Abstract: Emerging technologies increasingly accelerate intelligence and decision cycles, yet the officer as human-in-the-loop remains cognitively vulnerable within contested information environments. Artificial intelligence may both mitigate and amplify these vulnerabilities. This article conceptualises Cognitive Resilience as the systematic integration of cognitive control loops into military decision-making. It proposes a training framework—Countering Cognitive Warfare Training (CCW Training 2.0)—designed to operationalise this approach. Built around a fictional scenario, Operation Broken Signal (created by the authors), the framework models leadership under disrupted, distorted, and adversary-shaped information conditions typical of hybrid conflict.

Problem statement: How can military training institutions train officers to recognise and resist manipulation before it shapes their judgment?

So what?: Military forces must embed cognitive resilience into officers. Training authorities must revise their curricula to incorporate the fundamentals of cognitive warfare. Likewise, the decision-making process at all levels must be supplemented with “cognitive checkpoints” during the assessment phase. Finally, the ability to detect cognitive biases must be implemented in leadership and staff training.

Is the Stone-Aged Mind Fit for the Future?

“Cognitive Warfare is not the means by which we fight; it is the fight itself. The brain is both the target and the weapon.”Tanna Krewson, NATO Communicator’s Conference 2024[1]

Contemporary conflicts are waged on the physical battlespace and, crucially, with great frequency within the cognitive dimension—where perception, interpretation, and decision-making converge. Emerging technologies, especially artificial intelligence (AI), accelerate decision cycles and enhance situational awareness, yet simultaneously elevate the cognitive demands on military leaders.

In an increasingly algorithmically mediated information environment, the officer remains the indispensable human-in-the-loop (HITL). While emerging technologies accelerate data processing and decision support, responsibility for judgment, prioritisation, and leadership cannot be delegated to machines. Countering Cognitive Warfare (CCW), therefore, requires a deliberate recalibration of the human–machine relationship—one that preserves technological advantage while systematically strengthening human reflective capacity.

The Thread: Cognitive Warfare

“We see the world not as it is, but as we are.” Anaïs Nin[2]

In the contest for influence and interests, understanding cognitive processes is paramount. Decisions are not isolated acts; they arise from complex perceptual and cognitive mechanisms that shape individual worldviews, attitudes, and behaviours. For military leaders, the quality of these decisions directly impacts mission success, trust, and leadership effectiveness.

Cognitive Warfare is not inherently new, but modern technologies have vastly expanded its reach, speed, and depth. Advances in AI, algorithmic analysis, and behavioural sciences enable precise shaping of thought, exploitation of cognitive biases, and long-term influence on attitudes. Consequently, the battlespace is no longer solely geographic—it increasingly resides in human cognition.

Information has become a central instrument of power. Digital platforms and social media shape perception, emotions, and decision-making, with emotions amplifying impact. Much of human decision-making occurs unconsciously, rendering targeted narratives, half-truths, or disinformation highly effective.

Effects can be physical or virtual, but their ultimate impact is cognitive—modifying how decisions are made. As the NATO Warfare Centre observed in 2023: “Although most of the cognitive attacks remain below the threshold of armed conflict, the effects can be lethal and multidomain, affecting all five domains of warfare.”[3]

Effects dimensions can be physical or virtual, but their ultimate impact is cognitive.[4]

The decisive factor is not the objective truth of information, but its ability to penetrate individual perceptual barriers. Leaders who rely solely on fact-based decision-making risk underestimating their own cognitive vulnerability.

Countering Cognitive Warfare: “CCW-Training 2.0”

Countering Cognitive Warfare (CCW) requires more than mere awareness of the problem. It demands the systematic acquisition of methods and techniques that enhance Cognitive Resilience, which NATO defines as follows:

“Cognitive Resilience: The capacity to anticipate, prepare, withstand and recover quickly from cognitive attacks through the effective preparation of groups and individuals.”[5]

Similarly, NATO characterises Cognitive Warfare as:
 “the fight for Cognitive Superiority. Contesting in this environment comprises deliberate, synchronised military and non-military activities throughout the continuum of competition designed to gain, maintain, and protect cognitive advantage.”[6]

Here’s how NATO defines its pursuit of Cognitive Superiority in authoritative terms:

“Cognitive Superiority is the ability to excel in understanding and decision-making, enabling the ability to outthink and outmanoeuvre the adversary. It involves possessing faster, deeper, and broader understanding of the operating environment—including internal and external environments—and the ability to execute better, more effective decision-making than adversaries.”[7]

This emphasis on superior decision-making forms the core of this discussion. From the authors’ perspective, it is essential to equip future military leaders with tools that enable a holistic approach to cognitive threats. These definitions clarify what Cognitive Superiority and Cognitive Resilience entail at the conceptual level. The decisive question, however, is how these abstract requirements can be translated into officer education and everyday leadership practice.

