Abstract: The Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed major technological and doctrinal implications. Among these, the big question that arises is whether the manoeuvrist approach, which is one of the cornerstones of current NATO doctrine, is still relevant and practicable in current and future conflicts.

The most evident trend is how, for the most part, the ground operations in Ukraine are more similar to the well-known model of attritional warfare rather than the much more celebrated and positively regarded one of manoeuvre warfare. Extensive references to examples drawn from military history and the legacy of Soviet strategic thought and its main theorists contribute to better delineating the exact nature and mutual interactions between these two above-mentioned concepts.

The conclusion can be drawn that a series of factors, especially related to technology and the capabilities of the means employed, have led to a general superiority of defence over the attack, in what one can dare to define as a new “1914 syndrome”. This is analogous to what happened in the early stages of the First World War on the Western Front when this phenomenon led directly to the stalemate of trench warfare for the following four years. At present, we must have the intellectual honesty to admit that we are not yet able to formulate proposals or identify solutions to continue to propose the application of the manoeuvre approach, assuming that it still proves to be practically feasible. To truly set up a necessary doctrinal development, we will have to wait for the end of the conflict in Ukraine and have truly in-depth analyses, based on consolidated data and ascertained facts, available.

Problem statement: Are there ways to continue pursuing the manoeuvrist approach?

So what?: All organisations responsible for the development of doctrine and training must urgently address the problem of revising the current land doctrine operations down to the so-defined “Land Tactical Activities” (NATO ATP 3.2.1.1) based on what emerges from the Ukrainian battlefields.

Large-Scale Land Operations

The dawn of February 24, 2022, showed an astonished world the reappearance of a forgotten ghost: a great conventional war in Europe. The images of helicopters loaded with assault troops thundering through the skies and armoured columns pushing toward the heart of Ukraine immediately reminded all professional observers of the major manoeuvre operations that took place in those same regions during the Second World War, especially during the large-scale operations conducted in 1943-44. In this view, examples of the most important campaigns implemented after 1945, such as the fulminating ones conducted by the Israelis in the Middle East throughout four conflicts or the very brief but intense “100-hour war” of 1991 in the decisive phase of Operation Desert Storm, are always alive in the current culture and training of Western armies. Therefore, after the first few weeks, when the operations in Ukraine began to take on rather different characteristics from those of the examples described above, numerous authors, even among the most authoritative, began to show a certain surprise.

A Long Struggle

First, it is worth recalling how the so-called “manoeuvrist approach” is currently one of the cornerstones of NATO doctrine. In publication AJP-0.1 F “Allied Joint Doctrine”,[1] it is included as one of the tenets of the alliance philosophy on the conduct of joint campaigns and operations, consequential and integrated with those of the “Behaviour-Centric Approach” and “Mission Command”. Conceived as an indirect approach aimed at targeting the conceptual and moral components of the opponent’s fighting power rather than the physical one, it is, at the highest level, described in purely theoretical terms. Specifically in land operations, the manoeuvrist approach in AJP-3.2 B “Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations”,[2] is again considered as one of the “fundamentals”. It is still directly related to the concept of mission command. Focusing on the tactical level, the NATO publication ATP-3.2.1 C “Conduct of Land Tactical Operations”,[3] fully includes the manoeuvrist approach among the pillars on which to base the planning and conduct of land operations. It links the approach once again to the concept of mission command and introduces combined arms as a peculiar aspect of tactical land combat. In this case, the concept is explained in a substantially theoretical and all-inclusive way. On the tactical level of land operations, especially by referring to the wide range of examples available from the study of military history, it is possible to state that the term “manoeuvre” cannot be separated from its traditional meaning: that is, it can be applied fully and successfully through the physical movement of forces more quickly and more effectively than the opponent. This is what one may learn by studying the campaigns of the past in which the concept of “manoeuvre warfare” was applied to its fullest extent: one of the most famous, for example, that of 1805 conducted by Napoleon’s Grande Armée in Bavaria, the so-called “manoeuvre on Ulm” and also “the battle won only by marches”.[4]

Specifically in land operations, the manoeuvrist approach in AJP-3.2 B “Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations”, is again considered as one of the “fundamentals”.

The deeds of the great “manoeuvrist” commanders of the past illustrate the many good reasons why it is logical and acceptable to pursue this philosophy of warfare in a determined manner: in this way, it is possible to win rapidly, economically (in terms of losses and sources), and very often with definitive results. Among the main theoretical and doctrinal foundations, but also and above all regarding the applications of this concept on the field, the German “Blitzkrieg” of 1939-41[5] and the “Glubokaya Operatsiya” (Deep Operations) doctrine, which Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky developed and introduced in the Red Army in the 1930s[6] are worth mentioning.

