Abstract: This paper seeks to discern, deter, and defeat hostile Chinese intentions in the Taiwan Strait. The existing literature tends to be constrained by an overreliance on military and/or historical myopia. Therefore, such means will be supplemented by a multifaceted approach. The elements of strategy and strategy itself will be subsumed under the aegis of a grand strategic conception.[1] Beijing’s aspirations for regional hegemony represent a threat not only to the vital interests of the United States (U.S.) but to the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) East Asian neighbours. Moreover, the economic fallout from a blockade or kinetic conflict involving Taiwan poses a threat to the global economy. Short- and long-term plans should be formulated to consider contingency and divergent coalition interests.
Problem statement: How might the PRC’s designs upon East Asia and the U.S. defence of the Western Pacific best be rendered inert?
So what?: An anti-hegemonic coalition should be created to defend Taiwan while building an economic strategic reserve for collective self-sufficiency in semiconductor manufacturing. The objective will be to deter the PRC from attempting a blockade or invasion of Taiwan over a 20-25-year period. Global economic security and the interests of the U.S., and its East Asian partners demand it.
Deterrence or Extinction
The twin threat of a Chinese invasion and blockade of Taiwan will herein be treated as synonymous. This reflects the likelihood that any invasion would also include a blockade.[2] Given that a blockade, if uncontested, would lead to the surrender or starvation of the Taiwanese government, its deterrence and defeat remain within the remit of this report. Since a blockade by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) might be accompanied by landing operations by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), invasion scenarios must also be considered. To reduce the chances of accidentally provoking a general war, the U.S.’ role should be limited to training, equipping, funding, and coordinating anti-Beijing forces.[3]
Since a blockade by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) might be accompanied by landing operations by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), invasion scenarios must also be considered.
Wargame iterations indicate high losses all around, even among victorious invading Chinese troops.[4] As such, a depleted PLAN should pose no immediate threat to the Indo-Pacific theatre. Therefore, a high-risk option, such as attacking mainland China, should be viewed as a disproportionate means of response.[5] If, on the other hand, Taiwan were to fall, and the PLAN allowed to rebuild before a regional anti-hegemonic coalition could do the same, then Japan, South Korea, and others might be threatened.
The global semiconductor trade’s economic impact remains a factor of similarly geopolitical import.[6] Domestic U.S. efforts (e.g., the CHIPS Act) are only the beginning. The European Commission should be encouraged to pursue the European Parliament’s interest in bilateral trade with Taiwan.[7] Over the next two decades, an anti-hegemonic coalition aimed at Beijing should build a collective, strategic arsenal to achieve self-sufficiency in oil, semiconductors, and rare earth metals. Failure to do so could lead to a situation where, 25 years hence, a Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-ruled Taiwan controls access to the semiconductor trade.
If Beijing felt pushed into a corner, whether from perceived efforts at regime change, its commitment to reunification by 2049, or fear of impending demographic collapse, it might feel compelled to lash out.[8] In the event of a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan, then both the U.S. and the PRC, indeed, the global economy—could face catastrophic risks.
As the sole regional hegemon within any prospective anti-hegemonic coalition, the U.S. must assume the role of what Elbridge Colby calls the external cornerstone balancer.[9] The U.S. Department of Defense would require significant budgetary influxes, the expense of which pales into insignificance when considering the effects of a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. Mines, anti-ship missiles, and radar are three asymmetric systems that provide great needs at low per-unit costs. So long as a porcupine strategy (e.g., arming Taiwan to the teeth) is backed by resources, the significance of which the strategic situation demands, deterrence remains a valid means of securing peace through strength.
Deterrence should be visible in its results (improved weapons systems in the arsenals of U.S. allies and partners)—not methods (public-private partnerships/cutouts for weapons transactions; increased training of Taiwanese officers in the U.S., away from CCP prying eyes; and in general, keeping as low a profile as possible, while engaging in activities in the Western Pacific.)[10] Peace through strength requires silence, not bluster. Power demands respect, not spectacle, when dealing with a shame-based, warrior-sage culture. Since Xi Jinping has publicly committed to “reunification” with Taiwan by 2049, deterrence must speak the diplomatic lingua franca. Until the world no longer relies on the CCP for the necessities of life, it must concern itself with the affairs of the Western Pacific.
