Abstract: The Rohingyas, an ethnic Muslim minority in Myanmar, have been subjected to violence, oppression, and xenophobia through draconian state law and systematic eviction campaigns for ages. Nearly 1 million Rohingyas took refuge in Bangladesh in the face of genocide. It seems like the Rohingya refugee crisis is similar to the endless and futile crisis that Sisyphus, a Greek Mythological king, faced as a punishment for continuously rolling a rock up a hill and falling. This group of people, who lived in the Arakan of Burma, continuously faced displacement throughout history and yet are not citizens of any nation. Their history, identity and ethnicity have often been used to serve narrow political interests. Both Myanmar and the neighbouring country Bangladesh used perplexing and unrealistic frameworks and narratives that continuously made the situation unresolvable and Sisyphean. The securitisation of the Rohingyas both in their native land and the host country made them stateless and dehumanised. Defective narratives of history, identity, and social actions caused such a grave situation. This article tries to shift a paradigm for the readers to look into the crisis while being aware of the defective and flawed narratives created by political agents for narrow political self-interest.

Problem statement: What are the rooted, unaddressed substantive factors that caused the persistence of the Rohingya refugee crisis?

So what?: The flawed narrations on Rohingya history and identity can be said to be the most unaddressed and dormant reason behind this almost-unresolvable crisis. Histories are always subject to arguments. Hence, the political agenda contravened the historical narratives for self-centred political purposes. This Sisyphean complexity will not be resolved without decluttering this fragmented historical outlook towards the crisis. For that, viewers have to look into the crisis from different lenses. History, Identity and Securitization are the most rooted factors for this Sisyphean endeavour leading towards this heinous genocide. World leaders need to declutter these flawed factors so that millions of ethnic lives can be saved.

“The memory of the world is not a bright, shining crystal, but a heap of broken fragments”[1]

After the enactment of a draconian Citizenship law in 1982, the Rohingyas in Myanmar became stateless. Before that, the Rohingyas used to have a profound historical existence that was often denied by the racist Burmese regimes, and this denial and misinformation campaign had become one of the tools for the Rohingya genocide. This part of the history and the geography of the Arakan is mingled in a broader geopolitical framework. It may be worth noting that this long stretch of land is separated from mainland Myanmar by the Arakan Yoma mountain range while historically connected with the region of Bangladesh.[2] Dannya Waddy (Dhannovati) is recorded to have been a kingdom in this land at the beginning of the Christian era. According to U San Tha Aung, a native scholar of Arakan culture, Aryans from the west were the primary inhabitants of the Arakan.[3], [4] A renowned British oriental scholar and Boden professor of Sanskrit, Edward Hamilton Johnston, translated the Anandacandra stone inscription or Shitthaung pillar, which has been identified as the most extensive, best preserved and reliable chronicles by UNESCO and was widely researched by scholars like Dr. D.C. Sircir, Noel Singer, Pamela Gutman, U San Tha Aung and more.[5] This inscription indicates that it had been a Hindu land since time immemorial,[6] and Dr. Gutman prescribes that its language resembles that used in Bengal (Bangladesh) during the early 6th Century CE.[7] British Historian D.G.E. Hall writes, “Burmese do not seem to have settled in Arakan until possibly as late as the tenth century A.D. Hence, earlier dynasties are thought to have been Indian ruling over a population similar to that of Bengal”. Edward Hamilton Johnston indicated that they might be ‘Proto-Australoid people like that of Bengal or Negrito group of Neolithic descendants’. Noel Francis Singer coined that these inhabitants had much in common with the people living on the north-western side of the Naaf River (today’s Bangladesh).[8]

Phayre (1883) mentioned that the Arakan continued to remain an independent kingdom until it was conquered by the Burman King, Budaw U Waing or Bodawpaya, in 1784 AD with an intention to bring in Buddhist reform.[9], [10] After the annexation, the Arakanese Kingdom was abolished, and the enslavement and expulsion of Rakhaines spiked.[11] The Burman army killed, raped, and enslaved the natives of Arakan, sparking the first influx of refugees from Arakan to Bangladesh, followed by 1791 and 1796 failed counterinsurgency by Arakaneese, resulting in an even greater influx of refugees into modern-day Bangladesh.[12] Eventually, concerned with the Burmese expansion, the British Raj waged the first Anglo-Burmese war in 1824, forcing Burma to surrender Arakan under The Treaty of Yandabo (1826).[13] Critics like U Khin Maung Saw (2011) and Dr Aye Kyaw (2009) coined that from the time of the Yandabo Treaty, a huge counter-wave of migration from the Indian Subcontinent to Arakan was seen. The British brought tens of thousands of ‘Chittagonian Bengali Muslims’ into underpopulated Arakan for colonisation purposes. According to these critics, the predominant Muslim Bengali migrants from Chittagong, who did not integrate with the natives and did not settle, are to blame for the destabilisation of Arakan as well as the whole of Myanmar (Burma).[14], [15]