At this point, however, recalling the surprise of many military analysts in seeing land operations in Ukraine slip towards a form very far from those doctrinally described as “manoeuvrist” during the spring and summer of 2022, it is good to outline an important context. The first aspect to recognise is that “manoeuvre warfare” was not the only, and on closer inspection, perhaps not even the main theory to be processed and applied. Over the last two centuries, the exact opposite side of the coin in Europe and North America, namely “attrition warfare”, has perhaps manifested itself more and with greater force. Certainly, as its counterpart, it has coexisted and dialectically interacted fully with manoeuvre warfare, often overshadowing it in the actual conduct of conflicts in which the major powers were involved. According to one of the most important military scholars and theorists of the post-war period, Richard Simpkin, in his essential work specifically dedicated to this topic, “Race to the Swift”,[7] based on a distorted interpretation of Clausewitz’s thought in France, Great Britain and the U.S., what was recognised and put into practice was mainly the attrition concept. Another important author, Robert Leonhard, offers some interesting observations in “The Art of Manoeuvre”,[8] his book dedicated to the same subject. From the very first pages, he underlines how even in the 1990s in the U.S. Army, the mentality and a good part of the doctrine and technical-tactical procedures were still profoundly influenced by an orientation towards the concepts of attrition and physical destruction of the enemy, rather than on the idea of manoeuvre. According to Leonhard, this mentality persisted even after the “AirLand battle 2000” doctrine had been officially codified and published.

Recalling the surprise of many military analysts in seeing land operations in Ukraine slip towards a form very far from those doctrinally described as “manoeuvrist” during the spring and summer of 2022, it is good to outline an important context.

In this broad context of coexistence and dialectic between these two major philosophies, Simpkin himself recalls how, during a real conflict or campaign, the phases in which manoeuvre operations and battles take place, and those in which the logic of friction and attrition prevail are both present. They alternate and influence each other in a dynamic interaction. Finally, while very often the swift and glorious victories achieved through rapid manoeuvres are certainly better and more acceptable than the long and exhausting battles of attrition, there are cases in which armies which had theorised and doctrinally emphasised and elaborated the concept of manoeuvre eventually had to accept the logic of attrition under the weight of the conditions imposed by the battlefield, often created above all by technological evolution. This is what happened, for example, on the Western Front in 1914-1915.[9]

Tukhachevsky Neglected

In the early stages of the so-called “special military operation,” the Russian Federation’s ground forces quickly wedged themselves into Ukrainian territory following multiple axes of advance aimed at as many operational objectives. In northern Ukraine, these objectives were represented by the main urban centres and the capital, Kyiv. The region of Donbas not yet under the control of the separatist republics, was another crucial goal. Finally, in the southern part of the country, other important coastal cities, such as Kherson (at the mouth of the Dnieper), Mariupol, and Berdiansk, were the destination of the advancing Russian columns. The attempted conquest of the capital, Kyiv, with the consequent dismissal of the government, was one of the main strategic objectives to be achieved. In the south, the aim was to establish territorial contiguity between Donbas and Crimea, creating that ‘land bridge’ between the two regions occupied in 2014 and have been geographically separated since then. The main armoured and mechanised attacks were coordinated with at least one significant air assault operation: that on the Hostomel airfield, about 15 km northwest of Kyiv. In those early days of the invasion, how Russian forces were operating could, in some ways, recall some principles and doctrinal schemes well known. They derive from the great background represented by the legacy of the Soviet school of military thought and, in particular, the concept of “Deep Operations”, developed by Tukhachevsky.

However, after the dramatic first hours of the war, when the march of the main attacking combat formations seemed fast and inexorable, the actual outcome of the various Russian offensive operations began to appear increasingly uncertain.[10] This development ended, starting in the second half of March, in a culmination of Russian offensive operations, especially those taking place in northern and northeastern Ukraine. In the following month, recognising the failure of the attempt to take Kyiv, the Russian ground forces began to retreat from northern Ukraine, in order to concentrate in the eastern regions and developed a new offensive in the Donbas region and the port city of Mariupol. Since then, the rapid manoeuvre operations of the major Russian formations ceased, and a slower, more methodical offensive began in the Donbas. Their approach during this phase was focused on the execution of systematic attacks and the intense use of artillery fire. This transition led to a sudden change. Initially, Russian forces conducted a ground campaign with highly dynamic operations, attempting to strike and disarticulate primarily the conceptual and moral components of Ukrainian fighting power. Then, they moved on to a series of deliberate offensives aimed at wearing down and destroying the enemy forces defending the Donbas: a very rapid transition from a “manoeuvrist approach” to a “battle of attrition”, in which the Russian military tried to exploit their relative superiority in firepower.

