Abstract: Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European policymakers have gained a renewed sense of how fragile peace is in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). A brief brush through Bosnia’s recent history reveals outstanding issues following the war in the 1990s, foreign meddling in internal politics, as well as an internal secessionist movement on the rise. All these factors point to the necessity of security guarantees. Moreover-due to its location in Europe and the majority of neighbouring Balkan states being part of NATO—the military alliance immediately springs to mind as the logical choice for security guarantees. However, BiH’s bid to enter the Alliance has yet to come to fruition.

Problem statement: In light of BiH’s EU candidacy status, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden’s recent NATO accession, is a political compromise a possibility for BiH’s entry into the Alliance?

So what?: BiH’s political leadership should prioritise national unity over divisive rhetoric and focus on long-term stability through political reform, good governance and inclusive dialogue. The international community, particularly the EU, NATO and the UN, should focus on supporting the strengthening of democratic institutions in BiH as the core of societal resilience domestically and ensuring that BiH’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected internationally. In the end, both local and international efforts are vital to moving beyond the current deadlock and towards NATO accession.

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Paralysed Peace

Whether a sign of stability or political stalemate, there has not been a wide-scale armed conflict on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) since 1995. However, both the EU and the US have failed to press for essential reforms in the country, which has resulted in the state being captured by ethno-nationalistic leaders lacking a common political vision and expending great efforts to memorialise a single historical narrative.

Several other challenges persist, such as the acute lack of human resources, the near-future retirement of a large number of staff from the Armed Forces of BiH and the absence of an update to the BiH Security Policy to reflect the current challenges and trends in the digital era. In addition, there is the situation related to the banking system and the visit of the Council of Europe’s Moneyval team in February 2024 regards fighting money laundering and combating terrorism.[1] Consequently, the absence of functioning domestic checks on systemic abuse has led to there being little in the way of institutional reform and reconciliation, which are essential for any aspirations for lasting peace.

The absence of functioning domestic checks on systemic abuse has led to there being little in the way of institutional reform and reconciliation, which are essential for any aspirations for lasting peace.

Although peacekeeping responsibilities were handed over to the EU’s Operation Althea (EUFOR) in 2004, according to the Dayton Accords, NATO remains BiH’s technical custodian of peace and security. On November 02, 2024, the mandate of EUFOR was renewed[2] at the UN Security Council despite fears that Russia could veto it. This same fear persists every year since the mandate is subject to annual UNSC approval. Still, arguably, an EU-led operation is likely perceived as a better alternative to the possibility of instability or the prospects of reinstalling the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR, later SFOR).

The concerns over Russian influence in BiH do not end only with this decision. Only two days after Russia invaded Ukraine, EUFOR activated and deployed approximately 500 personnel from its reserves stationed outside of BiH, as a precautionary measure to maintain security. The rationale behind this was that the “deterioration of the security situation internationally has the potential to spread instability to Bosnia and Herzegovina”.[3] Altogether, EUFOR comprises approximately 3,500 personnel, and with the reinforcements, the number of deployed forces in BiH increases to 1,100.[4] BiH being in a political stalemate over security issues is not a recent phenomenon, and there have not been any major domestic escalations involving violence or armed clashes. Hence, the timing of this rapid increase clearly shows that the war in Ukraine is perceived as threatening BiH’s stability and security.

Cold War 2.0 in the Balkans?

It is imperative to position BiH’s NATO accession within the current shifting geopolitical environment. In simplified terms, Russia is strategically interested in keeping the Balkans fragmented and divided and stalling their Euro-Atlantic integration. Russia’s main goal in BiH over more than two decades has been to keep the state divided and dysfunctional and to prevent it from developing its own independent foreign policy track, including joining NATO.[5] This was made clear by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to BiH, Igor Kalabukhov, who, a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, stated that BiH’s membership of NATO is an “internal matter”, but pointed out that Ukraine shows what is to be expected in that case and that Russia would respond to any threat.[6]

Russia exerts influence in the country mainly through Bosnia’s post-war constitutional arrangement. The Dayton Accords successfully ended the war, yet it could be argued that they also carved out Republika Srpska (RS) as a separate entity, thereby giving legal status to a majority pro-Serbian state headed by a president, whose activities overlap with Russia’s interests and who is actively seeking support from Moscow. Russia supports Republika Srpska’s aspirations for greater autonomy within BiH, aligning with Moscow’s broader policy of opposing Western-backed centralisation efforts in BiH. Moscow views Republika Srpska as a lever to counterbalance Western influence in the Balkans, a region where “Russia and the West are vying for influence”.[7] Meetings between Dodik and Putin have also become commonplace, and it seems that the representatives of the international community have come to terms with it.[8] Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Dodik has met Putin four times.[9] Republika Srpska’s President Milorad Dodik seeks funding from Moscow, as well as political support for his standoff with the OHR and central state institutions due to his secessionist aspirations.[10] He has also been adamant in his refusal to join Western sanctions against Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine.[11] During their meeting in Moscow in May 2023, Putin said that trade between Russia and Republika Srpska had increased by 57% in the last year, while Dodik said that Republika Srpska “remains pro-Russian, anti-Western, and anti-American”.[12], [13], [14] During his most recent trip to Russia, Dodik was invited to a security conference in St. Petersburg, where Republika Srpska was treated as an independent state, and its flag was placed alongside those of other countries.[15] In his speech regarding contemporary challenges in the sphere of security, he accused the United States of America of waging a “special hybrid war against the RS and Serbia”.[16] Overall, Moscow is capitalising on its connections with the Bosnian Serb leadership and has a direct channel of influence on its politics.