Bulls and Bears
Taiwan is the centre of the U.S.’ First Island Chain, extending (in the north) from the southern coast of Japan to (in the south) an area between Malaysia and Vietnam.[11] Arming Taiwan and the First Island Chain aims to slow down a putative Chinese advance. Especially with regard to Taiwan, any delay that indigenous forces might purchase would be paid back in kind via the freeing up of naval and aerial reinforcements. The danger here, however, concerns what might constitute a “red line” for Beijing.[12] Such waters might be tested incrementally, based on the best available intelligence, allowing for the demands of time and prudence of proportionality in navigating the grey zone between war and peace.
Worse than confronting danger, however, is pretending the danger does not exist. As a case in point, one wargame sought to bypass the worst of such dangers by allowing for attacks upon the mainland yet discounting the possibility of a Chinese nuclear response.[13] Such efforts might achieve victory, but only within the simulacrum of an artificial world. To attain real victory, real conditions must be taken into account. In short, in war, accidents abound. It is up to policymakers to design systems capable of framing objectives according to national interests across the strategic continuum.
Worse than confronting danger, however, is pretending the danger does not exist.
Nonetheless, doing nothing must also be considered an option. In this case, a global economic collapse, owing to disruption of the supply chain (and not just semiconductors), could emanate from the Taiwan Strait. As calamitous as such a financial meltdown might be, a nuclear exchange in the Western Pacific, whether originating in misperception or not, would constitute a precedence incalculably worse.
At the same time, doing nothing, i.e., appeasing the CCP, might simply be handing Beijing the keys to the Western Pacific. In which case, the PLAN would neither be slowed nor attrited by deterrence during its 100-mile passage across the Taiwan Strait.[14] An intact landing force might secure sufficient beachhead and harbour space to land enough troops to seize the island.
Given the innumerable difficulties of crossing the strait and taking an island with a force that has not been to war for over 40 years, a Chinese victory is difficult to imagine.[15] Nonetheless, if the PLAN is preparing to invade within the next 5 to 10 years, as certain experts believe, coalition members must overhaul their respective war economies.
A Historical Premise: Taiwan Since the War of 1895
Military analyses concerning a prospective Sino-Taiwanese war tend to be hampered by the fact that Taiwan has not been invaded since the end of the 19th century.[16] This might be partly remedied by a brief analysis, hoping to draw contemporary lessons.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was ostensibly ended by the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895).[17] The conflict, while largely obscure, is noteworthy for three reasons regarding the prospects of a future Chinese invasion of Taiwan. First, it pitted a vastly superior demographic and economic power (PRC) against a putatively inferior contending force (Japan). Nonetheless, the latter shocked the world with an (evidently) easy victory. Second, the treaty’s conclusion, at a time when Taiwan remained unoccupied by the enemy, added uncertainty to the negotiators’ plans. Third, the occupation provoked an even greater war.
Much like the freikorps (irregular) troops in Germany in the aftermath of World War I, the intact homeland rebelled. In the case of Taiwan, the May 1895 treaty was immediately followed by an indigenous uprising, which coerced its Chinese governors into declaring independence.[18] Taking advantage of the mountainous terrain, rough aquatic surroundings, and extremely warm conditions, a calamitous guerrilla campaign ensued. Spearheaded by Taiwan’s indigenous people and reinforced by its remaining Chinese defenders, the hitherto unassailed islanders prolonged the war for a year and a half. By the time Japan had subdued all resistance mechanisms (towards the end of 1895), Japan’s roughly 700 casualties had ballooned by some 20,000, owing mainly to disease.[19]
While Taiwan remained in Japan’s hands until the end of the Second World War, the difficulty of its capture remained within memory. China retrieved sovereignty over the island following the Japanese defeat in 1945.[20]
However, Marxist-Leninist (soon to be Maoist) guerrillas overthrew the government in Beijing, the latter fleeing to Taiwan in 1949. Supported by the U.S., the Kuomintang (KMT), under Chiang Kai Shek, was recognised as the rightful government of China.[21] With Beijing’s enemy being backed by the U.S., and buttressed by the memories of 1895, subsequent attempts to take the main island never quite came off.[22]
Supported by the U.S., the Kuomintang (KMT), under Chiang Kai Shek, was recognised as the rightful government of China.
Meanwhile, the communist rulers of the new PRC, controlling the mainland, considered themselves to be the government of China.[23] The term One China, comprising the mainland and affiliated islands, was proclaimed by both Beijing and Taiwan (Taipei). The difference lay in the fact that each considered themselves to be the legitimate rulers thereof. The term, as well as the baggage accompanying it, continues to sound a contentious chord.
