Abstract: Emerging technologies (ETs) in the military, including AI, Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems, robotics, hypersonic, and cyber weapons, are dubbed “disruptive technologies” because of their potential to pose serious challenges to offensive strategic forces, nuclear command and control, and communications and intelligence systems. These technologies escalate crisis instability by increasing uncertainty. In South Asia, a region that already faces strategic instability, emerging technologies offer both opportunities and challenges. Their rapid integration into military and defence systems can significantly alter the balance of power. After 1998, nuclear deterrence became the core of Pakistan’s security policy; however, it is now challenged by India’s quest to acquire critical military technologies.
Problem statement: Does India’s development of emerging military technologies destabilise the strategic balance in South Asia?
So what?: While the acquisition of emerging military technologies will profoundly impact the strategic stability in South Asia, nuclear deterrence can still play a considerable role in maintaining peace and stability in the region. South Asia has already been prone to territorial disputes, resulting in four major wars between Pakistan and India. However, after the 1998 nuclear tests, the two states have been at relative peace. However, the development of emerging technologies such as AI, ASATs, hypersonic missile technology, and cyber weapons present new risks and may disturb the strategic balance between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
Source: shutterstock.com/kentoh
Leading Global Powers
Globally, India is the fourth country after Russia, the US, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to demonstrate hypersonic missile capabilities.[1] The country is also developing its own advanced missile defence systems in collaboration with the US and Israel, along with acquiring S-400 from Russia. For instance, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) jointly developed Barak-8, a surface-to-air missile system designed to protect against a variety of airborne threats, including aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and combat jets.[2] Pakistan sees such advancements as a direct threat to its second-strike capability, as they can potentially compromise the survivability and operational readiness of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, thereby undermining the country’s credible minimum deterrence.[3]
IAI and DRDO jointly developed Barak-8, a surface-to-air missile system designed to protect against a variety of airborne threats.
More recently, the Indian military has launched over a thousand sophisticated start-ups in defence and aerospace domains to develop AI-powered unmanned aerial vehicles, swarm drones, artificial intelligence, quantum communications, imaging sensors, image processing, and space-based surveillance systems.[4] According to Indian media reports, New Delhi has already deployed approximately 140 AI-based surveillance systems along its northwestern border with Pakistan.[5] As a result, a regional arms race driven by technological advancements is intensifying, eroding the traditional boundaries between nuclear and conventional arms.[6] The erosion of this boundary poses a serious risk of nuclear escalation in South Asia, already marked by instability.
Contrary to India’s military pursuits, Pakistan’s approach has been reactive and has sought to balance the strategic equation with India. For Pakistan, India’s acquisition of cutting-edge technologies is a looming threat to strategic stability, given the proven gap in conventional military capabilities between the two adversaries.[7] Although Pakistan has not officially declared the use of emerging technologies to deter India, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has introduced the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computing (CENTAIC). CENTAIC is considered Pakistan’s vanguard of military AI development, which will enable the military to integrate AI into its operational and strategic domain.[8]
Analysing India’s Acquisition of Emerging Technologies of Warfare
India justifies the acquisition of military ETs on the notion of countering the PRC’s growing military prowess and fulfilling its designated responsibility of a ‘net security provider’ in the region.[9] However, the acquisition and transfer of critical ETs have serious security implications for Pakistan in the context of the strategic stability of the region.
India has made notable strides in AI research. On the one hand, this sophisticated technology enhances military decision-making and situational awareness. The development of the Rustom-2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) exemplifies this.[10] On the other hand, it poses a risk of creating strategic instability. For instance, India’s AI Task Force is working on surveillance systems called the Multi-Agent Robotics Framework (MARF) and unmanned underwater vehicles such as Matsya, which can operate with minimal human involvement, raising risks of accidental engagements and escalation. These advancements improve India’s operational efficiency and bolster its cyber warfare capabilities by providing secure communication and offensive options to attack adversary assets, including those of Pakistan.[11]
Cyberwarfare is another critical domain in which India has developed capabilities focused on targeting Pakistan.[12] Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and valuable assets such as dams, nuclear power plants, and command and control systems could destabilise Pakistan’s economy and security. Reports by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) indicate that India’s offensive cyber potential[13] is particularly “Pakistan-focused,” and New Delhi has collaborated with international partners, including the US, to strengthen its cyber offensive capabilities.
