Abstract: Manoeuvre warfare, while still valuable, is insufficient on its own to address the complexities of contemporary and future conflicts. The war in Ukraine, characterised by static front lines and attritional tactics, highlights its limitations. Military strategies must evolve to integrate both manoeuvre and positional warfare. A flexible, hybrid approach, combining elements of manoeuvre, positional, and attritional warfare, is essential for achieving strategic success in conflict.

Problem statement: Military operations in Ukraine since 2023 have proven to be sobering for Western officers used to drawing large arrows on maps. On the one hand, the manoeuvre-centric approach encounters its (known) limitations. At the same time, on the other hand, striking resemblances to the Western Front of 1914-1918 emerge. What implications does the sobering experience of military operations in Ukraine hold for the future of land operations?

So what?: The failed Russian invasion of February 2022, as well as the unsuccessful Ukrainian counteroffensive of June 2023, severely challenged the foundational principles of Western military doctrine, rooted in the manoeuvrist approach. Western officers must grapple with this realisation, acutely aware that Russia will likely pose the most tangible threat to the EU and NATO. Hence, it is imperative to re-embrace positional warfare.

How to Address Numerical Superiority?

Manoeuvre warfare doctrine, as we know it today, is a product of an intense debate within NATO concerning how best to address the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact. The adoption of this doctrine also coincided with the US military’s reorientation towards conventional warfare following the Vietnam War. Additionally, it was influenced by the Israeli success in the latter stages of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) ability to achieve rapid and decisive operational success through manoeuvre demonstrated the effectiveness of such an approach, reinforcing its appeal to Western military strategists.[1]

Although manoeuvre warfare has been central to most, if not all,[2] NATO armed forces, it is noteworthy that no universally accepted definition of the concept exists. Since its creation, manoeuvre warfare seems to have been so used and misused, as Amos Fox claims, that the meaning of the concept has become polysemic: “This generates misunderstanding about manoeuvre, resulting in the term’s misuse and abuse for those uneducated in the idea. Manoeuvre, in many ways, is at a crossroads. The idea is so overused and misapplied that a generation of practitioners cannot think beyond the bounds of the term that they think they know.”[3] The objective of manoeuvre warfare, however, is clear: “to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.”[4]

Although manoeuvre warfare has been central to most, if not all, NATO armed forces, it is noteworthy that no universally accepted definition of the concept exists.

The characteristics associated with manoeuvre warfare are numerous and diverse, including high tempo, surprise, pre-emption, simultaneity, and exploitation.[5] Additionally, manoeuvre involves embracing chaos, unpredictability, mission-type command orders, unity of effort and surfaces and gaps (to avoid the enemy’s strengths and focus on his weak points).[6] Other critical aspects include individual initiative, flexibility, agility and moral courage,[7] accurate information, tactical and operational mobility, favourable terrain, mobile sustainment infrastructure, proficient formations,[8] economy of force,[9] audacity[10] and, ultimately, combined arms warfare.[11]

The methods are equally numerous. Ideally, the highest and purest application of manoeuvre warfare is to deter the enemy without engaging in combat (“to preempt the enemy”), to dislocate the enemy’s forces, or ultimately to disrupt the enemy by targeting and neutralising his nervous system or brain to paralyse him.[12] This is preferably achieved by attacking the enemy’s weaknesses, such as (among others) his command and control.[13] Finally, it is essential to emphasise that manoeuvre warfare represents an indirect approach.[14]

The Manoeuvrist Approach Alone Insufficient in Preparing for War

Even though NATO countries have not engaged in a peer-to-peer high-intensity conflict for the past three decades, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022—especially the subsequent stagnation of the front lines by late 2022, where combat became more positional—has sparked debate among scholars and analysts about the ongoing relevance of manoeuvre warfare. This discussion centres on whether manoeuvre warfare remains a viable doctrine or if it should be considered obsolete or ‘dead’,[15] as Anthony King already noted in a RUSI podcast in 2020, long before Russia’s full-scale invasion.[16]

