Abstract: In response to the balkanisation of Africa due to colonisation, which resulted in fragmented micro-nations marked by economic fragility, the heads of state of 16 West African countries established the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. This community aimed to foster economic integration and solidarity, bridging the divide between English- and French-speaking countries. Following civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS evolved into a peace and security organisation focused on democracy, good governance, and human rights, with a zero-tolerance policy for military coups. However, recent developments, including the fifth coup recorded in the region from 2020 onwards, and the subsequent formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, countered the effectiveness of ECOWAS in maintaining peace and democratic norms in the region, raising significant geopolitical consequences.

Problem statement: What major geopolitical consequences will arise from establishing the AES for the subregion and beyond?

So what?: The analysis reveals the urgent need for reinforced and cohesive international mediation efforts to prevent the disintegration of ECOWAS, a critical regional body for stability in West Africa. It emphasises the strategic role of the African Union, the United Nations, and, to a lesser extent, the European Union, which must adopt a unified approach that transcends national interests, integrating security, climate-sensitive development, and support for democratic governance. This is vital for maintaining regional stability and countering external powers’ geopolitical influence, otherwise encouraging the fragmentation of West Africa’s collective security architecture.

The Sahel Power Shift

Recent Developments in West Africa

Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum, elected in 2021, experienced the first peaceful, democratic transfer of power since independence in 1960.[1] However, on July 26, 2023, he was ousted by his presidential guard in the fifth coup in the Sahel region in three years. The coup leaders claimed their actions were to prevent further economic and security problems. The following day, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin supported the coup and offered his fighters’ services. By July 29, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and France had all taken measures against the coup, including financial cutoffs and calls for a return to constitutional order. On July 30, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demanded Bazoum’s reinstatement within a week, threatening the use of force and imposing financial sanctions.

On August 11, 2023, Paris expressed its “full support for all the conclusions” adopted at the ECOWAS summit, including the military option.[2] The situation prompted international concern, with ECOWAS military chiefs planning a possible intervention and the U.S. pausing certain aid programs. Coup generals sought assistance from the Wagner Group as the ECOWAS deadline approached, while tens of thousands of coup supporters rallied in Niamey. On August 07, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland held talks with the coup leaders, who denied requests to meet with Bazoum. On August 15, Russian President Vladimir Putin “stressed the importance of a peaceful resolution of the situation for a more stable Sahel”, Mali’s military leader Assimi Goita said after a phone call with the Russian president. The Kremlin said in a statement that Mali initiated the call.[3] The People’s Republic of China (PRC), a key economic player in Niger and a veto-wielding UN Security Council member, initially had a muted response to the Sahel crisis. By September 11, it had officially reiterated its traditional diplomatic stance in African affairs. The PRC’s ambassador stated that China “has always pursued a policy of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries” and encouraged African countries “to solve their problems in an African way.”[4]

On August 15, Russian President Vladimir Putin “stressed the importance of a peaceful resolution of the situation for a more stable Sahel”, Mali’s military leader Assimi Goita said after a phone call with the Russian president.

In this regard, the major international actors with economic development or aid, military or diplomatic influence in the central Sahel region, including the EU, France, Germany, Russia, PRC, and the U.S., displayed mixed and contradictory responses to the coup, reflecting their concerns over regional stability, respect for democracy, and their own strategic or economic interests. These diverging views underscore the competition for control and influence in the Sahel, exacerbating the geopolitical ‘big game’ and increasing regional tensions, seriously jeopardising long-standing and strenuous regional efforts to establish a collective security mechanism anchored in democracy, good governance, and human rights.

Creation of the Alliance of Sahel States

This dramatic turn of events reflects the broader geopolitical contest in the Sahel region, which is strategically important and rich in critical minerals. Against this backdrop and ECOWAS’s willingness to use force to restore constitutional order in Niger, the leaders of the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, on September 13, 2023, announced the establishment of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) through the Liptako-Gourma Pact.[5] A September 26, 2023, report by the Timbuktu Institute for Peace Studies warned of the AES’s existential risk to ECOWAS’s collective peace and security architecture.[6]

The three countries subsequently withdrew from ECOWAS on January 26, 2024, citing ‘illegal and inhumane’ sanctions, invasion threats, and a lack of anti-terrorism support. On July 7, 2024, they further announced the establishment of a Confederation. It is worth noting that Russia immediately applauded the three-junta initiative and offered its official recognition. Thus far, Russia is the only country extending official recognition of this ECOWAS breakaway alliance.[7] Predictions including the demise of the G5FC, a five Central Sahel nations anti-terrorism military force backed by France and the EU, fragmentation of international effort to combat terrorism and rampant transitional organised crime soon materialised. The anticipated weakening of ECOWAS as a regional security provider and the loss of credibility or agency as a peace mediator also occurred.