Reports by the IISS indicate that India’s offensive cyber potential is particularly “Pakistan-focused”.
India’s recent test of hypersonic missiles undertaken by India’s Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) on November 16, 2024, is equally concerning for Pakistan’s security. Hypersonic missiles travel at speeds greater than Mach 5 with the ability to manoeuvre at these speeds. A hypersonic missile’s high velocity, unpredictable trajectory, and ability to manoeuvre during flight overwhelm traditional air defence systems, which are designed to counter slower and more predictable targets. India’s BrahMos-II programme, based on hypersonic scramjet technology, exemplifies its efforts to develop weapons capable of bypassing air defence systems. These weapons pose significant challenges to South Asian deterrence stability as they can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.[14]
Advancing the sophistication of its missile programme, India has led to missile systems, such as the Prithvi, Prahaar, and Agni missile series, including the intercontinental Agni-V. The development of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) like Agni-V with a range of about 5000 kilometres, which is targeted at the PRC, also deepens Pakistan’s security concerns.[15] India’s pursuit of space-based technologies also signals its intent to dominate future military conflicts. ISRO and DRDO are advancing India’s space command and developing capabilities such as anti-satellite missiles and satellite guidance systems such as navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC),[16] which improve India’s surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities. On March 27, 2019, India tested anti-satellite (ASAT) missile technology,[17] an indigenous missile to hit satellites in low earth orbit. India’s pursuit of ETs enhances its military posture but raises significant regional security concerns, particularly for Pakistan.
For instance, AI-powered armed drones increase the risk of unintended engagement between the two nuclear-weapon states. The swift and autonomous responses can bypass human intervention and lead to a full-scale war, including a nuclear exchange. Another example is AI-based surveillance systems, which improve real-time targeting capabilities. India has already deployed this technology on its border with Pakistan, which could potentially lead to a preemptive strike. India’s growing reliance on ETs in military operations underscores the urgent need for robust safeguards and confidence-building measures (CBMs) to prevent unintended escalations and maintain strategic stability in South Asia.
Mapping Strategic Implications of India’s Pursuits of ETs on Pakistan’s Security
In addition, India’s application of AI in the military domain has enhanced its defensive and offensive capabilities.[18] Enhancing India’s offensive capabilities would force Pakistan to take the required steps to maintain and strengthen its warfighting capabilities.[19] For instance, the two competitors can race to integrate AI into early warning systems, which would be a critical element in reducing decision-making time, thus creating a ‘fog of war’ scenario.[20] In addition, Pakistan’s drive to induct AI and machine learning would help, among other things, to enhance situational awareness about India’s military preparedness by enabling real-time analysis of surveillance data and early detection of shifts in India’s military posture. This will allow a quicker and more strategic response.
India’s application of AI in the military domain has enhanced its defensive and offensive capabilities.
Along with strategic partnerships with great powers such as the US and Russia, India has also made efforts to develop its own military technologies indigenously. The PRC factor drives New Delhi’s collaboration with the US,[21] allowing it to pursue the path of strategic force modernisation. India deliberately wants to push Pakistan into an arms race to cripple its fragile economy. Given this backdrop, Pakistan should effectively counter India’s motives by adopting specific policies as well as technological measures within its resource constraints.
Effective Deterrence Posture
Pakistan requires a comprehensive national security plan to address emerging security challenges. The regional security and deterrence matrix is becoming more complex due to India’s rapid military modernisation and growing conventional capabilities,[22] which are supported by strategic partnerships such as the Indo-US defence agreements. For instance, the US and India have significantly expanded their military cooperation through engagements such as annual air and maritime exercises and also advancing defense trade. Since 2008, India has contracted for more than $20 billion worth of US-origin defence articles,[23] reflecting a deepening defence relationship. These developments put Pakistan’s credible minimum nuclear deterrent posture under considerable pressure. For instance, India’s acquisition of advanced missile systems, such as the Russian S-400 air defence system, and its growing naval power in the Indian Ocean create strategic imbalances.[24] Against this backdrop, India is leveraging its superior air and missile defence systems to neutralise Pakistan’s second-strike capability during a conflict, which seriously risks undermining deterrence stability in the region.
