Abstract: New weapon systems, like drones, challenge the ability of tanks to manoeuvre on the battlefield, thereby influencing the conduct of operations by mechanised forces. In the 21st century, tank forces must persist in both attritional and manoeuvre warfare. Therefore, new design features, alongside updated tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), must be introduced for tanks in Western armies.

Problem statement: How can tanks be enabled to persist in attritional surroundings and conduct manoeuvre operations on the modern battlefield?

So what?: The military-industrial complex needs to take action concerning the implementation of new tank design features to counter new anti-tank weapons (e.g., drones and loitering munitions). Furthermore, current tactical parameters (e.g., the extent of assembly areas) must be adapted and integrated into army regulations and the training of non-commissioned officers and officers.

Protection, Firepower, Mobility

At first glance, it appears that the role of tanks, as manoeuvre-enabling weapons, has not changed since their deployment in the First World War. No land weapon system provides the perfectly balanced combination of protection, firepower, and mobility as the tank does. However, hindrances and challenges to mobility have steadily increased over the last two decades. The rapid development of drones and long-range precision artillery munitions, among other modern military technologies, make a compelling case for rethinking the traditional approaches to designing and using tanks.

Taking the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020) and the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022 onwards) as cases in point, it is clear that tank units find themselves shuttling between manoeuvre and attritional warfare. For example, while the manoeuvre of mechanised forces could be seen in the Ukrainian summer offensives of 2022 and 2023, the use of tanks in attritional warfare can be observed in the omnipresent battles for trenches and hedgerows all over the eastern and southern frontlines in Ukraine today.[1]

Evolution of the Modern Battlefield

When examining recent (Second Nagorno-Karabakh War) or current (Russo-Ukrainian War) conflicts closely, one can observe a shift in a tank’s tasks and purpose on the battlefield and the need to evolve its capabilities (i.e., incorporate new design features).

Unmanned Systems are an Integral Part of Modern Warfare

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was the first conflict to have featured the excessive use of drones in conventional warfare. As Antal (2022) noted, “The combination of HOTL [human on the loop] and HOOTL [human out of the loop] systems, combined with the manoeuvre of conventional forces, established a tempo of battle that overwhelmed the Armenians. Azerbaijan set the conditions with robotic systems, then finished the fight with soldiers.”[2] Unmanned systems, first and foremost drones, also show their impact on the Ukrainian battlefield and pose a serious threat to tanks, as protection systems have not been improved adequately.[3]

Unmanned systems, first and foremost drones, also show their impact on the Ukrainian battlefield and pose a serious threat to tanks, as protection systems have not been improved adequately.

The Battlespace is Transparent

Directly linked to the excessive use of unmanned (aerial) systems are improved capabilities in sensing and reconnoitring, rendering today’s battlefields virtually fully transparent. In this respect, Antal stated, “Sensors, the most important ones mounted in satellites, aircraft and UAVs, gave the Azerbaijani military a clear, 24-hour, unblinking view of the battlespace. Optical, thermal and electronic sensors identified Armenian positions that were camouflaged in the traditional way.”[4] Facing an enemy force that can not only sense objects on the battlefield but also identify them and choose adequate countermeasures necessitates improving current camouflage and protection methods for armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs).

Furthermore, tank manoeuvres are severely restricted as every tactical movement, even the assembly of forces prior to an attack, is detected, assessed, and countered with direct and indirect fire.[5]

War is Conducted at Hyper Speed

Antal notes, “During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the speed of engagements […] happened as fast as the machines could sense, identify and strike. […] Using unmanned systems, the kill-chain sped up.”[6] The extensive use of robotic systems together with increased computing and network capabilities (e.g., Ukraine’s GIS Arta[7]) make it necessary to support human operators by using new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), which help swiftly analyse (sensor—) data and speed up target engagement, as well as choose the appropriate protection measures for own forces.