Russia exerts influence in the country mainly through Bosnia’s post-war constitutional arrangement.

Neighbouring Serbia exhibits a style of government that bears an uncanny resemblance to the illiberal democracy also found in Russia, thereby contributing to the spread of Russian influence in Republika Srpska.[17], [18], [19] Much to the resemblance of Russia, where Vladimir Putin presents himself as the defender of Russians in and outside of Russia and has the Russian Church firmly by his side in all endeavours, including military ones; the Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić, presents himself as an advocate for all Serbs on the Balkan peninsula and together with the Serbian Orthodox Church further fuels Serbian ethno-nationalism.[20], [21] Consequently, for instance, in 2023, in Kosovo, dozens of soldiers from KFOR were incapacitated by members of the Serb minority who were loyal to Vučić,[22] thereby undermining the credibility of NATO operability in the region. What had partially led to that was the Belgrade-backed Serbian List party calling on ethnic Serbs to resign from all Kosovar institutions and boycott the upcoming elections amid a dispute with Pristina over license plates.[23] Tensions escalated when ethnic Albanian mayors took office in northern Kosovo’s Serb majority areas. Vucic, who is the commander-in-chief of the Serbian armed forces, raised the army’s combat readiness to the highest level and stationed troops at the border.[24] NATO peacekeepers may have halted the escalation, but Kosovo Serbs still look to Belgrade and Vučić for guidance and support.

Vladimir Putin presents himself as the defender of Russians in and outside of Russia and has the Russian Church firmly by his side in all endeavours.

In Montenegro, the pro-Serbian presidential candidate Jakov Milatović came to power in May 2023 and made his first official visit to Belgrade, where he emphasised a shared “history and traditional closeness” with Serbia.[25] It quickly became clear what the outcome of the two most pressing open issues weighing on the relations between the two countries would look like. Already in 2016, Montenegro had requested the extradition of Svetozar Marović, the former President of the State Union of  Serbia and Montenegro. However, he evades justice by staying in Belgrade.[26] Despite high media attention to the Marovic case in Montenegro, President Milatović quotes assurances given to him by President Vučić without any action being taken.[27] The second outstanding issue was that both countries were expelling each other’s ambassadors. The previous Serbian ambassador to Montenegro, Vladimir Božović, was declared “persona non grata” in 2020, citing interference in the internal affairs of Montenegro as the reason.[28] In turn, Serbia declared Montenegrin Ambassador to Belgrade Tarzan Milosević “persona non grata”, but later withdrew that decision.[29] Vučić supported the Serbian ambassador, and despite his status, Ambassador Božović stayed in Montenegro, attending numerous events of the Serbian Orthodox Church and being active on social media.[30] Two years later, Montenegrin authorities banned him from entering the country due to “malignant influence” in favour of the Russian Federation.[31] Serbia blatantly disregarded the issue and only appointed a new ambassador at the end of Ambassador Božović’s term.[32] In Montenegrin media, President Milatović is seen as dependent on Aleksandar Vučić’s support in post-election combinations with “pro-Serbian parties”, and that was further proven after the Parliamentary elections in June 2023 when Milatović insisted on including political forces from the radically pro-Serb camp in the parliamentary majority.[33], [34] Despite being a NATO member since 2017, the political shift in Montenegro now offers an opportunity for Vučić and Moscow to undermine NATO decision-making and its geopolitical influence in the Western Balkans.

Despite being a NATO member since 2017, the political shift in Montenegro now offers an opportunity for Vučić and Moscow to undermine NATO decision-making and its geopolitical influence in the Western Balkans.

