Abstract: India launched Operation Sindoor on May 07, 2025, striking nine terrorist camps in Pakistan, following a horrific terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 22. India’s strategic restraint in targeting only terror infrastructure in Pakistan in the initial stages of the operation is not evidence of its weakness, but rather a civilisational choice, and the articulation of its epistemic universe as revealed in its epics, particularly the Mahabharata. The analysis of critical decisions made during the operation, alongside corresponding lessons from ancient, seminal philosophical texts, may help in finding a new possibility for integrating ethics and power in both domestic and international strategy.
Problem statement: How can India’s consistent pattern of strategic restraint in the face of provocation be understood beyond the binaries of weakness and strength?
So what?: India’s policymakers, strategic community, and global partners should recognise and articulate India’s unique strategic culture more explicitly. Ancient philosophical and cultural texts can be interpreted as offering timeless insights that may inform contemporary foreign and security policy. There is a need for discussion of this civilisational approach to deterrence and force.
Military Restraint
On April 22, 2025, 25 Indian civilians and one Nepalese national were murdered in a religiously motivated terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, which specifically targeted members of a particular religious community, leaving the entire nation distraught. Two weeks after the attack, on the intervening night of May 06-07, India launched Operation Sindoor, a measured military response against terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK). Minutes after the initial strikes, the Indian government published a press release, clarifying that while conducting the operation, it deliberately engaged only nine terror sites so as not to escalate the situation by targeting Pakistani military bases and civilian infrastructure.[1] It was only after Pakistan targeted Indian military bases and religious sites that the Indian military responded by targeting Pakistan’s air bases.[2] Post-independence Indian governments have remained restrained in their actions, particularly in military affairs,[3] and Operation Sindoor was no exception.[4]
Minutes after the initial strikes, the Indian government published a press release, clarifying that while conducting the operation, it deliberately engaged only nine terror sites so as not to escalate the situation by targeting Pakistani military bases and civilian infrastructure.
However, this military restraint should not be regarded as a sign of weakness; rather, it symbolises an extremely deep-seated strategic and moral philosophy ingrained into India’s civilisational ethos. To comprehend this philosophy, one must look beyond geopolitics and into India’s historical and cultural narratives, particularly how the Mahabharata and its teachings on duty, righteousness, and ethical methods of warfare continue to inform ideas about strategy and statecraft. Here, the epic is not considered a causal explanation for the Indian government’s decisions. Instead, it is used as a cultural mirror to comprehend and interpret the logic of restraint as it is understood in the Indian tradition. The parallels are drawn in a hermeneutic way to understand the repetitive normative patterns. In that regard, the archetypes of Arjuna and Vidura are used as interpretative lenses.
India’s Tryst with Pakistan’s State-Sponsored Terrorism
The alleged manipulation of the 1987 Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly election is believed to have been a turning point in the province’s political history. It is assumed that the failure of the electoral process deepened the local population’s disillusionment with the Indian democratic process and created a fertile ground for disturbance. Pakistan began to capitalise on this unease and provided moral, political, material, and military support to separatist elements and institutionalised terrorism as a tool of policy.[5] In Operation Sindoor, India’s measured approach of sticking to terror targets to avoid escalation with Pakistan, which is also nuclear-armed, only solidifies the standing of India as a responsible nuclear power, one that uses force with both restraint and legitimacy. In contrast, Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear activities are well documented.[6] The principle of restraint has been constantly maintained in the wake of a series of terror provocations over the years. So, after each of those terrorist occurrences, the Indian response was temperate. The 9/11 World Trade Centre attack galvanised the world against the issue of terrorism. The Indian government sensed that this was the right opportunity to push the case of Pakistan-based terrorism. In December 2001, the Indian government claimed Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) sponsored a terror attack on its Parliament in New Delhi. At the international level, many states supported India. Significantly, LeT and JeM were added to the UN sanctions list.[7] Following the 2001 attack on the seat of democracy, the government initiated Operation Parakram. The operation entailed mobilising military forces but stopped short of firing a single bullet. In particular, regarding the Mumbai attacks of 2008, surgical strikes in 2016, and the Balakot airstrike of 2019, India has showcased a pattern: respond firmly, but within the realm of strategic restraint.[8]
In particular, regarding the 26/11 attacks, the charge sheet filed in the Supreme Court had notably stated that the attack was an act of declaring war against the country.[9] Ajmal Kasab, a Pakistani national, was convicted for the 26/11 attacks after due process of law. He was a member of LeT. If accounts of former diplomats and military personnel are reviewed, then one could understand that the Indian military was on standby to carry out strikes inside POK or Pakistan.[10] After much deliberation, the Indian resort to any form of an offensive military response to the horrendous terror act remained minor, if it existed at all. In January 2016, JeM terrorists attacked India’s Pathankot air base. In a conciliatory tone, the Indian government accepted Pakistan’s offer for a joint investigation and gave Pakistani officers access to the militarily sensitive air base.[11] It seems that, in the wake of Pakistan’s procrastinating attitude, after the Uri attack in September 2016, the government of India publicly acknowledged performing surgical strikes into POK. Then, in an intermediate step, in 2019, the military crossed the international border and claimed to have levelled terror launch pads in Balakot.
