Abstract: This article examines the causes of the Israeli–Palestinian and broader Israeli–Arab conflict by analysing the historical, moral, and political dimensions of both Jewish/Israeli and Arab positions. On the Israeli side, it explores the evolution of Zionism and Revisionist Zionism into a doctrine aimed at securing Israeli control over Palestine west of the Jordan River and reinforcing American–Israeli influence in the Middle East. On the Arab side, it contrasts the conflict-resolution approaches of the Moderate Sunni states and the predominantly Shia-led ‘Axis of Resistance’, focusing on four pivotal milestones: the 1948 Nakba, the rise and decline of pan-Arabism, the 1979 Camp David Agreement, and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (Beirut Declaration).

Problem statement: Why has the Israeli–Arab conflict resisted any lasting political or diplomatic solution?

So what?: Resolving the Middle East conundrum requires a negotiated settlement involving both Israel and the United States. There are two strategic scenarios:
(1) Pax Hebraica—Israel, supported by the United States, consolidates control over Palestine, expands normalisation with Arab states, and asserts regional dominance;
(2) Gathering the Arab Lands—a renewed pan-Arab movement, potentially led by Saudi Arabia, seeks to restore Arab solidarity and reverse the legacy of Sykes–Picot.

Introduction

The Israeli-Arab conflict has long posed a threat to international peace and security by destabilising Palestine and the broader Middle East. The conflict has ignited multiple wars, involving Israel and various Arab states, and, at times, regional and global powers. Between wars, tensions have simmered, manifesting in terrorist and counter-terrorist violence, political and diplomatic confrontations, and–most tragically–in widespread human suffering.

Much ink has been spilt to uncover the causes of the conflict and to propose solutions acceptable to all parties. Yet, little has been achieved; conflict endures, with no resolution in sight. Key to this stagnation is the international community’s failure to translate solemn declarations into reality. At the analytical level, many analyses omit critical aspects. In particular, they fail to explain why a two-state solution has never been–and is unlikely ever to be–a viable option; why the Arab world remains divided between the Moderates (predominantly Sunni) and the ‘Axis of Resistance’ (predominantly Shia); why the Israeli-Arab conflict has no political/diplomatic solution.

The Israeli Stance

The Israeli stance stems from Israel’s far-reaching objectives. Chief among them is the establishment of regional dominance, regarded as the most effective means of ensuring a secure environment, political stability, and economic prosperity. This ambitious objective rests on a multi-phase strategy pursued in parallel. First and foremost, the territory of Palestine, as geographically defined under the UN General Assembly resolution 181 (1947),[1] is envisaged to fall under Israel’s full sovereignty through the expulsion of Arabs from Gaza and the continued expansion of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, or Judea and Samarea, to put it in the Jewish way. In parallel, the Abraham Accords are to be extended to additional countries, with the emphasis placed on promoting peaceful relations and advancing political, economic, and cultural cooperation, while addressing the Palestinian question primarily in symbolic or rhetorical terms.

The Israeli stance stems from Israel’s far-reaching objectives.

Israel enjoys broad and unconditional support from the United States. Indeed, the Israeli-American partnership (hereinafter referred to as “the Tandem”) shares a geostrategic ambition: the establishment of Pax Hebraica, a regional security order under the Tandem’s hegemonic domination in the Middle East and potentially beyond. The notion of Pax Hebraica is not a new one. It has been mentioned and explained, for instance, by the Israeli scholar Emmanuel Farjoun, who wrote about the Likud’s far-reaching strategic goals: “The aim of this strategy is to build around a greater Israel a zone of direct Israel presence and influence. A zone of Pax Hebraica (highlight added), in which Israel will have direct lines of communication and control over its immediate neighbours: Lebanon, Syria and Jordan and by implication over the entire Arab East from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Iraq”.[2]

It should be added that such a development would not only serve to achieve Israel’s geopolitical aims, but—perhaps most significantly—would enable the Jewish people, after millennia, to assert control over the biblical Promised Land: “From the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates”.[3]

Zionism vs. Revisionist Zionism

The Jewish liberation movement developed against the backdrop of an ideological and political confrontation between Zionism and Revisionist Zionism. The spiritual father of the Jewish State, Theodor Herzl, acknowledged as such in Israel’s Declaration of Independence, defined the purpose of establishing an independent Jewish state in clear terms: “Our first object is … supremacy, assured to us by international law, over a portion of the globe sufficiently large to satisfy our just requirements”.[4] The dividing line between Zionism, founded in the late 19^th century, and Revisionist Zionism, which emerged in the mid-20^th century, lies in how each interprets the notions of a “portion of the globe sufficiently large” and “our just requirements”.