Furthermore, with Croatia being a NATO member since 2009, it would be logical to assume that the ethnic Croats in BiH would be a strong pro-NATO lobby. However, Herzegovinian Croats, who dominate Croat politics in BiH as opposed to the Bosnian Croats, who are more moderate, often support the HDZ BiH party, which has expressed pro-Russian sentiments between the lines.[35] In fact, two of the most influential and polarising political parties in BiH, the Serbian SNSD party and the Croatian HDZ BiH party, also harbour pro-Russian views. For instance, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the HDZ leader Dragan Čović and a few other HDZ BiH members voted against Bosnia joining EU sanctions on Russia.[36] Aside from Dodik, Russia has been supporting Čović, who calls for greater autonomy for Bosnia’s Croat population (as it does not have its own entity).[37] In 2023, he blocked an interconnector pipeline project with Croatia that could have helped Bosnia diversify supplies away from Russia.[38] Essentially, through its proxy relationships with Vučić, Dodik and Čović – Russia keeps the Western Balkans destabilised.[39]

Russia’s ability to indirectly shape local politics derives from its objectives being simpler than those of the EU and the US. The West has sought to persuade local nationalist elites to actively cooperate with the state-building process. However, Russia’s goal has always been to keep things as they are–by ensuring that its proxies obstruct that process.[40] In other words, Russia has never needed to change Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat nationalist leaders’ behaviour; on the contrary, their work to undermine the Bosnian state was a weapon Russia was able to pick up. Overall, Russia has only succeeded in undermining BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration because the US and the EU have progressively disengaged from Bosnia and have instead focused on placating Russian proxies there.

NATO Accession

Contrary to Russia’s divisive role in the Balkans, NATO’s presence and involvement in the region contributes to stability, prevents conflicts, and mitigates the risks of renewed hostilities. Integrating into NATO entails aligning defence structures, military standards, and interoperability with other NATO members, which would consequently result in a more efficient and professionalised defence sector better equipped to address emerging security challenges. The integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into NATO would signal the country’s commitment to peace and stability, fostering trust among neighbouring states and further contributing to the peace and security of the wider Balkan region. NATO membership would offer Bosnia and Herzegovina the opportunity to collaborate closely with neighbouring countries and foster regional cooperation that could extend beyond military matters, encompassing areas such as intelligence sharing, counterterrorism efforts, and disaster response.[41] Moreover, there would also be economic benefits as NATO integration can attract foreign investments, promote economic growth, and improve the country’s infrastructure.[42] As a member of NATO, Bosnia and Herzegovina would benefit from increased trade opportunities, access to NATO’s economic initiatives, and the potential for joint defence projects that would bring about technological advancements.[43] NATO membership requires adherence to democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Hence, the integration process would encourage reforms in governance, administration, and the judiciary, fostering transparency and accountability.

NATO membership requires adherence to democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

Overall, the integration process necessitates significant institutional reforms and modernisation efforts, which would contribute to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s development and further bring it closer to fulfilling the EU accession criteria. However, a survey on national perceptions towards NATO from 2023 illustrated a notable distinction. 84.1% had a positive perception in the Federation of BiH, whereas only 29.4% had it in Republika Srpska.[44] Despite the positive prospects of NATO accession, it seems that a sizable proportion of the citizens of BiH are not of favourable disposition towards NATO. This could be examined as an indirect result of two main challenges that continuously hamper the accession progress of BiH to NATO, namely, the partial absence of political will and the glaring threat of secession.

Political Appetite

Following the general elections in 2022, the ruling coalition signed a document featuring the country’s ambition to join the EU. However, there was no reference to its aspirations towards NATO.[45] This decline in political appetite to further pursue NATO integration is spearheaded by the Serb-dominated part of the country and the legal reforms in Republika Srpska. This simply drains most of the political attention regarding domestic issues.[46] Moreover, in the RS, objections to NATO accession for BiH are based on an emotional perspective linked to trauma experienced by RS and Serbia during the NATO military interventions in BiH (1995) and Kosovo (1999). In a joint NATO press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić described the reasons hindering cooperation between Serbia and NATO as “emotional issues, psychological issues, and mainly because of 1999 and because of Kosovo issues”.[47] This sentiment is mirrored in RS. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has strengthened its disinformation campaign in Southeast Europe—particularly in regard to Euro-Atlantic integration. In turn, this has resulted in considerable sections of society holding a positive image of Russia and its political leadership.[48] As highlighted by OSCE officials, if the political course in Serbia shifts in regards to NATO and the way it is perceived, that would directly impact the sentiments in RS as well.[49] There is a need to provide accurate information and highlight the benefits of reform efforts in BiH with a particular emphasis on activities that link key stakeholders: government, parliament, judiciary, civil society and media.[50] However, reports from 2023 describe Russian influence and disinformation efforts as “stable”,[51] leaving little room for optimistic forecasts.

Furthermore, ethnic Serbs and Croats have their kin states bordering BiH, with a significant number having dual citizenship. Bosniaks, however, lack any kin state and have no state to grant them citizenship and, by extension, protection easily. Hence, they are the primary group with a vested interest in joining NATO. Statistical data shows that between 2012 (the year before Croatia entered the EU) and 2021, the number of newborn Bosnian Croats decreased by 22 per cent, and the number of newborn Bosniaks decreased by 23 per cent. In contrast, the number of newborn Bosnian Serbs in BiH decreased by just 5 per cent.[52] Deducting from this data, the constituent peoples, among which the most secessionist supporters could be found, are the ones with the lowest brain drain and highest birth rate.