The butterfly effect of successive coups and establishing the AES will cause a complete upheaval in strategic alliances, with far-reaching yet unpredictable consequences. The region, previously a secure community with mutual trust and solidarity, now faces the emergence of two antagonistic security blocs with ideological and political divides. This results in increased mistrust, an arms race, a stark divide between democratic and autocratic regimes, and alignment with global ideological conflicts, notably between NATO and Russia. These changes risk creating severe interstate conflict risks, democratic backsliding, disruption of economic integration, and exacerbation of security and humanitarian crises, including transnational crime and climate-related issues, impacting migration flows.

From Economic Integration to Collective Security

One of the defining characteristics of independent Africa is its fragmentation into numerous micro-nations. This ‘Balkanisation’ has resulted in fragile economies and underdevelopment across African states. Several regional economic and political integration organisations, such as the Conseil de l’Entente and the West African Economic Community, were established in response. However, the idea of creating ECOWAS was first proposed in 1968 and revisited in 1972 by the heads of state, Lt Colonel Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo, a small francophone country in the sub-region, and General Gowon of the anglophone giant Nigeria. ECOWAS was officially established on May 28, 1975, by the Treaty of Lagos, which took effect on November 5, 1976.[8]

The Treaty of Lagos envisioned “an economically integrated, united, and prosperous sub-region”. Its goals included accelerating economic and social development and elevating the population’s standard of living. These goals were to be pursued in a climate of peace and security.[9] The underlying political objective of the founders was to break the colonial legacy of division: the francophone bloc under strong French influence, the anglophone bloc, and states under Russian influence, all within the context of intense East-West rivalry. On the signature of the Treaty of Lagos, the French leading Monthly Journal Le Monde Diplomatique welcomed this potentially stabilising effect.[10]

The Treaty of Lagos envisioned “an economically integrated, united, and prosperous sub-region”.

Today, ECOWAS is comprised of 15 states divided into three major zones. The promotion of regional integration aims to fight poverty and regional disparities and reduce external economic domination. At its inception, ECOWAS was established[11] with the vision of “creating a single regional community through economic integration and of self-reliance”[12]. However, ECOWAS leaders recognised the link between peace, security, and economic development during the Cold War when West Africa was a battleground for global influence. As a result, although peace and security was not explicitly provided for in the founding treaty, member states felt the need to agree on a set of security and defence protocols,[13] particularly the Protocol on Non-Aggression (Lagos, 1978)[14] and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense (Freetown, 1981).[15] These protocols establish principles central to ECOWAS’s conflict prevention, management, and resolution approach. They emphasise respect for territorial integrity, protection against external aggression, peaceful dispute settlement, collective security, and intervention in inter-state conflicts. Furthermore, they provide for the future dismantling of all foreign military bases. In addition, the Declaration of Political Principles (Abuja, Nigeria, 1991) outlined principles for mediation, respect for human rights, political pluralism, and democracy. Over the following two decades, these arrangements continued to significantly influence the organisation’s practices, and ECOWAS became a pioneering model and a pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The Revised ECOWAS Treaty

The process of revising its foundational treaty responded to the new security and development challenges, culminating in the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty.[16] This revision aimed at regional integration and addressed the negative impacts of civil conflicts on the integration agenda. The 1993 revised ECOWAS Treaty recommits the member states to gradually strengthen the supra-nationality of the regional body. The preamble states that heads of state and government are “convinced that the integration of the Member States into a viable regional Community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the Community within the context of a collective political will.”

The 1993 revised ECOWAS Treaty recommits the member states to gradually strengthen the supra-nationality of the regional body.

It is important to note that the major change in the ECOWAS leadership’s political will to relinquish their national sovereignty to collective security partially turned the organisation into what could be dubbed a proto-supranational organisation, an unprecedented innovation in African regionalism. ECOWAS, therefore, became an experimental ‘statecraft incubator’ for the African Union. Article 4 on Fundamental Principles, absent from the original 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, affirms several principles already adopted in the 1978 and 1981 Protocols, among which solidarity and self-reliance; non-aggression between member states; maintenance of regional peace, stability, and security through the promotion and strengthening of good governance and neighbourliness.

A Nascent Regional Mechanism for Peace and Security

The following normative developments during the 1990s, in the early post-Cold War period, and the context of the second wave of democratisation are testimony of the ECOWAS efforts to build its capacity to more effectively address internal conflict by securing a legal mandate for the legitimate right to intervene in member states under specific circumstances, in pursuance of the UN nascent post-Cold War strategy of decentralising conflict prevention, resolution and peacekeeping, based on the principle of subsidiary provided under chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which was later formalised after the Brahimi Report.[17]

The civil wars in Liberia (1989) and Sierra Leone (1991) led to the spread of refugees, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, infiltration of rebels across borders, and widespread human insecurity and humanitarian crises in the region. Although primarily internal, these conflicts had significant regional implications, necessitating mechanisms for intervention. In response, ECOWAS developed a comprehensive mechanism to address the new challenges; the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security was born.[18] Article 2 of the Protocol defines the key ‘Principles’ of the recognition that economic and social development and the human security of peoples and States are inextricably linked; the promotion and consolidation of a democratic government as well as democratic institutions in each member state; the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms; and compliance to international humanitarian law. The mechanism should be implemented in cases of humanitarian crises, the overthrow of democratically elected governments, and other significant threats to regional peace and security.[19] Robust measures might be taken by the executive organ in charge of peace and security, approved by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC), and ultimately expressly authorised by the UN Security Council (principle of subsidiarity). The Protocol featured as far-reaching in normative terms.