In 1979, the Carter Administration championed the Taiwan Relations Act, following on the heels of the Nixon Administrations’ reversal of course.[24] The U.S., which, under Eisenhower, had gone so far as to protect Taiwan by threatening the PRC with nuclear arms, de-recognised Taipei in favour of Beijing. A kind of pseudo-legal no-man’s land, to which the PRC assented, enabled the U.S. to arm Taiwan, as well as to protect its interests concerning securing the island’s defence.
To this day, both Taipei and Beijing lay claim to the One China title, although Taiwan’s present leading faction (the Democratic Progressive Party/DPP) no longer presses such de jure claims.[25] This is dangerous, per se, for it implies (and, at times, has been made explicit by the pro-independence leaning DPP) that there is not one China, but two. Most China experts agree that if Taiwan declared itself independent, Beijing would invade within six months; thus, the notion of One China might not be effaced.[26] Given the occasionally vocal pro-independence leanings of the DPP, Taiwan’s presidential election in 2024 might have repercussions beyond its apparent scope.
Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic (DIME)
Deterrence may employ diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) means. It constitutes a strategy well-suited for the nuclear age, wherein an act of escalation might prove to be an existential threat. The U.S., China, North Korea, and other theatre-based actors, possess nuclear weapons.[27] Certain thresholds must not be crossed; the trick lies in deciphering them. However, even the best intelligence, information constrained by context, is beset with friction. Therefore, by diversifying means beyond the strictly military ken, misperception and escalation might more readily be avoided. Grand strategy involves the utilisation of DIME, and similar means, to prosecute and defend the state’s long-term interests.[28] To the extent that such interests might be adequately expressed and harmonised with the oscillations of the international system, states might overcome all save putatively irreconcilable differences. However, military means remain the most essential form of deterrence. Without them, the political becomes the province of dependency and threat. For statehood implies a monopoly upon the use of force.
Nonetheless, the military must implement political ends. While the military recommendations presented herein are calibrated for a period of 0-5 years, they reflect but one aspect of a grand strategic conception. The latter is conceived within a 20–25-year horizon. The reason for this is twofold. First, it might take at least 20 years for the U.S. to build a semiconductor manufacturing base, which, in tandem with others (e.g., Japan), might be capable of insuring the global economy against a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.[29] Second, Xi Jinping has publicly declared 2049 the deadline for “reintegrating” Taiwan with the PRC.
Military (M)
Military means may be taken as consisting of two kinds (offensive and defensive) and modes (active and passive.)[30] These interpenetrate the systole of martial, the diastole of diplomatic means, to achieve political ends.
If Taiwan succumbed to Chinese influence (whether by election, blockade, or war), East Asia and the Western Pacific might fall under the PRC’s sphere of influence. In this case, the Second Island Chain, comprising eastern Japan, Guam, and eastern Indonesia, would be threatened. Most scenarios wargamed by one prestigious panel resulted in the immediate devastation of Guam.[31] If Taiwan were to fall, Guam could subsequently be occupied. Therefore, the state of the U.S. fleet, air force, and budgets which inform them remain key. Increased procurements for stealth and asymmetric systems might best defend coalition members.
If Taiwan succumbed to Chinese influence (whether by election, blockade, or war), East Asia and the Western Pacific might fall under the PRC’s sphere of influence.
Given massive quantitative differentials, asymmetric systems offer means for redress via the provision of qualitative advantage (e.g., 1.4 billion Chinese versus 23 million Taiwanese people.)[32] Conversely, as regards the Western Pacific, bulky, expensive platforms of tanks, battleships, and non-stealthy fighters represent too little quantity in return for a misplaced qualitative edge.[33]
Economic (E)
Economic means projecting a nation’s productivity and military and martial potentialities. The predominant theme of our globalist age is the flat world of free, interdependent trade. Assumptions that this mechanism had made progress inevitable and war impossible were exploded by the guns of August 1914. On the other hand, the combination of progress and war led ineluctably to the nuclear age. Risk-aversive behaviour being prudent in this age of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), global supply chains have thrived. Yet Taiwan remains dependent on the PRC for approximately 40% of its exports and around 20% of its imports (42% for exports and 22% for imports in 2021.)[34]
Like 1914, an interruption of global trade would be an act of madness. Unlike 1914, today’s global trade routes run not through Europe, nor even continental Eurasia, but rather through the islands and environs of the Taiwan Strait. Through this strait flow, some 70% of global semiconductor production and nearly 50% of operational container ships.[35] Any offensive, or even defensive military means, must reckon with the consequences of closure, damage, or destruction of such waterways and resources. Were it not for the object lesson of 1914, policymakers might justly believe this region to be too interdependent for predation and war. In short, economics is just one aspect of DIME. Its overestimation, in retrospect, appears to have been a conceit of 1914.