Ethnic Serbs and Croats have their kin states bordering BiH, with a significant number having dual citizenship.

Secession

Given BiH’s recent history, it is unsurprising that secession remains part of the political discourse. In addition to the threat posed by state capture by ethno-nationalist politicians who lack the political will to push for reforms, the other major threat is the glaring possibility of secession that could potentially trigger another armed conflict. Over the past decade, the territorial and legal integrity and sovereignty of BiH have been under attack by the Bosnian Serb political leadership. For instance, the celebration of a Day of Republika Srpska (DoRS) was declared a “violation of the constitutional obligation of non-discrimination” by the Constitutional Court of BiH in November 2015 January 09 is controversial as it marks the 1992 declaration of secession by Bosnian Serbs, leading to the creation of the Republic of Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This event sparked the brutal four-year Bosnian War, resulting in over 100,000 deaths. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the day is seen as a painful reminder of the war’s devastating consequences.[53] Moreover, the date coincides with that of St. Stephen,[54] thus further placing emphasis on Serbian traditions and symbols. The celebration strengthens a Bosnian Serb-centric identity and statehood, allowing the SNSD party to position itself as the defender of a separate ethnic group. This focus on distinct identity contrasts with efforts for integration into Bosnia and Herzegovina and Euro-Atlantic structures. It reinforces the party’s stance against broader national unity. For instance, in 2023, the celebration featured paramilitary marches by the pro-Russian radical motorcycle gang Night Wolves.

Furthermore, Republika Srpska’s highest distinction was awarded to Vladimir Putin. These actions clearly show the geopolitical course of the leadership of RS.[55], [56] This year, the celebration once more featured a parade of paramilitary and police forces—a clear violation of BiH’s constitution and disregard for court rulings and promotion of Bosnian Serb identity serves as a tool for political gains. It reinforces a nationalistic agenda, and it could impact a referendum on secession from BiH. This stance supports an independent foreign policy and delays NATO integration, favouring a claim of neutrality. In October 2017, the RS National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the military neutrality of Republika Srpska[57] and thereby provided politicians with a legal instrument to defer pressure from Sarajevo or the international community to join NATO and gave legitimacy to a NATO-sceptic stance.

Milorad Dodik’s rhetoric and political clasp of RS throughout the years have resulted in political hurdles for further steps towards NATO integration. This, in turn, is a testament to the failure of the Western strategy of appeasement towards Dodik.[58] Even US sanctions against Dodik in response to obstructing the implementation of the Dayton Accords and his calls for secession have not had any tangible impact or halted his secessionist rhetoric.[59] The West’s approach to the Western Balkans is one of deterrence coupled with incentives of joining the Euro-Atlantic space. However, de-escalation in the form of appeasing Dodik has proven counter-productive and eerily reminiscent of that towards Putin in relation to Georgia.[60]

Milorad Dodik’s rhetoric and political clasp of RS throughout the years have resulted in political hurdles for further steps towards NATO integration.

A similar scenario where deterrence failed could be seen in other frozen conflicts as well as in Ukraine. Deterrence fails to consider the intensity of sentiments, further reinforced by propaganda and disinformation in RS. Still, the low percentage of public support for NATO integration[61] clearly shows that these should not be neglected. Secession in BiH was indeed a threat identified by NATO in 2023. At the NATO 2023 Summit in Vilnius, Heads of State and Government expressed their support for “the territorial integrity in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other relevant international agreements”.[62] They urged political leaders to “refrain from divisive and secessionist rhetoric and actions”.[63] However, there was no such strong language following the NATO 2024 Summit in Washington DC, where NATO only restated its commitment to support the security and defence capabilities of BiH and to enhance their capacity to counter hybrid threats”.[64], [65]

NATO: The Way Ahead?

Bosnia and Herzegovina joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 2006, followed by invitation in 2010 to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance.[66] However, despite these milestones, Allied foreign ministers have repeatedly called on Bosnian authorities to resolve the key issue of registering its immovable defence property with the state.[67] Drawing on fears of creeping unitarisation of BiH, which could result in the integration of the RS Ministry of Interior’s Police into BiH structures, Republika Srpska opposes the move and holds that it constitutes an infringement on its sovereignty.[68] Nonetheless, in December 2018, Alliance foreign ministers decided that NATO was ready to accept the submission of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first Annual National Programme under the MAP.[69] This was a political concession on the side of the Alliance. The MAP is a tool to guide countries, but it does not guarantee or pre-determine NATO membership.[70] Consequently, BiH has taken steps toward NATO accession rather quickly. However, the issue of defence property not being transferred to the central government remains outstanding and will continue to stall the process.