Our first object is … supremacy, assured to us by international law, over a portion of the globe sufficiently large to satisfy our just requirements.

For the followers of Theodor Herzl, this “portion” was understood as the territory of Palestine west of the Jordan River, with the recognition that coexistence with Palestinian Arabs was acceptable and possible. Revisionist Zionists, by contrast, envisioned a Jewish state encompassing all of historic Palestine, including territories east of the Jordan River—a national idea to be realised through the imposition of Israel’s will, whether by force or peace agreements designed to institutionalise Jewish supremacy.

Zionism

It is no coincidence that the socialists—most notably the Workers’ Party of the Land of Israel (MAPAI)—and the broader leftist Zionist movement served for many decades as the driving political force behind Zionism. Figures such as Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, and Shimon Peres emerged from that ideological tradition. Despite their individual differences, they shared a fundamental commitment to the Zionist vision—one that sought to find a modus vivendi with the Palestinians and the broader Arab world, to be attainable through political and diplomatic engagement, rather than by force alone.

That does not mean they were pacifists. Ben Gurion was at the helm of the Israeli state during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and Golda Meir is well-known for her resolute leadership of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Others likewise prioritised Israel’s security in the face of persistent threats from hostile Arab actors who consistently rejected the legitimacy of the Israeli state.

Thus, Zionist leadership faced two major tasks: first, preserving the integrity and security of the state; and second, reaching a just and lasting peace with its Arab neighbours. While they largely succeeded in the first task, efforts toward the second remained incomplete, despite significant attempts, particularly during the tenure of Yitzhak Rabin, the Labour Party leader, who served as Prime Minister from 1992 to 1995. During these years, the Israeli government launched unprecedented and wide-ranging political/diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a breakthrough in relations with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as well as with several Arab states, primarily Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.

Negotiations with the PLO culminated in 1993, when Israel and the PLO signed a Declaration of Principles (Oslo I), which laid out a framework for the gradual establishment of Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. In return, the PLO pledged to amend provisions in the Palestinian National Charter that denied Israel’s right to exist and formally renounced the use of terrorism as a political tool.[5]

In 1995, the two sides took another significant step with the signing of the Oslo II Agreement, which established a five-year interim period.[6] During this time, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was to assume control over major population centres in the West Bank, while Israeli forces would gradually withdraw from designated areas. Upon successful implementation of these mutual obligations, a final peace agreement was to be concluded by 1999. However, neither Oslo I nor Oslo II was fully implemented. While negotiations with Jordan culminated in the signing of a peace treaty in 1994, talks with the PLO, Syria, and Lebanon failed to produce any tangible results.

In 1995, the two sides took another significant step with the signing of the Oslo II Agreement, which established a five-year interim period.

There is a widespread opinion that Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination on November 04, 1995, destroyed the peace process. This is contestable, as considerable efforts to reach peaceful agreements with the PLO and Syria were made under Prime Minister Ehud Barak between 1999 and 2001. Determined to achieve a lasting peace with the Palestinians, Barak expressed a readiness to offer concessions that went significantly beyond the parameters of the original Oslo Accords.[7]

In July 2000, under the auspices of President Bill Clinton, an Israeli-Palestinian peace summit convened at Camp David, followed by negotiations at Bolling Air Force Base near Washington DC, in December of the same year. On December 23, President Clinton presented both delegations with a set of bridging proposals which, if accepted, could have ended decades-long conflict and opened the door to lasting peace. The American proposal envisioned the creation of a Palestinian state on 97 per cent of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip. A safe-passage corridor would connect the West Bank and Gaza without Israeli interference. On Jerusalem, the city would be divided, with Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and Jewish areas, and Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount and Arab neighbourhoods.[8]

Regarding the return of refugees, Palestinian refugees would be granted the right of return to the Palestinian state only. At the same time, Israel would acknowledge the hardship caused during the 1948 Nakba and participate in an international fund to support resettlement and compensation.[9] The Israeli government accepted the proposal. However, PLO leader Yasser Arafat responded with reservations that were tantamount to a refusal.[10]

In January 2001, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators made yet another attempt to break the deadlock, but this ended in failure. With this collapse, the final chapter in the effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through political/diplomatic means was closed.

