Abstract: As the world watches the war in Ukraine drag into its fifth year, two major events have already marked 2026: the swift capture of Venezuela’s leader and a large-scale military campaign against Iran by the U.S. Taken together, these military operations–both rapid, unilateral, and explicitly regime-focused–signal the re-emergence of unapologetic American hard-power projection. For Europe, long anchored in the transatlantic alliance, this evolution presents a stark dilemma. Despite possessing advanced military capabilities and significant economic leverage, the continent is increasingly drawn into crises it neither initiates nor controls, even as it remains an active contributor to security.
Problem statement: In a world of resurgent unilateralism, what strategic space remains for Europe within a transatlantic framework increasingly shaped exclusively by U.S. decision-making?
So what?: If European states aim to remain relevant in the emerging global order, they must undertake a decisive shift in both capacity building and strategic mindset. This requires not only increased military investment but also a broader societal recognition of the geopolitical transformation that began with the first Trump administration, accelerated through the COVID-19 pandemic, and was solidified by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The Return of Unilateral Hard Power
Since the second Trump Administration, the United States has adopted a strategic posture characterised by the unapologetic projection of its hard power,[1] increasingly privileging unilateral action over multilateral coordination. Operation “Epic Fury” against Iran exemplifies this shift. Althoughthe campaign first appeared unilateral, U.S. forces operated in close coordination with the Israeli Operation “Roaring Lion”.[2] This cooperation was part of Israel’s close alliance with Washington, its position as Iran’s principal rival, and its role as a first-rank military power in the region–already demonstrated in the Twelve-Day War in June 2025. While this partnership was operationally and strategically coherent for Washington, it largely neglected Europe and NATO, the alliance it has traditionally relied upon.
To make matters worse, unilateral claims over Greenland’s sovereignty and persistent threats to NATO cohesion have exacerbated mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic. Instability is spreading even as the transatlantic bond is weakening, raising urgent questions about Europe’s role on the international stage.
Present in the Theatre, Absent in Strategy
Despite this limited involvement, Europeans are far from absent in the Middle East. They notably maintain forward deployments with regional partners contributing to diplomacy, development, and stabilisation.
According to its Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP), the EU has instituted a military presence in the Gulf region as part of its broader Indo-Pacific presence since 2022. Since the implementation of this Maritime Area of Interest (MAI), which includes the Strait of Hormuz, Brussels has enhanced cooperation with the European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH) initiative, led by France. Furthermore, the EU had already started a diplomatic and military operation under UN mandate in the Horn of Africa in 2008, named ATALANTA. Although not directly involved in the Strait of Hormuz, the mission still operates near the war-torn region.
Besides, Europeans are also deeply involved in the region within the NATO framework. After the Second Gulf War, they took part in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) from 2004 to 2011, then in the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) in 2018, among other deployments. Recently, due to the regional security degradation, the personnel were relocated to Naples (Italy) in March 2026. A similar Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) initiative is currently underway in Jordan.
Europeans are also involved in the region outside of the EU and NATO frameworks. Aside from national representation (e.g., private companies, embassies, and military cooperation), their militaries are also permanently deployed at foreign bases. Across the Middle East, France is present in both Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with an estimated 2,700 soldiers, while Italy is also present in Djibouti. Europe’s militaries also actively participate in peacekeeping operations under UN mandates. In Lebanon, UNIFIL includes substantial contingents: Italy (784 personnel), Spain (660), and France (635), operating in a context where Iran-backed Hezbollah continues to exert influence. On a broader scale, the European Union is also the second-largest trading partner of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with total trade reaching €161.7 billion in 2024, and the continent accounts for 20% of the region’s arms imports.[3]
This presence exposes Europe to the consequences of decisions made exclusively in Washington. Decades of cooperation alongside U.S. forces have tied European militaries to American actions in the eyes of many regional actors.[4] This vulnerability became painfully clear when a French soldier was killed in a drone strike near Erbil on March 12, 2026, despite Paris’ stated defensive posture during Operation “Epic Fury”.[5] As a pro-Iranian militia named “Ashab al-Kahf” claimed responsibility, similar threats aimed at other European contingents were made, demonstrating the continent’s exposure. Moreover, amid the broader regional security degradation, several drones reportedly struck Cypriot territory on March 01, 2026, bringing the war directly onto European Union soil.[6] A Shahed-type drone is believed to have targeted a British military base in Cyprus, possibly in response to the suspected presence of U.S. aircraft operating from the airfield. Additional drones were launched that day and on March 04, 2026, but were successfully intercepted. Although the UK initially denied any access for American planes operating over Iran, exceptions were made the same day the drone strike occurred.[7]
However, while being a major contributor to peacekeeping operations and a significant security provider in the region, Europe was largely overlooked by its closest ally.