Drawing on fears of creeping unitarisation of BiH, which could result in the integration of the RS Ministry of Interior’s Police into BiH structures, Republika Srpska opposes the move and holds that it constitutes an infringement on its sovereignty.

To facilitate cooperation, and like other NATO partners, BiH also has a diplomatic mission at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and a liaison office at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. NATO also has a headquarters in Sarajevo tasked with the mission of assisting BiH with defence and security sector reforms and providing logistics and other support to the European Union Force (EUFOR) in BiH.[71] Under the Berlin Plus Agreements signed in March 2003, the European Union is able to draw upon NATO’s assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance would not be militarily involved. In BiH, in particular, this resulted in NATO providing support to EUFOR Operation Althea.

The EU has guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities, which contribute to EU-led military operations through the identification of command options, procedures for the release and recall of NATO assets and capabilities, and the exchange of classified intelligence under reciprocal security protection rules.[72] In practical terms, EUFOR is operationally incapable without guaranteed access to NATO support under the Berlin Plus Agreement.[73]  As far as NATO is concerned, the 2017 Republika Srpska declaration of military neutrality had the “effect of nullifying any chance of ratifying an accession plan sought by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.[74] Hence, NATO’s involvement within the Berlin Plus format remains vital to ensuring the peace and stability of BiH, even with a hypothetical integration within the EU.

In recent NATO rhetoric, and particularly following the war in Ukraine, BiH is featured not only in terms of capacity-building but also in terms of the Russian influence in the region. During the extraordinary meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs in March 2022, ministers discussed the need to support partners who may be at risk—with the emphasis placed on Georgia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina.[75] At the press conference that followed, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasised that Georgia and BiH “may be at risk, exposed for even more intervention, subversion, and potentially even attacks by the Russian armed forces of the Russian Federation”.[76]

In January 2023, the NATO Secretary General met with Denis Bećirović, the new Bosniak Member of the BiH Presidency in NATO HQ in Brussels. They discussed separatist actions and divisive rhetoric, which are fertile soil for malign external activities.[77] Indeed, there could be broader consequences following pro-Russian actors fostering instability in this part of Europe. Apart from Serbia, BiH is surrounded by NATO territory, which is subject to protection under the Washington Treaty. Hence, a potential destabilisation of Bosnia could easily spill over to NATO members Croatia and Montenegro. Furthermore, Bosnia’s 12-miles of coast is the only non-NATO territory on the Adriatic Sea. A worst-case scenario presented by some analysts is the opening of a new front in the Balkans to distract the international community from the war in Ukraine.[78] Since February 2022, NATO has increased its support for partners, including BiH, to help build their capabilities and strengthen their resilience. In February 2023, NATO further contributed to its reform efforts in BiH by endorsing the newly agreed Defence Capacity Building package.

Implementation of the MAP for BiH and all the other cooperation activities and initiatives that are being reinforced following the geopolitical landscape are stepping stones to accession to NATO, but they do not guarantee accession. That remains a political decision based on consensus reached at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) level. However, it remains to be seen whether NATO members would continue to focus on BiH meeting the technical requirements for NATO membership or whether the shift in the geopolitical environment and the pressing security concerns necessitate a political decision motivated by a strategic imperative.

Implementation of the MAP for BiH and all the other cooperation activities and initiatives that are being reinforced following the geopolitical landscape are stepping stones to accession to NATO, but they do not guarantee accession.

A Prospect or a Mirage?

The integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into NATO would represent a significant step towards strengthening security, stability, and cooperation in the Balkan region. NATO membership would solidify Bosnia and Herzegovina’s commitment to peace, reconciliation, and a Euro-Atlantic future. By joining the Alliance, the country would benefit from collective defence, enhanced regional cooperation, economic opportunities, and institutional reforms. Support for NATO membership varies across BiH, but ongoing cooperation and dialogue could help bridge differences. Addressing disinformation and public concerns would foster a better understanding of NATO’s benefits. This approach could help reduce misconceptions between Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is through such integrative efforts that a brighter and more secure future could be achieved for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider Balkan region in the long term.

However, Bosnia and Herzegovina still suffers divisive political rhetoric and deeply rooted political stalemate in both its entities. Moreover, any further drawing of BiH into the Russian sphere of influence through Republika Srpska diverges it from its NATO path. Other than providing support and capacity building through multiple programs, NATO seems to have no further incentive cards to play but that of membership. However, there is no evidence of any increased political appetite in NATO for even starting a discussion on imminent BiH entry. Given RS’s lack of political appetite, the issues with registering the immovable defence property of RS to the state of BiH, RS’ military neutrality, and repetitive threats of secession- BiH remains too politically fractured and not ready to join the Alliance. Despite today’s geopolitical pressure, reaching a consensus at the NAC-level in Brussels to take a politically-motivated consensual decision to offer membership as the Allies did with states like Montenegro and North Macedonia, for instance, seems equally unlikely for NATO member states. Perhaps one could argue that, where the current geopolitical reality would drive NATO enlargement in the future, BiH could be offered near-immediate NATO membership with Article 5 protection. However, that would still be highly unlikely because the National Assembly of Republika Srpska would block the ratification of NATO accession. Thus, as seen through the lens of political decision-making, NATO accession for Bosnia and Herzegovina sadly remains only a mirage.