Manoeuvre warfare alone is insufficient. Numerous indications suggest that, despite the uncertainties of peace (“fog of peace”[17]), manoeuvre warfare does not fully address all potential conflicts in which Western countries might get involved. Christopher Tuck, for instance, claims it’s far from sure that manoeuvre warfare will do the job in the future: “Manoeuvre warfare may continue to have relevance, in the sense that it will continue to form an important part of the lexicon of modern land warfare. This relevance is no guarantee, however, that manoeuvre warfare actually will work”.[18] Stephen Biddle argues that warfare risks becoming more attritional rather than characterised by rapid and decisive manoeuvre, particularly when there is no significant disparity in force employment between two belligerents.[19] Amos Fox argues that future combat operations will likely be fought in urban terrain, where manoeuvre warfare is scarcely feasible.[20] At the same time, Anthony King asserts that attrition and positional warfare have been the dominant forms of warfare in recent urban combat and are, therefore, likely to remain so in the near future: “In urban warfare, manoeuvre is dead and positional warfare – the siege has returned. The central military problem of urban warfare today is not how to move, still less how to swarm, but rather how to breach, clear, and hold heavily fortified buildings and neighbourhoods. In place of a rapier thrust, urban warfare has become a process of long, slow boring.”[21]

There are additional reasons why manoeuvre warfare may not be a one-size-fits-all solution for future conflicts. For instance, Amos Fox highlights a resurgence in the dominance of defensive operations, partly due to the omnipresence of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) equipment, such as drones, radars, and signal intelligence: “As this dynamic [return of the defensive] iterates on future battlefields, fewer and fewer actors will find benefit to operating in the open, and instead seek refuge in protected defensive locations.”[22] Jack Watling confirms this. “It [he refers to the new dynamics on the battlefield due to better sensors] swings the calculus from manoeuvre isolating defended positions to defended positions being able to reliably dislocate manoeuvre.”[23] Franz-Stefan Gady suggests that artificial intelligence (AI) could accelerate both offensive and defensive operations, diminishing the likelihood of successful manoeuvre warfare. As a result, future conflicts may evolve into a more technologically advanced form of attrition warfare.[24] Therefore, many scholars question the future viability of manoeuvre warfare.

There are additional reasons why manoeuvre warfare may not be a one-size-fits-all solution for future conflicts.

This observation does not necessarily imply that manoeuvre warfare is ‘dead’ or that it should be discarded entirely. Rather, it suggests that other forms of warfare, such as attritional or positional warfare, may be more relevant and important than Western doctrines have acknowledged in recent decades. The choice to do manoeuvre warfare doesn’t only depend on Western armies but also on potential enemies. Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for instance, have all adopted a doctrine of limited wars with limited aims, where a short and sudden campaign—such as a ‘land grab’—is immediately followed by rapid de-escalation and a transition to peace. This approach makes a manoeuvre warfare response to such limited campaigns challenging, if not entirely unfeasible.[25] Christopher Tuck agrees, emphasising the perceived incompatibility between manoeuvre warfare, which requires going ‘all in’ with all available (yet albeit few) resources, and these limited campaigns.[26] Amos Fox supports this view, adding that these limited wars are often characterised by “positional battles”.[27] However, it is essential to emphasise that, according to some interpretations, manoeuvre warfare does not always necessitate going ‘all in.’ As we discussed earlier, the ultimate form of manoeuvre is to preempt the opponent. However, when conflict escalates into actual warfare, Western countries are almost compelled to fully commit due to their current limited arsenals and stockpiles of weaponry. It is also important to recall the origins of manoeuvre warfare, a concept partly developed in response to a scarcity of Western resources and numerical inferiority compared to the Warsaw Pact nations.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that manoeuvre warfare—whether in its physical form or its psychological (non-physical) approach—aims to break the will and cohesion of the enemy.[28] However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated that both sides possess a strong will that is difficult to shatter. Russian military culture, in particular, still highly values “loss, sacrifice and suffering” and fosters “a ‘cult of the soldier-hero’, where scarcity and desolation are integral to the soldier’s life, and high levels of mortality and violence are accepted as natural consequences.”[29] Not all armies will collapse as easily as the Iraqi Armed Forces did in Kuwait and Iraq in February 1991. Additionally, some potential future adversaries may not seek to avoid attrition but rather embrace it.[30] The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), much like the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022–present), demonstrate this. It is, therefore, highly likely that countries such as Iran or Russia will attempt to undermine Western will and cohesion—typically associated with manoeuvre warfare—by compelling us to engage in an attritional campaign.