Each time a solution appeared within reach, prevailing factors interfered, obstructing the path to a just and equitable agreement. The Israelis blamed PLO leader Yasser Arafat, accusing him either of political maximalism and intransigence or of harbouring a hidden agenda, feigning an interest in peace, while preparing for a violent insurgency against the State of Israel.

Palestinians, in turn, constantly voiced concerns over the gap between Israel’s declared commitments and its actions on the ground, particularly the continued expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Israel’s position on the right of return for refugees, and the status of Jerusalem.

Palestinians constantly voiced concerns over the gap between Israel’s declared commitments and its actions on the ground.

At the heart of the deadlock were mutual distrust and a persistent reluctance to accept each other’s statehood. Palestinians viewed Israelis as foreign intruders, while Israelis struggled to reconcile themselves with the idea of an independent Palestinian state existing on part of what they considered the Promised Land, perceiving it instead as a permanent source of tension and an existential threat. 

Revisionist Zionism

Unlike the moderate and cautious Zionist leaders, Vladimir Jabotinsky, the founder of Revisionist Zionism, was a proponent of decisive solutions, bold measures, and ideological intransigence. He firmly believed that only force and unwavering determination could resolve the question of a Jewish homeland. While mainstream Zionists held to the maxim that “politics is the art of the possible”, Jabotinsky embraced the opposite conviction: “Politics is the art of the impossible”.

Born in Odesa, in the Russian Empire, into a traditional Jewish family, Jabotinsky was particularly well positioned—given the prevailing antisemitism and the pogroms—to grasp that the salvation of the Jewish people lay in the creation of an independent state and mass immigration to the Promised Land. He regarded himself as a true follower of Theodor Herzl.

Due to profound ideological rifts with the moderate Labour Zionists, Jabotinsky founded the World Union of Revisionist Zionists in 1925, and two years earlier had established the Beitar youth movement to train young Jews in nationalist ideas and military discipline. Both played a crucial role in preparing the ground for Jewish statehood, which at the time seemed to many a remote, if not an unattainable, dream.

Jabotinsky authored numerous articles and essays and delivered speeches before party congresses and public gatherings, but one short piece of writing stands out as the quintessence of his political thinking. His 1923 article The Iron Wall set forth revisionism’s major ideas, core principles and modes of action, leaving a profound and lasting impact on Jewish–and later Israeli–politics to this day. By its depth, significance, and thought-provoking arguments, this article, can justly be regarded as the manifesto of Revisionist Zionism.[11]

Jabotinsky emphasises two fundamental principles that should govern the relations between Jewish colonists and the native Arab population. First, he firmly rejects the idea of expelling Arabs from Palestine, asserting “that there will always be two nations in the land, though Jews must form the majority”. Second, he upholds the principle of equality among nations, rejecting any form of oppression against the Arabs.[12]

Yet this belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence takes an unexpected turn at the implementation stage. Jabotinsky questions whether “our peaceful aim” can be achieved “through peaceful means”.[13] His answer is unequivocally negative: “To think that the Arabs will voluntarily consent to the realisation of Zionism in return for the cultural and economic benefits we can bestow on them is infantile. This childish fantasy of our “Arabo-philes” comes from some kind of contempt for the Arab people, of some kind of unfounded view of this race as a rabble ready to be bribed to sell out their homeland for a railroad network”.[14]

Jabotinsky further argues that reaching an agreement with Arabs outside the Land of Israel is equally illusory. For them, “… agreeing to forego preservation of the Arab character of a country located in the centre of their future ‘federation’ (highlight added), we would offer to them something just as valuable. We can offer only two things: either money or political assistance, or both. But we can offer neither”.[15] The conclusion is stark: Israelis are unable to propose any compensation to either Palestinian or other Arabs for the loss of Palestine.

Jabotinsky further argues that reaching an agreement with Arabs outside the Land of Israel is equally illusory.