 

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Maya Ivanova is a research analyst specialising in security, risk assessment and with a geopolitical focus on the former Soviet Union and the Western Balkans. She previously worked at NATO, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the EU Commission. She holds a Master of Science degree in Security and Risk Management from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark and a Master of Arts degree in Politics and International Relations from the University of Aberdeen, the UK and Sciences Po Lille, France. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.

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[1] Interviews conducted with OSCE Officials on April 19, 2024, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[2] United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “Security Council Renews EUFOR-Althea Mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2757 (2024),” November 02, 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15884.doc.htm.

[3] “EUFOR Reserve Activation 2022”, Capt Seamus Shannon, “EUFOR Reserve Activation 2022,” European Union Force in BiH- Operation Althea, February 24, 2022, https://www.euforbih.org/index.php/latest-news/2951-eufor-reserve-activation-2022.

[4] Idem.

[5] Majda Ruge, “The past and the furious: How Russia’s revisionism threatens Bosnia,” European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, September 13, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-past-and-the-furious-how-russias-revisionism-threatens-bosnia/.

^[6] EuroActive Short News, “Russian Ambassador says BiH can join NATO, but Moscow will react,” March 17, 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/russian-ambassador-says-bih-can-join-nato-but-moscow-will-react/.

[7] Dimitar Bechev, “Between the EU and Moscow: How Russia Exploits Divisions in Bosnia,” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, June 27, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/bosnia-between-russia-eu?lang=en&center=russia-eurasia.

[8] Sarajevo Times, “How Milorad Dodik made Meetings with Vladimir Putin normal and acceptable?,” May 21, 2023, https://sarajevotimes.com/how-milorad-dodik-made-meetings-with-vladimir-putin-normal/.

[9] Radio Free Europe’s Balkan Service, “Dodik Doubles Down On Refusal To Join Sanctions Against Moscow In Meeting With Putin,” February 21, 2024,  https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-dodik-refusal-sanctions-moscow-meeting-putin/32829529.html.

[10] Dimitar Bechev, “Between the EU and Moscow: How Russia Exploits Divisions in Bosnia,” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, June 27, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/bosnia-between-russia-eu?lang=en&center=russia-eurasia.

[11] Radio Free Europe’s Balkan Service, “Dodik Doubles Down On Refusal To Join Sanctions Against Moscow In Meeting With Putin,” February 21, 2024,  https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-dodik-refusal-sanctions-moscow-meeting-putin/32829529.html.

[12] Idem.

[13] Reuters, “Russia’s Putin meets Bosnian Serb leader Dodik, hails rise in trade,” May 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-meets-bosnian-serb-leader-dodik-hails-rise-trade-2023-05-23/.

[14] Stefano Fella, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: secessionism in the Republika Srpska,” Research Briefing, House of Commons Library, April 29, 2024, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10013/CBP-10013.pdf.

[15] Denitsa Koseva, “Russia already treating Bosnia’s Republika Srpska as an independent state,” Business News Europe IntelliNews, April 25, 2024, https://www.intellinews.com/russia-already-treating-bosnia-s-republika-srpska-as-an-independent-state-322678/.

[16] Sarajevo Times, “Diplomatic Scandal: Russia treats the entity of Republika Srpska as a state?,” April 24, 2024, https://sarajevotimes.com/diplomatic-scandal-russia-treats-the-entity-of-republika-srpska-as-a-state/.

[17] Jerry Hartz, “Illiberal Foreign Influence on Democracy in Montenegro and Serbia,” National Democratic Institute, January 04, 2022, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Illiberal%20Foreign%20Influence%20on%20Democracy%20in%20Montenegro%20and%20Serbia.pdf.

[18] Sonja Biserko, “Republika Srpska as the spoils of war that Serbia will not give up,” Deutsche Welle, December 13, 2020, https://www.dw.com/sr/republika-srpska-kao-ratni-plen-od-kojeg-srbija-ne-odustaje/a-55921626?maca=sr-EMail-sharing.

[19] James McBride, “Russia’s Influence in the Balkans,” Council of Foreign Relations, November 21, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-influence-balkans.

[20] Sonja Biserko, “Republika Srpska as the spoils of war that Serbia will not give up,” Deutsche Welle, December 13, 2020, https://www.dw.com/sr/republika-srpska-kao-ratni-plen-od-kojeg-srbija-ne-odustaje/a-55921626?maca=sr-EMail-sharing.