Firstly, before the British-led immigration took place, there was no well-documented evidence of migration in this area. However, the geographical reality and archaeological evidence suggest that a very natural migration between Arakan and Teknaf, Cox’s Bazar (a district of present Bangladesh), was inevitable. The route of this reciprocal migration was through Naf river, a transboundary geographical border between the countries, as it was a relatively easier migration route for the inhabitants of both lands.  The author of this paper surveyed the border areas of Bangladesh and Myanmar and discovered that this river is only 1.6 km wide in some places and very easy to cross by boat. Apart from this border river, these two states have no other geographical barriers. Arakan’s northern part Mayu, as noted by Dr. Moshe Yegar, can be seen as ‘an almost direct continuation of eastern Bengal’ [Bangladesh].[16] Secondly, blaming the “Chittagonian Muslim Bengalis” for the destabilisation of the Arakan, as mentioned before, is subject to ahistorical claims. In the prior discussion on scholarly arguments, the archaeological findings and analysis by E.H.Johnston, Dr Gutman & D G E Hall, it is clear that Indian culture and its people have been intertwined with Arakan, indicating that this region has historically been considered as a Hindu land with similarity with eastern Bengal (Bangladesh). Evidently, these ‘Bengalis’, whom the critics blame for destabilisation, are the inhabitants whose ancestors used to be related to the inhabitants of the Arakan historically. This author interviewed several Rohingyas, refugees and NGO workers and discovered that people used to cross this river for conjugal day-to-day business purposes frequently. Such casual migration can still be seen as using informal arrangements and ignoring governmental restrictions, which indicates a continuous connection between the inhabitants. Some interviewees claimed that after the construction of roads through Arakan Yoma from the British period, it has now been easier to cross to mainland Myanmar (Burma) from Arakan, which was impractical before the development. The Arakan area is geographically isolated from mainland Myanmar by the Arakan Yoma mountain range, which allowed Arakan to develop as a separate political entity.[17]

Before the British-led immigration took place, there was no well-documented evidence of migration in this area.

The above argument stipulates that the immigration wave between Arakan and Bengal had long been a common phenomenon, and the homogeneity of ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic factors between the inhabitants of both areas was obvious. As Arakan is somewhat isolated from mainland Myanmar, the Burmese kings used to identify those inhabitants as aliens, which is one of the roots of genocidal racial profiling. So, blaming “Chittagonian Muslim Bengalis” for the destabilisation of Arakan is sort of blaming the historically and culturally homogeneous inhabitants of Arakan for the destabilisation of their own land. This destabilisation would not have been possible without foreign political involvement and purpose.

The polar opposite spectrum of narratives is indeed acting in the historical development of the Rohingyas. Resembling Herbert Butterfield’s (1924) thoughts, “The memory of the world is not a bright, shining crystal, but a heap of broken fragments”, it can be said that arguing over historical development will never be the way to solve this genocide. Instead, the most needed tool for peace will be the abolishment of such historical racial profiling, which is based on state interest. However, decluttering historical misconceptions alone cannot eliminate the genocidal tendencies due to the existence of identity politics.

“Identities are the basis of interest”[18]

Rohingyas are considered ethnic Muslim minorities residing in Rakhine State (formerly known as Arakan Province), which is on Myanmar’s coastline in the Bay of Bengal. Linguistically, the word Rohingya marks geographical references.[19] “The word Rohingya is an Indianised expression denoting the territory of Rakhine. Rohingya means “of Rakhine”. So it is a geographical reference not ethnic reference.” The earliest known usage of the term Rohingya dates back to 1799, when it appeared as ‘Rooinga’ in one of Francis Buchanan-Hamilton’s documents during the pre-colonial era.[20]

U Khin Maung Saw (2011) argued that the naming of the ‘Rooinga’ was given by Francis Buchanan-Hamilton by observing some slaves in Amarapura (not in Arakan) after the annexation in 1784. There, Rohingyas were brought as slaves of the Arakanese prisoners. Thus, Saw (2011) claimed that these ethnicities were not the natives of Arakan as they were the slaves of the then natives. However, this claim cannot be backed up with the logic of  Francis Buchanan-Hamilton’s naming of ‘Rooingas’ while staying in Amarapura. In the same paper, Saw (2011) cited Buchanan “I shall now add three dialects, spoken in the Burman Empire, but evidently derived from the language of the Hindu nation. The first is that spoken by the Mohamedans, who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves Rooinga, or native of Arakan. The Hindus of Arakan speak the second dialect. I procured it from a Brahmen and his attendants, who had been brought to Amarapura by the king’s eldest son, on his return from the conquest of Arakan. They call themselves Rossawn, and for what reason I do not know, wanted to persuade me that theirs was the common language of Arakan. Both these tribes, by the real natives of Arakan are called Kulaw Yalain, or stranger Arakan.”[21] Francis Buchanan-Hamilton has clearly mentioned that the Rooingas claimed themselves as natives of Arakan, and they had long settled in Arakan. This also revokes the claims of critics stating in the previous chapter that Rohingyas had no mentality to integrate and settle in the Arakan society.  It is worth noting that the question of ‘real natives’ in the above citation is not elucidated.