After the dramatic first hours of the war, when the march of the main attacking combat formations seemed fast and inexorable, the actual outcome of the various Russian offensive operations began to appear increasingly uncertain.

The failure of the main Russian offensive operations is certainly the most significant aspect of the first part of the Russian invasion, which started in February 2022. The Kremlin expected an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian government and a consequent weak resistance of its armed forces. As a consequence, the Russian armed forces began their operations based on hasty and deficient planning, but above all, with insufficient forces for a large-scale invasion of what is the second largest European nation, with strong and well-trained military forces that had been deeply reformed after the failures suffered in the previous conflict of 2014.[11] In essence, what the Russians had prepared and expected to carry out was a repeat of the invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and certainly not a “new” Operation Bagration as conducted by the Red Army in 1944. Inevitably, this great strategic miscalculation has produced serious consequences at the operational and tactical levels. The result, with the decisive additional contribution of a whole series of technological and tactical factors, has been the transformation of what should have been a sort of “Blitzkrieg” into a great and exhausting “Materialschlacht”.

In this regard, some authors[12] have tried to provide an interesting interpretation of what the Russian forces did in the first weeks of war by referring to another great source of military studies in vogue in the last century: the Soviet one of the 1920s and 1930s. Imagining what might have been the opinion of the major Soviet military theorists of that prolific period on this matter, one can refer to the concepts developed by Aleksandr A. Svechin, Mikail N. Tukhachevsky (the man nicknamed the “Red Napoleon”), Vladimir K. Triandafillov, and Georgii S. Isserson and formulate some interesting reflections. First of all,  Svechin, in his book ‘Strategy’[13] was the first to define in a coherent and structured way the concept of “operational” level and art. According to these ideas, accurate economic and military preparation for war is essential. Consequently, he would probably have disapproved of the lack of such accuracy demonstrated in the early stages of the invasion. Likewise, in what may appear to be a prophetic clarification regarding what happened in Ukraine in 2022-2023, mindful of the experience of the First World War, Svechin also explained how a lack of preparation could easily lead to the deplorable stalemate of trench warfare. Historical evidence itself demonstrates that this is a situation from which it is then very difficult to exit by returning to the conduct of rapid and decisive operations. On the other hand, the man who devised the “Glubokaya Operatsiya” doctrine,[14] Tukhachevsky, together with his student Isserson, would perhaps have viewed the deep and aggressive advances of Russian armoured formations, as well as some air assault operations, above all that on Hostomel, favourably in the very early days of the “special military operation”.

Some authors have tried to provide an interesting interpretation of what the Russian forces did in the first weeks of war by referring to another great source of military studies in vogue in the last century: the Soviet one of the 1920s and 1930s.

In February 2022, these operational methods seemed to be aimed at creating that “operational shock” deep inside the adversary’s territory that was one of the basic principles of the theories of Tukhachevsky. However, like Svechin, he would certainly not have approved the deficient preparation, especially regarding logistical support.  This, he considered essential to feed the great needs of the offensive operations in depth as he conceived them. Then, and most importantly, the reduced quantity of forces employed for the initial invasion probably undermined any possibility of developing operations of this type according to the principles of manoeuvre warfare. As Simpkin admirably explained, also based on the study of Soviet offensive operations in the Second World War, the basic model of manoeuvre warfare is the division of forces into two large groups, the “mobile force” and the “holding force”. In short, to generate that leverage effect that can be decisive, the mobile force acts as a lever pivoted on the holding force. It then goes on to act on an enemy mass blocked and held back by the same holding force. Added to this is the concept of “maximum contact”, specific to Tukhachevsky’s theory: attacking the widest possible front and then making deep penetrations breaching the weakest points.

Still referring to the initial errors that conditioned the early conduct of the conflict, there is another, more recent and important personality of the great “pantheon” of Soviet military reformers and theorists: Marshal Nikolai Vassilievich Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff from 1977 to 1984. He would have been critical of what happened, having warned in his studies how, in modern warfare, the initial operations are extremely important.[15]

The Operational-Tactical Perspective

At the operational and tactical levels, it is possible to identify some important elements precisely after two and a half years of conflict.[16] Many of these can be included in the list of major confirmations, in a sort of great return to a past regarding the conduct of large-scale and high-intensity operations. For at least three decades, we have seen armies, especially Western ones, engaged in peace support operations or long counterinsurgency campaigns. Now, the war in Ukraine illustrates, in a classic “back to basics”, a whole series of elements already known regarding the conduct of a conventional war. Among these is the great importance that both armies attribute to artillery in the conflict, especially because the Russians and the Ukrainians come from an important Russian-Soviet doctrinal heritage. Since the time of Peter the Great, it has conceived this component as essential.[17] The perfect demonstration of this, in the battle order of the brigades, is the presence of single-tube artillery on both sides of two battalions, and a third unit (a whole battalion for the Russian Army) of multiple rocket launchers, which is almost double or triple the NATO standard. In the specific context of artillery, a relevant factor is also the increased lethality provided by the combination of modern fire control systems (such as the innovative Ukrainian Kropyva system, developed with a commercially derived technology) and the now consolidated use of UAVs as sensors for targeting and fire observation, elements already observed and studied in the 2014 conflict.[18] Again, in this context, precision-guided munitions’ importance and confirmed effectiveness has inspired the term “artillery sniping”. At the same time, the appearance of the HIMARS system supplied to the Ukrainians in the summer of 2022 gave them a deep precision firing capability that proved to be very important in containing and then blocking the Russian offensives in Donbas.