If accounts of former diplomats and military personnel are reviewed, then one could understand that the Indian military was on standby to carry out strikes inside POK or Pakistan.
In the Kargil War of 1999, the Indian government chose not to cross the line of control between India and Pakistan.[12] After the Pahalgam attack, the Resistance Front (TRF), a known proxy of LeT, initially claimed responsibility for the attack. A few days later, they retracted the claim, citing a cyber intrusion. Indian investigators claimed that three Pakistani nationals affiliated with TRF, including an ex-Pakistan Army commando, carried out the attack.[13] The UNSC monitoring report has acknowledged TRF’s role and its LeT nexus behind the Pahalgam attack.[14] On July 29, 2025, Indian Home Minister Amit Shah, in the Indian Parliament, announced to have eliminated those three perpetrators behind the Pahalgam attack.[15] Before examining India’s recent military response, Operation Sindoor, it is relevant to understand the strategic logic that underpins it.
Implications and Challenges of India’s Strategic Restraint
India’s ethical position enhances its global credibility and rallies national unity in times of crisis. Predictable and principled responses establish a strong deterrent environment, resonating with the ethical but firm posture seen in India’s civilisational narrative. It is not a traditional, threat-based deterrence but rather retaliation-based deterrence. Coercion plays a crucial role in this regard. Especially in the case of long-standing rivalries, this type of deterrence is necessary.[16] Threat-based deterrence is a preventive measure that dissuades an adversary by threatening punishment. On the contrary, retaliation-based deterrence is a credible commitment to respond by force after the adversary acts.[17] The response could be disproportionate in nature. The core differences between the two types of deterrence are related to timing and the function of coercion. In the current context, India took action following the developments on April 22 in Pahalgam. It sent a clear signal that any hostile action will provoke a forceful response with unacceptable costs. In this sense, retaliation is not just preventive but also coercive. After the cessation of military hostilities on May 10, PM Modi addressed the nation. In the address, PM Modi argued that terror attacks will be treated as war and responded appropriately. Based on Operation Sindoor’s military dimension, the assertion falls under the category of retaliation-based deterrence. At the same time, Operation Sindoor provides an opportunity for India to establish a reputation as a responsible member of the global community. Restraint, nevertheless, is risky: foes can confuse it with weakness, and public opinion at home usually demands more forthwith retaliatory action.
Operation Sindoor provides an opportunity for India to establish a reputation as a responsible member of the global community.
Concerning the Modi Administration, it has become inevitable for the government to respond to each terror attack. This could enable Pakistan to play the game of death by a thousand cuts,[18] a doctrine widely attributed to the Pakistani military. It involves the support of terrorism in the Kashmir valley and targeted attacks on Indian civilians and security forces.[19] The goal is to bleed India over time, without crossing the threshold of conventional war. The lack of formalisation of a strategic doctrine poses challenges in communicating with allies and the general public. India must therefore institutionalise its strategic culture and codify the broad contours of its unique civilizational way of warfare. It is not necessary to publish national security documents each year and discuss every minute detail. A broad overview is sufficient to showcase the combination of clarity with ambivalence. It provides a scope to manoeuvre on the diplomatic and military front. In this regard, India’s nuclear doctrine is a case in point. The nuclear doctrine was India’s first public outline of security policy. Yet, it also serves as a camouflage, providing decision-makers with flexibility to interpret and adapt based on the situation. The institutionalisation further demands investing in capabilities such as intelligence and precision strike technology to enable sustained, effective, and ethical warfare. External policy-makers and analysts need to understand India’s history and literary texts to decode its security policy effectively. In this context, it is pertinent to understand Operation Sindoor to gain insight into the strategic thinking of the Indian government.
