Abstract: The Shahed-136, an Iranian-manufactured loitering munition built largely from foam and plywood, has emerged as a very effective weapons system. The Shahed-136 drone has demonstrated that low-cost, mass-produced aerial munitions can systematically overwhelm sophisticated and expensive air defence architectures. Iran’s direct deployment of Shaheds against Israel in 2025, followed by Russia’s relentless campaign averaging 140 drone strikes per day over Ukraine, established saturation as a viable operational method. Now in February 2026, the use of Shahed-136 by Iran and LUCAS by the U.S. revealed a new doctrine of attrition warfare centred on saturation and economic exhaustion.
Problem statement: How has the low-cost Shahed-136 drone established itself as a strategic asset across multiple conflict theatres?
So what?: The Shahed-136 is a stark reminder that it is important to invest not only in low-cost offensive drones but equally in affordable, scalable ways to shoot them down. A defence strategy built on expensive interceptors may lose the economic battle against cheap, mass-produced threats. Defence industries must urgently develop low-cost interceptor systems and electronic warfare tools to balance the scales.
A Weapon Built from Foam and Plywood
There is something almost absurd about the Shahed-136 drone, which is made largely of foam and plywood.[1] This drone is comparatively inexpensive and has long-range precision strike capability. The machine in itself is unglamorous; however, it has managed to tie down the most sophisticated air defence systems and drain billion-dollar military budgets. The name itself, “Witness” in Persian, however, does not merely observe, but arrives to destroy.
Designed and manufactured by Shahed Aviation Industries, the Shahed-136 is 3.5 meters long with a 2.5-meter wingspan, carrying a 40- to 50-kilogram warhead at its nose.[2] Its piston-driven engine produces a distinctive buzzing sound, likened by Ukrainians to a flying moped, making it loud, slow, and unmistakable. The drone’s range is 2000 km, and it is precision-guided using preprogrammed GPS and GLONASS waypoints uploaded before launch. It can be launched from a small booster rocket, which sends it into the sky; once airborne, it is largely autonomous, following its preprogrammed route, and, in its standard configuration, has no ability to receive updated instructions or transmit battlefield data. What it lacks in sophistication, it more than compensates for in economics. A single Shahed-136 costs between $20,000 and $50,000 to produce, a fraction of the $225,000 plus price tag of an Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM).[3] Iran’s Shahed Aviation Industries[4] manufactures them in bulk, and they can be launched from portable rails or truck-mounted racks, making them deployable from almost anywhere.
How Russia Utilised Shahed 136 against Ukraine
Since 2022, Russia has started to deploy Iranian-made Shahed drones (rebranded as Geran 2) against Ukraine. Since then, Shahed drones have been used extensively in Ukraine, and it has graduated from a tactical curiosity to a strategic instrument of sustained pressure.[5] By February 2025, an average of 140 Shaheds was being recorded every single day.[6] The purpose of this swarm was to probe Ukrainian defences, targeting energy infrastructure, and forcing a country to burn its interceptors faster than they could be replaced. Here again, the principal value of these drones was not in precision or lethality, but in affordability at scale. These drones helped Russia to fill the crucial gap in its military campaign. Before the inclusion of Iranian drones, Russia had been utilising a large fleet of surveillance drones, such as Eleron-3 and Orlan-10, along with a few offensive drones capable of hitting targets deep inside the adversary’s territory. The deployment of Shahed drones provided operational advantage and rapid development on the battlefield by attacking long-range artillery batteries, troop positions, weapon depots, and armoured vehicles. These drones were also used to target high-value infrastructure such as electrical power stations, transmission lines and water works.[7] This shows that Russia used the Iranian Shahed drone from both a tactical and strategic standpoint.