At the operational and tactical levels, it is possible to identify some important elements precisely after two and a half years of conflict.

Other observations to be considered “confirmations” of what was already known about the tactical context of a large-scale “peer-to-peer” war are certainly the high defensive value of field fortifications and minefields and, consequently, the need to preserve and improve the engineer capabilities and assets, including those required for river crossing operations.

Important tactical aspects that seem to recall a true “return to the past” are then derived from the sudden transition from dynamic and manoeuvre operations to other much slower, methodical ones focused on the attrition imposed on the enemy. The long, systematic attack, especially by the Russians, of large urban areas that the Ukrainians had transformed into real strongholds, such as Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, continued for months until the fall of those cities, has led some authors and this since 2014, even to indicate a sort of return to “siege warfare”.[19] There has also been a significant evolution in the tactical solutions introduced by the Russian army.[20] Among these, one of the most important is using “assault detachments”, a battalion-level formation designed explicitly for the attack on fortified positions and urban areas. Still, on the subject of organic evolution, it is worth noting, again on the Russian side, the rethinking of the structure based on the “Battalion Tactical Group” (BTG), a combined arms formation already present in 2014. In that previous conflict, it proved to be poorly suited to sustaining operations over a long time. As a result, Russian ground forces are returning to a traditional structure based on stronger and more homogeneous brigades, regiments and divisions.[21]

Important tactical aspects that seem to recall a true “return to the past” are then derived from the sudden transition from dynamic and manoeuvre operations to other much slower, methodical ones focused on the attrition imposed on the enemy.

Since the early stages, another debate has developed on the Russian air force’s real capabilities and, in general, to what extent air power contributed to the conflict’s outcome.[22] In this regard, the failure to acquire air superiority and the possibility of the albeit reduced Ukrainian air force continuing to operate despite the clear Russian numerical supremacy in the skies, was initially highlighted. However, it is good to place these evaluations in the context of the Russian conception of air forces. In their military thinking, the Russians have always been more oriented towards a tactical-operational role in support of ground operations. In contrast, the Western one is historically and doctrinally more oriented towards a concept of “air superiority” that allows effects also at a strategic level.[23] On the other hand, if the air war does not seem to have any decisive effects on the conflict, the intense and systematic campaign of missile attacks, integrated with the use of long-range UAVs, perhaps indicates a tendency to put into practice some new ideas developed in Russia in recent years. Major General Vladimir Slipchenko illustrated a concept called “no contact warfare’”, drawn from the study of “Operation Desert Storm”. According to it, the capabilities to strike the entire depth of a theatre of operations with long-range precision strike systems and even the entire enemy territory have greatly increased to the point of making them a comprehensive way of conducting a war, even at the operational and strategic levels.[24]

In addition to the return of a whole series of tactical factors already known and always important in warfighting operations, other elements, somehow new, are making an important turning point regarding the relevance of the manoeuvrist approach.[25] A fact is the ever-increasing pervasiveness and effectiveness of ISR assets of all types, a reality that precisely from observations in Ukraine has introduced the concept of a “transparent battlefield”. This has resulted in the ever-increasing difficulty in achieving surprise at all levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. At the tactical level, this phenomenon is dominated by the proliferation and ubiquity of unmanned aircraft systems. Surprise remains a fundamental element for any offensive operation based on the manoeuvre of forces, the lack of which can completely undermine the result, as demonstrated in the Ukrainian counteroffensive of the summer of 2023.[26] The UAS themselves have also become an attacking asset in all respects. In this case, this extends to different roles in a multi-level dimension, including that of the platoon and company manoeuvre units, convincing some to speak of the “dronisation” of the infantry. Added to all this is the ever-increasing rate of urbanisation in many areas of the world. This factor has also made the plains, the traditional terrain most favourable to the manoeuvre of forces, a rough’ terrain as much as, if not more so than, other areas. Then, the effectiveness of the most-used weapon systems in defensive combat is confirmed, such as anti-tank guided missile systems (ATGM) and anti-aircraft missiles (SAM and MANPADS). Additionally, artillery seems more lethal in crushing offensives than in supporting them, as has often happened in the past. This, even before the outbreak of the conflict, led some authors, perhaps prophetically, to speak of the superiority of defence over offence.[27]

A fact is the ever-increasing pervasiveness and effectiveness of ISR assets of all types, a reality that precisely from observations in Ukraine has introduced the concept of a “transparent battlefield”.

