Abstract: Cognitive operations affect people’s perception of reality and decision-making, guiding groups of people and targeted audiences towards conditions desired by a geopolitical adversary. What we are seeing is the use of social media being used in a disinformation context by authoritarian governments against the West in a direct and indirect way to change societies. But what we are also seeing is those perception approaches being used by authoritarian governments internally and externally. It is difficult to change people’s perceptions once they have been altered. This paper explores the hybrid threat relationship between Australia from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Problem statement: How tounderstand that dealing with hybrid threats are not standalone but should be part of a greater strategy?
So what?: Understanding that hybrid threats are not standalone but could be part of a greater strategy is vital. This paper will highlight the importance of understanding hybrid threats against Australia from the PRC. Understanding the nature of hybrid threats, how they can be interconnected, and how they have evolved over time.
Coercive and Subversive Activities
In an era of rapid technological advancements and increasing online connectivity, the proliferation of cyber threats, including the spread of new threats such as fake news and disinformation, presents a new significant challenge. According to the European Union (EU), hybrid threats influence and exploit vulnerabilities to inflict damage below the threshold of overt aggression. They are a mixture of coercive and subversive activities, conventional and unconventional methods, used in a coordinated manner across multiple domains.[1]
Hybrid threats influence and exploit vulnerabilities to inflict damage below the threshold of overt aggression.
The European Union Hybrid COE (Centre of Excellence) define hybrid threats as being:[2]
- coordinated and synchronised actions that deliberately target democratic states’ and institutions’ systemic vulnerabilities through a wide range of means;
- activities that exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution, as well as the different interfaces (war-peace, internal-external security, local-state, and national-international); and
- activities aimed at influencing different forms of decision-making at the local (regional), state, or institutional level, and designed to further and/or fulfil the agent’s strategic goals while undermining and/or hurting the target.
Hybrid attacks usually originate from authoritarian countries such as Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against Western countries.[3]
Defining Hybrid Threats
Defining hybrid threats is challenging due to their complexity and ever evolving nature. Understanding hybrid threats’ characteristics is essential to grasp their unique nature. Attackers employ a range of strategies and tactics to achieve their objectives. The EU Hybrid Threat conceptual model is based on 13 key domains.
The key domains related to this paper’s examples are:[4]
Infrastructure
While there is no commonly accepted definition of critical infrastructure (CI), all definitions emphasise the contributing role of CI to society or the debilitating effect in the case of disruption. The EU defines ‘critical infrastructure’ as “an asset, system or part thereof located in the Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have an impact on society.”
Economy
The economy as a domain of hybrid threats is defined as the production, distribution and consumption of all goods and services for a country. It includes its economic development and distribution of wealth. Economic policy instruments such as sanctions, taxation, trade embargoes, trade agreements, asset freezing, sterilised interventions, subsidies, tariffs, sovereign lending and debt forgiveness are all employed in this context.
Information
Weaponising information is used to undermine people’s perception of their security by pitting political, social, and cultural identities against one another. The purpose of the action is to exploit identity politics and allegiances, thus dividing influential interest groups and political alliances. Confusion and disorder ensue as people feel more insecure.
Hybrid Threat Examples
The PRC is focused globally on their influence and areas of interest, especially in the Asia Pacific region, and the use of social media for their influence operations. A key aim of their influence campaigns is the long-term acceptance of the PRC’s roles and visions of the world, including key political messages, e.g. One China Concept, One Belt-One Road Initiative, South China Expansion.
A key aim of their influence campaigns is the long-term acceptance of the PRC’s roles and visions of the world, including key political messages.
The paper will look at Hybrid Threat examples related to Australia and PRC, the examples being:
Information Attacks
In 2020, the Australian government released the Breton report, which detailed the death of 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners by Australian special forces soldiers during the Afghanistan War. The then Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison criticised the PRC’s foreign ministry for a Twitter (X) post depicting an image of a grinning Australian soldier slitting the throat of what appears to be an Afghan child.[5]
The Chinese government expressed criticism of Australia in response to the Breton Report for a number of reasons. The key reason was the state of diplomatic relationships between Australia and the PRC. The release of the Breton Report coincided with heightened diplomatic tensions between Australia and the PRC. These tensions were fueled by disagreements over issues such as human rights, territorial disputes, COVID-19 and trade. The example also highlighted the power of PRC state-controlled media outlets, such as the Global Times, which played a significant role in amplifying the criticism. These government media channels portrayed Australia as being aligned with Western interests and accused it of being part of a broader strategy to contain the PRC’s rise. The information attack heightened an already tense situation.