Strategic Precision and Moral Framing
Operation Sindoor is representative of India’s doctrine of calibrated response. It was neither a knee-jerk reaction nor a disproportionate action; conversely, it was a carefully premeditated and well-executed display of a nuanced military action backed by intelligence, designed to let the world know that India had the right to defend itself while avoiding an escalation spiral. In this respect, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh stressed India’s ‘Right to Respond’.[20] The Indian government may have emphasised this right to counter the narrative propagated by Pakistan, which had claimed that the Pahalgam terror attack was a false flag operation aiming to frame the Indian military action as an act of aggression. Regarding the international community, this emphasis seems to be an attempt to address issues concerning the proportionality and necessity of India’s response to terrorism harboured in Pakistan. It appears the Indian government wanted to address two issues by emphasising the right to defence. The first one is to counter the accusation of aggression and framing cross-border terrorism as a strategic threat that is equivalent to an act of war. It also indicates a shift in India’s willingness to respond militarily under a certain threshold. The government of India will determine the threshold. It also fits into the broader narrative of an assertive defence posture post Uri-September 2016 attack.
Operation Sindoor is representative of India’s doctrine of calibrated response.
Thus, under Operation Sindoor, the Indian government moved one step ahead and targeted the headquarters of the terrorist outfits in the Punjab province of Pakistan. The targets were beyond international borders. John Spencer, an expert on urban warfare, emphasised that the restraint shown by the Indian government is intended to demonstrate strategic clarity of objectives.[21] As Walter Ladwig implied, India’s continued display of strategic restraint in the face of Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism has been nothing short of extraordinary.[22] This approach suggests that the Indian government has gradually built upon its legacy of restraint to justify incremental escalations in its military responses to Pakistani provocations. It is pertinent to explore the principle of restraint with the help of the ancient Indian epic, the Mahabharata.
The Mahabharata and the Indian Strategic Ethos
It is possible to argue that India’s legacy of strategic restraint in the face of terrorism has parallels with its civilizational heritage, notably the epic Mahabharata.[23] The epic centres around the Kurukshetra War, a conflict between two factions of a royal family, the Pandavas and the Kauravas. Far from being the story of war, the Mahabharata, through the Kurukshetra war, symbolises not just conflict, but a moral and philosophical journey where moral codes prevailed even in warfare. The academic community has a healthy tradition of engaging with the Mahabharata. Naralikar and Chadha have argued that the epic provides a normative framework, discussing aspects of proportionality, rules of engagement, and the avoidance of unnecessary violence. These aspects are relevant to the current episode of India and Pakistan’s engagement. Jaishankar, the External Affairs Minister, in his book, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, claims that the Mahabharata provides a lens for interpreting contemporary India’s strategic thinking.[24]
Earlier, Defence Minister Singh cited the Bhagavad Gita (the Song of God) and claimed that India does not favour war, but at the same time, it resists injustice.[25] Importantly, PM Modi released Karan Singh’s book, the titular head of Jammu and Kashmir, on the Bhagavad Gita. Modi claimed Singh’s work revived the identity of Jammu and Kashmir. He further asserted that the Gita is a timeless guide for Indian people.[26] In the context of Pakistan’s interference in the region, Modi’s reference to Jammu and Kashmir is pertinent. Deep Dutta-Ray repudiated the Eurocentrism of Indian diplomacy. He claimed Indian diplomacy has at times used civilizational ethos as a reference point for contemporary diplomacy. He treated the Mahabharata as a reservoir of ethical and political archetypes (Krishna’s pragmatism, Yudhisthira’s Dharma dilemmas) that help to explain moral ambiguity and situational ethics of contemporary Indian diplomacy.[27] Ashis Nandy asserts that India’s engagement with its past, including the Mahabharata, frames how its present and future are visualised.[28] The above discussion suggests that academicians and policymakers have asserted that the Mahabharata resonates within contemporary political and strategic imaginations in India. So, it makes total sense to delve into the epic to get insight into contemporary India. In this regard, archetypes of strategic restraint and long-term vision from the Mahabharata are considered in this study. Among its most powerful characters is the figure of Arjuna. He was the most competent warrior in his time and one of the five Pandava brothers. At the start of the war, Arjuna becomes engulfed with grief and confusion when he spots his family members, acquaintances, and even his teachers on the opposing side. He decides not to lift his bow and instead ponders why he should fight in the first place.