However, Dr Aye Kyaw (2009) pointed out that the term ‘Rohingya’ came into “common usage” just after the 1942 Japan-Burmese war, followed by ‘communal’ violence injecting religious agitations into politics. After 1947, in Myanmar, the word Muslim became synonymous with Bengali or Indian.[22], [23] Arguably, historians like Shwe Lu Maung, D. G. Edward Hall, Sir Richard Carnac Temple, Peter Nicolaus and Mahbubul Alam suggest that over the centuries, different religious, ideological, tribal and ethnic identities converged in the construction of the Arakanese identity.[24] The identity of the natives of Arakan or Rohingyas is not singularly detachable. Rather, it is an amalgamation of different identities such as Aryans, Animists, the Kanyan tribe of Tibeto Burman group, Brahmanism, Hinduism, Jainism, Islam (spread by traders from the Arab Peninsula, Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey), Maghs (with Portuguese and French influence), slaves, heins (low-caste), Kamains and Bengali due to century-old mass migration.

Nevertheless, Myanmar is following its nationalist and realpolitik outlook to identify the Rohingyas, denying all the logic of the Rohingyas being native inhabitants of the Arakan. It denotes the Rohingyas as illegal Bengali immigrants while Bangladesh coins them as ‘forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals.’[25] This narration clearly suggests that both countries are forging Rohingya’s identity through the overlapping ties of nationality and citizenship, denying their century-old historical existence in the Rakhine state. According to the UN, the Rohingyas are now ‘de jure stateless’ just after the 1982 draconian citizenship law in Myanmar. Additionally, Buddhists in Myanmar refer to Rohingyas as Bengalis to deny their historical lineage within Myanmar.[26], [27] Furthermore, Burmese critics called Rohingyas “Chittagonian Muslims” as they have ethnic and linguistic similarities with Chittagonian inhabitants. Here, Chittagong is the border district of Bangladesh where millions of Rohingyas have sought asylum. However, in the previous part of the article, this author examines the obvious relevance of the homogeneity of the inhabitants of the Arakan and Cox’s Bazar (Bangladesh) due to the geographical reality.

Myanmar is following its nationalist and realpolitik outlook to identify the Rohingyas, denying all the logic of the Rohingyas being native inhabitants of the Arakan.

A renowned critic of Rohingya identity U Khin Maung Saw (1993) advocated that the word “Rohingya” is surfaced in world politics by so-called “Free Press”, “Free Wheeling” and self-proclaimed “Burma specialists” who have fabricated the history. He pointed out the absence of the word “Rohingya” in different statements and censuses of British Colonial Offices, which indicates that “Rohingyas” were absent from Arakan history.[28] In one of his writings, Saw (2011) assumed that these people never tried to assimilate into the native society, which is why they did not become the natives[29]. This assumption was rebutted previously in this paper but is an example of calculated narratives used to describe genocide techniques.

Additionally, Saw (1993) upheld that between 1950 and 1960, the “Mujahids” who plotted to make Northern Arakan into a separate Muslim state fled to Bangladesh and named themselves “Rohingyas”. He mentioned M.S Collis’s argument on the earlier influence of Islam in Arakan as “Bengal was absorbed into this Polity (i.e., Islam) in 1203. But it was its extreme limit. It never passed into Indo-China; and its influence from its arrival in 1203 till 1430 was negligible upon Arakan.” Saw (1993) pointed out that Islam became prominent in the region after the 14th century.[30] However, referring to the British Burma Gazetteer (1957), Professor Enamul Haq and Abdul Karim Shahitya Visarad, Dr Habib Siddiqui (2011) notes that the locals of Arakan interacted with Mohamedans or ‘Moor Arab Muslims’ dating 8th Century CE and also referred to R. B. Smart who wrote in the British Burma Gazetteer (1957) about the Muslim shipwreck on Ramree Island in the ninth century that led to a huge expansion of Islam in Arakan.[31], [32]

In his article, Saw (1993) mostly argued about the linguistic misinterpretation of the word “Rohingya” and some chronicles, stories and fantasies that circulate among the locals. Saw (1993) claimed that Kyemon U Thaung, a veteran journalist, “remembered” that the name “Rohingya” was created by the “Red Flag” communist for the “Mujahid” rebels.”[33] Moreover, Dr. Aye Kyaw (2009) pointed out that he “thinks” the word “Rohingya” appeared in the 1960s as he argues that Sultan Mahmud, a Bengali leader and a member of Parliament in Burma, did not use the word “Rohingya.”[34]