Russian military culture, in particular, still highly values “loss, sacrifice and suffering” and fosters “a ‘cult of the soldier-hero’, where scarcity and desolation are integral to the soldier’s life, and high levels of mortality and violence are accepted as natural consequences.”

The adversary’s unwillingness to play to our rules further undermines the future potential of the Western approach to manoeuvre warfare. Unfortunately for its proponents, the most recent attempt at employing manoeuvre warfare at the strategic level was the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The operation aimed to overwhelm the Ukrainian Armed Forces through multi-axis advances, deep strikes, an advance toward the capital, Kyiv, using airborne troops, and the attempt to seize and hold Hostomel Airport. The Russian attack met most of the criteria discussed earlier, such as surprise, simultaneity, agility, proficient (professional) units, and mobility. To be fair, the Russians had been more successful in earlier instances, such as in Georgia (2008) and Crimea (Ukraine) (2014), where they managed to achieve their objectives through campaigns that could be considered manoeuvre warfare.

The Relevance of Attritional Warfare

A broader historical perspective further challenges the naive belief in the invincibility of manoeuvre warfare, making it appear even less realistic. Some historians argue that most wars are won through attrition rather than manoeuvre.[31] Consequently, some contemporary theorists advocate embracing attrition and preparing for high losses and casualties.[32] Robert Fry notes that British military history offers few examples of successful manoeuvre warfare in land operations,[33] despite the efforts of many manoeuvre warfare advocates who have sought—and claimed to find—historical cases to support the superiority of manoeuvre warfare.[34]

Despite the limited success of manoeuvre warfare in peer-to-peer conflicts—arguably with the exception of the Gulf War in February 1991—military practitioners have largely remained unreflective on its limitations. Instead, positional and attritional warfare continues to be viewed as synonymous with failure and incompetence, a perspective that has persisted for decades.[35] For example, Martin Van Creveld demonstrates intellectual dishonesty when contrasting attritional (in the sense of positional) warfare with manoeuvre warfare. He claims, for instance, that in attritional warfare, one would maintain few or no reserves, always attack the enemy at their strongest point, or deploy most troops in the frontline where they are, naturally, most vulnerable.[36]

By 1915, the warring parties understood that heavily manning the front line was unwise. Henceforth, they began to take steps towards what would become a doctrine of flexible defence in depth.[37] Van Creveld overlooks the competitive nature of the battlefield. During periods of positional warfare, attackers sought enemy weaknesses and strived to maintain the initiative. They aimed for simultaneity and endeavoured to turn their OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop faster than their adversaries—all characteristics of… manoeuvre warfare. This was convincingly demonstrated by several specialists of the First World War, where the positional fighting on the Western Front, despite its apparent stagnation, actually proved to be a highly competitive environment.[38]

During periods of positional warfare, attackers sought enemy weaknesses and strived to maintain the initiative.