[21] Dusan Stojanovic, “Serbian Orthodox Church picks ally of president as patriarch,” Associated Press News, February 18, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/religion-serbia-coronavirus-pandemic-aleksandar-vucic-00ea047bf505e75d964b7db5b8411266.

[22] Radio Free Europe Balkan Service, “Dozens Of KFOR Troops, Protesters Injured As Clashes Break Out In Serb-Majority Towns In Northern Kosovo,” May 29, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/northern-kosovo-ethnic-albanian-mayors-kfor-serbs/32432330.html.

[23] Bekim Bislimi and Sandra Cvetkovic, “Ethnic Serbs In Kosovo Now Feel Betrayed After Quitting Their Jobs,” Radio Free Europe, September 17, 2024,   https://www.rferl.org/a/ethnic-serbs-kosovo-jobs/33123320.html.

[24] Guy Delauney, “Kosovo-Serbia row leaves Nato peacekeepers under attack,” BBC News, May 30, 2023,  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65754211.

[25] Dušan Komarčević, “‘Novi list u političkim odnosima’: Predsednik Crne Gore u prvoj poseti Srbiji” [“New page in political relations: The President of Montenegro on his first visit to Serbia”], Radio Slobodna Evropa, July 10, 2023, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-srbija-poseta-milatovic-vucic-odnosi/32496998.html.

[26] Vijesti, “Milatović on the Marović case: I received an assurance from Vučić that Serbia will behave responsibly,” July 10, 2023,  https://en.vijesti.me/amp/664762/milatovic-about-the-marovic-case%2C-i-got-assurance-from-vucic-that-serbia-will-be-handled-responsibly.

[27] Dušan Komarčević, “‘Novi list u političkim odnosima’: Predsednik Crne Gore u prvoj poseti Srbiji” [“New page in political relations: The President of Montenegro on his first visit to Serbia”], Radio Slobodna Evropa, July 10, 2023, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-srbija-poseta-milatovic-vucic-odnosi/32496998.html.

[28] Radio Slobodna Evropa, “Ambasador Crne Gore proglašen personom non grata u Srbiji” (“Montenegro’s Ambassador declared persona non grata in Serbia”), November 28, 2020, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/30973892.html.

[29] Dušan Komarčević, “‘Novi list u političkim odnosima’: Predsednik Crne Gore u prvoj poseti Srbiji” [“New page in political relations: The President of Montenegro on his first visit to Serbia”], Radio Slobodna Evropa, July 10, 2023, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-srbija-poseta-milatovic-vucic-odnosi/32496998.html.

[30] Idem.

[31] Idem.

[32] Embassy of the Republic of Serbia to Montenegro Official page, “Ambassador Nebojša Rodić,“ http://podgorica.mfa.gov.rs/ambassador.php.

[33] European Pravda, “How Alliance with Russia’s sympathisers divided Montenegro’s government,” March 5, 2024, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2024/03/5/7181046/.

[34] Natalia Ishchenko, “Чорногорський розкол: як конфлікт у партії влади дає шанс “друзям РФ” “(“Montenegro’s split: how conflict in the ruling party gives a chance to “friends of Russia””), European Pravda, March 04, 2024, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2024/03/4/7180806/.

[35] Interviews conducted with OSCE Officials on April 19, 2024, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[36] Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Rezultati glasanja, 21. sjednica Doma naroda Parlamentarne skupštine Bosne i Hercegovine” [“Voting results, 21st session of the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina”], March 24, 2022, 11:32:44, Voting results available at: https://static.parlament.ba/doc/147760_Rezultati%20glasanja%20za%2021.%20sjednicu%20Doma%20naroda%20od%2024032022.pdf.

[37] Dimitar Bechev, “Between the EU and Moscow: How Russia Exploits Divisions in Bosnia,” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center,  June 27, 2024,  https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/bosnia-between-russia-eu?lang=en&center=russia-eurasia.

[38] N1 Sarajevo, “US ambassador slams HDZ BiH leader over Southern Interconnection obstructions,” June 23, 2023, https://n1info.ba/english/news/us-ambassador-slams-hdz-bih-leader-over-southern-interconnection-obstructions/.

[39] Mersiha Gadzo and Harun Karcic, “Bosnia as the new ‘battleground’ between NATO and Russia,” Aljazeera, July 7, 2019,  https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/7/7/bosnia-as-the-new-battleground-between-nato-and-russia.

[40] Majda Ruge, “The past and the furious: How Russia’s revisionism threatens Bosnia,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 13, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-past-and-the-furious-how-russias-revisionism-threatens-bosnia/.

[41] NATO Official Website, “Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative,” last updated: May 29, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm.

[42] Idem.

[43] NATO Official Website, “Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,” last updated January 30, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49127.htm.