On the other hand, Peter Zeihan’s model, predicting the PRC’s economic and demographic decay, offers perhaps a better clue to decision-making in Beijing.[36] That is, only by control of East Asia and the Western Pacific might the PRC avoid the “middle-income trap.” This trap consists of a large class of elders aged out of the workforce and sub-replacement levels of births over deaths. The scope of the problem might best be understood in light of the usually austere CCP‘s promotion of virtual reality “kissing lips,” which might be seen as modernity’s response to ancient fertility pressures.[37] As farfetched a casus belli this might be, it seems no less unlikely than nationalism in August 1914. Given President Xi’s 2049 deadline for the “rejuvenation” of China, including de facto integration of Taiwan, shifts in the PRC’s economy and demography should be assessed as a rating of strategic import.
Given President Xi’s 2049 deadline for the “rejuvenation” of China, including de facto integration of Taiwan, shifts in the PRC’s economy and demography should be assessed as a rating of strategic import.
Information (I)
Information remains the most obscure component of DIME. Originally subsumed under the term “propaganda,” it underwent an ontological revolution owing to the computer-induced Information Age (IA).[38] The IA erected a non-spatially constrained extension of sounds, images and words. Originally conceived as a military tool, doctrinal evolution recast information warfare (IW) within the broader information environment (IE). By emphasising process and context, IE allows for the shaping of cognition throughout all DIME domains.[39]
Such contextualisation had already lent itself to conceiving information as operating within a functional, multidimensional framework. More importantly, it had done so within the schematic grammar of longstanding strategic doctrine. Information became redefined as the connective tissue (or processes) linking tactics with strategy.[40] As such, IW is now seen as occurring within an operational information environment (OIE).
The truly transformational potential of information (contextualised within a prevailing OIE) unfolds within several, even simultaneous, dimensions: physical (infrastructure, machines, personnel); information (bytes, as well as means for the conveyance, manipulation, and securing thereof); and cognitive, which impacts Boydian Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action (OODA) loops.[41] By manipulating perceptions, the OIE rubric acts per the methods of the most modern propaganda, transmuting the mere alteration of beliefs into the paralysis, or production, of desired propagandee acts.[42]
Such new schemas are not mere theoretics. Heavy digitisation of Taiwan’s utilities, in tandem with its geographic isolation as an island, renders it susceptible across multiple domains.[43] The putatively accidental cutting of two sea-cables between Taiwan and Matsu in February 2023, which took down the internet on the latter island, may have been a shot across the bow.[44] There are 14 underwater cables connecting Taiwan (including its outlying islands, such as Kinmen and Matsu) with the internet. Backup technologies, while increasingly pursued by Taipei, remain inadequate to prevent chaos from erupting in the event of full-scale war. It is axiomatic among the experts that the severing of such cables would constitute the opening salvo of any prospective Chinese invasion of Taiwan.[45] Efforts to redress the situation are hampered by Taipei’s lack of trust in an otherwise proven technology (Starlink), owing to its proprietor’s (Elon Musk’s) dealings with Beijing.
The OIE includes cyberwarfare.[46] The most strenuous efforts by the U.S., its partners, and allies in the anti-hegemonic coalition should address Taiwan’s gaping sea-cable vulnerability. Incorporating AUKUS, the QUAD, ASEAN, or some such minilateral grouping, the coalition should pool its resources to constitute economies of scale to solve this immense technological, diplomatic, and logistical challenge. Similar measures, comprising cyberwarfare, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and cybersecurity, should be developed, tested, and rendered robust to remediate Taiwan’s food, fuel, and other such vulnerabilities. Coordinating defensive cybersecurity measures with elite French, U.K., and German actors (e.g., CERTBw) accords with the E.U.’s interest in promoting “peace, security and stability in Asia,” and “the status quo and peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait.”[47]
The most strenuous efforts by the U.S., its partners, and allies in the anti-hegemonic coalition should address Taiwan’s gaping sea-cable vulnerability.
The content of grand strategy, as conceived herein concerning Taiwan, consists of utilising DIME methods to deter Chinese attempts at incorporating the region within the PRC’s sphere of interest. The expression thereof will focus on East Asia and the Western Pacific theatres. Deterrence within the context of the greater Indo-Pacific region largely exceeds the scope of this work.