Deployment of Shahed Drone by Iran in the June 2025 Conflict
In June 2025, six hours after Israeli air strikes on Iran, Iran sent more than 100 Iranian drones toward Tel Aviv.[8] This was Iran’s “Operation True Promise III”, and it represented the most visible use of the Shahed drones, along with other types, in a direct state-on-state confrontation. The scale was deliberate. Iran did not launch one or two drones. It launched a large wave of 100 drones simply to exhaust defence systems and interceptors with the sheer volume, which is precisely the tactical logic of a drone swarm. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies described such salvos as tools designed as much to saturate air defences as to destroy targets, cluttering radar screens and forcing command centres to spend their more capable surface-to-air missiles on relatively cheap threats.[9]
Through striking at the physical infrastructure of Israeli territory with the help of drones, Iran tried to demonstrate that it could sustain persistent, large-scale attacks with manageable cost. However, effectiveness, in the traditional sense, was limited amid Israel’s defences. Israel employed all of its multi-tiered air defence architecture against all of the Iranian drone and missile attacks.[10] However, for drones specifically, Israel employed Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and the newly operational naval Barak Magen system, supplemented by electronic warfare units and manned interceptor aircraft.[11]
Shahed-136 vs LUCAS in 2026 U.S-Iran Conflict
The use of drones in February 2026 illustrated not just a single dramatic strike but rather a doctrine of exhaustion. First, in February 2026, during Operation Epic Fury, when the coordinated U.S.-Israeli campaign targeting Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command nodes, air defence infrastructure, and missile launch sites across Iran, the Pentagon quietly debuted LUCAS, the Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System, an improved reverse-engineered derivative of Iran’s own Shahed-136.[12] In the aftermath of U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, the Persian Gulf has become the Shahed-136’s newest theatre, after Iran unleashed a retaliatory drone and missile campaign targeting U.S. assets and allied infrastructure across the region.[13] The scale of the attack was substantial. The UAE alone detected 941 Iranian drones, of which 65 breached its defences and struck ports, airports, hotels, and data centres, a pattern of targeting both military and economic assets.[14] U.S.-provided Patriot missile batteries and allied air defence networks intercepted the vast majority of incoming drones.[15] However, the fact that dozens still hit their targets shows that, for now, even a capable defence system cannot maintain a perfect record against a weapon designed to be launched in numbers. The purpose of these drones was not to alter the military balance but to put sustained pressure on the adversary, and for that, Shahed attacks were effective. These attacks disrupted supply chains, military bases and economic hubs crucial for the U.S and its allies in the Middle East and forced them to drain their stockpiles by using costly interceptors on cheap drones. From a tactical standpoint, cost asymmetry, interceptor exhaustion, scale, saturation, and autonomous operation are advantages for Shahed drones. From a strategic standpoint, Shahed drones provided a cheap horizontal escalation by disrupting infrastructure, and mass production provided attrition of drone attacks, which can change battlefield tactics and procurement priorities. For the Gulf States, using expensive interceptors against mass-produced drones creates unfavourable cost dynamics, and they are now actively searching for low-cost drone interceptors.[16]
Drones and the New Face of Warfare
Drone warfare at this scale is not really about hitting a target once, but rather it is about ensuring that by the following day, the defender has fewer missiles and a civilian population living in a state of permanent anxiety. Ukraine’s experience proved, in painful detail, that technological superiority cannot fully solve the problem of a cheap, mass-produced weapon launched in relentless waves. Even countermeasures like VAMPIRE systems, which fire $27,500 APKWS II missiles, represent a better ratio, but they do not eliminate the core asymmetry.[17] The strategic aim of using Shahed drones was layered to degrade infrastructure and deplete defence stocks. Tactically, the Shahed’s low radar cross-section and ability to fly in swarms made interception expensive and imperfect. However, despite this advantage, these drones can’t deliver a decisive victory on the battlefield; they are effective in prolonged conflicts, helping build pressure on the adversary. Patriot PAC-3 was the primary interceptor used by the Gulf States against Shahed drones, at a cost of roughly $4 million per missile.[18] Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), designed for ballistic missile threat, has also been employed by the Gulf States against drones. The Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security also warned that most of Israel’s Arrow 1 and Arrow 2 interceptors have been used against Iranian drones and Missiles.[19] During this conflict, Iran used a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones to attack the Gulf States and Israel. Most of these attacks were intercepted successfully, but that interception proved extraordinarily expensive. The importance of Shahed drones in this scenario is not in their lethality or precision but in the cost asymmetry that strongly favours Iran. Shahed drones are not a tool for military defeat, but they are a strategic arsenal for sustaining war that the adversary cannot win on current terms. According to Arthur Erickson, CEO of Texas-based Drone Company, the cost ratio per interception is 10:1 in Iran’s favour.[20] The imbalance between costs and ammunition depletion has been seen in the U.S. and Israel’s defence stocks, and their interceptors are under sustained operational pressure.