Against this conceptual backdrop, CCW Training 2.0 translates Cognitive Resilience into a concrete, trainable leadership competency. Its goal is not to replace technological decision-support, but to embed critical judgment into concrete command procedures and leadership routines, while responsibility for assessment, decision, and leadership remains human.

The Countering Cognitive Warfare Course

The Countering Cognitive Warfare Course—referred to in this article as CCW Training 2.0—is a conceptual training framework proposed by the authors to operationalise Cognitive Resilience within officer education. It is not an existing institutionalised course but a structured model intended to inform future curriculum development.

The framework is designed as a modular programme that guides participants from awareness to operational leadership competence while embedding reflective judgment into standard command-and-staff procedures. It draws on international expertise, particularly from the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) working line “Countering Cognitive Warfare”, and translates these insights into a coherent professional military education architecture.

The programme is structured in five progressive phases:

1. Awareness Phase – introducing cognitive biases, emotional triggers, and dynamics of digital information environments.
2. Analytical Phase – examining cognitive attacks through structured case studies and operational contextualisation.
3. Procedural Integration Phase – embedding “Cognitive Checkpoints” into planning and decision-making processes.
4. Applied Phase – stress-testing reflective judgment under time pressure in command-and-staff simulations.
5. Transfer Phase – consolidating lessons learned into individual leadership practice.

A central element of the proposed framework is the introduction of “Cognitive Checkpoints”—structured reflection mechanisms embedded within command procedures. These checkpoints require officers to question assumptions, explore alternative interpretations, and identify biases such as peer pressure or herd mentality before decisions are finalised.

While theoretical understanding and analytical tools are necessary preconditions, Cognitive Resilience must ultimately be tested under conditions of uncertainty, time pressure, and adversarial influence activities. For this reason, CCW Training 2.0 places particular emphasis on scenario-based training as a core pedagogical instrument.

At the beginning of the training, the foundational topics—objectives of cognitive warfare, cognition, and cognitive biases—are taught separately and then analysed through guided examples from current and past conflicts. The work proceeds in two stages: first, recognising disinformation, fake news, and influence operations; second, developing countermeasures at different levels, with particular emphasis on proactive measures.

A curricular adjustment is required to implement Cognitive Warfare as a dedicated course within officer training. Following the foundational phase, trainees learn analytical methods through case studies and apply appropriate countermeasures. Consolidation and practical application occur during combat, tactical, and staff training, where these elements are integrated into the command process. Connections and effects at the strategic and military-strategic levels should also be illustrated through examples of interest enforcement and conflicts within the course Political Education.

By establishing this interconnected training and embedding cognitive checkpoints as a permanent element of the command process—comparable to the role of ethical and legal principles in operational command—a lasting effect can be achieved. The long-term impact is further supported by continued professional development and advanced training in this field.

Countering Cognitive Warfare: Core Teaching Content

A deeper understanding of Cognitive Warfare requires a fundamental knowledge of human cognition. The training approach follows a clear didactic logic and is structured around three core modules, which are explored cross-disciplinarily and integrated into existing courses.

1. Foundations and cross-disciplinary implementation of Cognitive Resilience

The cognitive foundations are first introduced in the training module “Cognitive Warfare: Awareness & Cognitive Resilience.” Key topics include:

• Human cognition and cognitive biases and their impact on military decision-making;
• Recognition and contextualisation of hybrid narratives; and
• Information ethics and responsible use of digital media.

Building on this foundation, the content is further developed across disciplines, particularly in leadership-relevant courses such as Battlespace Training Exercises, Tactics, and Leadership Behaviour. Practical examples are used to analyse cognitive attacks and their effects on command procedures and decision-making.

In political education, current conflicts and the pursuit of interests are examined in terms of information-based influence mechanisms. Under guided instruction, participants derive implications for operational leadership and develop proactive measures to strengthen Cognitive Resilience.

2. Strengthening digital competence & media literacy

A second module focuses on digital and media literacy, covering digital platforms, applications, and the use of AI and algorithms—including deepfakes, bot networks, and social engineering. The emphasis is placed on hands-on work with analysis and detection tools (e.g. Deepware, Botometer) to understand manipulation mechanisms, dissemination patterns, and methods for identifying fake news and disinformation. Training is supported by a research and analysis facility similar to established digital and information literacy labs in academic and applied settings (e.g. Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto[8] and the Web Literacy Lab at FH JOANNEUM[9]), which provides simulated attacks and structured disinformation analysis exercises.