The Return of the War of Attrition?

The recent Ukrainian conflict demonstrates that the era of industrial warfare, in all its specificities and meanings, is still current. The creation and maintenance of a solid industrial and production base, both in terms of means and materials, ammunition and equipment, and primary resources, therefore, become decisive factors for the armies in battle and the populations involved. In particular, the availability of raw materials cannot be limited to wheat, oil and iron for industrial steel production, as was the case for previous total wars. Considering the current technological levels, it must necessarily extend, to give an example, also to rare earth and gas. The availability of raw materials and a developed industrial base are crucial factors for success, and human resources must be added.

Soldiers deployed on very large fronts recall the fate of the Southern Army Group in the Soviet Union during the Second World War.[28] They need to be supplied daily with all the essentials to live, move, and fight, with losses, wear and tear, and the consumption of personnel and equipment, and they show a picture that has disappeared from the international war scene for decades.

Soldiers deployed on very large fronts recall the fate of the Southern Army Group in the Soviet Union during the Second World War.

In 2022, the purchases by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for 155mm artillery shells (for all M795, M777 platforms and “extended range” ammunition) were expected to total 174 million dollars. This is equivalent to approximately 75,000 M795 basic “dumb” rounds, 1,400 XM1113 rounds for M777 and 1,046 XM1113 rounds “extended range” and an additional 75 million for the purchase of “Excalibur” precision-guided munitions.[29] The volumes of fire delivered, for example, by the Russian army in one of the hardest and most tragic moments of the conflict (i.e. May 2022), are estimated to be around 7,000 rounds per day.[30] Starting from these data, the entire annual U.S. supply would last, in the best case, 10 to 14 days.

A similar discussion could be made for other crucial armaments, such as anti-tank and ballistic cruise missiles. In 2022, the DoD commissioned approximately 2,100 missiles per year from Lockheed Martin, while the purchase of PRISM, JASSM and Tomahawk cruise missiles stood at 110, 500 and 60 units, respectively.[31]

These are some of the main data regarding the significant Western democratic power, the U.S. The comparison made with European industrial production could be even more merciless. The scenario of a conventional war of attrition is, therefore, a possibility that Western countries and military leaders must take seriously into consideration without underestimating or marginalising it as an appendix of “end of history” theories,[32] nowadays largely overcome by events.

If the competition between democracies and autocracies, even if indirect for now, has entered a military phase, the West cannot be caught unprepared.[33] To face this challenge, new industrial policies and substantial investments will be necessary aimed at the technical and qualitative aspects of armaments and a substantial increase in quantities.[34]

New industrial policies and substantial investments will be necessary aimed at the technical and qualitative aspects of armaments and a substantial increase in quantities.

The expansion of the industrial-military base will be a fundamental element in facing and winning a war of attrition, where the loss rates of vehicles and materials and the ability of countries to replace them quickly will make the difference on the field, especially in conditions of “technological parity” of the belligerents. New financial investments, increased production (especially ammunition and anti-tank and ballistic missiles), production partnerships, research into platform technological standardisation, and extension of logistical commonality are all aspects that Western military leaders will have to wisely direct and coordinate as priority requests for the political sphere.

However, wars of attrition and manoeuvre stalemate do not just have tactical or industrial implications. Attrition also affects human resources. Let us consider the Italian Army with its eleven operational brigades and 50,000 combat soldiers.

Also in this field, there are therefore urgent measures aimed at increasing the quantity of personnel whose small numbers – also in this case – were the result of the “Afghanisation”[35] of the most common operational scenarios in the last 30 years, i.e., low low-intensity counter-insurgency operations.

In this sector, the obstacles to overcome are even greater than expanding and strengthening the military-industrial base. The abolition of compulsory conscription, the subsequent decades of antimilitarism and the progressive destruction of the values ​​of patriotism have made the return to military service a path that is not only politically unviable but also socially unacceptable.

Yet the situation of personnel shortage in the Eastern European conflict, with the progressive expansion of the conscript classes called to arms, in perfect First World War style, for Ukraine and the continuous use by the Russian side—despite the large mixed conscription army—of Syrian and Chechen militias or paramilitary units, imply the delicacy of aspects linked to the availability, mobilisation, and consumption of men in a conventional war.

In summary, the correct management and organisation of all the factors analysed constitute the key to final success. History shows that only those with the most solid industrial base and the largest pool of resources will prevail, with all due respect to the aspects linked to the compulsive search for manoeuvre and technological superiority.