Critics of the Rohingya identity often argue on the origin of the word ‘Rohingya’. It is true that the origin of the word “Rohingya” has countless other perplexed undocumented chronicles, tales and stories. This author interviewed some Refugees and ascertained completely different narrations from each refugee about the origin of the word. U Khin Maung Saw (1993) mostly argued on the validity of the word “Rohingya”. Still, it could neither expel their identity from Arakan nor establish Burman identity in the Arakan as native inhabitants. The people prehistorically known as “Kala Mukh” (Black Faces), or “dark brown-coloured Indians who had much in common with the people (today’s Bangladeshis, or more particularly Chittagonians)”, were the native of this Arakan and are now called Rohingya.[35] This paper has previously established the historical and geographical existence of these inhabitants in Arakan. The contentions regarding being alien, Bengali and Chittagonian have been discussed and decluttered in previous parts. However, a critical part of identity politics is yet to be discussed: the impact of Islam on their identity. This particular identity can be traced to being the prime source of their being refugees.

“Terrorism should be seen in the light of the country’s security and not from the narrow perspective of caste, creed and religion”[36]

Continuing the previous discussion, an excerpt from C. Christine Fair (2019) is pertinent. “As time passes, Myanmar has consolidated its impunity, making its crimes (coining the action against Rohingyas as Genocide) a ‘fait accompli’. To do so, it first destabilised the legitimacy of the Rohingya as a group with a long history in the country. Second, it has taken advantage of global Islamophobia to characterise the Rohingya as Islamists and terrorists and has allied with countries that share this antipathy toward Muslims for domestic political reasons. Finally, it has capitalised on regional rivalries to render the Rohingya the quarry of the newest Great Game in the East”.[37] Different Burmese scholars used components of islamophobia in explaining the Rohingya crisis. For example, Saw (1993) argued that the ‘Mujiahids’ or the Muslim warriors were the ones who defined themselves as Rohingyas during the 1950s and 60s. He also referred to Kyemon U Thaung for “remembering” the derivation of the word “Rohingya” which was created by the “Red Flag” communist for the “Mujahid” rebels”.[38] However, claiming an ethnic group as a terrorist based on one’s ‘remembrance’ may not be a scholarly footprint in this grave critical issue.

This explicit religious segregation surfaced in 1942 when Muslims sided with the British and launched attacks against pro-Japanese Buddhists, creating a clear demarcation of Muslim North and Buddhist South in the Rakhine state. Eventually, the Buddhists switched sides and defeated the Japanese aggression. At that time, the main Muslim political body in Rakhine, the Jamait ul-Ulama, persuaded the British for an autonomous Muslim zone in Rakhine, but it was rejected. British favouring Muslims on economic and social factors became an issue of agitation and disturbance among the ethnic Burman majority. Fair (2019) pointed out that the increasing economic competition rooted in the resentment between both the religious and ethnic groups led the Burmese to split from the British Raj.[39] This inmost religious agitation based on political and economic disparities can be seen in the writings of critical Burmese scholars like Saw.[40] While this agitated political development started spreading just before the independence in 1948, several thousand Muslim guerillas or ‘Mujahids’ started an armed rebellion against Buddhist Burmese in Arakan, to create an independent Islamic state. During the 1950s, several junta operations killed thousands of such ‘Mujahids’ and started the narration that ‘these Muslims never belonged in Myanmar to begin with’.[41] Dr Aye Kyaw (2009) pointed out that the underlying problem of the Rohingya crisis is the idea of “Islamisation” and the expansion of Islam.[42]

The underlying problem of the Rohingya crisis is the idea of “Islamisation” and the expansion of Islam.

At this point, the term ‘Mujahid’ needs to be analysed. The word ‘Mujahid’ has no affiliation with separation or being a guerilla warrior. This word is derived from ‘Jihad,’ which modern English dictionaries tag with ‘holy war. ‘ However, “The root term for jihad is – juhd – which means making an ‘effort’ or ‘struggle’. In essence, jihad is to strive and exhaust your capacity and capabilities with your words or actions. This is far from the Arabic meaning of war (harb) and military combat (qital). In other words, military combat is not the essence of jihad.”[43] So, through the word ‘Mujahid, ’ Muslims identify themselves as human beings struggling for worldly and spiritual sanctity and purity. However, it is evident that along with mainstream media and academia, many Muslims also misinterpreted the word Jihad or Mujahid and used the term for terrorist activities.

It is worth noting that several Muslim Rohingyas were also victims of the guerillas who used the term ‘Mujahid’ for their narrow political interest and demanded to lay down their arms. Many Rohingyas were forced to join and aid the guerrillas against their will.[44] After surveying and interviewing many Rohingyas, this author discovered that such a phenomenon is still in action.

However, substantive factors like denial of citizenship rights, systematic persecution, communal riots, fascism by military junta, racial superiority of the Burman, lack of freedom of movement, sexual violence, systematic eviction campaign, ethnic engineering, forced labour, arbitrary confiscation of lands, financial coercion were the main reasons for the exodus of Rohingyas.[45] This ethnic group stood against the repressive state-sponsored genocide of Myanmar for their basic civic and human rights. “Mujahid” narration in this issue is merely a “securitisation of Rohingyas” by the Myanmar regime.