PM Modi released Karan Singh’s book, the titular head of Jammu and Kashmir, on the Bhagavad Gita.
Ethically refraining from violence as he grapples with acute moral dilemmas, rather than retreating, is simultaneously bold and deeply responsible. While Arjuna is experiencing this existential crisis, Lord Krishna, who serves as his charioteer, guides him through why he must wage this war. Krishna’s arguments and advice to Arjuna are detailed in one of the unparalleled masterpieces of Indian philosophy, “The Bhagavad Gita (the Song of God)”. Krishna argues that Arjuna must recall his svadharma[29] (self-Dharma) and explains, ‘Your identity as a Kshatriya (warrior) mandates you to act.’ He adds that Arjuna must not act out of hatred or based on decisions influenced by ego, but instead, in pursuance of justice and equilibrium. Consequently, while Arjuna did participate in the war, he was not as forthcoming in unleashing his full power and capability. He held back his full strength against Bhishma, a leading warrior of the opposing party.[30] Due to his hesitation, Arjuna could not unleash his full potential. At that point, Krishna intervened and argued, “Your compassion at the wrong time is not a feature of the warrior”.[31] The argument is a reminder that inaction can also be a moral failure. The message is nuanced: violence is not to be glorified, but neither is paralysing hesitation in the face of injustice to be sanctified. The illustration of Arjuna’s behaviour during the Kurukshetra War presents a culturally significant narrative about the use of force, commitment to duty, and deliberate strategic restraint. Indian leaders have frequently referenced characters and events from the epic, implying that these references contribute to the country’s political and diplomatic lexicon on war and peace. This cultural narrative parallels India’s observed pattern of strategic restraint, from Operation Parakram to Operation Sindoor.
Inaction can also be a moral failure.
This ethical template—duty-informed restraint—is often invoked in India’s contemporary strategic thought. It is a national position that harmonises assertiveness with restraint and force with prudence. It avoids glorifying violence, even when the use of force is unavoidable.[32] The May 07 press release of the Indian government emphasised these traits regarding Operation Sindoor. Despite the superiority of India’s conventional forces, the Indian government responded with restraint, limiting the use of its troops. Here, it is possible to find similarity with Arjuna’s behaviour in the initial phase of the Kurukshetra War. The country chose not to deploy its full military capabilities. It is pertinent to note that the Indian Chief of Defence Staff, Anil Chauhan, discussed correcting tactical mistakes from the initial phase of Operation Sindoor.[33] He has not revealed the exact nature of the loss incurred by Indian forces. Yet, his reference to tactical mistakes suggests that the Indian troops initially refrained from suppressing Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) due to a deliberate focus on targeting terrorists rather than Pakistan’s military assets. Following a tactical correction on May 10, the Indian Air Force demonstrated its ability to cripple the Air Defence System. These developments reflect a posture of strategic restraint. John Spencer concurred and stated that this doctrine of ethical force is evident in India’s recent conduct, particularly during Operation Sindoor. In the operation, military skill was combined with moral clarity, demonstrating that restraint is not a weakness but a strategic strength.
A Tactical Pause and the Mahabharata’s Strategic Wisdom
The recent military hostilities between India and Pakistan paused on the evening of May 10 after the Indian Air Force struck 11 airbases earlier that same morning. In the evening, the Indian government briefed the media about the cessation of military actions for the time being. They announced that Operation Sindoor is still ongoing. India claimed that during the military dimensions of Operation Sindoor, the Indian side interacted with a diverse set of nations, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. The X (formerly Twitter) timeline of Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar serves as evidence. He claimed to have told other world leaders that the hotline between the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of India and Pakistan is the only channel of communication. Thus, New Delhi argues that after Indian strikes on May 10, Pakistan’s DGMO reached out to his Indian counterpart and both sides reached an understanding for cessation of ongoing firing and military action. India maintained that the halt in operations is conditional and bilateral, rejecting the term ceasefire.