[44] Data sourced at the International conference “NATO and Security Challenges,” held on October 12, 2023, in Sarajevo and organised by the Atlantic Initiative.

[45]  Hamza Karcic, “NATO Needs to Welcome Bosnia Before It’s Too Late,” Foreign Policy, February 27, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/27/bosnia-nato-expansion-russia-putin/.

[46]  Interviews conducted with OSCE Officials on April 19, 2024, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[47] NATO Official Website, “Joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucić,” Published on 8 October 8, 2018, Last updated:  15 October 15, 2018 10:22, Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_159034.htm?selectedLocale=uk.

[48] Wouter Zweers, Niels Drost, Baptiste Henry, “Little substance, considerable impact: Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro,” Clingendael Report, August 2023, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2023-08/little-substance-considerable-impact.pdf.

[49] Interviews conducted with OSCE Officials on April 19, 2024, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[50] Idem.

[51] Wouter Zweers, Niels Drost, Baptiste Henry, “Little substance, considerable impact: Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro,” by Wouter Zweers, Niels Drost, Baptiste Henry, Clingendael Report, August 2023, Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2023-08/little-substance-considerable-impact.pdf.

[52] Valentino Grbavac, “Not like other Croats? Emigration patterns and voting behaviour of Herzegovinian Croats,” November 25, 2022, New Eastern Europe- Analysis, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/11/25/not-like-other-croats-emigration-patterns-and-voting-behaviour-of-herzegovinian-croats/.

[53] Idem.

[54] St. Stephen’s Day is celebrated on January 09 in Serbia.

[55] European Parliament Delegations Communiques, “Statement on the unconstitutional ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ celebrations by Romeo Franz (Greens/EFA, Germany), Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and Paulo Rangel (EPP, Portugal), Standing Rapporteur for Bosnia and Herzegovina,” European Parliament, January 12, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/statement-on-the-unconstitutional-day-of/product-details/20230112DPU34994.

[56] Euronews with Associated Press News, “Night Wolves and praise for Putin mark Milorad Dodik’s unconstitutional fête,” January 09, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/2023/01/09/night-wolves-and-praise-for-putin-mark-milorad-dodiks-unconstitutional-fete.

[57] Office of the High Representative, “56th report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 11, 2019,” https://www.ohr.int/56th-report-of-the-high-representative-for-implementation-of-the-peace-agreement-on-bosnia-and-herzegovina/.

[58] Georgio Cafiero, “Tensions between the U.S. and Bosnia’s Republika Srpska,” Trends Research and Advisory, August 20, 2024,  https://trendsresearch.org/insight/tensions-between-the-u-s-and-bosnias-republika-srpska/?srsltid=AfmBOopvDq-mb2fDSoDsO8C4ntAO13FxhkF1Pr_bMz4WFeyGKHNnlYsY#_ftn1.

[59] Idem.

[60] Nino Kalandadze, “The Fight for Freedom: Georgia’s Battle Against Authoritarianism,” April 30, 2024, The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, https://www.freiheit.org/south-caucasus/fight-freedom-georgias-battle-against-authoritarianism.

[61] Data sourced at the International conference “NATO and Security Challenges”, held on October 12, 2023, in Sarajevo and organised by the Atlantic Initiative.

[62] NATO Press, “Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius 11 July 2023,”  Press Release (2023) 001, Issued on July 11, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.

[63] Idem.; Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius 11 July 2023, NATO Press, Press Release (2023) 001, 11 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.

[64] Washington Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 10 July 2024, NATO Press,  https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27013.htm.

[65] NATO Press, “Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. 10 July 2024,” Press Release (2024) 001, Issued on July 10, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm.

[66] NATO Official Website, “Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Last updated: June 27, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49127.htm.

[67] Idem.

[68] Interviews conducted with OSCE Officials on April 19, 2024, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[69] NATO Official Website, “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” Last updated: April 19, 2023,  https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37356.htm.

[70] Idem.

[71] NATO Official Website, “Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Last updated: June 27, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49127.htm.

[72] LGen. Olivier Rittimann, “Operation Althea and the virtues of the Berlin Plus Agreement,” NATO Defence College Policy Brief, No. 02, January 2021, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1521.

[73] Interviews conducted with OSCE Officials on April 19, 2024, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[74] LGen. Olivier Rittimann, “Operation Althea and the virtues of the Berlin Plus Agreement,” LGen. Olivier Rittimann, NATO Defence College Policy Brief, No. 02, January 2021, Available at: https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1521.

[75] NATO Press, “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the Extraordinary meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs,”  Last updated: July 7, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_192739.htm.

[76] Idem.

[77] NATO Press, “NATO Secretary General meets with Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Last updated: January 16, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_210670.htm?selectedLocale=en.

[78] Ismet Fatih Čančar, “Russia’s New Front with the West in Bosnia,”  The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, March 21, 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-new-front-west-bosnia.