Many scholars tend to overlook positional warfare, focusing instead on manoeuvre warfare while acknowledging that both attrition and manoeuvre have their place on the battlefield.[39] While manoeuvre warfare is considered an indirect approach[40] in the tradition of  Basil Liddell Hart,[41] attrition is a direct approach. Attrition emphasises “battle, mass, firepower, systematic and sequential activity, cumulative action, and the physical wearing down of an adversary”.[42] Although many scholars recognise the complementarity of attritional and manoeuvre approaches, many practitioners (i.e. military) neglect the attritional approach, overwhelmingly favouring manoeuvre warfare. The one-sided emphasis on manoeuvre warfare—what Amos Fox has termed the ‘manoeuvre warfare bias’,[43] is problematic.

The latest Belgian Defence doctrine (2022) does not even mention the word ‘attrition’.[44] As a result, attritional (and positional warfare, too) is generally perceived as a primitive form of warfare that should be abandoned, a judgement William Owen argues is unfair. “The whole edifice of manoeuvre warfare rests on the idea that there are two competing forms of warfare, manoeuvre and attrition, one of which is skilled and the other which is clumsy. This construct is false; it makes no sense to favour one form over the other.”[45]

At the same time, not all military perspectives ignore attritional warfare. The US Army Field Manual 3-0 on operations clearly states: “Some combination of manoeuvre and attrition is typically necessary to achieve victory during armed conflict.”[46] Jordan et al. are explicit about the complementarity of attritional and manoeuvre warfare. “Attrition may enable manoeuvre by opening gaps that friendly forces can move through; manoeuvre may enable favourable attrition by placing forces in positions to fire upon the enemy more effectively or as a means of gaining surprise.”[47] NATO doctrine also supports this view, although it does not explicitly use the term ‘attrition’. Instead, it employs synonyms such as ‘destruction’, ‘destroy’, ‘targeting’, and ‘attriting’, among others.[48] Finally, attritional thinking continues to have a significant and often unconscious influence on operational planning. This was underscored by a Belgian colleague, who noted that many of his peers remain heavily focused on inflicting material losses on the enemy. This approach is often preferred because it is tangible and more comprehensible, at least compared to the more abstract challenge of breaking the enemy’s will and cohesion through manoeuvre warfare.

Attritional warfare, when used as an isolated and singular approach to a campaign, is not the right solution for the West either. Twentieth-century history provides two notable examples of attritional campaigns, both lost by the side attempting to implement them. The first was the US in Vietnam,[49] and the second was Germany’s attempt to bleed the French nation dry in the salient around Verdun in 1916. In both cases, military commanders reported exaggerated estimates of enemy losses while presenting their own losses in an overly optimistic manner, creating the impression of significant enemy attrition primarily on paper. Ironically, the German campaign at Verdun can also be seen as an example of the manoeuvrist approach—a German attempt to break the French centre of gravity (their ‘political will’) by inflicting overwhelming and unacceptable military losses, which, in essence, amounts to manoeuvre warfare through attrition.[50]

Positional Warfare: Reviled and Forgotten

While both scholars and doctrinal publications frequently discuss manoeuvre warfare and often acknowledge the existence of attritional warfare, positional warfare remains notably underrepresented in both scholarly work and doctrinal literature. One could argue that the definition of positional warfare is even more problematic than that of manoeuvre warfare. No NATO doctrinal publications explicitly refer to positional warfare. A quick search on the public website of the NATO Standardization Office yields only one reference close to positional warfare, specifically positional defence (now ‘Area Defence’)—basically holding ground. “The type of defence in which the bulk of the defending force is disposed in selected tactical localities where the decisive battle is to be fought. Principal reliance is placed on the ability of the forces in the defended localities to maintain their positions and to control the terrain between them. The reserve is used to add depth, to block, or restore the battle position by counterattack.”[51] Moreover, this definition dates back to October 1980. Notably, the latest Belgian Defence doctrine does not include the term ‘positional’. However, it does elaborate on the manoeuvrist approach and mentions ‘manoeuvre’ fifteen times. However, academics and analysts who address positional warfare often use the term without adequately defining it. They generally describe it as a system of fieldwork and trenches characterised by static fighting from and in prepared defences. Positional warfare focuses on controlling key terrain, sustaining defence, and gradually wearing down the enemy, which can be particularly effective in conflicts where rapid manoeuvre is impractical or impossible.