Education and Training

Recent conflicts have had immediate repercussions on Italian military education and training. These consequences are multiple and have affected a lot of sectors and entities.[36] First of all, for basic military education (Military Academy and Officers School), there has been a great return to history, and the study of the classics of military literature, with particular attention to case studies focused on conventional warfare (manoeuvre and attrition), combat in urban environments, and mountain warfare. Notable was also the progressive shift of the centre of gravity of basic and advanced educational courses provided by specialist institutes and centres of excellence from crisis response operations and stabilisation and peacekeeping operations to activities focused on conventional warfighting.

Particular emphasis was also placed on including case studies focused on the planning and conduct of modern joint-force combat operations, with the widespread and in-depth treatment of the aspects linked to multi-domain operations. The number and type of seminars and workshops at operational units and departments have also been increased, with the intervention of mobile training teams provided by the army’s centres of excellence.

The lessons learned from the current theatres of operation also guide the development and updating of the doctrine, especially those regarding the use of units or particular enablers, such as UAS, in high-intensity scenarios involving combined arms complexes. The in-depth study of the “ius ad bello” and the “ius in bello,” previously ancillary to the regulations and treaties that regulated the legal framework of reference for international stabilisation and security operations, was also attributed renewed importance.

The in-depth study of the “ius ad bello” and the “ius in bello” was also attributed renewed importance.

The introduction of wargaming in the officers’ training proves to be central to this renewal process, which aims to stimulate critical thinking and acquire theoretical and doctrinal baggage. It is also based on knowledge of the past, which is useful for resolving problems of modern operations linked to high-intensity scenarios. The search for mobility and fluid and in-depth manoeuvre-precisely to avoid the enemy’s consolidation of fronts and defensive line-is also a priority requirement in training. This training, as far as possible, considering the limitations linked to the available resources and to certain absurd environmental constraints on the use of ranges and training areas, increasingly tends towards the use of combined arms complexes from a joint and multinational perspective.

In this sense, international NATO exercises[37] take on particular value, such as the “Steadfast Defender 2024” or the “Nordic Response 24”, which took place in an arctic and mountainous environment and which saw – on the Italian side – mountain cavalry, artillery and tactical intelligence units engaged. The latter, which saw the participation of about 20,000 soldiers from 13 different nations, took place in northern Norway, Sweden and Finland, as well as in the corresponding airspace and sea areas. This activity confirms the strategic interest of the Alliance for the Scandinavian Far North, also in relation to the recent entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO. It increases the preparedness of the Nordic countries and the ability to conduct large-scale joint operations in difficult weather and climate conditions.

More generally, the war events in Ukraine, but also the fighting in Gaza, call for a return to the basics of the profession of arms. These sectors have so far been neglected or subordinated to primary training needs, which are instead functional to crisis response operations. In this sense, it will be necessary and important for infantry units to return to platoon-level trench-digging training and battlefield position-strengthening work techniques, which proved essential for recent military operations.

The war events in Ukraine, but also the fighting in Gaza, call for a return to the basics of the profession of arms.

The training must also focus on exercises of smaller combined arms units and studies aimed at maximising the capabilities of the weapon systems currently supplied to the infantry combat units with a view to “cooperative warfighting” and multipurpose use. The platforms and fields of application involved in the studies could be multiple, such as – to give an example – the use of the optics of the targeting system of the “Spyke” anti-tank missile for observation of the battlefield. Or use UAS for various operational tasks, from reconnaissance to fire observation to point bombing. Exploiting the operational capabilities of a weapon system in a transversal and, in some ways, “creative” way has always been implemented in war conflicts. One of the best-known and most effective examples was the German anti-aircraft piece 88 mm, used with extraordinary effectiveness in anti-tank function.

UAS have become an essential element of modern battlefields, which requires their distribution, use–and, therefore, training-down to the lowest order levels for units.

Finally, it will be crucial to introduce the study and management of the behavioural and sociological dynamics of battle so that young officers can have all the tools to guide their men in combat, manage stress levels, group dynamics, inevitable moments of discouragement and fear, and get the most out of their unit.

In short, it is a return to the main aspects of unit command in conventional combat. The Afghanisation of militaries must give way to a return to the past, especially in military training and education, if we want to have any chance of facing and overcoming future challenges.

 

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Colonel Gianluca Bonci attended the Italian Military Academy in Modena, after which he was assigned to the signal branch operative units, participating in seven multinational operations. He served many years as an Army General Staff member in Rome and at the NATO JFTC in Poland. He is the Doctrine Department Head of the Turin Army Officer School. He contributes to several magazines specialised in military doctrine and history and has published numerous articles and books.