Inevitable Allies, Not Subordinates
Yet when rapid regime change in Iran failed to materialise and global oil flows were threatened, U.S. President Donald Trump ultimately recognised the need for European support.[8], [9] As NATO’s Article 5 could not be invoked due to a lack of legal basis, the U.S. could only request help as voluntary contributions. However, after months of American aggressive diplomacy, Europeans chose not to intervene. This reluctance was subsequently portrayed by Trump as “cowardice”[10] and betrayal, thus not contributing to transatlantic reconciliation.
Given its role as a security provider and the deteriorating regional security conditions, the EU’s High Representative, Kaja Kallas, first suggested redeploying Operation EUNAVFOR Aspides from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz.[11] This consideration was later withdrawn, however, as she clarified that “This is not the European Union’s war”.[12] In the meantime, many European countries committed to deploying units in the affected regions to address the deteriorating security situation. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands announced the reinforcement of their Mediterranean presence, while the UK and France increased their support to their Gulf partners. Moreover, Europeans are now working together to assemble a 40-member coalition that could secure the Strait of Hormuz without Washington. A series of talks were held in London and Paris on April 17, 2026, and the Netherlands is said to have already sent frigates ahead of the future operation.[13] If Germany’s involvement seemed conditional, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced that her country was ready to participate in securing the region.
The episode highlights a persistent asymmetry in transatlantic perceptions: Europe is expected by the White House to provide support, yet remains excluded from the strategic decisions that generate the crises requiring its involvement. As a result, European states increasingly feel less like autonomous partners and more like subordinate actors whose interests are directly shaped and sometimes jeopardised by U.S. choices.[14]
Europe’s Strategic Paradox
If persistent tensions have eroded confidence, the transatlantic relationship nonetheless remains the indispensable and inevitable foundation of European security. This dependence endures despite substantial European military capabilities.
France and the United Kingdom are the only European powers capable of projecting force globally and on short notice, with Italy following closely.[15] Yet recent developments have exposed significant constraints on even these capabilities. When urgent maritime deployments were required, the Royal Navy lacked enough escorts and air capability for HMS Prince of Wales,[16] while HMS Dragon’s dispatch was delayed.[17] France retains a stronger expeditionary posture, yet its forces remain finite and already stretched across multiple theatres–even if the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle’s redeployment in the Mediterranean was rapid and successful.[18] While Italy can also deploy its navy overseas, its expeditionary capacity remains structurally and logistically constrained, with only one V/STOL aircraft carrier (Cavour) with limited aircraft capacity. In addition, the lack of nuclear-powered submarines and a relatively modest number of escort vessels further restrict Italy’s ability to sustain long-range, high-intensity operations independently. Indeed, the Marina Militare is primarily oriented toward Mediterranean security and regional dominance, rather than global projection.