3. Expanding leadership training: “Cognitive Checkpoints”

The Austrian Armed Forces’ standard decision-making process provides a structured framework effective even under time pressure. Assumptions are continuously reassessed and information validated through established intelligence loops. However, while these procedures verify data, they do not always explicitly address the cognitive dimension of interpretation—particularly in environments shaped by deliberate deception and narrative manipulation. In such contexts, structured cognitive self-verification becomes essential.

The guiding question “Cui bono?”—who benefits from the information at hand—is used not as an attribution tool but as a heuristic to stimulate reflection. In complex, incomplete information environments, perceived beneficiaries may profit coincidentally or as secondary actors. Applied uncritically, the logic risks becoming self-reinforcing and reinforcing confirmation bias.

To mitigate this risk, “cui bono” is embedded in a validation process that requires officers to:

• Identify multiple potential beneficiaries, including indirect actors.
• Distinguish between initiators and opportunistic beneficiaries.
• Consider non-intentional explanations.
• Seek disconfirming as well as confirming evidence.

Only when benefit alignment corresponds with additional indicators—such as capability, opportunity, pattern consistency, or corroborated intelligence—may it inform a provisional assessment.

These principles are operationalised through “Cognitive Checkpoints” integrated at key stages of the command procedure. They complement existing intelligence loops by focusing on assumptions, analytical framing, and decision logic. Typical guiding questions include:

• “Which assumptions underpin our assessment?”
• “What alternative interpretations are plausible?”
• “Could bias or emotional triggers influence our judgment?”
• “Who appears to benefit—and are there unintended beneficiaries?”

Instructors facilitate these reflection phases to ensure proportional application. Adapted for both individual command and staff settings, the checkpoints address cognitive risks including hierarchy effects, peer pressure, and herd mentality.

Decision-Making Training for Commanders and Staff

Methodologically, decision-making training initially takes place at the individual level. During the review phase, trainees and instructors jointly identify potential cognitive biases and develop appropriate countermeasures.

In staff environments, however, additional biases—such as peer pressure, herd mentality, or the recency effect—may emerge and significantly influence decisions.[10] To address this, a staff member with relevant expertise (e.g., from the communications domain, J10, or MilPR) should assume a monitoring role as a “cognitive checkpoint.” During the after-action review, instructors, together with this staff control function, identify possible biases that affected the decision-making process and analyse their impact.

Scenario Training

To operationalise Cognitive Resilience beyond the classroom, the Countering Cognitive Warfare Training employs scenario-based exercises–e.g. Exercise Broken Signal–that deliberately expose participants to manipulated and disrupted information environments.

To simulate the information environment, existing resources, such as social media monitoring teams, open-source intelligence (OSINT) capabilities, and simulated news and situational feeds, are used. These elements replicate a digital information space in which disinformation, half-truths, and conflicting reports are deliberately used to influence perception, situational awareness, and decision-making. Such methods are recognised in NATO, the EU, and national doctrines as core components of hybrid threats.

Synthetic information environments, as used in modern wargaming and Command Post Exercises, can further enhance simulation. Platforms like Conducttr[11] allow structured delivery of social media content, news, and disinformation narratives, realistically representing the dynamics of information-based influence operations.

Similarly, tools like InfoRange®[12] simulate complex, rapidly evolving digital information landscapes—including social media, online news, blogs, and OSINT sources—highlighting information overload and conflicting messages. Comparable systems are widely used in security and military training to prepare for cyber- and information-related threats.

This logic underpins the scenario design, which develops Cognitive Resilience under time pressure through repeated practice in recognising, assessing, and managing the influence of information. Attention is deliberately shifted away from technical analysis of individual sources toward leadership decision-making under incomplete or manipulated information.

The exercise integrates a multinational command module and simulates a hybrid threat scenario with military, political, and digital components. Differences in national information cultures, reporting channels, and evaluation standards are deliberately included as additional stressors.

The exercise unfolds in four sequential phases:

1. Situation briefing (30–45 min):
    Mission assignment and operational overview (e.g. humanitarian evacuation in a fragile environment) are supplemented by simulated social media streams, news reports, and initial OSINT products to establish a complex information environment.
2. Information disruption (45–60 min):
    Deliberate information overload via viral content, fake social media posts from supposed decision-makers, manipulated maps, and conflicting open-source reports. Accurate information is intentionally mixed with half-truths and disinformation, reflecting typical hybrid influence operations.
3. Decision pressure (30 min):
    Decision-making under high time pressure in a dynamic, unclear information environment. Leaders must prioritise, question assumptions, and remain operationally effective. Time constraints limit analytical depth in favour of decision-relevant heuristics.
4. Debriefing (60–90 min):
    Structured review of decision processes with a focus on cognitive biases (e.g. authority bias, confirmation bias, availability heuristic). Alternatives are discussed, and measures to detect and mitigate information-driven errors are developed.