Focusing further on internal affairs, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001)[20] introduces the principles of separation of powers, parliamentary immunity, judicial independence, transparent elections, prohibition of unconstitutional changes, democratic participation, apolitical military, and secular state governance. In addition, the earlier Protocol on the Community Court of Justice (Abuja, 1991)[21] had established the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice as the judicial authority tasked with upholding law and equity, interpreting treaties, and resolving disputes within or involving the community. It uniquely allows citizens of member states to directly approach the Court for human rights protection without exhausting internal remedies. This human rights protection is a critical instrument for upholding the rule of law and safeguarding fundamental rights and also represents a top mechanism of peaceful resolution of disputes in Africa, notably those of a political nature, which, unattended, usually are triggers of deadly violent conflict in West Africa.[22]

The Critical Prohibition of Military Participation in Politics

In this context, the critical instrument of the African Charter on Elections and Good Governance of the AU (2007)[23] provides for a range of sanctions against violating member states. Specifically, Article 23.5 provides for measures against unconstitutional changes, including coups, mercenary interventions, armed dissident actions, refusal to hand over power after elections, and constitutional amendments undermining democratic principles. This instrument further mandates that armed forces must stay aloof from politics, providing that “[t]he army is apolitical and subject to duly established political authority; no serving member of the armed forces is eligible for elective political office”. To further shield democratic politics from military interference, Article 25.4 provides that ‘the perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or hold any position of responsibility in political institutions of their State.’

The critical instrument of the African Charter on Elections and Good Governance of the AU provides for a range of sanctions against violating member states.

This critical prohibition of military participation in politics, provided for in the ECOWAS normative framework, is a potent antidote against what is dubbed as ‘coup laundering’, a tactic employed by certain coup plotters, which involves swapping military attire for a civilian suit. This strategy aims to manipulate the transitional process and the ensuing elections, thereby retaining power through seemingly legitimate means. The AU and ECOWAS dense normative framework, mostly derived from the latter’s mechanism, is a reflection of the common policy to apply a zero-tolerance rule to military coups whilst tempering the international law sacrosanct principle of the international principle of non-interference by that of non-indifference.

The current geopolitical context mirrors the era of the Cold War, marked by deep mistrust among West African states ideologically divided between two opposing blocs, each striving to expand its influence through any means necessary. This includes subversive actions, the importation of weapons, the use of mercenaries or private military services (PMS), miss/disinformation, propaganda and the massive deployment of foreign troops. A notable example is the latest Niger coup, which faced the threat of ECOWAS’s potential use of force to restore constitutional order.

One of the most critical fallouts from such an emerging, conflictual environment in the region is the proliferation of weapons, including advanced military technology, especially in the AES countries, coming to grip with dogged terrorist threats seriously, an internal insurgency, whilst perceiving neighbouring ECOWAS member states as a potential threat to its external security. This opens huge security equipment services opportunities for non-Western security partners, Iran, Türkyie, and especially Russia, the new main strategic security partner.[24] In this regard, it is worth highlighting that in January 2024, Russia announced a military partnership agreement with Niger. And by March, Russian President Vladimir Putin and General Abdourahmane Tiani, head of Niger’s National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, discussed a “strategic, multi-sectoral, and comprehensive” cooperation project during a phone call. This partnership materialised between April and May with the arrival of three cargo flights carrying military equipment, including an air defence system.[25]

ECOWAS’s Mixed Record as Assertive Power

From the early independence years to the 1990s, which ushered in the so-called second wave of democracy, West Africa was plagued by military coups, resulting in chronic instability, internal political strife and massive human rights violations. For instance, according to Peter Mwai, quoting a study by U.S. researchers Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne of the University of Kentucky, 200 coup attempts were registered in Africa, and 107 in West Africa, with a success rate of 50 per cent.[26] This positions West Africa as the world leader in coups d’états.

200 coup attempts were registered in Africa, and 107 in West Africa, with a success rate of 50 per cent.

In 1975, 16 heads of state of the founding member states were military-governed. In the following years, the three central Sahel countries, Burkina, Mali, and Niger, are the only ECOWAS members who do not have continuous and lasting progress in the evolution of their political systems towards democracy and the rule of law instead of militarism.

As a result of the serious consequences represented by coups, militarism, and unconstitutional changes in general, ECOWAS leaders, in line with the African Union guidelines and decisions, as described above, developed a robust normative system of collective security characterised by a policy of zero-tolerance for coups. In this regard, the bloc’s policy yielded some measurable results. In 2020, there were no military regimes among ECOWAS member states. The two exceptions from the coup contagion were Cabo Verde and Senegal, whose military always stayed aloof from politics.

