Abstract: As Europe confronts the return of high-intensity warfare and prolonged industrial attrition, longstanding assumptions about defence readiness are being reconsidered. This report examines Türkiye’s evolving role within the European security landscape, arguing that Ankara has emerged as a significant yet inherently limited contributor to addressing Europe’s structural shortfalls in manpower, munitions, and operational adaptability. Türkiye’s expanding defence-industrial base and operational experience, particularly in ammunition production and drone-enabled warfare, offer tangible short-term advantages, especially where European systems have struggled to scale output or adapt quickly to changing battlefield conditions. Yet framing Türkiye as a comprehensive “Strategic Shield” risks overstating both its capacity and its systemic impact. Its contribution remains shaped by a combination of structural factors, including reliance on external supply chains for advanced components, incomplete interoperability within NATO and EU frameworks, and persistent political frictions with key European partners. Taken together, these constraints suggest that Türkiye’s role is best understood not as a systemic solution, but as a situational stabilising force, one capable of alleviating specific pressures without fundamentally transforming the European defence architecture.

Problem statement: How can the transatlantic alliance reconcile Türkiye’s drive for “strategic autonomy” with the operational realities of European demographic contraction and industrial ammunition scarcity?

So what?: For global policymakers, this shift signals a transition from “U.S.-guaranteed stability” to a “localised multipolar risk management” where Türkiye’s industrial scale acts as a valuable insurance policy against severe degradation in Europe’s defence readiness.

The Paradox of Human Capital and Strategic Operational Depth

For three decades, European defence planners operated under the post-Cold War illusion of a “peace dividend,” leading to downsized standing militaries and a shift toward niche, expeditionary capabilities. However, the return of large-scale attrition warfare in Eurasia has re-established a brutal geopolitical constant: regardless of technological sophistication, the strategic necessity for mass and “boots on the ground” remains critical to deterrence. Türkiye maintains NATO’s second-largest standing military, with approximately 425,000 active personnel, rising to 700,000 when Gendarmerie forces are included.

This figure significantly exceeds the combined military manpower of several major European powers, providing a vital depth for alliance-wide deterrence.[1], [2] Like many European militaries, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) accumulated operational experience primarily through stabilisation operations, hybrid conflict environments, and counter-insurgency campaigns rather than large-scale conventional warfare. Turkish operations in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus demonstrated a comparatively rapid integration of unmanned systems, tactical adaptation, and battlefield flexibility.

At the same time, these experiences are not universally transferable to all conflict scenarios. Differences in doctrine, interoperability standards, and command structures continue to limit the extent to which Turkish operational practices can be integrated into broader NATO frameworks. Nevertheless, these operational experiences have increased Türkiye’s relevance within ongoing alliance discussions regarding hybrid warfare adaptation and tactical innovation.

The Ammunition Constraint: Contribution Without Resolution

Europe’s ammunition shortages highlight the limits of its current industrial base. Consumption rates in high-intensity warfare have outpaced production capacity, exposing systemic constraints.[3] Türkiye has responded by expanding its production of 155mm artillery ammunition, helping to alleviate short-term pressures.[4] Yet this contribution remains supplementary relative to overall demand. Export data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicates significant growth in Türkiye’s defence sector.[5] However, such expansion does not automatically translate into sustained wartime production, particularly given continued reliance on externally sourced components. This suggests a more modest role: Türkiye acts as a buffer within a constrained system, rather than a solution to its underlying limitations.

Technological Trajectories: Speed vs Integration

Türkiye’s defence innovation model prioritises rapid development cycles and operational deployment, particularly in unmanned systems. This has enabled relatively quick adaptation to evolving battlefield conditions. European initiatives, by contrast, tend to emphasise interoperability, long-term integration, and multinational coordination across multiple actors.[6] The result is not a simple contrast between “fast” and “slow” systems, but a difference in strategic orientation. One prioritises responsiveness and operational flexibility, while the other focuses on institutional cohesion and long-term integration.

Programmes such as KAAN illustrate both the ambitions and the limitations of Türkiye’s defence-industrial trajectory. While these platforms demonstrate significant progress in indigenous capability development, they continue to rely on external technologies and globally integrated supply chains in several critical areas. Consequently, Türkiye’s technological trajectory should not be interpreted as a replacement for European defence-industrial development. Rather, it represents an additional layer of operational flexibility within a broader and structurally interdependent alliance framework.

Europe’s Structural Strengths and the Coordination Challenge

A balanced assessment requires acknowledging that Europe’s defence constraints do not stem from technological inferiority or a lack of aggregate capacity. Collectively, European states maintain one of the world’s largest industrial and financial bases, advanced aerospace manufacturers, highly capable naval forces, sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and extensive defence research ecosystems. In purely structural terms, Europe possesses substantial long-term defence potential.[7]

The challenge lies less in the existence of capability than in the speed of mobilisation, procurement fragmentation, and political coordination. Europe’s defence-industrial landscape remains distributed across multiple national systems, each shaped by distinct budgetary priorities, procurement procedures, and strategic cultures. While this structure supports resilience and technological depth over the long term, it can slow rapid collective responses during high-intensity crises.[8]

Within this context, Türkiye’s relevance should not be interpreted as compensating for European technological weakness, but rather as providing selective operational flexibility in areas where speed, surge production, and tactical adaptation have become strategically valuable.

Strategic Autonomy vs. Systemic Integration

Türkiye’s expanding military-industrial capacity is increasingly perceived as a strategic hedge against the growing vulnerabilities within Europe’s defence posture. Yet this development remains politically paradoxical: while Ankara’s capabilities could reinforce collective resilience, several European capitals continue to interpret Türkiye’s strategic autonomy less as a shared asset and more as a potential source of divergence. Public debates frequently centre on procurement disputes surrounding systems such as the S-400 and the F-35 programme, but these controversies often obscure a more immediate operational reality, namely Türkiye’s demonstrated ability to rapidly scale defence production and address critical capability shortages in real time. Consequently, the integration of Turkish defence-industrial capacity, while recognising both its substantial scale and its enduring structural limitations, should be understood as an important stabilising component within Europe’s broader security framework rather than as a substitute for systemic European rearmament.

As of April 2026, the “Steel Dome” (Çelik Kubbe) has moved beyond the conceptual stage and entered a phase of operational maturity, particularly following the integration of the SİPER-1 long-range air defence system into its layered architecture.[9] Functioning as an AI-assisted and networked air defence ecosystem, the Steel Dome demonstrates an increasing capacity to counter saturation attacks and complex aerial threats. Presented at DIMDEX 2026, the system also highlights an alternative model of rapid defence integration that could complement existing European initiatives such as the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), which continues to face coordination and interoperability challenges among participating states.[10] In this sense, Türkiye’s contribution lies not in replacing Europe’s defence architecture, but in providing an already operational layer of strategic resilience along the alliance’s southeastern flank.

[1] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2024 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2024).

[2] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2024),” NATO, June 12, 2024.

[3] European Defence Agency, Defence Data 2024–2025 (Brussels: European Defence Agency, 2025).

[4] European Defence Agency, “Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP),” European Defence Agency, 2024.

[5] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2024,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, 2025.

[6] European Commission, European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) (Brussels: European Commission, 2024).

[7] European Defence Agency, Defence Data 2024–2025 (Brussels: European Defence Agency, 2025).

[8] European Commission, European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) (Brussels: European Commission, 2024).

[9] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of National Defence, official statements regarding SİPER long-range air defence integration and Steel Dome development, 2024–2026.

[10] ASELSAN, official public materials and exhibition presentations regarding integrated air defence systems, including DIMDEX 2026.