AR/VR elements, a simulated newsroom, or live-prepared information feeds can further enhance realism, reflecting the dynamics and density of the information space while centring on leadership decision-making.

Overall, Operation Broken Signal trains leaders to remain decision-capable in hybrid operational and crisis environments amid deliberate information influence.

Case Studies for Scenario Training and Exercises

Building on scenario-based training, practical case studies add an analytical and reflective dimension. This approach develops comprehensive conflict-resolution competence by situating military action within broader societal, political, and informational contexts. The following cases show that Cognitive Warfare already shapes decision-making at all command levels through perception, judgment, and trust rather than physical force.

As a training tool, they reveal cognitive vulnerabilities and biases, inform scenario design, and reinforce the structured application of “Cognitive Checkpoints” under manipulation pressure. Case studies also serve as templates for custom exercises that can be tailored to explore specific biases or to progress from simple to complex scenarios.

Scenario Analysis Tool

An analytical tool is required to identify influencing factors within available information. Initially, situation assessment is applied, evaluating relevant parameters regarding:

• Force: enemy, friendly, and other actors;
• Space: potential to generate effects and conduct actions;
• Time: duration required for courses of action and time available for opposing countermeasures.

This is referred to as Force–Space–Time Analysis (FST Analysis): who can generate which effects, where, and within what timeframe.

FST Analysis is conducted in three steps:

1. Representation: depict the situation and force dispositions;
2. Assessment: evaluate possible courses of action to achieve specific effects;
3. Conclusions: determine necessary countermeasures in temporal and spatial terms to prevent or mitigate effects.

The development of courses of action and decision-making depends on the quality and quantity of available data. Historically described as Clausewitz’s “fog of war”, decisions were made with insufficient or delayed information. Modern operational environments are not fully transparent either. Despite advanced technology, assumptions of complete information and the detection of all movements are misleading.

Adversaries may deliberately induce information overload, causing relevant data to be lost in a flood of inputs—akin to searching for a needle in a haystack. Available information must therefore be carefully examined for deceptive meaning; decisions may be steered toward outcomes desired by the adversary. These cognitive checkpoints serve as control loops within the decision-making process, requiring assessment at a meta-level: cui bono?—who benefits from a given decision or action?

Three dimensions of the information environment are relevant, within which effects can be generated:

• Physical dimension: positioning forces, kinetic effects;
• Virtual dimension: cyber operations, cyberattacks;
• Cognitive dimension: influencing thinking or decisions via disinformation or propaganda.

All effects ultimately influence the cognitive dimension, as they are perceived and processed as information—the central element of operations.

The interaction between FST Analysis and Physical–Virtual–Cognitive (PVC) Dimension Analysis, centred on information.

Scenario Analysis Tool: Force-Space-Time Analysis & physical-virtual-cognitive Dimensions Analysis (FST&PVC Analysis); Source: Authors.

Application Examples

1. Cognitive deception at operational and military-strategic levels.
2. Effects originating at individual and tactical levels, potentially escalating to strategic impact.

Example 1: Kharkiv Counter-Offensive (2022)

Situational Brief

The first major Ukrainian counter-offensive, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, took place in autumn 2022. Ukraine repeatedly made it known, through media channels, that there would be a counter-offensive to recapture the Kherson region.[13] In response, Russia redeployed significant forces from other sectors, including Kharkiv, to the south to prepare for the anticipated attack.[14]

On August 29, 2022, Ukraine’s Southern Command officially declared the start of the Kherson offensive.[15]  Initially, only limited gains were observed, but ultimately, Ukrainian forces recaptured the city, forcing Russian troops to withdraw across the Dnipro River.[16]

According to Taras Berezovets, a former national security adviser, the Kherson offensive was, in fact, “a major special deception operation.”[17] The public announcements were designed to conceal preparations for an attack involving at least six brigades in Kharkiv.[18] With forces redeployed south, the Kharkiv sector was left undermanned and without reserves. Within three days, Ukrainian forces recaptured approximately 6,000 km², while Russian troops retreated in disarray, abandoning significant amounts of equipment.[19]

Operational Details

Ukraine coordinated secure communication channels and carefully timed media messaging to mislead Russian decision-makers. Known informants in the Kharkiv region were identified and neutralised to preserve operational secrecy.[20]  Troop movements followed a Force–Space–Time (FST) framework, integrating both actual manoeuvres and perceived actions. Internal briefings and operational simulations further ensured cohesion among units while minimising the risk of information leakage.