ECOWAS and the Management of Unconstitutional Changes

Though, on several occasions, ECOWAS managed to deter or reverse coups where they happened, the organisation has a mixed track record in successfully reversing military coups. Under its crisis management mechanisms, it employs a combination of diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and, at times, the threat or use of force.

In May 1997, Sierra Leone experienced a military coup that overthrew the democratically elected president, Ahmad Tidiane Kabbah. After diplomatic efforts failed, ECOWAS intervened militarily through ECOMOG in March 1998, under a UN Security Council mandate, to restore President Kabbah. The intervention was led by a Nigerian contingent and supported by Ghana and Guinea, with financial backing from the UN, U.S., UK, and EU.[27]

Similarly, on March 22, 2012, Mali saw a coup d’état led by Captain Sanogo and the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR), which toppled the democratically elected government of General Amadou Toumani Touré just before the end of his final term. The international community, including the UN Security Council, the AU, and ECOWAS, widely condemned the coup. On March 29, ECOWAS issued a 72-hour ultimatum to the CNRDR junta to relinquish power, threatening to close Mali’s borders, freeze assets, and impose travel bans on the junta leaders. Following the suspension of Mali from ECOWAS and the AU and the freezing of development cooperation by the U.S., the World Bank, the EU, and the African Development Bank, negotiations led to an agreement on April 6, 2012. Power was handed over to Diouncounda Traoré, the President of Mali’s National Assembly, leading to the lifting of sanctions.[28]

Following the suspension of Mali from ECOWAS and the AU and the freezing of development cooperation by the U.S., the World Bank, the EU, and the African Development Bank, negotiations led to an agreement on April 6, 2012.

In December 2016, The Gambia faced a constitutional crisis when incumbent President Yaya Jammeh contested the electoral victory of opposition candidate Adama Barrow despite initially conceding defeat. Consequentially, ECOWAS launched ‘Operation Restore Democracy’ in January 2017, with forces entering Gambia at Barrow’s request. Barrow was inaugurated as the new President at the Gambian Embassy in Dakar, Senegal, and when the troops reached the capital Banjul, Jammeh resigned and left the country.[29]

Most recently, on July 26, 2023, Niger experienced a military coup that deposed democratically elected President Mohammed Bazoum. General Abdourahmane Tchiani, the presidential guard commander, declared himself the new leader. ECOWAS, led by Nigeria, condemned the coup and demanded Bazoum’s immediate reinstatement, imposing financial sanctions and threatening military intervention if the demands were not met by August 6. In response, neighbouring countries under military rule, including Mali and Burkina Faso, declared their support for Niger, warning that any intervention would be considered a declaration of war against them as well. These leaders, including Colonel Assimi Goïta of Mali, Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso, and Mamadi Doumbouya of Guinea, criticised ECOWAS’s stance, arguing that the sanctions undermined the spirit of pan-Africanism.[30]

The main reason put forth by the leaders of the three juntas for the decision to break away from ECOWAS was that sanctions, including the threat to use force to restore constitutional order, are illegal. However, a close look at the ECOWAS normative framework and customary practice proves the contrary: On several occasions, in 1998 in Sierra Leone and in 2017 in the Gambia, ECOWAS used the same coercive measure, with the full endorsement of the UN Security Council, which retains the exclusive power of authorisation.[31]

Challenges, Weaknesses, and Pertinent Criticisms of ECOWAS

In light of ECOWAS’s failure to reverse the recent coup in Niger, marking the fifth such event in three years — an unprecedented occurrence, harsh criticism has surged from various segments of the region, particularly among the youth and broader public opinion. While many of these criticisms stem from a lack of understanding of the legal and political frameworks underpinning ECOWAS’s actions and policies, and are further fueled by disinformation campaigns orchestrated by illiberal foreign powers with ideological and economic interests in West Africa, the regional body has displayed shortcomings. These include inconsistent and sometimes ill-advised measures in addressing unconstitutional changes. Undertaking to restore ECOWAS’s credibility and enhance its effectiveness as a regional organisation that has otherwise achieved significant progress in peace, security, and economic integration, the following points are the most salient:

• Adherence to Democracy and Good Governance Protocols: One of the primary challenges for ECOWAS is the non-compliance and blatant violations of its substantial protocol provisions by member state leaders.
• Complacency towards heads of state: ECOWAS is often seen as a ‘syndicate of heads of state’, adopting a complacent attitude toward politicians who manipulate national constitutions to extend their tenure, undermining the ideals of democracy and good governance proclaimed. The organisation firmly condemns military coups while tolerating constitutional coups and electoral charades,[32] leading to a perception of double standards. However, this perception is widespread in the region and contributes to discrediting ECOWAS. It was not founded because the bloc had no legal base that prevented a president from hanging on to power. When ECOWAS initiated a reform aimed at amending the Protocol on Good Governance to introduce a term limit to two, a few member states wielded their veto. This hinders a significant, major reform that ECOWAS should rekindle to improve its image, and more effectively prevent military coups.
• Reaction to civil and political rights violations: ECOWAS leaders rarely respond to severe civil and political rights violations. For instance, Article 22 of the Good Governance Protocol stipulates that the use of firearms to disperse non-violent demonstrations is prohibited, yet these provisions are often ignored without significant repercussions.[33]
• Enforcement of Court of Justice decisions: ECOWAS suffers from the non-enforcement of its Court of Justice decisions, weakening the effectiveness and credibility of its legal and dispute resolution mechanisms.
• Operationalisation of the standby force: The ECOWAS standby force, intended to be part of the African standby force since 2004 and effective from 2016, has not been operationalised due to a lack of resources and political will. Some member states are wary of this force, hindering its implementation.[34]
• ECOWAS’s static approach to mixed diplomacy: ECOWAS often lacks responsiveness to rapid developments, such as the formation of the Liptako-Gourma Pact by three juntas. ECOWAS should have taken diplomatic initiatives to negotiate and make concessions, but this was not done effectively.[35]