From the outset of Operation Sindoor, the Indian position was one of restraint, leaving the possibility of an off-ramp open to Pakistan. In this regard, Jaishankar suggested that at the outset of the operation, the Indian government communicated the limited scope of military actions to the Pakistani government. However, they chose to ignore Indian communication. Thus, on May 07, after securing the initial objective of targeting the terror base, the Indian forces were on alert to ensure the safety of the nation. The declaration of the purpose does not imply an immediate stop to all military activity. The decision to communicate with Pakistan at the start of the conflict can be interpreted as resonating with the teachings of Shanti Parva (Peace Book- part of the Mahabharata), which emphasises Dharma.[34] Shanti Parva argued for communicating war aims to the adversary. Jaishankar indicates that India’s approach can be compared to counsel in Shanti Parva.
From the outset of Operation Sindoor, the Indian position was one of restraint, leaving the possibility of an off-ramp open to Pakistan.
The May 10 strikes on strategic airbases showed India’s precision and hinted at the vulnerability of Pakistani military assets, including elements linked to its nuclear command.[35] It means that India has not attacked the nuclear command but targeted the Nur Khan air base. Pakistan’s strategic command centre is based near the air base, and strikes could be considered a warning regarding the weakness of Pakistan’s air defence. India has already struck a crucial weak link diplomatically by linking terrorism with the Indus Waters Treaty. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that water and blood won’t run together.[36] This was one of the five measures the Indian government announced on April 23, immediately after the Pahalgam attack. Other measures included the closure of the integrated Check Post in Attari and the suspension of the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme for Pakistani nationals. In addition, India declared all military advisors in the Pakistan High Commission persona non grata and withdrew its own advisors from Pakistan. The government of India also decided to reduce the strength of the high commission from 55 to 30.[37] These measures indicate a diplomatic offensive by the Indian government. These measures, including precision strikes of May 10, also reveal India’s strategic restraint. India’s decision to avoid targeting Pakistan’s strategic command or senior military leadership indicates a deliberate effort to control the ladder of escalation. India’s approach is different from the escalation-prone or indiscriminate operations observed in several ongoing global conflicts.
India’s message to the terrorists and their backers was clear: peace is sought, but violence will be responded to in kind. Again, it appears that Indian decision-makers exercised a broader vision and used restraint to halt the military action. Above all, this pause in military action under Operation Sindoor is different from an “end”, and allows Indian decision-makers space to work the escalation ladder. It stresses the conditional aspect of the understanding. After facing military setbacks, Pakistan reached out to India for a ceasefire. However, India emphasised cessation of military action on its own terms. India’s ambition of becoming a developed nation by 2047[38] does not leave room for the continuation of wars. Hence, the tactical pause is an excellent move in the backdrop of strategic restraint.
India’s message to the terrorists and their backers was clear: peace is sought, but violence will be responded to in kind.
In a way, this move sheds light on the Kurukshetra War. The 13th day of the Kurukshetra war saw the Chakravyuha (labyrinth) formation used by the Kauravas. Susharman of the Trigarta kingdom intentionally taunted Arjuna and diverted him into a one-on-one duel. From a military perspective, Arjuna was drawn into the pursuit of a tactical goal (Susharman), and lost sight of the overall strategy—the Chakravyuha. This enabled the enemy to entrap Abhimanyu[39] within the formation and kill him tragically. Therefore, Arjuna personally lost, and the Pandavas collectively experienced a psychological blow.
In comparison, the decision to halt Operation Sindoor and the non-initiation of a prolonged war with Pakistan can be seen as highlighting a preference for strategic foresight. It bypasses the temptation for immediate and reckless retaliation. It evokes a theme reminiscent of Vidura’s advice in the Mahabharata. It also contrasts with Arjuna’s tactical entanglement that was visible during the Chakravyuha episode. Vidura was the uncle of the Pandavas and the Prime Minister of the Kuru Kingdom. Srinivasan and Aithal argued that Vidura represents a moral compass, and his counsel is rooted in foresight and moral coherence. Vidura prioritises Dharma and long-term welfare over short-term material gains.[40] In the current case, the comprehensive development by 2047 appears to be the long-term vision of the Indian government. As discussed above, India and Pakistan have framed the situation differently. India rejected the term ceasefire. Additionally, Pakistan has used terror networks to provoke India. A case in point in the current context was Pakistan’s massive drone attacks on several Indian cities on the night of May 10. India termed these attacks a violation of the understanding reached earlier that day. The situation can be compared to Arjua’s duel with Sushrman and consequent entrapment. However, the Indian decision has parallels with Vidura’s advice, and can be seen as not losing track of the big game plan.