The type of defence in which the bulk of the defending force is disposed in selected tactical localities where the decisive battle is to be fought.

Several wars have shown that armies often choose to fight from complex systems of fieldworks and trench networks, frequently combined with deep defensive positions, integrated artillery firing points, logistical bases, and protection by barbed wire and land mines. Russia’s war in Ukraine is a particularly notable example. The fighting along the 1,000-kilometer frontline bears many similarities to the Great War on the Western Front (1914–1918). There are trench-clearing operations, deep dugouts, and artillery is central to operations. The latter causing two-thirds of all casualties—the same number as in the First World War on the Western Front.[52] We also see the mass mobilisation of civilians to sustain the war effort because, ultimately, the war in Ukraine has become a war of attrition. At its core, the challenge lies in breaking through the enemy’s defensive positions.

Much like the years 1915–1917, neither belligerent in Ukraine has been able to achieve a breakthrough nor effectively exploit one, apart from the successful Ukrainian Kharkiv offensive of September 2022 against very poorly manned Russian positions.[53] Both armies lack proficient formations to execute a manoeuvrist campaign successfully.

Additional historical examples bear remarkable similarities to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second half of the Korean War (1950-1953) is an example of positional warfare.[54] The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) is another example. It involved two large militaries equipped with modern jets, tanks, and armoured vehicles, engaging in mass mobilisation, long-range missile strikes, and economic warfare.[55] As noted,  this was a war “in which the character of the fighting was reminiscent of the middle element of the First World War, with a focus on artillery and infantry assaults in the context of static, attritional warfare.”[56] In both cases, none of the belligerents initially planned for a prolonged campaign of positional warfare. However, they ended up discovering it ‘on the job.’ The same applies to the Western Front of the First World War, where all armies firmly believed in what was then termed “mobile warfare.” However, by late 1914, exhaustion forced them to dig in while they prepared and hoped–in vain–to resume mobile warfare in 1915.

A similar comparison can be made with the Iraqi defensive positions along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border that US Marines attacked during Operation Desert Storm. Although coalition forces managed to easily break through these poorly prepared and executed defensive positions (lacking depth) and decisively defeated the Iraqi forces in less than a week, this success was primarily due to their ability to attack the weak flank and engage the centre of gravity, the elite reserve forces of the Republican Guard. While this operation can be viewed as a prime example of successful manoeuvre warfare, it is essential to recognise the poor condition of the Iraqi Armed Forces, which reduces this campaign from a true peer-to-peer conflict to a rather asymmetric warfare scenario. Moreover, the Coalition established air supremacy and targeted the Iraqi Armed Forces for 39 days. Furthermore, Stephen Biddle does not consider Norman Schwarzkopf’s campaign plan an example of manoeuvre warfare, as the enveloping forces encountered the well-entrenched Republican Guard units from the direction the latter had anticipated.

In contrast, manoeuvre warfare typically prescribes avoiding the enemy’s strength, particularly their reserve forces.[57] This leads Biddle to conclude that Desert Storm is not a quintessential example of manoeuvre warfare. Simply put, the operational plan did not constitute manoeuvre warfare, and more positional warfare was involved than is generally acknowledged.

Manoeuvre warfare typically prescribes avoiding the enemy’s strength, particularly their reserve forces.