How Russia and the U.S. improved upon the Shahed-136
What is particularly noteworthy is that technological innovation does not always flow from advanced countries to less advanced ones; the Shahed case demonstrates that military innovations can emerge from unexpected sources. The Shahed drone has so clearly proven its battlefield utility that both Russia and the United States have adopted and improved the one-way attack drone strategy. Russia has invested $1.75 billion in establishing a domestic factory to produce its own variant, the Geran-2.[21] Russia replaced the original satellite navigation with Kometa M systems, which are more compatible with GLONASS. The flight controller of Geran 2 was also replaced with a Russian-made unit, which improved flight stability.[22] The payload has also increased from 50kg to 90kg, and it now includes advanced navigation features resistant to external interference, such as jamming and spoofing, using Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas.[23]
The United States’ deployment of LUCAS in the 2026 conflict is also a reverse-engineered, upgraded version of the Shahed-136. LUCAS has also integrated advanced American avionics, navigation systems and manufacturing refinements. At a glance, both LUCAS and Shahed look the same; however, when you look under the hood, LUCAS has more advanced features. LUCAS operates within a larger digital ecosystem, and it communicates with satellite and command centres. In terms of navigation, LUCAS can operate more like a connected battlefield sensor than a one-way weapon. Furthermore, LUCAS has more operational flexibility and can carry explosive warheads, surveillance sensors and communication relay equipment. This flexibility has turned LUCAS from a single-purpose weapon to a multi-purpose battlefield tool.[24]
When it comes to cost assessment, both Geran 2 and LUCAS are slightly more expensive than Shahed drones. Geran-2 estimated cost is $30,000-$80,000 per unit, and LUCAS is $35,000-$40,000 per unit.[25] As compared to Shahed Drones ($20,000-$50,000), these drones are slightly expensive, but they are still a fraction of the defender’s interceptor missiles. The cost-effectiveness of these drones is their most striking feature, particularly given that no country has unlimited resources.
What Comes Next?
The Shahed-136 has forced a fundamental reconsideration of how modern warfare is fought and sustained. Its significance lies not in technological sophistication, but in its ability to exploit the economic and operational vulnerabilities of advanced air defence systems. By combining low cost with mass deployment, it transforms warfare into a contest of endurance, where the side that can sustain pressure over time gains the advantage.
Across Ukraine and the Middle East, the consistent pattern is clear: even highly capable, layered air defence systems struggle to maintain efficiency when confronted with persistent, large-scale drone attacks. Interception remains possible, but increasingly comes at a disproportionate financial and logistical cost. This dynamic does not necessarily produce immediate battlefield breakthroughs, but it steadily degrades defensive capacity, strains resources, and imposes long-term strategic pressure.
The wider implication is that drone warfare is no longer defined primarily by precision or lethality, but by affordability, scalability, and sustainability. The diffusion and adaptation of systems like the Shahed-136, including by technologically advanced states, further underscores that this model is not an anomaly but an emerging norm.
For defence planners, the challenge is no longer simply to defend against drones, but to restore balance in the economics of air defence. Without the development of scalable, cost-effective countermeasures, states risk entering conflicts in which they can win tactically yet lose strategically through resource exhaustion. In this evolving landscape, the ability to sustain defence at scale, rather than merely achieve interception, will increasingly determine success.
[1] Deni Ellis Béchard, “How Drone Swarms Work—From Iran’s Shahed Attack to Ukraine’s Operation,” Scientific American, accessed March 9, 2026, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-drone-swarms-work-from-irans-shahed-attack-to-ukraines-operation.
[2] Deni Ellis Béchard, “How Drone Swarms Work—From Iran’s Shahed Attack to Ukraine’s Operation,” Scientific American, accessed March 9, 2026, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-drone-swarms-work-from-irans-shahed-attack-to-ukraines-operation.
[3] Alec Pow, “How Much Does a Shahed Drone Cost?” The Pricer, June 23, 2025, last reviewed February 2026, https://www.thepricer.org/how-much-does-a-shahed-drone-cost/; Thomas Newdick, “British Fighters Launch Record Number of ASRAAM Dogfight Missiles,” The War Zone, accessed March 9, 2026, https://www.twz.com/british-fighters-launch-record-number-of-asraam-dogfight-missiles.
[4] “Shahed Aviation Industries,” Iran Watch, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, accessed March 9, 2026, https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahed-aviation-industries.
[5] Francesco Salesio Schiavi, “Ukraine’s Drone War Is Reshaping Gulf Defense,” Gulf International Forum, March 27, 2026, https://gulfif.org/ukraines-drone-war-is-reshaping-gulf-defense/.
[6] Igor Anokhin and Spencer Faragasso, “Updated Analysis of Russian Shahed-136 Deployment Against Ukraine,” Institute for Science and International Security, March 5, 2025, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/updated-analysis-of-russian-shahed-136-deployment-against-ukraine/.
[7] Francesco Salesio Schiavi, “Assessing Russian Use of Iranian Drones in Ukraine: Facts and Implications,” Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), October 26, 2022, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/assessing-russian-use-iranian-drones-ukraine-facts-and-implications-36520.