At this point, Jabotinsky presents his central thesis: “This colonisation can, therefore, continue and develop only under the protection of a force independent of the local population—an iron wall which the native population cannot break through”.[16]

The extensive quotations here are necessary to grasp the core strategic logic of Revisionist Zionism: the rejection of any negotiated agreement unless such an agreement could be reached under duress. Apparently, this principle has remained a constant in Israeli politics under the Likud party, the only difference lying in the prioritisation of Jewish goals depending on the historical moment.

In Jabotinsky’s time, the top priority for the Jewish cause was the colonisation of Palestine. Under Likud, particularly during Binyamin Netanyahu’s tenure, that priority has shifted toward the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland and to the pursuit of the Abraham Accords engineered by the Tandem. Unlike in Jabotinsky’s era, today this Tandem can offer “either money or political assistance or both” as compensation for the loss of Palestine west of the Jordan River.

Transformation of Revisionist Zionism

It is worthwhile examining the extent to which the current leadership of the Likud party remains committed to the principles laid out by the founder of Revisionist Zionism. This scrutiny is particularly relevant in the context of how his ideology is being implemented today. While both Jabotinsky and the Likud emphasise force, boldness, and disdain for the “Arabo-phile” tendencies of moderate Zionist figures, their differences are profound.

Unlike Jabotinsky’s broader vision, which—despite its reliance on strength—recognised the inevitability of coexistence with the Palestinian population, the Likud party and Israel’s current Prime Minister have openly pursued a cardinally different policy. Its aim is the expulsion of native Palestinians, coupled with the ongoing expansion of Israel’s military/political influence throughout the Middle East. This transformation of Revisionist Zionism began with the Likud party’s first assumption of power in 1977. It took extreme forms under Binyamin Netanyahu—the longest-serving prime minister in Israel’s history, and the most prominent figure to emerge from the right wing of its political spectrum. He represents the most forceful and ideologically coherent incarnation of the new wave of Revisionist Zionism. Under Netanyahu’s leadership, the consistent reliance on military force has produced a shift in the balance of power between Israel, the Palestinians, and the broader Arab world, obviously in favour of the former.

Since October 07, 2023, Israel has succeeded in breaking the backbone of two long-standing foes: the Lebanese political-military organisation Hezbollah and the Hamas movement in Gaza. True, in a recent twist of events, Hezbollah refused to disarm—as demanded by Lebanese President Aoun and the American Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack—threatening civil war,[17] while Hamas has continued to strengthen its ranks by recruiting new militants.[18] Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that they can overrule the overwhelming strategic and political trends in the region. These developments also contributed to the downfall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, significantly weakening the regional position of a key strategic rival, Iran.

In a recent twist of events, Hezbollah refused to disarm, threatening civil war, while Hamas has continued to strengthen its ranks by recruiting new militants.

Israel’s conduct clearly leads to the conclusion that it has overstepped the boundaries of what is permissible under the International Bill of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions.[19] Francesca Albanese, The Special Rapporteur, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, goes even further, characterising the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory as apocalyptic and accusing the Israeli government of being responsible for “one of the cruellest genocides in modern history.”[20]

There is little wonder, therefore, that the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued, on November 21, 2024, an arrest warrant for Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant.[21] The charges include crimes against humanity and war crimes related to Israeli actions in Gaza. President Trump responded by imposing sanctions on the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, and the Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese, accusing the latter of anti-Semitism.[22]

The Arab Stance

The Arab position, focused on defending Palestinian rights to statehood, the return of refugees, East Jerusalem, and recognition of the pre-1967 borders, began to shift toward a more moderate and compromising approach. This shift started with the 1979 peace accord between Israel and Egypt[23] and was followed by a series of normalisation agreements between Israel and several Arab states, known as the Abraham Accords.[24] However, a radical, intransigent bloc, comprising Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas, otherwise known as the ‘Axis of Resistance’, took a diametrically opposite stance. This camp declared open hostility toward Israel and made no secret of its intent to annihilate the Jewish state.

The Arab position, focused on defending Palestinian rights to statehood, the return of refugees, East Jerusalem, and recognition of the pre-1967 borders, began to shift toward a more moderate and compromising approach.