Diplomacy (D)
Any prospective coalition thwarting Beijing’s reintegrationist ambitions would comprise democratic and autocratic norms.[48] Even Taiwan, among the most democratic East Asian nations, harbours a (relatively) pro-Beijing party, the Kuomintang (KMT). Conversely, the communist PRC has accrued historic rates of—largely capitalistic—economic growth, lifting historic numbers of people out of poverty. Democratic South Korea might remain outside the coalition, owing to its proximity to China and North Korea. Communist Vietnam would probably remain neutral, although its sympathies (but not geography) might lend succour to an anti-hegemonic coalition.
According to certain realists, domestic configurations of states have no bearing on geopolitical facts.[49] In practice, the national interest, expressed by that equally amorphous abstraction, the will of the people, assumes various, oft-competing, domestic forms (even at the most authoritarian end of the ideological spectrum.) In 2020, such tensions in Hong Kong led to the collapse of the PRC’s credibility, as Beijing reneged on its one nation, two systems policy.[50]
The U.S. is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), whereby the U.S. recognised Beijing, in place of Taipei.[51] The act, the declaration of which was co-endorsed by Beijing, leaves ample room for largesse regarding the interpretation thereof. Not only does it allow for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, but it also allows the U.S. to come to the latter’s defence to protect U.S. interests. So long as the One China policy is not rebuked (and the PRC, Taiwan, and the U.S. all accept it), and so long as Taiwan does not declare independence, the status quo might be maintained. Of course, the PRC and Taiwan have different views as to what “One China” actually means. Nonetheless, such diplomatic tact, including that between Beijing and Taipei, has maintained peace for over 40 years.
So long as the One China policy is not rebuked, and so long as Taiwan does not declare independence, the status quo might be maintained.
The PRC, for its part, claims not only Taiwan but also large chunks of East Asia (Korea, most of the South China Sea, Okinawa)[52] Beijing has consistently violated the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which it is bound as a signatory state. It has attacked fishing craft and other vessels from several neighbouring states. Since 2022, Beijing has increased its grey zone tactics, including armadas of dozens of planes penetrating Taiwan’s median zone.[53]
Military (M) & Diplomacy (D)
These proposals are based on realist, as opposed to legalist, means of preventing kinetic conflict in the East Asian and Western Pacific theatres. Such a conflict, even if short of de jure war, could disrupt global supply chains or even escalate to a nuclear exchange. Yet the following proposals are not conceived in a vacuum. The greatest probability for a successful PRC invasion of Taiwan would entail the untested PLAN crossing 80 to 120 miles of uncontested straits.[54] The most logical means to achieve this would be via a surprise attack, followed by a blockade of the Taiwan Strait. Theoretically, such a blockade would only have to be held long enough for the PLAN’s understrength transport wing to ferry enough troops to Taiwan to secure the invasion.
A porcupine defence is predicated upon the prepositioning of many light, mobile, anti-air and anti-ship weapons, in addition to mines and accompanying systems.[55] In this paper, the term is tantamount to arming an anti-hegemonic coalition, including Taiwan, as rapidly and efficiently as possible. The objective should be to impose prospective costs that Beijing is unwilling to incur (deterrence); and, failing that, to erect a force posture capable of interdicting an invading force.
An effective defence of Taiwan is not credible without a strong basis in U.S. support.[56] Such support need not be kinetic, save insofar as the U.S. might supply, train, and fund an anti-hegemonic coalition. Whether such a coalition could succeed without direct (i.e., kinetic) U.S. support remains uncertain in the event of an invasion. Nonetheless, it is likely that Guam (a U.S. territory) would be bombed within the opening days of any prospective Chinese invasion [57]. The literature is teeming with scenarios of U.S. naval and anti-missile actions—including attacks against airbases and missile launching sites located in mainland China. Given a lack of consensus concerning a prospective Chinese response, attacks against the mainland should be restricted to those conducted by non-nuclear coalition members.[58]
Here, we run up against the rules of engagement—the bane of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Lieutenant General David Deptula argues against signalling that any options are off the table so as not to unduly hamper U.S. capabilities.[59] Such an approach seems to court unacceptable risks for all concerned. Rather, Beijing’s nuclear capability argues for negotiating restrictions on certain targets and weapons systems. Such restrictions should be negotiated via informal (i.e., private) diplomacy between Beijing and any U.S.-led coalition—prior to any prospective cross-strait crisis (let alone an act of war).
Beijing’s nuclear capability argues for negotiating restrictions on certain targets and weapons systems.