[8] Yonah Jeremy Bob, “IDF Intercepts Massive Drone Attack from Iran, Pummels Tehran’s Air Defenses,” The Jerusalem Post, June 13, 2025, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-857598.
[9] Neil Hollenbeck et al., “Calculating the Cost-Effectiveness of Russia’s Drone Strikes,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 19, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/calculating-cost-effectiveness-russias-drone-strikes.
[10] Ari Cicurel, Shielded by Fire: Middle East Air Defense During the June 2025 Israel-Iran War (Washington, DC: Jewish Institute for National Security of America, August 2025), https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Shielded-by-Fire.pdf.
[11] Seth J. Frantzman, “New Missile Defenses, EW Tactics Aided Israel During 12-Day Iran Conflict,” Breaking Defense, July 1, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/new-missile-defenses-ew-tactics-aided-israel-during-12-day-iran-conflict/.
[12] Bill Greenwalt, “LUCAS: Rapid Warfighting Acquisition,” Defense Acquisition Substack, accessed March 9, 2026, https://defenseacquisition.substack.com/p/lucas-rapid-warfighting-acquisition.
[13] Audrey MacAlpine, “‘We Know Shaheds’: Ukraine Touts Drone Expertise in US-Israel War with Iran,” Al Jazeera, March 6, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/6/we-know-shaheds-ukraine-touts-drone-expertise-in-us-israel-war-with-iran.
[14] Amanda Macias, “Iran’s Cheap Shahed-136 Drones Are Forcing the U.S. and Allies to Spend Heavily on Air Defenses,” CNBC, March 5, 2026, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/05/iran-shahed-136-drone-cost-air-defense-gulf-war-us-israel-gulf-scorpion-strike-centcom.html.
[15] Dylan Butts, “Iran’s Shahed Drone: How ‘the Poor Man’s Cruise Missile’ Is Shaping Tehran’s Retaliation,” CNBC, March 5, 2026, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/05/iran-shahed-drone-cost-air-defense-gulf-war-us-israel-gulf-scorpion-strike-centcom.html.
[16] Francesco Salesio Schiavi, “Ukraine’s Drone War Is Reshaping Gulf Defense,” Gulf International Forum, March 27, 2026, https://gulfif.org/ukraines-drone-war-is-reshaping-gulf-defense/.
[17] “VAMPIRE™ Counter-Unmanned Aerial System,” L3Harris Technologies, accessed March 9, 2026, https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/vampire; Emma Helfrich and Tyler Rogoway, “What the VAMPIRE Weapon System the U.S. Is Sending to Ukraine Can Actually Do,” The War Zone, August 26, 2022, https://www.twz.com/what-the-vampire-weapon-system-the-u-s-is-sending-to-ukraine-can-actually-do.
[18] “What Cost-Effective Options Do Gulf States Have to Counter the Drone Menace?,” Arab News, March 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2637563/middle-east.
[19] “Interceptor Crisis: Israel Days from Running Out of Arrow-3 as US THAAD Stocks Drain in Iran War, RUSI Warns ‘Years Needed to Rebuild,’” Defence Security Asia, March 26, 2026, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/israel-arrow3-thaad-shortage-iran-war-rusi-interceptor-crisis-2026/.
[20] “Iran’s Cheap Drones and the Cost of Air Defense,” The New York Times, March 4, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/04/business/iran-shahed-drones-missiles-us-war.html.
[21] CNN, “Russia Expands Production of Iranian-Designed Drones at Secret Factory,” CNN, August 8, 2025, accessed March 9, 2026, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/08/europe/russia-drone-factory-iran-intl.
[22] “Exclusive Focus: Geran-2 Kamikaze Drone, Russian Version of Iranian Shahed-136 Deployed in Ukraine,” Army Recognition, November 15, 2024, https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/exclusive-focus-geran-2-kamikaze-drone-russian-version-of-iranian-shahed-136-deployed-in-ukraine.
[23] “Geran-2 Kamikaze Drone: Russia’s Evolving Loitering Munition and Its Impact on Modern Warfare,” Ruavia, accessed March 9, 2026, https://ruavia.su/geran-2-kamikaze-drone-russias-evolving-loitering-munition-and-its-impact-on-modern-warfar.
[24] “LUCAS Drone vs Shahed-136,” Defense Feeds, accessed March 9, 2026, https://defensefeeds.com/analysis/weapons/lucas-drone-vs-shahed-136/.
[25] “FLM-136: America’s Cheap Iran-Designed Shahed Drone Clone,” Euronews, March 10, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/2026/03/10/flm-136-americas-cheap-iran-designed-shahed-drone-clone.