The First Arab-Israeli War and the Nakba

Had the Arab states accepted UN Resolution 181, adopted on November 29, 1947, and established the State of Palestine accordingly, the entire geopolitical trajectory of the Middle East might have unfolded quite differently. In retrospect, acceptance of the Resolution could have spared the Arab world the subsequent calamities, defeats, and tragic losses that followed. The Arab position was driven by a profound sense of moral obligation to act in the face of a development they regarded as both undesirable and humiliating. In the summer of 1947, during a meeting with Abba Eban, a prominent Zionist intellectual and diplomat, Azzam Pasha, then Secretary-General of the Arab League, expressed this sentiment clearly: “There is no shame in being compelled by force to accept an unjust and unwanted situation. What would be shameful would be to accept this without attempting to prevent it”.[25]

The Arab states thus opted for confrontation: on May 15, 1948, just one day after Israel proclaimed its independence, five Arab armies, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Transjordan, invaded Israel. Saudi Arabia contributed a small number of volunteer fighters, although it did not participate directly in the invasion. That day marked not only the beginning of the first Arab-Israeli war, but also the onset of one protracted and devastating conflict.

The war ended in defeat for the Arab states, first and foremost because they failed to achieve their principal objective: preventing the establishment of the State of Israel. On the contrary, Israel not only emerged as a sovereign state but also expanded its territory significantly, from the 56 per cent allotted by the UN Partition Plan to 78 per cent of Mandatory Palestine.[26] This outcome reinforced Israel’s self-confidence and its determination to consolidate and build upon its military and political victory. The Arabs perceived the outcome of the war not merely as a defeat, but as a catastrophe, known as the Nakba in Arabic. More than 700,000 Palestinians were forced to flee their homes. Since then, the issue of the “right of return” has become a central stumbling block in efforts to resolve the conflict.

At first sight, the Arab states appeared determined and bold in taking up the challenge of fighting for what they proclaimed as the just cause of the Palestinians. In reality, the pursuit of this objective ultimately failed, largely due to the absence of a unified military command, which reflected a lack of cohesive political will to achieve a common goal. In practice, each Arab army fought not to defend the common cause but to serve the strategic interests of its own government. It was in this context that Egypt seized control of the Gaza Strip, while Transjordan annexed the West Bank.

Nasser, the Ba’ath Party, and the Quest for Unity

During the following two decades, the concept of Arab unity, led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, dominated the Arab world. For almost twenty years, Nasser stood at the forefront of Arab politics, and his strategic endeavour to promote Arab unity and wage an anti-imperialist struggle often shaped the political landscape in the Middle East. The conflict with Israel came to be seen not only as a struggle for Palestinian rights, but also as resistance to Israel’s role as a perceived Western stronghold in the Middle East.

The concept of Arab unity, led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, dominated the Arab world.

In parallel with the events in Egypt, significant developments occurred in Syria and Iraq, where the pan-Arabist ideas of the Arab Awakening (Nahda) were transformed into an ideological doctrine formulated by the Syrian founders of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath (Rebirth) Party, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar. In 1963, the Ba’ath party came to power through military coups in both Iraq and Syria, though it was in 1968 in Iraq and 1970 in Syria that the regimes of Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad, respectively, took a definite shape.

To fully understand the political stances of these leaders in the following decades, one must consider their adherence to Ba’athist ideology, which advocated for Arab unity and maintained an irreconcilable stance toward Israel. For example, Hafez al-Assad’s rigid and uncompromising attitude to Israel was rooted in Ba’athist ideology.

In his quest for Arab unity, Nasser sought to overcome the conflicting interests of Arab states. Yet this proved unattainable. The Arab states remained unwilling to subordinate their national interests in favour of a consolidated position on key regional issues. The short-lived union between Egypt and Syria (1958-1961) stands perhaps as the most telling example of this failure. In practical terms, Nasser’s leadership and Egypt’s ambitions gradually slid into hegemonic assertiveness—a shift that, in the end, eroded the very ideal of pan-Arabism.