The Copenhagen School argues that security issues, including mainstream and human securities, are often constructed socially. On the other hand, another prominent school of thought, the Paris School, states that securitisation often operates by controlling populations using tools like bureaucratic procedures, surveillance and risk management tools.[46], [47] Myanmar has been using disputed historical debates, identity engineering and religious narratives to securitise the Rohingya issues for narrow political interest. Therefore, the government, since 1962, has ensured the racial superiority of the Burman race in Myanmar. However, the host country of millions of Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh, is using the same securitisation approach, rendering this huge population completely insecure.

Shilly Shallying From Under to Over-Securitisation of Rohingyas in Bangladesh

Failing to balance the securitisation of the Rohingya crisis looped Bangladesh into a Sisyphean struggle. Firstly, remaining silent and failing to raise a flag to garner international attention till 2017 bred further Rohingya atrocities.[48] Acting as a securitising actor, the Bangladesh government failed to identify this cross-border threat as a top priority in security discussion and thus under-securitized this international crisis. Therefore, it obliquely made the crisis a fait accompli. Quite the opposite, the government ordered sealing of the land and sea borders along with mobilising forces to stem the inflow of the Rohingyas. This refoulement was criticised by many “Responsibility To Protect (R2P)” advocates as a backdrop of apathy and inaction. [49], [50] Bangladesh used its non-signatory status of the 1951 Refugee Convention as a logic for its non-complacence, although it has ratified a variety of relevant treaties and conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As a second point, institutes outside government circles like the National Human Rights Commission Bangladesh (NHRCB) used flawed interpretations of international refugee law to disqualify the status of Rohingyas as asylum seekers by mooting that “actions of non-state actors did not comprise ‘persecution’ and therefore that the incoming Rohingyas did not qualify for asylum status” up until the Myanmar President openly justified the expulsion.[51] Even if the Rohingyas are persecuted only by non-state actors, section 65 of the “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugee” provides a clear understanding that the agents of persecution can be state agents as well as non-state actors.

Remaining silent and failing to raise a flag to garner international attention till 2017 bred further Rohingya atrocities.

Concerning the above points, an argument seems to be spiralling within some realpolitik and pragmatic pundits that when Myanmar opens up in dialogue, the Rohingya issue should not hinder efforts to improve relations with the country. Rather, Bangladesh should focus on ‘constructive engagements’ and the ‘look-east-policy’ rather than the Rohingya crisis. While Bangladesh continues to put aside the Rohingya issue, Myanmar continues its policy of ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas in Myanmar.[52] Thirdly, the electronic and print media in Bangladesh constantly crafted Rohingyas as ‘intruders’ and ‘infiltrators’ and nurtured ‘anti-Rohingya’ sentiments within the Bangladeshi community. These media contents generally lacked tolerance and were filled with “injudicious patriotism and petty nationalism.” This over-securitization process led to us-versus-them rhetoric in society.

Numerous security concerns often accompany the securitisation process of Rohingyas in Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s Department of Narcotics Control (BDNC) issues that the Bangladesh-Myanmar border has emerged as a crucial gateway for illegal drug trafficking. Yaba or ‘madness drug’ has gained popularity in Bangladesh alongside the Rohingya influx. Consequently, in a global aspect, Bangladesh became a transit point for international drug trafficking from the ‘Golden Triangle’ (Myanmar, Laos and Thailand) to the West. Criminal activities come abreast with drug trafficking. Authorities claimed that at least 14 criminal groups are present, of which some are reportedly linked to Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) camps in Bangladesh.[53], [54] These two issues have increased the securitisation of Rohingyas in Bangladesh to a much greater extent since 2017. Their movements are restricted. Owning a cell phone is barred. The spheres of criminal punishments have increased. Factors such as overpopulation, lack of resources and vacant land area crises associated with the Rohingya influx in Bangladesh have been the word on the streets at national and global levels. Many case studies show that their mere presence in Bangladesh creates anguish and stress within the host community as they are changing the demographic elements. Many Rohingyas have been human trafficked to countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, which indicates the inefficacy of human security regimes in South and Southeast Asia.[55] The emergence of Islamic radicalism and militancy in association with the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh is also a pressing concern. “The ARSA militant group continues to have a prominent presence in the camps and could launch cross-border raids on Myanmar’s security forces, as it did in January 2018.”[56] Bangladesh is heavily concerned about this security issue as “this prolonged refugee crisis has been and continues to be exploited by various transnational terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic States (IS).”[57] Arguably, both countries are complacent about robust connectivity development, fearing that this may further increase the Rohingya influx.[58]