While far from foolproof, some such set of negotiated restrictions remains of existential import, given the ever-present possibility of nuclear escalation. This is why deterring an invasion in the first place warrants such urgent, resource-intensive support. Nonetheless, a successful landing by the PLAN on Taiwan would not necessarily doom the defenders to failure.[60] Taiwan harbours certain features (e.g., mountains, rough tides in the straits), which might lend themselves to an incisive defensive edge if history be any judge.[61]
Windows of Opportunity
Military means, which constitute the backbone of the porcupine defence here, address, owing to a sense of urgency, a short-term (0 to 5-year) window. As for long-term, strategic dispositions, the U.S. cannot be relied upon to contest Chinese hegemony in the Western Pacific beyond a certain point. An operational window of opportunity, extending for approximately 20 to 25 years (vide supra), represents the maximum period during which the U.S. might be relied upon to fulfil this role.[62] Following this, the U.S. might be more likely to retreat behind the Second Island Chain.[63] As such, this window constitutes an even greater sense of urgency for China’s East Asian neighbours.
Therefore, military means must be supplemented by longer-term diplomacy to mitigate the spread of Sinicisation throughout the Indo-Pacific. By combining the elements of DIME, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the QUAD, or some such grouping might constitute a kind of Asian NATO, requisite for mitigating any potential U.S. retreat beyond the Western Pacific. Given their proximity to Beijing, regional coalition members will need collateral (e.g., an Asian NATO) against any prospective, precipitate U.S. exodus (e.g., Afghanistan, Vietnam) from the coalition.
Recommendations and Conclusions
- Grand Strategy (Diplomacy, D): Instantiate Obama’s (2011) Strategic Pivot to Asia (Indo-Pacific);
- Operations (Diplomacy, D; Military, M): Build an anti-Beijing coalition (Deterrence, 2023-2028);
- Tactics (Economic, E; Information, I): Protect Taiwan’s undersea cables; trade; cybersecurity;
- Operational (Economy, E; Information, I): Strategically disperse semiconductor manufacturing;
- Operational/Strategic (Diplomacy, D; Military, M; Economic, E): Asian NATO to deter and hedge;
- Tactical/Strategic (Military, M; Diplomacy, D): Anti-escalatory rules of engagement with Beijing; and
- Operational (Economic, E, Diplomacy, D): Integrate anti-hegemonic Asian economy and trade.
Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait constitute the centre of gravity for global supply chains. In the event of a war or blockade, a global economic crisis, depression, or collapse might ensue. Tensions between the PRC and its neighbours, particularly Taiwan, coexist with economic interdependence for many and geographic vulnerability for some. Perceptions of U.S. decline and the dispersal of Western resources towards secondary strategic ends (e.g., Syria and the Eastern European theatre) coincide with the PRC’s ascension in the Indo-Pacific. China’s grey-zone tactics and economic leverage threaten to achieve “national rejuvenation” by 2049—crowned by the “reintegration” of Taiwan.
Tensions between the PRC and its neighbours, particularly Taiwan, coexist with economic interdependence for many and geographic vulnerability for some.
Given the threat to world trade, including the U.S.’ economic and technological base, a U.S.-led anti-hegemonic coalition should defend Taiwan and the Western Pacific. The coalition should seek to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Information infrastructure (e.g., underseas cables, cybersecurity) should be rendered more resilient; backup systems should be expanded. Economic decoupling of essential (e.g., semiconductor) industries from the PRC should seek to reduce Beijing’s economic leverage. Diplomacy should build an anti-hegemonic coalition yet negotiate potential rules of engagement with Beijing. A potential escalation between nuclear-armed powers might be best avoided by such means.
Marc Cohen is a philosopher with a freshly-minted MPA in Global Affairs. His approach to foreign policy is based upon grand strategic, technological, and geopolitical conceptions. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.
[1] The use of the term strategy here is subsumed under a conceptual rubric employing diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) means. Strategy itself refers to the specific operational principle (deterrence) predicated thereupon. Grand strategy refers to the coordination of all such means, over a 20-to-25-year period, for developing a global semiconductor manufacturing base independent of Beijing and unthreatened by potential bottlenecks in the Taiwan Strait.
[2] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2019).
[3] Such limits would apply to any nuclear, anti-hegemonic coalition, or power (e.g., France or the United Kingdom.) Yet such limits would not nullify legitimate needs for defence (e.g., against an attack on Okinawa or Guam.)