ECOWAS Conflict Resolution Setback and Geopolitical Fallout in the Sahel and Beyond

After this short analysis of ECOWAS’s strengths and weaknesses, let us now revisit the newly established facts by the Niger coup: In response to the stringent economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and the threat of military intervention, Niger, alongside its neighbouring countries Mali and Burkina Faso — both under military rule and subject to similar sanctions —, took a significant step on September 16, 2023. In what can be seen as a strategic move for their survival, they announced the signing of the Liptako-Gourma Pact, thereby forming the Alliance of Sahel Countries (AES).

With this “khaki pact”, the Timbuktu Institute wrote in September 2023,[36] the three countries are formalising their split with ECOWAS, especially with the implications of Article 6 (equivalent to NATO’s Article 5), known as ‘casus foederis’ in military alliance law. This principle now provides a legal basis for mutual assistance between allied states in the event of aggression or armed attack, for example, if ECOWAS were to consider military intervention. In its assessment, the Institute further pointed out that the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed this evolvement at the UN General Assembly. However, in addition to a real challenge to the regional collective security mechanism, there is a divergent feature: In the event of a rebellion under the terms of Article 6 of the pact, theoretically, Niger and Burkina Faso soldiers could now support Malian forces against armed groups in Northern Mali already at war with Bamako. Article 6 clearly states: “Any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more contracting parties shall be considered as an aggression against the other parties and shall give rise to a duty of assistance and relief on the part of all parties”,[37] whereas ECOWAS has signed defence pacts since the 1970s (non-aggression and mutual assistance in the event of aggression). Therefore, certain pact provisions nullify any possibility of non-diplomatic sanctions within the ECOWAS system. The dislocation of ECOWAS may already be underway, as the question now arises of the compatibility between membership of ECOWAS and adherence to a scheme that runs counter to its founding objectives. Uncertainties about integration, collective defence and security, and the future of democracy immediately occur.

Any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more contracting parties shall be considered as an aggression against the other parties and shall give rise to a duty of assistance and relief on the part of all parties.

A Region Polarised along Ideological Lines

The establishment of the AES by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger implies a significant shift from a unified security and defence community in West Africa to a region polarised along ideological lines. This polarisation reflects the broader geopolitical struggle between NATO and Russia,[38] with democratic regimes on one side and illiberal regimes on the other. The AES’s formation challenges the existing regional collective security mechanisms under ECOWAS, with implications akin to NATO’s Article 5, mandating mutual defence among the member states. Therefore, creating the AES not only leads to auto-Balkanisation of the region but also represents a major challenge for ECOWAS. This alliance now perceives ECOWAS’s collective security mechanism as a strategic threat. If the provisions of the AES pact become operational, it would further complicate the security environment and undermine ECOWAS’s peace and security architecture.

This polarisation is intensified by the scramble for Africa’s critical natural resources, geopolitical influence, and the inflow of arms, exacerbating the risk of interstate conflict. The resulting tensions, such as those between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso or Niger and Benin, erode trust and hinder the necessary economic and security cooperation from combating transnational threats like terrorism and organised crime. In addition to several cross-border incidents, the heads of state of the three juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger never miss an opportunity to use very hostile rhetoric against the regional bloc and its member states, the AU, or the so-called Western countries whilst praising Russia as their “reliable and sincere partner”, and thus also mobilising their population along the same line. In Burkina Faso, the head of the ruling junta has once again accused Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in a speech delivered on July 11, 2024, of wanting to destabilise his country. He also criticised Cotonou, Benin, reiterating that his neighbour was hosting two French bases.[39] The situation is best encapsulated in a headline from a well-known weekly: “ECOWAS — AES: The War of Blocs.”[40]

In Burkina Faso, the head of the ruling junta has once again accused Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in a speech delivered on July 11, 2024, of wanting to destabilise his country.

The Worrying Silence on Popular Sovereignty

In effect, whilst the ECOWAS vision is an integrated West Africa, sustainably developed and prosperous, and at peace, based on respect for democracy, human rights, and good governance, the AES includes none of those principles, but the “[t]he necessity to continue the heroic struggles led by African peoples and countries for political independence, human dignity, and economic emancipation.”[41] As commendable as it may be, this vision, which is essentially focused on security and sovereignty, remains silent on popular sovereignty, which is based on the freedom of citizens to exercise popular sovereignty through democratic elections, the only source of democratic legitimacy.