Germany, meanwhile, represents a rising industrial and financial power whose military potential is considerable but whose willingness to deploy forces abroad, especially beyond Europe, remains constrained by its political and strategic culture.[19] Furthermore, Eastern European states, most notably Poland, whose military is actively building up its capabilities, prioritise territorial defence against Russia above expeditionary commitments, further limiting the prospects for a European response beyond the continent’s immediate neighbourhood.[20]
A Continent Constrained by its Dependencies
Taken together, these factors reveal a Europe rich in potential yet constrained in strategic capability. Military will, industrial power, and economic opportunities exist, but capacities and political resolution remain insufficient. If Europe is dependent at the strategic level, it is equally dependent at the operational level. For instance, European armies must invest heavily in enabling capabilities, for which they remain heavily dependent on the United States. In contemporary military strategy, enablers are the resources that enable an army to employ its combat forces effectively. These resources have become essential in modern conflicts because they allow for the rapid deployment of forces, the coordination of operations, and the sustained maintenance of military effort. Europe possesses several advanced capabilities in this area, particularly in maritime surveillance, missile systems, satellites, and aeronautics, thanks to countries such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. However, they remain too dependent on the United States for some major strategic enablers, particularly in global intelligence, heavy airlift, aerial refuelling and certain integrated command and missile defence capabilities.[21]
As the EU had long refrained from assuming military responsibilities before 2022, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) never armed itself with a solid and permanent military component–other than the still growing Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). As a result, the EU’s command-and-control (C2) structure consists only of national representatives. It relies on cooperation with NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), according to the “Berlin Plus” accords signed in 1999.[22] The agreement provides Europe with broader access to NATO’s military, logistical, and intelligence capabilities, while establishing a coordination mechanism designed to avoid duplication of existing structures and the primacy of decision-making by the North Atlantic Council. As a result, Brussels lacks the core attributes of a credible military power and operates primarily as a coordinating framework rather than a genuine actor.
Even the EU White Paper, the Strategic Compass, owes its adoption less to long-term convergence than to a temporary alignment of member states’ threat perceptions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as the project, initiated in 2020, required five versions before achieving common acceptance. After 2022, Brussels also expanded other existing instruments, like the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the CSDP. All of them provide the institutional foundations for addressing the capability gaps, provided member states are willing to use them coherently.
What Future for European Defence?
To achieve autonomy, Europeans must therefore achieve independence at both the strategic and operational levels, as relying solely on NATO and the American security umbrella for defence now appears to have been a poor strategic gamble. Because no EU country currently possesses such an aptitude on its own, this objective requires a common approach. Rather than developing an EU framework ex nihilo, Europeans should prioritise building a European pillar within NATO, which already offers an advanced defence ecosystem. Thanks to interoperability ensured by exercises, common standards, and an administration proven by years of experience, the Alliance currently appears to be the best system for ensuring the continent’s defence. Furthermore, its independence from Brussels allows the Alliance to integrate non-European powers such as the U.S., Canada, and Türkiye, as well as European states that are not EU members, such as the United Kingdom, Iceland or Norway. While a fully autonomous European defence would maximise political freedom of action, it would require costly duplication of existing NATO structures and could further weaken the Alliance cohesion. Conversely, maintaining the current model preserves interoperability and deterrence but lays the foundations for Europe’s strategic dependence. This pillar could then act as a future basis to implement a more integrated defence at the EU level once the necessary political and institutional maturity has been achieved–in accordance with the wishes and ambitions of sovereign nations.
As EU countries enter a rearmament phase, the coordination of common objectives should become a central priority. Greater harmonisation of these efforts could enhance their operational impact. Over the next decade, cooperation in areas such as enabler capabilities, integrated air defence, ammunition stockpiles, and cyber warfare could accelerate the broader process of force buildup. Failing to seize this opportunity would almost inevitably lead to strategic shortfalls, as European armed forces risk lacking critical capabilities, intelligence support, equipment, and, ultimately, operational flexibility on the battlefield.
Ultimately, Europe’s challenge is no longer whether it should assume greater responsibility for its own security, but how quickly it can do so and to what extent. Failure to act risks leaving the continent increasingly exposed to decisions taken elsewhere while reducing its ability to shape the international order on which its prosperity and security depend.
[1] The Heritage Foundation, “All 4 Iran War Assumptions Dead Wrong—Trump Proves Experts Got Fooled Again,” March 12, 2026, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/all-4-iran-war-assumptions-dead-wrong-trump-proves-experts-got-fooled-again.
[2] Institute for National Security Studies, “Operation Roaring Lion—Initial Insights,” March 8, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/operation-roaring-lion-initial-insights/.
[3] Atlantic Council, “The Europe-Gulf Forum,” accessed August 26, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/the-europe-gulf-forum/.