The collapse (al-Naksa in Arabic) that followed the Arab defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War became, as the Lebanese-born American scholar Fouad Ajami sharply observed, the Waterloo of pan-Arabism.[27]

The Camp David Accords

After the 1967 defeat, the Arabs experienced yet another failure on the battlefield. The 1973 Yom Kippur War might well have turned into a full-blown disaster for Egypt had it not been for American intervention, which restrained Israel’s final advance and paved the way for a negotiated cease-fire. Anwar Sadat initiated a dramatic shift in the country’s foreign policy. Even before the Yom Kippur War, he had begun distancing Egypt from the Soviet Union. The decisive role Washington played in the war’s final phase convinced the Egyptian leader to align the country’s security and development prospects with its American ally. Close ties with Israel and the rapprochement with the new Egyptian ally placed the U.S. in a unique position as a peace broker who could use its influence to negotiate a settlement between formerly irreconcilable adversaries.

Close ties with Israel and the rapprochement with the new Egyptian ally placed the U.S. in a unique position as a peace broker who could use its influence to negotiate a settlement between formerly irreconcilable adversaries.

The Camp David Accords, signed in November 1978[28] and followed by the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of March 26, 1979,[29] marked an unprecedented event in modern Middle Eastern history. For the first time, an Arab state recognised the right of the “Zionist intruders” to exist. Furthermore, the treaty stipulated the establishment of political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties between the two signatories. In the context of bilateral relations, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula, and Egypt thus restored its sovereignty over its internationally acknowledged borders.

However, the peace treaty contained a second, no less important dimension—the Palestinian settlement. In this regard, the parties agreed that Palestinians would acquire autonomy over the West Bank and Gaza with negotiations involving all concerned parties to follow at a later stage.[30] While the provisions on bilateral relations included concrete and actionable steps, the section addressing the Palestinian question remained vague and non-committal.

In retrospect, the 1979 peace treaty contained another element, whose far-reaching implications could not have been foreseen at the time. Specifically, the treaty text refers to the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David, stressing that it: “…constitute[s] a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbours which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis”.[31]

The Arab world categorically rejected the idea of a separate peace with Israel. As the Israeli diplomat Itamar Rabinovich aptly observed, “Sadat and Egypt violated a taboo that an Arab consensus had strictly enforced for more than three decades”.[32] At the time, the prospect of other Arab states following suit seemed unimaginable.

The 2002 Arab League Peace Initiative

The Arab leaders did not confine themselves to mere criticism but sought to advance political/diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the Palestinian question and laying the groundwork for peace and cooperation. In February 2002, Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah proposed a new initiative, which was further elaborated in the Beirut Declaration, adopted at the Arab League Summit.[33]

In February 2002, Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah proposed a new initiative, which was further elaborated in the Beirut Declaration, adopted at the Arab League Summit.

The significance of this document is hard to overstate. Its symbolism lay in the fact that, for the first time, the Arab world articulated a joint position on resolving the Palestinian conflict. Its political and diplomatic weight stemmed from its concrete, actionable proposals for a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel. The Arab states declared their willingness to recognise the Jewish state and work together toward a peaceful and prosperous Middle East, provided Israel accepted a) complete withdrawal from the occupied territories, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the June 04, 1967, lines, as well as from the remaining occupied areas of Lebanon;

1. b) a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution 194;
2. c) the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 04, 1997, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.[34]

In fact, the Beirut Declaration echoed the “land for peace” principle introduced at Camp David, yet it articulated with greater clarity the prerequisites for a lasting peace in the region. These three points constituted red lines, thresholds beneath which any peace settlement would not only undermine Arab interests but also compromise the integrity of pan-Arab identity itself.

The Israeli government took note of the Beirut initiative but refrained from engaging in substantive negotiations over its proposals. In reality, Israel was not prepared to accept such conditions—neither then, under Ariel Sharon’s leadership, nor now, under Binyamin Netanyahu’s right-wing government. As for the Arab states, their stance has gradually shifted over time from consistently adhering to their proclaimed principles of conflict resolution to adopting a more flexible and pragmatic approach, even at the cost of crossing the red lines set by the Beirut Declaration.

To be continued…

 

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Dr. Vahram Abadjian is an independent international affairs analyst. His research interests encompass several regions of the globe, with a particular focus on the Middle East and North Africa, where he has been actively engaged in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and Tunisia. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Vienna. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of The Defence Horizon Journal.

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[1] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 181 (II). Future Government of Palestine, A/RES/181(II), November 29, 1947, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/181(II).

[2] Emmanuel Farjoun, “Pax Hebraica,” Matzpen, July 10, 1983, https://matzpen.org/english/1983-07-10/pax-hebraica-emmanuel-farjoun/.