The military juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso broke away from ECOWAS, partly to avoid returning power to civilians through democratic elections. Despite agreeing on a timeline for a return to constitutional order, none have specified the duration of their transitions. Analysts predict these juntas might emulate Chad, transforming military rule into civilian governance by running for office, which could legitimise their coups as democratic mandates. According to Afrobarometer polls, 53 per cent of African respondents might support a military coup under certain circumstances, with 80 per cent in Mali endorsing a coup if elected officials fail to represent the people’s interests.[42] Youth activists and analysts from Sahel countries cite several reasons for growing anti-Western sentiment, particularly anti-French sentiment and disillusionment with democracy. Key among these are dysfunctional democratic systems plagued by rigged elections, corruption, clientelism, nepotism, and human rights violations. These issues have left many marginalised youths frustrated by unmet basic needs. Additionally, ‘Western hypocrisy’, especially in supporting corrupt or repressive African regimes while imposing their values, fuels resentment. A frequently cited example is France’s backing of President Déby in Chad after he unconstitutionally took power following his father’s death in 2021.[43]

Youth activists and analysts from Sahel countries cite several reasons for growing anti-Western sentiment, particularly anti-French sentiment and disillusionment with democracy.

However, these many uncertainties about the collective defence clause meet with real concerns about the implementation of this alliance. Military regimes may have divergent interests and priorities over time. Moreover, since these regimes are transitional, we may wonder about the attitude of the future democratic governments that are likely to be established following the current military transitions.

Presence of Military Regimes in Conflict Management Endeavours and Development Cooperation

The pact will continue negatively impacting the AU’s mediation and conflict resolution roles. The enduring presence of military regimes in alliances could make it difficult for the AU to exercise its role as a neutral mediator and make its conflict resolution role in the regions more complex.

A further potential negative consequence of the AES pact is that it authorises all member states to mutually address all security threats in member states, including the fight against separatist rebels, who are called terrorists. On the announcement of the formation of the new bloc, Tuareg groups in Mali and Niger expressed the view that the Liptako-Gourma Pact was a conspiracy by the military juntas against their community. Rhissa Boula, a former minister and founder of the Council of Resistance for the Republic (CRR), which tried to topple the military junta in Niger, has denounced the AES and supported the CSP-PSD, a coalition of political and military movements in Northern Mali. Former Tuareg rebels in Niger, who initially backed the coup leaders, now oppose the AES and have protested against Niger’s support for Mali in its conflict with the CSP-PSD. This ethnicisation of the conflict threatens regional stability.[44]

More broadly, this instability is likely to hinder regional development cooperation, particularly with the EU, (still) West Africa’s main development partner and second-largest humanitarian aid provider. The EU has significant stakes in maintaining close, beneficial relations with West Africa due to historical, economic, human, cultural, security, and geostrategic reasons. Both West Africa and North Africa share common interests in addressing climate change, environmental challenges, security threats, and transnational organised crime, including cocaine trafficking and migrant smuggling by land, via the Sahel-Sahara route,[45] with Niger as a key hub.[46]

ECOWAS at a Crossroads

To sum up, ECOWAS currently faces navigating geopolitical shifts, governance failures, the resurgence of militarism and foreign powers’ rivalry. It initially focused on economic integration among West African states but expanded its mandate to include conflict management in response to threats like civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. ECOWAS successfully managed peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, it faced challenges in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as recent developments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

ECOWAS currently faces navigating geopolitical shifts, governance failures, the resurgence of militarism and foreign powers’ rivalry.

Over time, weak governance, rising inequalities, corruption, failure to deliver development to a majority of the population, climate change impacts, and the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya created challenges for democratic systems and led to a resurgence of militarism. Many ECOWAS leaders failed to comply with its protocols on peace, security, and democracy, undermining the organisation’s credibility and reducing its ability to act effectively. ECOWAS to fully achieve its objective of regional peace and security anchored in the institutionalisation of democracy, good governance, accountability; the rule of law, and human rights; and a culture of peace, civil society organisations in those countries and at a regional level, must take on the fight.

 

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Babacar Ndiaye; Professor ret. of American studies, political history and foreign policy analyst, Transnational organised crime prevention/human security expert, UNODC, West and Central Africa, Principal Political Affairs Officer, ECOWAS. Senior Fellow at Timbuktu Institute for Peace Studies. Areas of interest: geopolitics, conflict prevention and resolution, multilateralism and diplomacy. Graduate from the Vienna School of International Studies. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.

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[1] “Timeline: ‘What has happened in Niger since the coup?,” Aljazeera, 20.08.2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/8/20/timeline-what-has-happened-in-niger-since-the-coup.

[2] Nicolas Barotte, “Niger: la France en soutien de la Cédéao mais jusqu’où?,” Le figaro, 11.08.2023, https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/niger-la-france-en-soutien-de-la-cedeao-mais-jusqu-ou-20230811.