Assessment

The broad public announcement of an offensive against Kherson, combined with strict secrecy in Kharkiv, prompted Russia to shift forces south, weakening the northern sector.[21] Kherson was a credible operational hub, reinforcing Russia’s expectation of a southern attack.[22]

Training Relevance

This scenario is used to train decision-makers to recognise cognitive traps and deception strategies. Exercises connect Physical–Virtual–Cognitive (PVC) analysis with practical decisions on troop deployment and resource allocation. Participants are required to apply cognitive checkpoints to assess narrative coherence, plausibility, and the potential for deception.

The operation produced both military and cognitive effects, as Russian misjudgments temporarily weakened perceptions of the General Staff’s competence and of Vladimir Putin’s leadership.[23]

Conclusions

There is strong indicative evidence that Ukrainian communication regarding the Kherson offensive contributed to misleading Russian forces. However, it cannot be definitively proven that this was a fully centralised and coordinated deception operation.[24] Key analytical questions remain: why an adversary would publicly announce an offensive, what advantages might arise from reinforcing the targeted sector, whether such actions could create vulnerabilities elsewhere, how multi-domain reconnaissance can reveal true intentions, and how forces should be positioned to respond effectively to potential deception.

Practical Applicability

In training environments, this case is presented as a simulation using staggered open-source inputs that create a plausible yet incomplete operational picture. Participants are required to make decisions under uncertainty while confronting contradictions and fragmented information. Debriefings focus on the consequences of assumptions, cognitive biases, and insufficient verification processes.

PVC analysis illustrates how media narratives in the virtual dimension influenced cognitive processes in Russian decision-making, while perceived Ukrainian activities in the physical domain shaped the redeployment of forces.

Recommendations

Media channels can be effectively leveraged to enhance the credibility of deception, but they must be complemented by independent verification mechanisms and contingency planning. Cognitive checkpoints should be integrated at all levels of decision-making, including plausibility assessments, consideration of alternative interpretations, and identification of hidden intentions. Training scenarios should emphasise long-term learning transfer through repetition, cross-case comparison, and benchmarking against international standards.

Curricular Integration and Training Design

The scenario is closely linked to modules on information operations, leadership under uncertainty, and strategic resource management. Participant performance can be evaluated using pre- and post-assessments that measure the ability to detect cognitive deception. Instructors receive targeted preparation in bias recognition, debriefing methods, and scenario facilitation.

Training design incorporates staggered open-source inputs that form a coherent but incomplete picture, with deliberately embedded contradictions to encourage critical analysis. Practical exercises include planning deception operations, anticipating adversary reactions, and applying FST and PVC frameworks. Debriefings systematically address cognitive biases, sources of error, and narrative misinterpretations.

Learning Objectives

The primary objectives are to enable participants to distinguish correlation from causation, recognise narrative coherence traps, and apply cognitive checkpoints under conditions of uncertainty. The training also aims to strengthen decision-making in multi-domain environments and to ensure sustainable learning outcomes through integration across multiple modules and simulation exercises.

Example 2: Influence of Social Media

Situational Brief

Both Russia and Ukraine utilise social media and mobile phones as instruments of influence. For example, the Ukrainian military intelligence service, HUR (Holovne Upravlinnja Rozvidky), intercepts mobile communications of Russian soldiers and uses the information operationally. Reports about poor leadership, supply shortages, or internal problems are exploited for propaganda purposes and sometimes communicated to soldiers’ home communities.[25] “In particular, fragments are used in which Russian soldiers express discontent, disappointment with their leadership, or confessions of (war) crimes.”[26]

This detailed intelligence is also used to target Russian soldiers directly through personalised mobile messages, encouraging safe surrender (e.g., the project “I Want to Live”).[27] “By replacing traditional PSYOP methods with mobile technology and social media, Ukraine can now reach enemy soldiers through the smartphones in their hands, aiming to stoke fear, spread confusion, and encourage surrender. (…) These operations can be directed at enemy forces, civilian populations, or other approved audiences to weaken an enemy’s will, strengthen support from allies, and gain cooperation from undecided groups.”[28] The success of the project ‘I Want to Live’ is evident from over 300 Russian surrenders and more than 26,000 individual applications of Russian accounts as of June 2024.[29]

Mobile phones are additionally used to spread panic by disseminating messages about imminent attacks, urging civilians or soldiers to flee, as observed in the Kharkiv region or Crimea (by Russian forces).[30], [31] Russia also distributes AI-generated videos across social media platforms, presenting various narratives—for instance, videos allegedly showing Ukrainian soldiers fleeing and complaining about leadership and operational deficiencies (e.g., on TikTok).[32] According to the U.S. broadcaster NBC News, at least 21 circulating clips are deepfakes that were generated or manipulated using the AI video generator Sora 2 by OpenAI, depicting Ukrainian soldiers crying, surrendering, or making alleged confessions.[33] This is not only about falsified videos, but also about manipulated quotes and fabricated scandals. This content spreads particularly quickly because it is emotionally charged.[34]