No Binary Distinction

Manoeuvre warfare is not ‘dead,’ even though the evidence supporting the doctrine’s effectiveness is limited. Instead, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the binary distinction between manoeuvre and positional warfare is unhelpful, as modern conflicts often necessitate a combination of both approaches. This blend enables armies to remain unpredictable to their adversaries and, more practically, to manoeuvre in a way that isolates cities before transitioning to positional assaults to operate within them.[58], [59] The necessity of employing both approaches stems from the limitations of manoeuvre warfare and the inherent drawbacks of positional warfare. Positional warfare is predominantly defensive in nature, meaning it does not facilitate territorial gains. Moreover, when poorly executed—such as from unprepared or poorly situated combat positions—it can result in significant casualties (a risk that also applies to manoeuvre warfare, which is inherently more perilous). Additionally, I believe that positional warfare places a more substantial burden on troops, both physically—due to unhealthy living conditions—and mentally, as heavy shelling and bombardments can have severe psychological impacts, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).[60]

Manoeuvre warfare is not the only feasible or realistic approach for future battlefields. Future conflicts will likely require us to understand, engage in, or execute other forms of warfare, such as attritional or positional warfare. As David Jordan et al. observe: “History suggests that, in the future, many different forms of land warfare are likely to co-exist because land warfare is shaped by different political, economic, social and cultural contexts.”[61]  As we already mentioned, Christopher Tuck also questions whether our singular focus on manoeuvre warfare is the best strategy for the future.[62] The most cautious approach to this uncertainty is to embrace both attritional and positional warfare. John Kiszely advocates for manoeuvre warfare as plan A, while urging preparation for a plan B (attritional or positional warfare).[63] In the future, officers must be capable of shifting from manoeuvre warfare to positional or attritional strategies, depending on the circumstances. This underscores the idea that warfare is not merely a science but an art, and the commander’s talent and skill will allow them to determine which approach is most suitable.[64]

How future positional warfare should be envisioned is best left to the military specialists of today. However, it will closely resemble the elastic defence in depth seen in 1918. It will be characterised by dispersed hedgehog positions organised in all-around defence with numerous automatic weapons, mortars, grenades, and now also anti-tank weapons, rather than the linear trench lines of 1915. This shift is driven by the fact that no modern army possesses the millions of soldiers that made it possible during the First World War to build, maintain, and man such an unbroken defensive system across multiple kilometres of depth. In an offensive operation, a military campaign might initially employ manoeuvre warfare to achieve strategic surprise and dislocate the enemy but then transition to positional warfare to consolidate gains and wear down the adversary. Alternatively, it could use positional warfare as a temporary phase to stabilise the front before resuming offensive operations after a brief positional (and often attritional) pause.[65]

In an offensive operation, a military campaign might initially employ manoeuvre warfare to achieve strategic surprise and dislocate the enemy but then transition to positional warfare to consolidate gains and wear down the adversary.

Flexibility, Knowledge and Training

Manoeuvre warfare, as formalised in the late 20th Century, was largely a response to the quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. The doctrine was designed to counter mass with agility, focusing on physically and psychologically outmanoeuvring the enemy. However, the conditions that once made manoeuvre warfare the preferred approach have changed. Military doctrines must evolve to reflect the new reality. However, this doesn’t mean that manoeuvre is ‘dead’; rather, military commanders must have the flexibility, knowledge, and training to shift between manoeuvre and positional strategies depending on the operational environment, enemy capabilities, and strategic objectives.

Manoeuvre warfare remains vital to military strategy but is not a one-size-fits-all solution. The increasing prominence of positional and attritional warfare in recent conflicts highlights the need for a more nuanced approach. While these two types of warfare may not have the same appeal as the dynamic and fast-paced manoeuvre warfare, their importance cannot be understated, especially in modern conflicts characterised by urbanisation, advanced technology, and limited campaigns. Military planners and practitioners must be prepared to integrate manoeuvre with positional warfare, adapting to the specific challenges of each conflict. By doing so, they can create more resilient and effective strategies that can achieve lasting success on the battlefield.

 

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Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Tom Simoens is a Professor of History at the Royal Military Academy in Brussels, where he leads the Department of Conflict Studies. He specialises in military history, with a focus on the First World War and military justice. Since 2022, he has frequently provided analysis for the Belgian press on the war in Ukraine. Since the summer of 2022, Dr. Simoens has noted increasing parallels between the conflict in Ukraine and the Western Front from 1914-1918. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the Belgian Ministry of Defence or the Royal Military Academy (Brussels).