[3] “Timeline: ‘What has happened in Niger since the coup?,” Aljazeera, 20.08.2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/8/20/timeline-what-has-happened-in-niger-since-the-coup.

[4] “La Chine entend jouer un ‘rôle de médiateur’ dans la crise au Niger,” BFMTV, 05.09.2023.

[5] “Coopération tripartite: Signature de la Charte du Liptako-Gourma instituant l’Alliance des États du Sahel,” Koulouba, 03.10.2024, https://koulouba.ml/cooperation-tripartite-signature-de-la-charte-du-liptako-gourma-instituant-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel/.

[6] “Liptako-Gourma Charter: A ‘khaki’ pact against the collective security mechanism,” Timbuktu Institute for Peace Studies, last modified on 24.07.2024, https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/753-liptako-gourma-charter-a-khaki-pact-against-the-collective-security-mechanism.

[7] “L’AES décrochent déjà un grand allié : La Fédération de Russie reconnaît officiellement la formation de la Confédération de l’Alliance des États du Sahel (AES). Elle a félicité cette initiative des présidents du Mali, du Burkina Faso et du Niger, qui a pour but d’assurer la sécurité et le développement des pays du Sahel,” Agence Nigérienne de Presse, 16.07.2024.

[8]  Servan Ahougnon, “William Tubman, l’homme à l’origine de l’idée de création de la CEDEAO,” ECOFIN, 29.05.2020.

[9] ECOWAS Treaty, signed in Lagos, May 28, 1975.

[10] Marc Penouil, “Le traité de Lagos, efface le clivage entre pays francophones et anglophones,” Le Monde Diplomatique, Octobre 1975, 24.

[11] Lagos Treaty, May 28, 1975.

[12] Ibid.

[13] ECOWAS, ‘Mediator’s Guide’.

[14] The Protocol Relating to Non-Aggression stipulated prohibiting the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of member states (Article 1), outlining ECOWAS’s role in resolving violent conflicts, referring unresolved disputes to a Committee of the Authority, and ultimately to the Authority itself (Article 5.2) and stressing that ECOWAS’s objectives can only be achieved in a climate of peace and harmony, aiming to prevent subversion and destabilisation reminiscent of Cold War tensions (Preamble).

[15] The Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence, A/SP03/5/81, signed on May 29, 1981, in Freetown, Sierra Leone, further clarifies the collective security arrangement for guiding member states in conflict situations declaring any armed threat or aggression against one member state as a threat against the entire community (Article 2), enlarging the institutional powers of the ECOWAS Authority to decide on armed intervention, establish Allied Armed Forces, examine peace and security issues, and create a Defence Council and Defence Commission, and warning of the risks posed by foreign military bases on African soil and calls for their eventual dismantling. Article 20.3. reads: “Member States undertake to put an end to the presence of foreign military bases on their national territories as soon as the Community is in a position to meet their defence requirements”. See also Bagayoko Niagalé et Ba Mouhamadou Moustapha, “L’architecture institutionnelle de paix et de sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest,” African Security Sector Network, août 2020.

[16] CEDEAO et CMI, Guide pour la Médiation. Abuja: CEDEAO, 2018.

[17] UN General Assembly and Security Council, Brahimi Report, A/55/305 S/2000/809, 21.08.2000, a_55_305_e_brahimi_report.pdf.

[18] ECOWAS, Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08 – The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, accessed on 12.08.2024, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39184-doc-140._the_ecowas_conflict_prevention_framework.pdf. Key provisions of the instrument include, among others, the prevention, management and resolution of internal and inter-State conflicts (Article 3(a)). It also aims at strengthening cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines (Article 3(d)), and the promotion of close cooperation between member states in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping (Article 3(g)).

[19] (Chapter V, Article 25), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance, 2007, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36384-treaty-african-charter-on-democracy-and-governance.pdf.

[20] ECOWAS, Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (A/SP1/12/01), OHCHR, accessed on 12.08.2024, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/ecowasprot.htm.

[21] http://www.courtecowas.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Protocole-A-P1-7-91.pdf.

[22] Mention must be made, at this point, of the OAU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, which was adopted and signed in Libreville already in 1977, opts for the criminalisation of mercenarism. This may be seen in connection with the binding legal instrument of the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (Abuja, 2006), since the illicit and licit flow of small arms and light weapons has significantly impacted ECOWAS countries.

[23] AU, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted 30 January 2007, https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance.

[24] “Turkey, Iran, Morocco seek greater role in Sahel following French exit,” AFP, 12.03.2024.

[25] “Niger: quelles sont les forces militaires en présence après le retrait du contingent américain?,” RFI, 07.08.2024, https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240807-niger-quelles-sont-les-forces-militaires-en-pr%C3%A9sence-apr%C3%A8s-le-retrait-du-contingent-am%C3%A9ricain.

[26] Peter Mwai, “Gabon coup: The latest in a series of military takeovers on the continent,” BBC, 30.08.2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600.