However, at variance with the security concerns mentioned before, Rohingya aren’t in Bangladesh by choice, let alone being economic migrants. They are rendered ‘de jure stateless’ individuals subject to genocidal atrocities. Resource constraints of Bangladesh might not be a valid ground for the refoulement of Rohingyas while they are dehumanised across the border. The allegation that Rohingyas are involved in criminality more than the locals is not borne by facts but rather is a stereotypical view of asylum seekers/refugees held worldwide. There is no comprehensive research or police analysis to back this security concern. Conversely, there are narratives of Rohingyas being exploited by the locals as voiceless people who make the perfect scapegoats for any societal blame. In addition, “Rohingyas have been blamed for usurping Bangladesh labour market in countries like Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, and when they are engaged in criminal activities in those countries, the blame falls on Bangladeshi workers”. These are mere conjectures with little to no evidence. Furthermore, if these Rohingyas had indeed travelled with Bangladeshi passports, it reflects poorly on the immigration and passport departments of the Bangladesh government in terms of their laxity. Moreover, many Rohingyas received a modest level of favourable treatment in Saudi Arabia for their stateless identity. Since 1992, the Bangladeshi government has had a policy of denying Rohingya refugee status; post 1992, “late arrived” Rohingyas created squatter settlements in a disorganised way, unlike those who arrived before then. This ill-conceived policy of Bangladesh created disorganisation where the Rohingyas were bound to rely on different resources in the host communities, which hence created a lasting negative impact on the environment and society.[59] This author surveyed the camps in Chattogram and discovered some different situations. The resentment between both the host civilians and the Rohingyas has increased. In some parts of Teknaf, the demography has severely changed as the Rohingyas outnumbered the hosts. As they are not allowed to move freely and work just like the Bengalis, petty crimes are often committed. Some NGO workers informed the author that they do not remain in the ground after dusk as the camps become riskier for the hosts.

Since 1992, the Bangladeshi government has had a policy of denying Rohingya refugee status; post 1992, “late arrived” Rohingyas created squatter settlements in a disorganised way, unlike those who arrived before then.

However, Bangladesh has used Rohingya issues as per its narrow interest. As already discussed above, the Bangladesh government had under-securitised the Rohingya crisis until 2017, when international pressure started to increase. At that point, the government of Bangladesh started creating discourses as the most humane government for being the host for the Rohingyas. Political populist narration ensured national and global support for the existing ruling parties. Whenever the restrictive refoulement procedure of the Bangladesh government started to backfire and the party got reelected, the political narratives started to shift towards the securitisation of the Rohingyas.[60] The perplexing policy framework of Bangladesh regarding under and over-securitization of the Rohingya issues based on off-key arguments outlines that it formulates its policies as a response to events, not strategically. This shows that Bangladesh’s policy approach comprises a “tactical reaction to the global situation rather than a strategic response as a product of careful calculations. In other words, it tends to be reactive rather than proactive”.[61] In this case, such a reactionary policy approach puts millions of lives at stake. A strategic foreign policy would have calculated the issue perceptively, allowing Bangladesh to whistleblow the crisis at the outset. This reactive foreign policy outlook underpins the issue as an unresolvable ‘Sisyphean endeavour.’

Doing the Needful

In the scholarly academic realm, thousands of recommendation frameworks exist to resolve this crisis. However, none of those recommendations are useful, as the root issues remain unaddressed. The discussed historical narratives, identity construction and islamophobia have been the impediments to the resolution. World leaders have to address the ethnic cleansing that is done with narratives and politicised securitisation. Moreover, Bangladesh, the neighbouring host country, uses the issue for its own populist purposes.  Reactionary approaches towards the Rohingya crisis can hardly save the lives of millions. Readers must address the underlying loops in Rohingyas’s identity formation and historical development. In the above discussion, the unaddressed arguments have been discussed so that the future can halt this Sisyphean complexity of the Rohingya crisis.

 

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Mohammad Istiaq Jawad holds a Master’s in International Relations. The independent researcher is a specialist in the analysis of Bangladesh’s foreign policy and nationalism, as well as an expert in the financial sector. To consolidate the understanding of the topic, the author conducted a field survey at Rohingya Camps in Teknaf, Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. The survey lasted 03 days, from 30th August to 01st September 2024. During the survey, this author conducted interviews with nine interviewees, who were Rohingyas, refugees, and social workers. All of them demanded to remain anonymous due to their security concern. This author is grateful to the following fellow researchers; Mr. Md Saiful Islam, Mr. Pavel Das and Mr. Akhlakur Rahman for assisting in the survey. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.

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[1] Herbert Butterfield, The historical novel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[2] C.R. Abrar, Repatriation of Rohingya Refugees, Burma Library, https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/docs/Abrar-repatriation.htm.

[3] Aman Ullah, Arakan doesn’t belong to Rakhine Buddhists alone, The Rohingya Post, https://www.rohingyapost.com/arakan-doesnt-belong-to-rakhine-buddhists-alone/.

[4] Aman Ullah, Dr Edward Hamilton Johnston and Anandacandra Stone Inscription, The Rohingya Post, https://www.rohingyapost.com/dr-edward-hamilton-johnston-and-anandacandra-stone-inscription/.