Technological Countermeasures
According to a 2020 report released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Pakistan’s investment in AI is very low and depends on foreign technology, as it invested only 367 million rupees (USD 1.32 million) in 2018 for three AI projects.[25] Pakistan can collaborate with its strategic partners, such as the PRC, to overcome technological asymmetry vis-à-vis India. Along with the PRC as a reliable option, Pakistan should never skip the option of developing an indigenous technological base that is critical for its defence and security.[26]
Pakistan can collaborate with its strategic partners, such as the PRC, to overcome technological asymmetry vis-à-vis India.
Strengthening Conventional Forces
Pakistan should develop its conventional capabilities as the first and foremost means of defence. Pakistan has an unequal conventional equation with India owing to its weaker economic prowess, which has led Islamabad to rely on nuclear deterrence, thereby lowering the nuclear threshold. Furthermore, nuclear deterrence is more cost-effective for Pakistan because the cost of its conventional forces is at least six times higher than that of the nuclear forces.[27]
Diplomatic Initiatives
There is also a greater need to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan through confidence-building measures (CBMs). India needs to reflect on its conventional build-up, nuclear, and missile programs that Pakistan sees as a threat. India and Pakistan need to ease tensions in the region by improving their relations and reviving bilateral diplomatic talks that have ceased since 2008. However, India remains reluctant to engage in dialogue.[28] It has negated Pakistan’s initiatives, such as the Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), which could help ensure stability in the region.[29] Collectively, they need to target the root causes of insecurities and adopt conflict resolution measures. As the two South Asian neighbours face severe non-traditional security challenges, they need to invest less in armament and more in human development.
A Way Forward
The emergence of new technologies, such as AI, cyber warfare capabilities, hypersonic missiles, missile defence systems, and unmanned drones, offers both opportunities and challenges. In South Asia, ETs, such as AI-enabled weapon systems, pose risks of miscalculations and accidental escalations. Currently, India has a potential technological edge in ETs over Pakistan, posing a serious threat to regional strategic stability. To counterbalance this, Pakistan needs to develop technological countermeasures and enhance its conventional military capabilities to prevent future conflicts from escalating into a nuclear confrontation. Pakistan and India must prioritise diplomatic initiatives to improve bilateral relations and avoid an arms race in the region. For Pakistan, the challenge is to balance its security needs and the risk of an arms race in the region.
Zamzam Channa is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), based in Islamabad, Pakistan. She holds a Bachelor’s in International Relations from the University of Sindh, Jamshoro. Her areas of research interest are global security and stability, emerging technologies of war, and great power rivalry. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.
[1] Prateek Tripathi, “How Hypersonic Weapons Are Redefining Warfare,” Observer Research Foundation, May 02, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-hypersonic-weapons-are-redefining-warfare.
[2] Mercy A. Kuo, “India-Israel Defense and Security Cooperation,” The Diplomat, November 19, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/india-israel-defense-and-security-cooperation/.
[3] Saddaf Sultaana, “India-Israel Defence Cooperation: Security Implications for Pakistan,” Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses 7, no. 1 (July 12, 2021).
[4] Ajay Kumar and Tejas Bharadwaj, “One Year of the INDUS-X: Defense Innovation Between India and the U.S.,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 18, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/one-year-of-the-indus-x-defense-innovation-between-india-and-the-us?lang=en.
[5] Zohaib Altaf and Nimrah Javed, “The Militarization of AI in South Asia,” South Asian Voices, January 16, 2024, https://southasianvoices.org/sec-c-pk-r-militarization-of-ai-01-16-2024/.
[6] Laurence Norman, Daniel Kiss, Ming Li, and Peter Saidel, “The Bomb Is Back as the Risk of Nuclear War Enters a New Age,” The Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/nuclear-bomb-weapons-war-explained-01d6e397.
[7] M. Q. Mustafa, “Pakistan’s Military Security and Conventional Balance of Power,” Strategic Studies 28 (2008): 35–44.