Another example shows interviews with civilians calling for a rapid end to the war.[35] The AI-generated videos share a similar visual style and imitate the format of street interviews with supposedly “ordinary Ukrainians.”[36] The characters in the videos voice nearly identical views: they claim to want the war to end at any cost, while alleging that the Ukrainian authorities are opposed to this.[37] The goal of the campaign is to demoralise Ukrainian society and shift responsibility for the continuation of the war onto the Ukrainian authorities.[38]

Operational Details

Messages and videos are deliberately designed to exploit emotional triggers and cognitive biases, thereby increasing their persuasive effect on targeted audiences. The timing, distribution channels, and target groups are carefully coordinated to maximise psychological impact. At the same time, both sides continuously monitor social media sentiment and adapt their messaging in near-real time to influence morale and shape decision-making processes.

Assessment

Such content directly affects the thinking and decision-making of social media users and recipients of targeted messages. Through disinformation, and particularly emotional narratives, long-term influence is exerted on how individuals evaluate information and make decisions. As often stated in the context of Cognitive Warfare: “Traditional propaganda changed what you believe; Cognitive Warfare changes how you decide what to believe.”[39]

These methods deliberately exploit cognitive biases, foster distrust, and intensify societal polarisation. In the Russia–Ukraine conflict, both sides aim to undermine the opponent’s will to fight and confidence in military and political leadership.[40]

This case examines the deliberate use of emotionally charged social media content—such as videos showing exhausted or distressed soldiers—to influence morale, resilience, and trust in leadership. This highlights the emotional dimension of Cognitive Warfare, which is often underestimated but significantly impacts perception and decision-making.

Training Relevance

FST analysis alone is insufficient because effects are often intangible or delayed. A holistic assessment of the information environment is necessary to understand which instruments produce specific effects and how to counter them both reactively and proactively. Participants learn to analyse content for emotional cues, intended behavioural responses, and exploitation of cognitive biases.

Conclusions

The Physical–Virtual–Cognitive (PVC) analysis, particularly the cognitive dimension, identifies how targeted, partially personalised, AI-generated content affects individual thinking and decision-making. Military officers occupy a sensitive “sandwich position”: they are leaders and subordinates, while simultaneously being members of society with families and social networks. They must recognise that uncritical consumption and dissemination of social media content—including disinformation—can directly influence the decision-making of their immediate environment.

This dynamic fosters polarisation, echo chambers, and information bubbles, which can undermine unit cohesion and jeopardise effective operational leadership at all command levels.

Practical Applicability

Trust-building measures should be established during peacetime in order to strengthen cohesion and resilience within operational structures.[41], [42] Institutions must be prepared to identify and expose disinformation, clearly communicating both actors and intentions through reliable fact-checking mechanisms. In training contexts, participants learn to connect social media analysis with operational decision-making and leadership responsibilities, thereby enhancing their ability to respond effectively to information-based threats.

Recommendations

To counter subtle forms of influence at the individual level, threats must first be made visible and understandable. Training should therefore include the systematic analysis of example videos and messages, focusing on their emotional impact and the behavioural responses they are designed to trigger. Particular attention must be paid to cognitive biases deliberately exploited in such content.

Training Relevance

Although proactive content creation, such as developing positive emotional narratives, is generally not a primary responsibility at lower command levels, potential response options should still be addressed in training to build awareness. Training programmes should further emphasise trust-building leadership practices and the responsible use of smartphones, social media, and other media. This includes strengthening media literacy both on and off duty, and in peacetime and operational contexts.

Central Topics

Key areas of focus include assessing the credibility of information, preventing the disclosure of sensitive military or personal data, and recognising and countering disinformation and propaganda.

Training Design

Participants are presented with staggered social media feeds and simulated mobile communications, which require them to assess narrative coherence, identify emotional triggers, and evaluate intended effects. Exercises are designed to simulate both reactive and proactive decision-making in the presence of potentially manipulative content. Debriefings concentrate on identifying cognitive biases, assessing source credibility, and developing measures to strengthen trust and unit cohesion. Overall, the training adopts a holistic approach by linking social media influence to leadership, operational decision-making, and resilience-building.

Learning Objectives

The training aims to enable participants to recognise emotional manipulation and cognitive biases in social media content, and to evaluate the credibility and reliability of information. It further seeks to deepen understanding of how disinformation affects decision-making at both individual and unit levels. Participants are expected to apply trust-building measures and media literacy skills within operational environments, while ensuring long-term knowledge transfer through integration across multiple modules and exercises.

Partnerships and International Best Practices

Cognitive Warfare represents a shared challenge for the Western values community and demands coordinated, collective responses. International cooperation is essential to counter societal polarisation, strengthen cohesion and solidarity, and safeguard long-term resilience and the will to fight.