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[1] Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” 35.

[2] No country objected to the use of the term “manoeuvrist approach” in the NATO document AJP 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. Many thanks to LtCol (GS) Gregory Retz for this clarification and his proofreading of this paper.

[3] Amos C Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?: Understanding the Conditions and Components of Warfighting,” The RUSI Journal 166, no. 6–7 (11 April 2022): 13, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2022.2058601.

[4] David Jordan et al., Understanding Modern Warfare, Second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 123.

[5] “Belgian Defence Doctrine. Fundamental Principles to Approach Belgian Defence Operations,” (Cab CHOD, August 2022), 77.

[6] William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 13–18.

[7] Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” 27.

[8] Amos C Fox, “A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver Warfare Doctrine,” Armor CXXIX, no. 4 (2017): 19.

[9] Ibid., 12.

[10] “Manoeuvre Warfare,” (Wellington (India): Defence Services Staff College, June 1998), 54.

[11] Martin L. Van Creveld, Kenneth S. Brower, and Steven L. Canby, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, 4th printing (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2001), 3–8.

[12] Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver. Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (Place of publication not identified: Presidio Press, 1991).

[13] Kiszely, “The Meaning of Manoeuvre,” 37.

[14] Alderson, “Influence, the Indirect Approach and Manoeuvre.”

[15] Amos C Fox, “A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver Warfare Doctrine,” Armor CXXIX, no. 4 (2017).

[16] Episode 30: Is the Era of Manoeuvre Warfare Dead? | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org).

[17] Monica Duffy Toft and Talbot Imlay, “Strategic and Military Planning under the Fog of Peace,” in: The Fog of Peace and War Planning, by Monica Duffy Toft and Talbot Imlay (Routledge, 2006), 1–10, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203019658.

[18] Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” 42.

[19] Ibid., 40–41. Tuck refers to Biddle.

[20] Amos C Fox, “A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver Warfare Doctrine,” Armor CXXIX, no. 4 (2017): 16.

[21] Anthony King, Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021).

[22] Amos C Fox, “A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver Warfare Doctrine,” Armor CXXIX, no. 4 (2017): 17.

[23] Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the 21st Century, New Perspectives on Security and Defence, Vol 1 (London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2024), 57.

[24] Franz-Stefan Gady, “What Does AI Mean for the Future of Manoeuvre Warfare?,” IISS, 5 May 2020, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2020/05/csfc-ai-manoeuvre-warfare/.

[25] Sidharth Kaushal, “Positional Warfare: A Paradigm for Understanding Twenty-First-Century Conflict,” The RUSI Journal 163, no. 2 (4 March 2018): 34–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1470395.

[26] Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” 37–39.

[27] Amos C Fox, “A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver Warfare Doctrine,” Armor CXXIX, no. 4 (2017).

[28] Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” 33.

[29] Joris Van Bladel, “Mass Matters: Understanding Russia’s Military Conduct and the Threat It Poses – Egmont Institute,” March 14, 2024, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/mass-matters-understanding-russias-military-conduct-and-the-threat-it-poses/.

[30] Robert Fry, “The Meaning of Manoeuvre,” The RUSI Journal 143, no. 6 (December 1998): 42, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849808446327.

[31] Amos C. Fox, “The Israel-Hamas Conflict: “You Might Not Be Interested in Attrition, but Attrition Is Interested in You”,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, May 2024, 7, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2024.2346128.

[32] Amos C Fox, “Move, Strike, Protect: An Alternative to the Primacy of Decisiveness and the Offense or Defense Dichotomy in Military Thinking,” Landpower Essay 23–4 (June 2023): 6.

[33] Robert Fry, “The Meaning of Manoeuvre,” The RUSI Journal 143, no. 6 (December 1998): 41, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849808446327.