[8] Umaima Ali, “Comparing the AI-Military Integration by India and Pakistan,” Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research, September 07, 2023, https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/comparing-the-ai-military-integration-by-india-and-pakistan/.
[9] Dinakar Peri, “Indigenous UAV Rustom-2 to Complete User Trials by August 2023,” The Hindu, October 20, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indigenous-uav-rustom-2-to-complete-user-trials-by-august-2023/article66032155.ece.
[10] Antoine Levesques and Viraj Solanki, “Preferred Security Partner: Anchoring India in the Asia-Pacific,” in Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2024, Chapter 3, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2024, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library—content–migration/files/publications—free-files/aprsa-2024/aprsa24-05-chapter-3_sp.pdf.
[11] Safia Mansoor, “India’s AI Militarization: Security Repercussions for Pakistan,” Russian International Affairs Council, June 24, 2024, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/military-and-security/india-s-ai-militarization-security-repercussions-for-pakistan/.
[12] Usman Haider, “Indian Military’s Embrace of Cyber Warfare,” Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies, July 8, 2024, https://casstt.com/indian-militarys-embrace-of-cyber-warfare/.
[13] “India’s Offensive Cyber Capability More Focused on Pakistan Than China, UK Think Tank Says,” The Print, https://theprint.in/india/indias-offensive-cyber-capability-more-focused-on-pakistan-than-china-uk-think-tank-says/685774/.
[14] “India Successfully Tests Long-Range Hypersonic Missile,” The Express Tribune, November 17, 2024, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2510155/india-successfully-tests-long-range-hypersonic-missile.
15] Amun A. Khan, “The Drivers of Indian MIRV Temptations,” Center for International Strategic Studies, Issue no. 5, https://ciss.org.pk/PDFs/Strategic_View_V.pdf.
[16] “NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation), India,” Novatel, https://novatel.com/an-introduction-to-gnss/gnss-constellations/navic.
[17] Ashley J. Tellis, “India’s ASAT Test: An Incomplete Success,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 15, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/04/indias-asat-test-an-incomplete-success?lang=en.
[18] Sonia Naz, “India’s Military Application of AI: Implications for Pakistan,” Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, 2021, https://csspr.uol.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Indias-Application-of-AI-Tech.pdf.
[19] Maha Shahid, “AI in Military Security,” Daily Times, December 17, 2024, https://dailytimes.com.pk/1248397/ai-in-military-security/.
[20] Jawad Ali Shah, “Unravelling Warfare in the Age of AI,” The Defense Horizon Journal, August 22, 2024, https://tdhj.org/blog/post/warfare-ai/.
[21] Z. Khan, “Strategic Conundrum of US–China and India–Pakistan: A Perspective,” Margalla Papers 20, no. 1 (2016).
[22] National Security Policy of Pakistan (2022–2026), National Security Division, 2022.
[23] India-U.S.: Major Arms Transfers and Military Exercises, Congressional Research Service, updated December 5, 2024.
[24] Shaza Arif, “India’s Acquisition of the S-400 Air Defense System: Implications and Options for Pakistan,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, August 25, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2743750/indias-acquisition-of-the-s-400-air-defense-system-implications-and-options-for/.
[25] ] Sonia Naz, “India’s Military Application of AI: Implications for Pakistan,” Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, 2021, https://csspr.uol.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Indias-Application-of-AI-Tech.pdf.
[26] “Indigenisation, Technological Sovereignty, Key to Pakistan’s Defence Evolution: Speakers,” Associated Press of Pakistan, February 14, 2024, https://www.app.com.pk/national/indigenisation-technological-sovereignty-key-to-pakistans-defence-evolution-speakers/.
[27] Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy,” Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA 27, no. 1 (January–March 2003). https://www.idsa.in/publisher/pakistans-nuclear-strategy/.
[28] “India ‘Not in Favour of Talks with Pakistan Unless…’: Amit Shah,” NDTV, September 6, 2024, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-not-in-favour-of-talks-with-pakistan-unless-amit-shah-6507162.
[29] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Arms Control: Risk Reduction Measures Between India and Pakistan,” SASSU Research Paper no. 1 (June 2005), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99910/RP%20No%2001.pdf.
