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 61(2), 397–415, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13377.

[3] D. Cadier, Populist politics of representation and foreign policy: evidence from Poland. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 703–721, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00257-2.

[4] M. Kisilowski, “Militant Public Administration,” Verfassungsblog, Last accessed June 12, 2024,  https://verfassungsblog.de/militant-public-administration/.

[5] J. Sutor, Prawo dyplomatyczne i konsularne. Wolters Kluwer, ISBN: 9788381601290.

[6] C. Lequesne, Populist governments and career diplomats in the EU: the challenge of political capture. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 779–795, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00261-6.

[7] P. Visnovitz and E. K. Jenne, Populist argumentation in foreign policy: the case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán, 2010–2020. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 683–702, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00256-3.

[8] D. Cadier, Populist representational Practices and Foreign Policy: An analysis of the case of Poland, In Springer eBooks (67–85), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41640-8_4.

[9] D. Cadier, Populist politics of representation and foreign policy: evidence from Poland. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 703–721, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00257-2.

[10] D. W. Drezner, Present at the destruction: the Trump administration and the foreign policy bureaucracy. The Journal of Politics, 81(2), 723–730, https://doi.org/10.1086/702230.

[11] Idem.

[12] Idem.

[13] C. Lequesne, Populist governments and career diplomats in the EU: the challenge of political capture. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 779–795, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00261-6.

[14] P. Müller and D. Gazsi, “Populist capture of foreign policy institutions: the Orbán government and the De‐Europeanization of Hungarian foreign policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 61(2), 397–415, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13377.

[15] C. Lequesne, Populist governments and career diplomats in the EU: the challenge of political capture. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 779–795, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00261-6.

[16] P. Visnovitz and E. K. Jenne, Populist argumentation in foreign policy: the case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán, 2010–2020. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 683–702, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00256-3.

[17] C. Lequesne, Populist governments and career diplomats in the EU: the challenge of political capture. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 779–795, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00261-6.

[18] P. Visnovitz and E. K. Jenne, Populist argumentation in foreign policy: the case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán, 2010–2020. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 683–702, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00256-3.

[19] D. Cadier, “Foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics by other means: pathways and patterns of populist politicisation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 20(1), https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad035.

[20] D. Cadier, Populist representational Practices and Foreign Policy: An analysis of the case of Poland, In Springer eBooks (67–85), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41640-8_4.

[21] D. Cadier, Populist politics of representation and foreign policy: evidence from Poland. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 703–721, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00257-2.

[22] P. Müller and D. Gazsi, “Populist capture of foreign policy institutions: the Orbán government and the De‐Europeanization of Hungarian foreign policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 61(2), 397–415, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13377.

[23] Idem.

[24] D. Cadier, Populist politics of representation and foreign policy: evidence from Poland. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 703–721, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00257-2.

[25] C. Lequesne, Populist governments and career diplomats in the EU: the challenge of political capture. Comparative European Politics, 19(6), 779–795, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00261-6.

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