[4] Reuters, “US Unpredictability Impacts Our Interests, France Army Chief Says,” March 24, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-unpredictability-impacts-our-interests-france-army-chief-says-2026-03-24/.
[5] Le Monde, “After Soldier Is Killed in Iraq, France Confronts Costs of Middle East Engagement,” March 13, 2026, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/03/13/after-a-soldier-killed-in-iraq-france-confronts-the-costs-of-its-middle-east-engagement_6751406_4.html.
[6] BBC, “Two Drones Intercepted Heading for RAF Base, Cyprus Says,” March 2, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm2r0q310e3o.
[7] The Guardian, “Hezbollah Said to Have Launched Drone That Struck UK RAF Airbase in Cyprus,” March 2, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/02/uk-airbase-raf-akrotiri-cyprus-suspected-drone-strike.
[8] Michael Shurkin, “A Dumpster Fire of World-Historical Proportions,” Pax Americana, March 9, 2026, https://shurkin.substack.com/p/a-dumpster-fire-of-world-historical.
[9] Donald J. Trump, Truth Social post, March 14, 2026, https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116227904143399817.
[10] Donald J. Trump, Truth Social post, March 20, 2026, https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116261796648776538.
[11] Euronews, “EU Weighs Extending Naval Mission Aspides to Strait of Hormuz amid Iran Crisis,” March 15, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/03/15/eu-weighs-extending-naval-mission-aspides-to-strait-of-hormuz-amid-iran-crisis.
[12] Eunews, “Iran, Kallas: ‘This Is Not the EU’s War; for Now, Aspides Will Not Be Extended to Hormuz,’” March 16, 2026, https://www.eunews.it/en/2026/03/16/iran-kallas-this-is-not-the-eus-war-for-now-aspides-will-not-be-extended-to-hormuz/.
[13] Euronews, “Europe-Led Coalition Prepares Mission to Reopen Strait of Hormuz,” April 17, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/17/europe-led-coalition-prepares-mission-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz.
[14] The Guardian, “Love Actually? Washington’s Current Relationship with Britain Is More Like Contempt Actually,” March 21, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/mar/21/britain-us-special-relationship-trump-starmer.
[15] Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Sticking Together or Drifting Apart: The Future of Franco-British Defense Cooperation,” October 28, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/sticking-together-or-drifting-apart-future-franco-british-defense-cooperation.
[16] 19FortyFive, “Aircraft Carrier HMS Prince of Wales Has Spent Only 21.3% of Its Time at Sea,” March 23, 2026, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/03/aircraft-carrier-hms-prince-of-wales-has-spent-only-21-3-of-its-time-at-sea/.
[17] The Guardian, “British Destroyer HMS Dragon Arrives in Eastern Mediterranean,” March 23, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/mar/23/british-destroyer-hms-dragon-arrives-in-eastern-mediterranean.
[18] Cyprus Mail, “Charles de Gaulle Remains South of Limassol, France Denies Plans to Deploy to Red Sea,” March 17, 2026, https://cyprus-mail.com/2026/03/17/charles-de-gaulle-remains-south-of-limassol-france-denies-plans-to-deploy-to-red-sea.
[19] German Bundestag, “Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr,” updated August 24, 2026, German Bundestag; Hanns W. Maull, “Noch Zivilmacht? Die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” SWP-Studie 2025/S 13 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 19, 2025), Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
[20] Polish Ministry of National Defence, “Federation of Exercises Codenamed IRON DEFENDER-25—One Goal, Many Forces, Shared Readiness,” August 26, 2025, Polish Ministry of National Defence.
[21] Future Europe, “Strategic Domains: Developing the EU’s Capabilities and Enablers for a Free and Secure Global Order,” July 24, 2024, https://feu-journal.eu/issues/issue-5/strategic-domains-developing-the-eus-capabilities-and-enablers-for-a-free-and-secure-global-order/.
[22] The European Security and Defence Union, “Planning and Commanding EU Military Operations in a Complex Security Landscape,” April 22, 2025, https://magazine-the-european.com/2025/04/22/planning-and-commanding-eu-military-op-erations-in-a-complex-security-landscape/.