[5] The Anandacandra Stone Inscription (2018) – memory of the World Committee for Asia and the Pacific (2021) Memory of the World Committee for Asia and the Pacific, https://www.mowcapunesco.org/register/the-anandacandra-stone-inscription-republic-of-the-union-of-myanmar-2018/.

[6] Aman Ullah, Arakan doesn’t belong to Rakhine Buddhists alone, The Rohingya Post, https://www.rohingyapost.com/arakan-doesnt-belong-to-rakhine-buddhists-alone/.

[7] Habib Siddiqui, “Muslim identity and demography in the Arakan State of Burma,” SSRN Electronic Journal [Preprint], doi:10.2139/ssrn.1949971.

[8] Aman Ullah, Arakan doesn’t belong to Rakhine Buddhists alone, The Rohingya Post, https://www.rohingyapost.com/arakan-doesnt-belong-to-rakhine-buddhists-alone/.

[9] Arthur P. Phayre, History of Burma: From the Earliest time to the end of the First War with British India.

[10] Khin Maung Saw, Islamization of Burma through Chittagonian Bengalis as “Rohingya Refugees,” Online Burma/Myanmar Library, https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Khin-Maung-Saw-NM-2011-09-Islamanisation_of_Burma_through_Chittagonian_Bengalis-en.pdf.

[11] Idem.

[12] C.R. Abrar, Repatriation of Rohingya Refugees, Burma Library, https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/docs/Abrar-repatriation.htm.

[13] Khin Maung Saw, Islamization of Burma through Chittagonian Bengalis as “Rohingya Refugees,” Online Burma/Myanmar Library, https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Khin-Maung-Saw-NM-2011-09-Islamanisation_of_Burma_through_Chittagonian_Bengalis-en.pdf.

[14] Aye Kyaw, An Historian Looks at Rohingya, THE IRRAWADDY, https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=18388&Submit=Submit.

[15] Khin Maung Saw, Islamization of Burma through Chittagonian Bengalis as “Rohingya Refugees,” Online Burma/Myanmar Library, https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Khin-Maung-Saw-NM-2011-09-Islamanisation_of_Burma_through_Chittagonian_Bengalis-en.pdf.

[16] Habib Siddiqui, “Muslim identity and demography in the Arakan State of Burma,” SSRN Electronic Journal [Preprint], doi:10.2139/ssrn.1949971.

[17] Idem.

[18] Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.

[19] Sreeparna Banerjee, The Rohingya crisis and its impact on Bangladesh-Myanmar relations, orfonline.org, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-rohingya-crisis-and-its-impact-on-bangladesh-myanmar-relations.

[20] C. Christine Fair, “The making of the Rohingya genocide and Myanmar’s impunity,” Current History, 118(807), 149–153, doi:10.1525/curh.2019.118.807.149.

[21] Khin Maung Saw, Islamization of Burma through Chittagonian Bengalis as “Rohingya Refugees,” Online Burma/Myanmar Library, https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Khin-Maung-Saw-NM-2011-09-Islamanisation_of_Burma_through_Chittagonian_Bengalis-en.pdf.

[22] Aye Kyaw, An Historian Looks at Rohingya, THE IRRAWADDY, https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=18388&Submit=Submit.

[23] C. Christine Fair, “The making of the Rohingya genocide and Myanmar’s impunity,” Current History, 118(807), 149–153, doi:10.1525/curh.2019.118.807.149.

[24] C.R. Abrar, Repatriation of Rohingya Refugees, Burma Library, https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/docs/Abrar-repatriation.htm.

[25] Sreeparna Banerjee, The Rohingya crisis and its impact on Bangladesh-Myanmar relations, orfonline.org, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-rohingya-crisis-and-its-impact-on-bangladesh-myanmar-relations.

[26] C. Christine Fair, “The making of the Rohingya genocide and Myanmar’s impunity,” Current History, 118(807), 149–153, doi:10.1525/curh.2019.118.807.149.

[27] Sreeparna Banerjee, The Rohingya crisis and its impact on Bangladesh-Myanmar relations, orfonline.org, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-rohingya-crisis-and-its-impact-on-bangladesh-myanmar-relations.

[28] U Khin Maung Saw, The ‘Rohingyas’, Who Are They? The Origin of the name ‘Rohingya,’ Mahanriban Calcutta Research Group, http://www.mcrg.ac.in/WC_2015/Reading/D_stateless_Refugee.pdf.

[29] Khin Maung Saw, Islamization of Burma through Chittagonian Bengalis as “Rohingya Refugees,” Online Burma/Myanmar Library, https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Khin-Maung-Saw-NM-2011-09-Islamanisation_of_Burma_through_Chittagonian_Bengalis-en.pdf.

[30] U Khin Maung Saw, The ‘Rohingyas’, Who Are They? The Origin of the name ‘Rohingya,’ Mahanriban Calcutta Research Group, http://www.mcrg.ac.in/WC_2015/Reading/D_stateless_Refugee.pdf.