Lieutenant Colonel Fabio Riggi attended the Italian Military Academy in Modena, where he was assigned to the branch of artillery. He subsequently served in field and air defence artillery units, participating in several multinational NATO operations. He is currently employed at the Tactics Competence Centre of the Turin Army Officer School. Additionally, he contributes to several magazines and websites sspecialised in military topics and has published numerous articles on military doctrine and history.

The views contained in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the Italian Army and Department of Defence.

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[1] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Office, (AJP-01) Allied Joint Doctrine (ed. F, vers. 1, December 2022), Allied Joint Publication, Brussels.

[2] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Office, (AJP)-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (ed. B, vers. 1, February 2022), Allied Joint Publication, Brussels.

[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Office, (ATP)-3.2.1 Conduct of Land Tactical Operations (ed, C, vers. 1, February 2022), Allied Tactical Publication, Brussels.

[4]  https://it.topwar.ru/84483-ya-vyigral-srazhenie-odnimi-marshami-kak-napoleon-razgromil-iii-antifrancuzskuyu-koaliciyu.html.

[5] For an in-depth study on these topics, we recommend reading the following volumes: Charles Messenger, The Art of Blitzkrieg (London: Ian Allan Ltd, 1991); Heinz Guderian, Achtung Panzer (London: Cassel, 1999); Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg (London: Pimlico, 1996).

[6] For an in-depth study on these topics, we recommend reading the following volumes: Richard Simpkin, Deep Battle, The Brainchild of Marshal Tuchacevskii (London: Potomac Books, 1996); Richard Simpkin, Red Armour (London: Potomac Books, 1984); David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed, How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Christopher Paul McPadden, Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky (1893-1937): Practitioner and Theorist of War (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2006).

[7] Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift (London: Potomac Books, 1985), 132.

[8] Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle (New York: Presidio Press, 1992), 26.

[9] Max Hastings, Catastrophe, Europe Goes to War 1914 (London: William Collins, 2014); Robert Foley, “Preparing the German Army for the First World War: The Operational Ideas of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger,” The University of New South Wales: War and Society, October 2004, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1-25; Lisa Haygood,  Schlieffen and Germany’s Strategic Failure: This We Did Not Foresee (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2015).

[10] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022.

[11] Denys Kiryukhin, “The Ukrainian Military: from Degradation to Renewal,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, last modified August 17, 2018, https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/08/the-ukrainian-military-from-degradation-to-renewal.

[12] Jon Klug, “Soviet Theory Forgotten: Russian Military Strategy in the War in Ukraine,” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 9, Issue 3, Spring 2024, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/volume/9/issue/3/; Stanisław Koziej, “What Would the Greats Say About War in the 21st Century,” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 9, Issue 3, Spring 2024, 30-37, https://koziej.pl/what-would-the-greats-say-about-war-in-the-21st-century-military-strategy-magazine-volume-9-issue-3-spring-2024/.

[13] Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View, 1992), 232.

[14] Richard Simpkin, Deep Battle, The Brainchild of Marshal Tuchacevskii (London: Potomac Books, 1987), 134-146.

[15] Mary C. Fitz Gerald, “Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operation,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 Autumn, 1986, 6-25; Michael Kofman, “The Ogarkov Reforms: The Soviet Inheritance Behind Russia’s Military Transformation,” Russian Military Analysis, last updated July 11, 2019, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2019/07/11/the-ogarkov.

[16]  Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022,” Royal United Service Institute, 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022.

[17] Army Recognition Group SPRL, “Analysis. Comparison between Russian and Ukrainian Artillery Powers on the Battlefield,” last modified 28 July 2022, https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/ukrainian-artillery-vs-russian-artillery-on-the-ukrainian-battlefield; Yuri Svitlyk, “Modern Artillery is Ukraine’s Superweapon,” Root Nation, last modified 17 May 2022, https://root-nation.com/en/articles-en/weapons-en/en-modern-artillery-is-ukraines-superweapon; Sam Cranny-Evans, “Russia’s Artillery War in Ukraine: Challenges and Innovations,” Royal United Service Institute, last modified  August 09, 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-artillery-war-ukraine-challenges-and-innovations; Maj. Patrick Hinton, “Lean on the Barrage: The Role of Artillery in Ukraine’s Counteroffensive,” Royal United Service Institute, last modified July 12, 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/lean-barrage-role-artillery-ukraines-counteroffensive.

[18] Dr. Philip Karber, “Lesson Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War,” The Potomac Foundation, July 08, 2015, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Phillip-Karber/publication/316122469_Karber_RUS-UKR_War_Lessons_Learned/links/58f1576e458515ff23ab42bc/Karber-RUS-UKR-War-Lessons-Learned.pdf.