[3] Gen. 15:18 (NRSV).

[4] Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State, trans. Sylvie d’Avigdor (London: Penguin Books, 2010), 98.

[5] United Nations, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, A/48/486, S/26560, September 23, 1993, https://undocs.org/en/A/48/486.

[6] United Nations, Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II Accord), A/51/889, S/1997/357, May 7, 1997, https://undocs.org/en/A/51/889.

[7] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel–Palestinian Negotiations at Camp David – July 2000, July 2001, https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Israel-Palestinian%20Negotiations%20at%20Camp%20David%20-%20July%202000.aspx; and The Taba Talks (January 2001). https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/The%20Taba%20Talks%20(January%202001).aspx

[8] For President Clinton’s bridging proposals of December 23, 2000, see Itamar Rabinovich, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948–2003 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 156–58.

[9] Rand Corporation, Building a Successful Palestinian State, Appendix B, Clinton Parameters (Presented by President Bill Clinton to the Israeli and Palestinian Negotiators) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005), accessed June 28, 2025, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/mg146-2dcr.16.pdf.

[10] Rabinovich, Waging Peace, 158.

[11] Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall,” in Lenni Brenner, The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir (London: Zed Books, 1984), Annex 1.

[12] Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall,” para. 1.

[13] Jabotinsky,  “The Iron Wall,” para. 1.

[14] Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall,” para. 4.

[15] Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall,” para. 12.

[16] Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall,” para. 13.

[17] Al Jazeera, “Hezbollah Chief Rejects Disarmament Demands, Says Israel Must First Comply with Ceasefire,” Al Jazeera, August 25, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/25/hezbollah-chief-rejects-disarmament-demands-israel-comply-with-ceasefire.

[18] Erin Banco, “Exclusive: Hamas Has Added up to 15,000 Fighters since Start of War, US Figures Show,” Reuters, January 25, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-has-added-up-15000-fighters-since-start-war-us-figures-show-2025-01-24/.

[19] In particular, one should point to Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which safeguard the right to life and protection from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, as well as to Article 3 and Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibit collective punishment and the targeting of civilian population.

[20] Emma Farge, “UN Expert Urges States to Cut Israel Trade Ties over ‘Apocalyptic’ Gaza Situation,” Reuters, July 03, 2025, accessed July 6, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/un-expert-asks-states-cut-trade-ties-with-israel-over-gaza-situation-2025-07-03.

[21] International Criminal Court, “Situation in the State of Palestine: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Issues Warrants of Arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant,” ICC News Release, November 21, 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges.

[22] Francesca Regalado, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on UN Expert Who Has Criticized Israel’s Gaza War,” New York Times, July 10, 2025, last accessed July 07, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/us/politics/gaza-francesca-albanese-sanctions.html.

[23] United Nations, Israel and Egypt Treaty of Peace (with Annexes and Maps), Signed at Washington on 26 March 1979, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1136, no. 17855, 1979. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201136/volume-1136-I-17813-English.pdf.

[24] U.S. Department of State, The Abraham Accords (2017–2021 Archived Content), last accessed July 19, 2025, https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/?safe=1.

[25] Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel through My Eyes (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1992), quoted in Emmanuel Navon, The Star and the Sceptre: A Diplomatic History of Israel (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2020).

[26] Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab–Israeli War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 406–12.

[27] Fouad Ajami, “The End of Pan-Arabism,” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 2 (Winter 1978): 355–373, https://ismi.emory.edu/documents/Readings/Fouad%2C%20Ajami%20End%20of%20Pan%20Arabism.pdf

[28] The Camp David Accords, September 17, 1978, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david.

[29] United Nations, Israel and Egypt Treaty of Peace.

[30] Idem.

[31] Idem.

[32] Itamar Rabinovich, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948–2003 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 25.

[33] League of Arab States. Beirut Declaration (Arab Peace Initiative). Adopted at the Arab League Summit, Beirut, March 28, 2002. Available at United Nations Peacemaker, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SA_020328_ArabPeaceInitiative%28BeirutDeclaration%29.pdf

[34] League of Arab States, “Beirut Declaration, Arab Peace Initiative,” March 28, 2002, Council of the League of Arab States, Beirut Summit.