[31] Habib Siddiqui, “Muslim identity and demography in the Arakan State of Burma,” SSRN Electronic Journal [Preprint], doi:10.2139/ssrn.1949971.

[32] Moshe Yegar, Between integration and secession: The Muslim communities of the southern philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma, Lanham, Md: Lexington Books.

[33] U Khin Maung Saw, The ‘Rohingyas’, Who Are They? The Origin of the name ‘Rohingya,’ Mahanriban Calcutta Research Group, http://www.mcrg.ac.in/WC_2015/Reading/D_stateless_Refugee.pdf.

[34] Aye Kyaw, An Historian Looks at Rohingya, THE IRRAWADDY, https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=18388&Submit=Submit.

[35] Habib Siddiqui, “Muslim identity and demography in the Arakan State of Burma,” SSRN Electronic Journal [Preprint], doi:10.2139/ssrn.1949971.

[36] Oscar Fernandes, Brainy Quote, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/oscar_fernandes_633583?src=t_terrorism.

[37] C. Christine Fair, “The making of the Rohingya genocide and Myanmar’s impunity,” Current History, 118(807), 149–153, doi:10.1525/curh.2019.118.807.149.

[38] U Khin Maung Saw, The ‘Rohingyas’, Who Are They? The Origin of the name ‘Rohingya,’ Mahanriban Calcutta Research Group, http://www.mcrg.ac.in/WC_2015/Reading/D_stateless_Refugee.pdf.

[39] C. Christine Fair, “The making of the Rohingya genocide and Myanmar’s impunity,” Current History, 118(807), 149–153, doi:10.1525/curh.2019.118.807.149.

[40] Khin Maung Saw, Islamization of Burma through Chittagonian Bengalis as “Rohingya Refugees,” Online Burma/Myanmar Library, https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Khin-Maung-Saw-NM-2011-09-Islamanisation_of_Burma_through_Chittagonian_Bengalis-en.pdf.

[41] C. Christine Fair, “The making of the Rohingya genocide and Myanmar’s impunity,” Current History, 118(807), 149–153, doi:10.1525/curh.2019.118.807.149.

[42] Aye Kyaw, An Historian Looks at Rohingya, THE IRRAWADDY, https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=18388&Submit=Submit.

[43] Ghazi bin Muhammad, A thinking person’s guide to islam: The essence of islam in 12 verses from the Qurʼan, London: White Thread Press : Turath Publishing.

[44] C. Christine Fair, “The making of the Rohingya genocide and Myanmar’s impunity,” Current History, 118(807), 149–153, doi:10.1525/curh.2019.118.807.149.

[45] Khaled Imran, “Refugee, Migrants and the Displaced,” BSS (Hons) Course in Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP), Dhaka: Mirpur, July 14, 2017.

[46] Taufiq-e-Faruque, “Bangladesh’s policy on Rohingya Refugees: Securitization or what?,” NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability, 28–47, doi:10.37540/njips.v3i2.54.

[47] Jef Huysmans, The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU, London: Routledge.

[48] C. R Abrar, Multilevel Approaches to Human Security and Conflict Management: The Rohingya Case, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05811.

[49] Idem.

[50] Amal de Chickera, Stateless and persecuted: What next for the Rohingya?, migrationpolicy.org, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/stateless-persecuted-rohingya.

[51] C. R Abrar, Multilevel Approaches to Human Security and Conflict Management: The Rohingya Case, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05811.

[52] C.R. Abrar, Rohingyas: Asylum seekers, not infiltrators, The Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-239719.

[53]  Idem.

[54] Iftekharul Bashar, “Rohingya Crisis and Western Myanmar’s Evolving Threat Landscape,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 11(06), 14–18.

[55] Sreeparna Banerjee, The Rohingya crisis and its impact on Bangladesh-Myanmar relations, orfonline.org, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-rohingya-crisis-and-its-impact-on-bangladesh-myanmar-relations.

[56] International Crisis Group. Bangladesh-myanmar: The danger of forced Rohingya repatriation | crisis group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b153-bangladesh-myanmar-danger-forced-rohingya-repatriation.

[57] Iftekharul Bashar, “Rohingya Crisis and Western Myanmar’s Evolving Threat Landscape,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 11(06), 14–18.

[58] Sreeparna Banerjee, The Rohingya crisis and its impact on Bangladesh-Myanmar relations, orfonline.org, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-rohingya-crisis-and-its-impact-on-bangladesh-myanmar-relations.

[59] C.R. Abrar, Rohingyas: Asylum seekers, not infiltrators, The Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-239719.

[60] Taufiq-e-Faruque, “Bangladesh’s policy on Rohingya Refugees: Securitization or what?,” NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability, 28–47, doi:10.37540/njips.v3i2.54.

[61] Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, Balancing Bangladesh’s foreign policy, The Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/opinion/perspective/balancing-bangladeshs-foreign-policy-1619698.