A survey conducted among nations participating in the Countering Cognitive Warfare (CCW) project indicates that Cognitive Warfare currently receives minimal attention in leadership training, if addressed at all. Existing exercises primarily focus on subject-matter experts, and insights relevant to decision-makers are not systematically integrated into leadership education.

To raise awareness and develop sustainable, proactive countermeasures, international cooperation must be strengthened. Initiatives such as joint programmes, student exchanges, and instructor-exchange programmes are essential. Developing effective training scenarios requires interdisciplinary expertise, including linguists, psychologists, media and marketing specialists, communication experts, social and cultural advisors, and political scientists. Such collaboration enables comprehensive threat analysis and the design of effective countermeasures. These efforts not only support realistic scenario development but also foster innovation and creativity. Results can be applied in practice, for example, in crafting narratives for strategic communication.

Against this backdrop, 20 nations, together with NATO/ACT and the EU/EDA, have joined forces under the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) to advance the Countering Cognitive Warfare (CCW) initiative. Under the joint leadership of Austria and Poland, proactive, cross-border approaches are being developed to consolidate best national practices and integrate them into a coordinated capability development process.

By the end of 2026, a CCW Guide, developed during a multinational project by more than 20 nations and NATO/ACT and EU/EDA, co-led by AUT and POL, is scheduled for publication, providing a practical, action-oriented framework for designing and implementing strategic communication. Insights gained will directly benefit Austrian capability development and can be systematically embedded in military training, particularly in officer education. In strategic communication, close collaboration exists with the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom CoE) in Riga, aligned with Austria’s NATO Partnership Goals for capability enhancement.

A core instrument in capability development is wargaming—employed at all levels. Platforms such as the US Marine Corps Operational Wargaming System (OWS) and the Littoral Commander Wargame enable the analysis of complex multi-domain scenarios. Matrix Games are particularly effective in illustrating interdependencies across political, military, social, and economic dimensions, allowing participants to make decisions from the perspective of key stakeholders.

The German Bundeswehr similarly integrates Cognitive Warfare into its training, including computer-assisted Command Post Exercises (CPX) and multinational wargames such as HYDRA (Blue vs. Red Team operations in a hybrid scenario protecting military infrastructure) and COHESION (interagency strategic communication exercises in a hybrid information environment). Furthermore, exchange programmes, guest lectures, and joint research projects on cognitive influence and resilience strategies contribute to the sustainable enhancement of national capabilities. Systematic integration of these international partnerships into officer training is strongly recommended.

Train the Trainer

Cognitive Warfare remains a relatively new topic for most instructors and is rarely implemented in training, so the introduction will need to be gradual. Foundational knowledge must be established first: the objectives of Cognitive Warfare, the mechanisms influencing thinking and decision-making, and the practical application of cognitive biases. Examples should link the strategic level to the individual, including reciprocal effects.

Methodology should proceed step by step, allowing sufficient depth in analytical stages (representation → assessment → conclusions), mirroring later application in training. Cognitive overload must be avoided. Only after detailed analysis of real-world cases should participants develop and apply their own examples in complex exercises. Instructors must learn to identify instruments and methods of Cognitive Warfare—information operations, psychological operations, disinformation, and propaganda—and analyse their impact on the operational situation and potential countermeasures. For integrated case studies in complex exercises, red–blue teaming interactions should foster creativity and innovation. Individual cognitive biases must be identified, and mitigation strategies discussed.

Practical application and consolidation occur under expert supervision. Instructors first provide structured feedback to trainees on their analyses and decisions. Subsequent supervision focuses on the instructor’s own methodological and instructional performance.

Quality assurance requires regular supervision and opportunities to exchange experience with civilian and military institutions to further develop instructor expertise.

Conclusion

By combining critical thinking, digital literacy, and simulation-based training, the Austrian Armed Forces can prepare officers for both current and emerging forms of warfare, ensuring that decisions remain reflective and resilient amid attempts at manipulation. Training 2.0 does not aim to accelerate decision-making but to ensure decisions withstand qualitative scrutiny. Ignoring the cognitive dimension risks strategic obsolescence, even in technologically advanced contexts. Officers who are influenced by disinformation and adversary propaganda, and who face declining societal and unit morale without effective countermeasures, are strategically compromised before conflict even begins. This challenge must be addressed through systematic, cross-disciplinary implementation of Countering Cognitive Warfare in officer education.

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[1] NATO, Cognitive Warfare Concept, Version 1.3 (BiSC staffed), June 18, 2025.

[2] New York Times, “Daily Crossword Puzzle,” August 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/crosswords/daily-puzzle-2017-08-05.html.

[3] NATO, Cognitive Warfare Concept, Version 1.3 (BiSC staffed), June 18, 2025.