[4] “Losses in all iterations were high and sobering for both sides. In all but the ‘Taiwan stands alone’ scenario, China lost the large preponderance of its surface fleet, including amphibious ships, surface combatants, and carriers, as well as a portion of its submarine fleet,” Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham,” Report Launch―The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” CSIS, January 9, 2023, p. 101, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan (csis.org).
[5] Owing to risks involving brinkmanship, given the PRC’s nuclear capabilities.
[6] Luis Miguel, “If China Takes Taiwan, They Control Global Semiconductor Production,” The New American, December 05, 2021, https://thenewamerican.com/if-china-takes-taiwan-they-control-global-semiconductor-production/.
[7] Stefan Grobe, “EU Must Stand ‘firm’ with Taiwan to Ease Tensions with China, Says Taipei’s Envoy,” Euronews, January 15, 2024. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/01/15/eu-must-stand-firm-with-taiwan-to-ease-tensions-with-china-says-taipeis-envoy.
[8] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2019); Peter Zeihan, The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalisation, (New York, NY: Harper Business, 2022).
[9] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).
[10] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2019).
[11] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).
[12] red line: An unacceptable provocation, be it from a military, diplomatic, or other point-of-view. E.g., publicised visits to Taiwan by high-level U.S. officials might constitute a red line for Beijing, demanding a purportedly proportionate response. During times of international tension or a perceived buildup to war, concepts of proportionality might exceed their peacetime precedents.
[13] Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham,” Report Launch―The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” CSIS, January 09, 2023, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan (csis.org).
[14] Ian Easton, “Will America Defend Taiwan? Here’s What History Says,” Hoover Institution, June 30, 2021, https://www.hoover.org/research/will-america-defend-taiwan-heres-what-history-says.
[15] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2019).
[16] Sebastien Roblin, ”What Happened When China Tried To Take Taiwan in the 1950s?”, The National Interest, April 23, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/what-happened-when-china-tried-take-taiwan-1950s-183388; David Brown, ”China and Taiwan: A really simple guide,” BBC News, April 06, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59900139.
[17] Piotr Olender, “Sino-Japanese Naval War 1894-1895,” (Sandomierz, Poland: Stratus, 2014).
[18] Idem.
[19] Idem.
[20] John Pike, ”Taiwan - 1947 – February 28 Incident/228 Massacre,” GlobalSecurity.org, October 07, 2021, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/taiwan-228.htm.
[21] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2019).
[22] Ian Easton, “Will America Defend Taiwan? Here’s What History Says,” Hoover Institution, June 30, 2021, https://www.hoover.org/research/will-america-defend-taiwan-heres-what-history-says.
[23] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2019).
[24] Lindsay Maizland, ”Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 18, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden.
[25] Idem.
[26] Maizland’s survey of China experts echoed this sentiment among 77% of respondents; Lindsay Maizland, ”Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 18, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden. The notion of “One China” speaks to the principle of legitimacy—which, in the eyes of Beijing, should render Taiwan subject to the PRC.
[27] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).
[28] Rush Doshi, “The long game: China’s grand strategy to displace American order,” Brookings, August 02, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/.
[29] Michelle Toh and Junko Ogura, “Japan joins the US and Europe in chipmaking curbs on China,” CNN, March 31, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/31/tech/japan-china-chip-export-curbs-intl-hnk/index.html.
[30] Clausewitz, On War, Jolles, Trans., (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 23-24.
[31] Stephen D. Bryen and Lt. General Earl Hailston, Stopping a Taiwan Invasion: Findings and Recommendations from the Center for Security Policy Panel of Experts, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy, 2022.)
[32] CIA, “China,” The World Factbook, April 23, 2023, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/china/; CIA, “Taiwan,” The World Factbook, April 14, 2023, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/taiwan/; World Bank Open Data, “World Bank Open Data,” 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL. Note: Taiwan is omitted from the most recent (2021) World Bank population figures.
[33] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).
[34] Evelyn Cheng, ”Taiwan’s trade with China is far bigger than its trade with the U.S.,” CNBC, August 04, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/taiwans-trade-with-china-is-far-bigger-than-its-trade-with-the-us.html.
[35] Kevin Varley, “Taiwan Tensions Raise Risks in One of Busiest Shipping Lanes,” Bloomberg, August 02, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-02/taiwan-tensions-raise-risks-in-one-of-busiest-shipping-lanes.
[36] China’s population of 1.4 billion is on pace to fall to 700 million by 2070 (or, possibly, by 2050); Peter Zeihan, The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalisation, (New York, NY: Harper Business, 2022), 59, 103-104.