India stayed balanced, defied being cornered in a Chakravyuha-like trap, and protected its long-term economic and strategic interests. Here, Pakistan’s Chakravyuha has military and diplomatic elements. George Perkovich had warned of Pakistan’s escalation to de-escalate doctrine to trap India into a disproportionate response.[41] Pakistan uses terrorism as an entrapment to hope for broader Indian retaliation and thereby invite international mediation. In doing so, Pakistan seeks to shift diplomatic blame onto India for the escalation. Therefore, it seems that the asymmetric provocation is intended to entangle India in a complex diplomatic and military trap. Pakistan’s signal to the international community about an early nuclear escalation threshold attempts to create a no-exit trilemma for India. The trilemma India faces is this: either internationalising the bilateral conflict, a military response to terrorism that could trigger a broader war, or exercising restraint and risking the perception of weakness. This mirrors the logic of Chakravahu as discussed in the Mahabharata. Had the confrontation escalated into a broader war, it would have undermined India’s development momentum. Here, restraint was not an indication of weakness, but an exercise in vision and strategic maturity.
A Civilizational Reflection
Beyond a military action, Operation Sindoor can be seen as a reflection of India’s civilizational soul. It blends old wisdom and new strategic necessities. India’s approach, restraint with determination and ethics with firmness, is a paradigm distinct from classical power politics. It is a lesson that the sword should only be drawn when necessary, and wielded with clarity and empathy. The Mahabharata contains a verse that suggests whatever exists in the epic also exists in the outside world, and whatever is not found in the Mahabharata is found nowhere else.[42] Naralikar and Naralikar have also argued that the epic addresses virtually every dimension of human decision-making and statecraft. In this regard, this study has limited itself to exploring the aspect of strategic restraint. It has not entered into other aspects of human decision-making. This study could serve as a starting point for expanding beyond military affairs and exploring different aspects of diplomacy, informing further research. Importantly, the Mahabharata serves as one of the relevant ancient literary texts through which one may explore the strategic thinking of contemporary India. Apart from the Mahabharata, the Ramayana also provides significant avenues relevant to Indian strategic thinking. It should be noted that Rajnath Singh found parallels between Lord Hanuman’s action to burn Ashok Vatika (Ashok Garden) in Sri Lanka and Operation Sindoor’s initial focus on targeting the terrorist infrastructure.[43] Furthermore, other ancient literary texts, such as the Panchatantra, Kautilya’s Arthashastra, Nitisara, and numerous other sources, may also provide an entry point to understanding the strategic thought of contemporary India, making them valuable resources for examining Indian diplomacy and statecraft.
Beyond a military action, Operation Sindoor can be seen as a reflection of India’s civilizational soul.
This research also contributes to the existing debate on Indian strategic culture. In 1992, during the post-Cold War period, American scholar George Tanham claimed that India lacked a strategic culture, sparking a debate on the presence of strategic culture in India.
The lack of a formal security doctrine added to the confusion over Indian strategic thought. The current study aims to contribute to this debate. It may help watchers and scholars of Indian foreign policy to get new insights about Indian strategic thinking. In an era dominated by doubt and zero-sum conflicts, India’s history of calculated and ethical warfare suggests a continuity between its current foreign policy and its philosophical heritage. To understand the strategic culture of India, it is necessary to understand Indian society itself.
Aniket Udayrao Bhavthankar; Doctoral Candidate in International Relations, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, where he has submitted his doctoral dissertation. Aniket’s research focuses on India’s democratic conceptions in foreign policy, strategic culture, and civilisational worldviews. He has previously worked as an Assistant Professor at Symbiosis School of International Studies and a Senior Research Associate at the Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi. His work has been published in leading strategic forums, including Eurasia Review and Indian Defence Review. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the University of Duisburg-Essen.
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[14] United Nations Security Council, Thirty-sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Pursuant to Resolutions 1267(1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and Associated Individuals, groups undertakings, and entities, UN Doc. S/2025/482 (New York: United Nations, 2025), 16, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482.
[15] Press Information Bureau, Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah Participates in the Special Discussion in the Lok Sabha Today on India’s Strong, Successful, and Decisive Response to the Pahalgam Terrorist Attack through ‘Operation Sindoor’, July 29, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2149811.
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[18] Peter Chalk and C. Christine Fair, “Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Leads the Kashmiri Insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 14, no. 10 (December 2002): 14–18.
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[29] The word “Dharma” cannot be accurately rendered in English. It could be associated with duty or righteousness
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[39] Son of Arjuna.
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