[4] NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01), ed. F, Version 1 (December 2022), 107.

[5] NATO, Cognitive Warfare Concept, Version 1.3 (BiSC staffed), July 2024, draft (unpublished).

[6] NATO, Cognitive Warfare Concept, Version 1.3 (BiSC staffed), June 18, 2025.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, “The Citizen Lab,” accessed January 17, 2026, https://citizenlab.ca/.

[9] FH Joanneum, “Web Literacy Lab,” accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.fh-joanneum.at/labor/web-literacy-lab/.

[10] Krinken Rohleder, Cognitive Attack Surface: The Mind’s Vulnerabilities and How to Build Resilience against Manipulation, Exploitation, and Delusion (Poland: Amazon Fulfillment, 2025), 50–52.

[11] Conducttr®, “Defence & Security Organisations,” accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.conducttr.com/defence-security.

[12] PREVENCY®, InfoRange®, “Militär und Sicherheitsbehörden,” accessed January 17, 2026, https://prevency.com/militaer-und-sicherheitsbehoerden/.

[13] Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, and Joe Littell, “The Kherson Ruse: Ukraine and the Art of Military Deception,” Modern War Institute, December 10, 2022, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-kherson-ruse-ukraine-and-the-art-of-military-deception/ (accessed March 15, 2026).

[14] Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman, “Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition,” Taylor & Francis Online, March 28, 2023, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2023.2193092 (accessed March 15, 2026).

[15] Isobel Koshiw, Lorenzo Tondo, and Artem Mazhulin, “Ukraine’s Southern Offensive ‘Was Designed to Trick Russia’,” The Guardian, September 10, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/10/ukraines-publicised-southern-offensive-was-disinformation-campaign (accessed March 15, 2026).

[16] Euronews, “Ukraine War: Kyiv Claims Breakthrough in Major New Kherson Offensive,” August 29, 2022, https://www.euronews.com/2022/08/29/ukraine-launches-counter-offensive-to-retake-kherson-say-authorities (accessed March 15, 2026).

[17] Koshiw, Tondo, and Mazhulin, “Ukraine’s Southern Offensive.”

[18] Gady and Kofman, “Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition.”

[19] Ibid.

[20] Koshiw, Tondo, and Mazhulin, “Ukraine’s Southern Offensive.”

[21] Kateryna Stepanenko et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2022,” Institute for the Study of War, September 12, 2022, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_88/ (accessed March 15, 2026).

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Koshiw, Tondo, and Mazhulin, “Ukraine’s Southern Offensive,” accessed May 4, 2026.

[25] Peter Schrijver, “Ukraine’s Fight on the Front Lines of the Information Environment,” Modern War Institute, December 9, 2023, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/ukraines-fight-on-the-front-lines-of-the-information-environment/ (accessed March 15, 2026).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Peter Schrijver, “‘I Want to Live’: Psychological Warfare for the Modern Era,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, November 3, 2024, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/i-want-to-live-psychological-warfare-for-the-modern-era/ (accessed March 15, 2026).

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Schrijver, “Ukraine’s Fight on the Front Lines.”

[31] Max Hunder, “Russia vs Ukraine: The Biggest War of the Fake News Era,” Reuters, August 1, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-vs-ukraine-biggest-war-fake-news-era-2024-07-31/ (accessed March 15, 2026).

[32] Anna von Stefenelli, “KI-Kampagne im Ukraine-Krieg: Russland flutet Social Media mit Fake-Videos von Soldaten,” Watson, December 14, 2025, https://politik.watson.de/politik/ukraine/937558202-russland-flutet-social-media-mit-ki-fake-videos-von-ukrainischen-soldaten (accessed March 19, 2026).

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ukrinform, “Russia Spreading New Series of AI Videos Imitating ‘Street Interviews with Ukrainians’,” February 12, 2026, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/4090439-russia-spreading-new-series-of-ai-videos-imitating-street-interviews-with-ukrainians-ccd.html (accessed March 15, 2026).

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Jennifer Ewbank, “Shadow: From Propaganda to Perception Architecture,” February 17, 2026, https://jennifer-ewbank.com/shadow-%26-signal%E2%84%A2/f/shadow-from-propaganda-to-perception-architecture (accessed March 15, 2026).

[40] Max de Baey-Ernsten, Doreen Denstädt, and Daniel Hajok, “Kriegsberichterstattung auf TikTok,” Mediendiskurs, May 10, 2022, https://mediendiskurs.online/beitrag/kriegsberichterstattung-auf-tiktok-beitrag-772/ (accessed January 17, 2026).

[41] Schrijver, “Ukraine’s Fight on the Front Lines.”

[42] Hunder, “Russia vs Ukraine.”