[19] Maj Amos C. Fox, “Battle of Debal’tseve: the Conventional Line of Effort in Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine”, March 01, 2017, https://www.benning.army.mil/armor.

[20]  Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine,” Royal United Service Institute, London (2023).

[21] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine in 2024,” Royal United Service Institute, London (2024).

[22] Justin Bronk, Jack Watling, and Nick Reynolds, “The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence,” Royal United Service Institute, London (2022).

[23] Mike Pietrucha, “Amateur hour, Failing the Air Campaign,” War on The Rocks (August 11, 2022), https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/amateur-hour-part-ii-failing-the-air-campaign.

[24] Jacob W. Kipp, “Russian Sixth Generation Warfare and Recent Developments,” The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9 (January 25, 2015), https://jamestown.org/program/russian-sixth-generation-warfare-and-recent-developments.

[25] Anthony King, “Is Manoeuvre Alive?,” Wavell Room, October 17, 2022, https://wavellroom.com/2022/10/07/is-manoeuvre-alive; Steve Maguire, “Yes, Manoeuvre is Alive. Ukraine Proves it,” Wavell Room, November 04, 2022, https://wavellroom.com/2022/11/04/yes-manoeuvre-is-alive-ukraine-proves-it.

[26] Jack Watling, Oleksandr V Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds, “Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations, 2022–23,” Royal United Service Institute, London (2024).

[27] T.X. Hammes, “The Tactical Defense Becomes Dominant Again,” National Defense, University Press, JFQ 103, 4th Quarter, 2021: 10-17, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2807244/the-tactical-defense-becomes-dominant-again.

[28] Army Group South was reconstituted to prepare for Operation Barbarossa: the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The command was entrusted to the experienced Gerd von Rundstedt. The operational theatre entrusted to von Rundstedt’s troops was the Ukrainian one: pushing deep south of the Pryp’jat’ marshes, Army Group South was supposed to occupy Ukrainian territory and Kyiv until it settled on the banks of the Dnieper. The army group in this first phase was composed of: 1^st Armoured Army (von Kleist), VI Army (von Reichenau), XVII Army (von Stülpnagel) and XI Army (von Schobert), as well as 2 Romanian armies, the III and IV.

[29] The M982 Excalibur (previously XM982) is a 155 mm extended-range guided artillery shell developed in a collaborative effort between the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) and the United States Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC). It is a GPS and inertial-guided munition capable of being used in close support situations within 75–150 meters (250–490 ft) of friendly troops or where targets might be prohibitively close to civilians to attack with conventional unguided artillery fire.

[30] Alex Vershinin, “The return of industrial warfare,” Royal United Service Institute, January 17, 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare.

[31] Idem.

[32] “The end of history” is one of the key concepts of the analysis of the political scientist Francis Fukuyama: according to this thesis, the process of the social, economic and political evolution of humanity reached its peak at the end of the 20th century, an epochal turning point starting from which would be opening a final phase of the conclusion of history as such. For Fukuyama, the form of state inspired by democratic liberalism is the last possible for man and also the most perfect: it cannot in fact, degenerate into anything worse, and it itself is not a degeneration of any other political form. History moves towards progress, and technological and industrial progress has been ensured, guided and directed by capitalism in the economic sphere. Capitalism has its political counterpart in liberal democracy because it is better compatible with the government of a technologically advanced society and because industrialisation produces middle classes that demand political participation and equal rights.

[33] Alex Vershinin, “The return of industrial warfare,” Royal United Service Institute,  January 17, 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare.

[34] In this sense, for example, the rearmament plan for a total of 100 billion euros approved in June 2022 by Germany and the recent 8.5 billion euro orders to produce artillery ammunition which will be used to fill the empty depots of the Bundeswehr, but to a large extent also to supply Ukraine again, must be interpreted. “Germania, Scholz prosegue la corsa al riarmo: commessa da 8,5 miliardi in munizioni al colosso Rheinmetall”, Andrea M. Jarach, Il Fatto Quotidiano, , last modified 21 June  2024, https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2024/06/21/germania-scholz-prosegue-la-corsa-al-riarmo-commessa-da-85-miliardi-in-munizioni-al-colosso-rheinmetall-e-la-maggiore-di-sempre/7596384/.

[35] The “Afghanisation” process did not only concern the Italian army but also other Western armies, which have progressively abandoned the medium and heavy components of the combat forces in favour of the light one, more expendable in theatres such as Iraq or Afghanistan. This drift also included training, the formulation and development of doctrine and the procurement of combat materials.

[36] Authors’ professional observation and assessment.

[37] Difesa.it, “Terminata l’Esercitazione NATO Nordic Response 2024”, MoD, last updated March 20, 2024, https://www.difesa.it/smd/news-italia/terminata-esercitazione-nato-nordic-response-2024/49707.html.