[37] Nectar Gan, “Web-based kissing device horrifies Chinese social media users,” CNN, March 01, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/25/china/china-remote-kissing-device-intl-hnk.
[38] Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: Information Operations,” December 09, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10771.
[39] Eric Cheung, Will Ripley and Gladys Tsai, “How Taiwan is trying to defend against a cyber ‘World War III’,” CNN, July 23, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/23/tech/taiwan-china-cybersecurity-intl-hnk/index.html.
[40] Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: Information Operations,” December 09, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10771.
[41] Idem.
[42] Propagandee: Term coined by Jacques Ellul, denoting the target of a propagandist. The term “enemy,” in this context, would be inappropriate—for propaganda may be equally aimed at domestic, as well as allied, targets; Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, (New York, USA: Vintage Books, 1973).
[43] Eric Cheung, Will Ripley and Gladys Tsai, “How Taiwan is trying to defend against a cyber ‘World War III’,” CNN, July 23, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/23/tech/taiwan-china-cybersecurity-intl-hnk/index.html.
[44] Sarah Wu and Yimou Lee, “Fear of the dark: Taiwan sees wartime frailty in communication links with world,” Reuters, March 15, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/fear-dark-taiwan-sees-wartime-frailty-communication-links-with-world-2023-03-15/.
[45] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2019). Taiwan’s outlying islands, such as Kinmen and Matsu, would probably be taken at the outset. Note that the dedication of resources towards their defence would, besides being futile, probably play into China‘s hands. Well-meaning attention concerning their defense would likely be exploited, via feints, and disinformation, to disrupt what should constitute the coalition’s center of gravity: defense of the main island of Taiwan.
[46] Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: Information Operations,” December 09, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10771.
[47] Franz-Stefan Gady and Oskar Glaese, “What Could European Militaries Contribute to the Defense of Taiwan?,” The Diplomat, April 06, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/what-could-european-militaries-contribute-to-the-defense-of-taiwan/.
[48] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021). The PRC’s notion of “reunification” is belied by the fact that it has never obtained de facto control of Taiwan; hence the use of the term “reintegration” here.
[49] Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1969).
[50] Rachel A. Winston and Ishika Sachdeva, Raging Waters in the South China Sea: What the Battle for Supremacy Means for Southeast Asia, (Irvine, CA: Lizard Publishing, 2020).
[51] Lindsay Maizland, ”Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 18, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden.
[52] Rachel A. Winston and Ishika Sachdeva, Raging Waters in the South China Sea: What the Battle for Supremacy Means for Southeast Asia, (Irvine, CA: Lizard Publishing, 2020).
[53] Yimou Lee, “Taiwan reports China’s largest incursion yet to air defence zone,” Reuters, December 26, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-says-43-chinese-air-force-planes-crossed-taiwan-strait-median-line-2022-12-26/.
[54] Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2019).
[55] Idem.
[56] Idem.; Note: While the U.S. recognises the PRC as the lone legitimate nation of China, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, to which the PRC assented, allows the U.S. “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardise the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan,” Congress.gov, “H.R. 2479 – Taiwan Relations Act,” Congress.Gov (Library of Congress, April 10, 1979, https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479/text.
[57] “In one of the base scenario iterations, the Chinese team did not attack bases in Japan, but China did strike Andersen Air Force Base in Guam in every iteration,” owing to “the prospect of extremely high and rapid losses to its amphibious fleet,” Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham,” Report Launch―The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” CSIS, January 09, 2023, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan (csis.org), 87, 95.
[58] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).
[59] Stephen D. Bryen and Lt. General Earl Hailston, Stopping a Taiwan Invasion: Findings and Recommendations from the Center for Security Policy Panel of Experts, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy, 2022.)
[60] ”Taiwan,” in this sentence, is used loosely to refer to the main island–with the proviso that the Penghus, as well as other Taiwanese islands, would almost certainly be involved in any prospective war.
[61] Piotr Olender, Sino-Japanese Naval War 1894-1895, (Sandomierz, Poland: Stratus, 2014).
[62] Elbridge Colby refers to this role as that of an external cornerstone balancer; Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021). An analogy with the role played by Britain in its dealings with Europe during the 19th century is both instructive, and limited—perhaps even weak. For Britain lay “just across the pond” (i.e., the English Channel) from the Continent. The nearest U.S. base (at Guam) is roughly 600 nautical miles from Taiwan; Hawaii, 4000; and the mainland U.S., roughly 5000.
[63] Idem.