[27] Peter A. Dumbuya, “ECOWAS Military Intervention in Sierra Leone: Anglophone-Francophnie Bipolarity or Multipolarity?,“ Vol. 25, No. 2, Third World Political, Economic, and Social Developments in Historical Perspective (Fall 2008).

[28] ”La Cédéao lève les sanctions contre le Mali,” France 24, 08.04.2012.

[29] Paul D. Williams, “An African Model of Coercion,” IPI Global Observatory, 16.03.2017.

[30] Inesta B. Lndzoubou, “Alliance of Sahel States Departure from ECOWAS: Implications for WAEMU and the CFA Franc,” Modern Diplomacy, 13.02.2024.

[31] Svenja Raube, “An international Assessment of ECOWAS Threat to Use Force in Niger,” justsecurity.org, 16.08.2023. Furthermore, to recapitulate, the threat or use of force is prohibited under international law (Article 2.4 of the UN Charter), which only allows for the possibility of military intervention under two conditions, first, self-defence, including ‘by ad hoc invitation’ at the request of legitimate political authorities (President Bazoum’s appeal recognised as such by the UN Security Council and ECOWAS) and second, by calling on ‘collective security’ upon invitation (consent) anticipated in an international commitment (in this case, Article 25 ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism relating to conflict Prevention, subject to express authorisation by AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and UN Security Council, under Chapter VII).

[32] Fredrik Söderbaum, “With a Little Help From My Friends: How Regional Organizations in Africa Sustain Clientelism, Corruption and Discrimination,” Semantic Scholar, (July 23): 6. The author coined the Regime-boosting regionalism which he argued seeks to strengthen the status, legitimacy and the general interests of the political regime (rather than the nation-state per se), both on the international arena and domestically. Many ruling (or crumbling) regimes and political leaders in Africa engage in symbolic and discursive activities, whereby they praise the goals of regionalism and regional organisations, sign cooperation treaties and agreements, and take part in ‘summitry regionalism’, but without having a commitment to or bearing the costs of policy implementation.

[33] Paul Melly, “Ecowas in crisis: Why West Africa’s united front is in tatters,“ BBC, 10.02.2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68255833.

[34] Chinedu Asadu, ”West African defense chiefs propose a $2.6 billion security plan that analysts say might not work,” AP, 27.06.2024, https://apnews.com/article/ecowas-nigeria-westafrica-military-coup-security-24e9b9a8f8e6fddfb669b872d60151d5.

[35] Melly, “Ecowas in crisis”.

[36] “The Liptako-Gourma Charter. A Kaki Pact Against the ECOWAS Collective Security Mechanism?,” timbuktu-institute.org, 23.09.2023.

[37] Mathew Brunce, ”Sierra Leone Welcomes Restored President,” Reuters, 10.03.1998.

[38] Patrick Forestier, Poutine Contre la France: un grand reporter au cœur des guerres du Kremlin (Paris: Le Cherche Midi, 2024), 78.

[39] ”La Côte d’Ivoire et le Benin, plus jamais dans le collimateur d’Ibrahima Traoré,” Jeune Afrique et AFP, 11.07.2024.

[40] Manon Laplace, ”Afrique de L’ouest. CEDEAO-AES; Bientôt la guerre des ”blocs ?,” Jeune Afrique, No 3134, (Mars 2024): 28-35.

[41] AES, Charte du Liptako Gourma Instituant l’Alliance des Etats du Sahel.

[42] ”En Afrique, les coups d’Etat font de nouveaux adeptes,” Seneplus, 23.07.2024, https://www.seneplus.com/politique/en-afrique-les-coups-detat-font-de-nouveaux-adeptes.

[43]  ”Webinar: Echos régionaux du changement politique au Sénégal,” Timbuktu Institute, 17.04.2024.

[44] ”Le Mali au-delà du front Nord: Contestations internes et menaces sur la sécurité régionale,”  Timbuktu Institute, 16.10.2023.

[45] UNODC, Smuggling of Migrants in the Sahel: Transnational Organized Threat Assessment. New York: UNODC, 2004.

[46] Chris Ewokor and Sam Hancock, ”Niger: Les putschistes abrogent la loi contre le trafic de migrants,” BBC, 28.11.2023.

[46] Mwai, ”Gabon coup”.

[46] Raube, ”An International Assessment of ECOWAS Threat to Use Force in Niger.”  

[46] It is worth noting that paradoxically, the Liptako-Gourma Charter expresses in its whereases, adherence to ECOWAS revised treaty, the very legal foundation for ECOWAS mandate to slap sanctions against Niger, as the basis of international rule of law, along the UN Charter, and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

[46] ”The Liptako-Gourma Charter,” timbuktu-institute.org ; ”Charte du LIPTAKO-GOURMA instituant l’Alliance des États du Sahel entre le Burkina Faso, la République du Mali et la République du Niger,” Facebook page of Ministère Burkinabé des Affaires Étrangères, 16.09.2023, https ://www.facebook.com/100064378944389/posts/708697931286165/?mibextid=hubsqH.