Economic Attacks
Australia’s trade ties with the PRC were impacted in 2018 when Australia publicly banned Huawei from its 5G network, and it worsened after Australia called for an enquiry into the origins of COVID-19. The PRC responded by introducing a trade war by banning imports of Australian barley, beef, coal, cotton, seafood and wine imports from Australia, which impacted billions of dollars of Australian exports.[6]
China imposed trade sanctions and tariffs on Australian exports again linked to escalating political tensions. The rationale of the economic actions was that the trade embargoes would have a financial impact on Australia and seriously affect Australia’s trade. There was also the political message behind the trade sanctions due to the tense political situation, and the PRC wanted to send a message to Australia of their displeasure of the situation. They wanted Australia to see the error of their ways and stand down from their actions. It is only in 2024 that we are starting to see some normalisation of diplomatic relations between Australia and the PRC.
Infrastructure
One of Australia’s key ports in Northern Australia, Darwin Port, was leased to a Chinese-owned company, Landbridge, for a period of 99 years. The concern is that ports form part of Australia’s critical infrastructure, and Darwin Port is key to Australia’s defence strategy and also U.S. military forces operarting in the area.
The key concern is the national security risk of a PRC company having control of one of Australia’s key strategic assets. The arrangement has been controversial and was a key factor in the heightened diplomatic tensions between Australia and the PRC. A key area of tension in Australia was the discussion related to economic gains from leasing the port versus the potential security risks. A future challenge also relates to future Australian investments in Darwin Port when it is controlled by a PRC-owned company.
The key concern is the national security risk of a PRC company having control of one of Australia’s key strategic assets.
The new Australian Labour government (2022) has undertaken a security review and decided to put steps in place to monitor Landbridge operations to mitigate any possible security risks,[7] However, there are still ongoing security concerns from some Australian quarters about the agreement and that the new proposed monitoring arrangements would not be sufficient.[8]
Understanding is Key
Developing effective countermeasures is crucial to mitigate the impact of hybrid threats. This paper has highlighted the importance of understanding hybrid threats against Australia from the PRC. Understanding that hybrid threats are not standalone but could be part of a greater strategy is vital. Understanding the nature of hybrid threats, how they can be interconnected, and how they evolve over time is essential.
There are a number of areas where Australia does not fully understand the implications. As an example, the risks in relation to society and democracy are not fully understood, including the risk to Australian democratic institutions, including elections. The awareness and understanding of these threats will help Australia to defend against interference and maintain the integrity of its democratic processes.
Australia’s awareness of hybrid threats is essential for protecting its national security, critical infrastructure, democratic institutions, and regional stability in an ever-changing world where authoritarian countries are becoming significant future threats.
Matthew Warren, Centre of Cyber Security Research and Innovation, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.
[1] European Union, The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public Version, Publications Office of the European Union, ISBN 978-92-76-29819-9.
[2] European Union Hybrid Threat CoE (Centre of Excellence), Hybrid threats as a concept, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-as-a-phenomenon/, last accessed February 16, 2024.
[3] NATO Vilnius Summit Communiqué, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm February 16, 2024.
[4] Graphic and model structure of the domains: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/the-landscape-of-hybrid-threats-a-conceptual-model/ February 16, 2024.
[5] Yahoo News, 2020, “PM blasts China for ‘truly repugnant’ image of Australian soldier,” https://au.news.yahoo.com/scott-morrison-slams-china-image-australian-soldier-child-china-025809975.html, November 30, 2023.
[6] New York Times, 2020, “Australia Condemns Lurid Tweet by Chinese Official as ‘Disgusting Slur’,” https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/world/australia/china-tweet-soldier., November 30, 2023.
[7] Reuters, 2022, “Tension between China and Australia over commodities”.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-trade-china-commodities-tim/timeline-tension-between-china-and-australia-over-commodities-trade-idUSKBN28L0D8/, December 11, 2023.
[8] Reuters, 2023, “Australia says ‘not necessary’ to cancel Chinese firm’s lease on Darwin port,” https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australia-says-not-necessary-cancel-chinese-firms-lease-darwin-port-2023-10-20/, October 20.