[34] E.g. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 4–5.

[35] Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” 41.

[36] Van Creveld, Brower, and Canby, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, 8–10.

[37] Tom Simoens, De chaos van het slagveld. Het Belgisch leger in de loopgraven, 1914-1918 (Antwerpen: Horizon, 2016), 284–360.

[38] Idem.

[39] Chris Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice, Routledge Library Editions. Military and Naval History, Volume 3 (London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 15–16; Kiszely, “The Meaning of Manoeuvre,” 36.

[40] Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” 26–27.

[41] Kiszely, “The Meaning of Manoeuvre,” 17.

[42] Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” 26.

[43] Amos C Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?: Understanding the Conditions and Components of Warfighting,” The RUSI Journal 166, no. 6–7 (11 April 2022): 18, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2022.2058601.

[44] “Belgian Defence Doctrine. Fundamental Principles to Approach Belgian Defence Operations.”

[45] William F Owen, “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud,” The RUSI Journal 153, no. 4 (August 2008): 63, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840802386224.

[46] US Army HQ, “FM 3-0 Operations,” (Department of the Army, October 2022), 1–3.

[47] Jordan et al., Understanding Modern Warfare, 94.

[48] For instance: NATO ATP 3.2.1 Land Tactical Activities (2022). However, both concepts (destruction and attrition) are not considered to be synomyms, according to some analysts, further contributing to the semantic confusion… See: Ian T. Brown, A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare, First edition (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2018), 128.

[49] Van Creveld, Brower, and Canby, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, xv.

[50] Robert Fry, “The Meaning of Manoeuvre,” The RUSI Journal 143, no. 6 (December 1998): 42, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849808446327.

[51] “NSO Public Website,” accessed August 25, 2024, https://nso.nato.int/nso/home/main/home.

[52] For the First World War, see: Tom Simoens, De chaos van het slagveld, 105 (note 560). As for the Russo-Ukraine War since February 2022, there are only indirect indications, such as this report by Reuters claiming that “Since the war began, artillery has proved so lethal that it has caused more than 80% of casualties on both sides, according to estimates by Ukrainian military commanders.” (Years of U.S., NATO miscalculations left Ukraine massively outgunned (reuters.com) from July 19, 2024).

[53] Luc De Vos, Franky Bostyn, and Tom Simoens, “The First World War and the Fundamental Problem of Breaking through the Front,” in World War One (1914-1918). 40th International Congress of Military History Varna, Bulgaria (31 August – 5 September 2014), by J. Baev and K. Grozev (Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press, 2015), 765–90.

[54] Li Chen, “From Civil War Victor to Cold War Guard: Positional Warfare in Korea and the Transformation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 1951–1953,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2 January 2015): 183–214, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.980578.

[55] Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[56] Jordan et al., Understanding Modern Warfare, 145.

[57] Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 5. pr., 1, paperb. print (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006), 147.

[58] Amos C Fox, “The Principles for the Future of Warfare and Stand-Off Warfare,” Landpower Essay 24–4 (April 2024): 4–6.

[59] Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the 21st Century, New Perspectives on Security and Defence, Vol 1 (London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2024), 76.

[60] While there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that military personnel are more likely to suffer from PTSD in positional warfare compared to manoeuvre warfare, it seems plausible based on psychological research. Studies indicate that the more individuals are exposed to violence and explosions, the greater the likelihood of developing PTSD. Given that positional warfare often involves prolonged exposure to such conditions, as seen in the Donbas conflict in Ukraine, it can be assumed that the risk of PTSD in these situations is higher than in more dynamic forms of warfare.

[61] Jordan et al., Understanding Modern Warfare, 128.

[62] Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” 42.

[63] Kiszely, “The Meaning of Manoeuvre,” 38.

[64] Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare, 13.

[65] Anthony King expressed a similar idea in this podcast: Peter Roberts, “Manoeuvre Theory Is in a Coma,” This Means War, n.d.