The Number of Tasks for Tanks Has Increased

With tank-on-tank combat being relatively rare in Ukraine, a general shift of a tank’s tasks on the battlefield can be noticed (at least, in an attritional context). Used primarily as a platform for indirect fire (i.e., to close gaps if artillery units are not available) and an element to create breaches in the enemy’s defence for follow-up infantry forces, the actual use of tanks as a mobile striking force is severely limited.[8] Mechanised forces must be massed and further employed in combat formations to bring firepower into effect and create breakthroughs. However, as seen in Ukraine, the high density of enemy sensors (and, thereby, high-level reconnaissance by the enemy), as well as the permanent scarcity of infantry units (necessary for close-range protection of tanks), hamper the massing of mechanised forces. Therefore, the tactics and deployment of AFVs must be rethought and adapted to serve the needs of both attritional and (classical) manoeuvre warfare.

Mechanised forces must be massed and further employed in combat formations to bring firepower into effect and create breakthroughs.

Innovating Tank Designs for Manoeuvrability on Modern Battlefields

Throughout the history of the tank, different factors have determined its design. Beginning with the first tanks (Generations 1 and 2) of the First and Second World War, which simply combined the elements of mobility, protection, and firepower (often referred to as the “holy trinity” of tank forces), tanks’ capabilities gradually increased as new tactical requirements and technological developments emerged.

Although every nation has a slightly different approach, it is clear that, during the Cold War, tank designs globally were enhanced with computing (e.g., fire-control systems), reliability/maintainability (e.g., modularity for fast replacement of damaged parts) and human factors (e.g., increased protection for the crew members through external ammunition storage, improved ergonomics, etc.). The outcome of these design imperatives is evident in the kind of tanks seen on today’s battlefields (Generations 3 and 4): Leopard 1 and 2, T-72, Abrams, or the Merkava.[9] However, this hexagon of requirements is no longer sufficient on future battlefields as new technologies (e.g., drone technology, artificial intelligence, etc.) have changed the game. Current tank designs can no longer be upgraded to make them capable of facing future challenges. What is needed is another evolution— the fifth generation of tanks.[10]
A Generation-5 tank will have to fulfil nine specific requirements (built around the “holy trinity” as its foundation) to compete on future battlefields.[11]

Enhanced Mobility and Reliability

The mobility of future tanks will be determined by not only the sheer power of their engines or power-to-weight ratios but also the integration of new engine technology, particularly the use of electric motors. A Generation-5 tank could be electrically driven or, at the minimum, run on a hybrid combustion/electrical engine.[13] This would open up possibilities for the tactical use of tanks, as electrical engines not only require lesser maintenance (compared to combustion engines) but also emit significantly less sound, making it possible for tanks to mask their movements (e.g., during reconnaissance missions or when approaching an objective).
The downside, however, will be an increased need for logistical support, especially fuel/electricity supply. As of today, charging electric vehicle batteries requires a remarkable amount of time and infrastructural resources. This problem needs to be solved either via a highly mobile, high-capacity charging station (i.e., a “charger truck”) or the ability to exchange tanks’ batteries within a short amount of time and, preferably, without the crew having to leave the vehicle (i.e., a “battery carrier and exchange truck”). Regardless of how this challenge is met, the need for electrical propulsion for a future tank, at least in a hybrid version, is evident due to its tactical benefits.
To enhance the mobility of tanks further, they need to be serviceable over long timeframes (>1 week) without extensive maintenance measures to manoeuvre at an operational depth, overcome enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, and threaten enemy command and control (C2)-elements.[14] This could be achieved by new forms of power packs (as described above), robust electrics within the tank, and using highly durable materials for parts prone to wear and tear (e.g., tracks and sprocket wheels).

A Generation-5 tank could be electrically driven or, at the minimum, run on a hybrid combustion/electrical engine.

Enhanced Firepower

Given the steadily increasing level of protection of enemy AFVs and maxed-out capabilities of the NATO-standard 120 mm cannon, a new way of thinking about firepower is the need of the hour. Most importantly, a tank must still be able to provide direct fire (to fulfil its classical role as an anti-tank weapon as well as against field fortifications and infantry). Therefore, cannons with calibres ranging from 140 mm (e.g., the German-French ASCALON[15]) up to 152 mm (e.g., Russian 2A83, planned as an upgrade for the T-14 Armata[16]) are already being developed in defence industries. A single human loader can no longer handle ammunition for such calibres due to the length (>1 m) and weight (>40 kg/round).[17] Hence, an automated loader will have to replace the human loader, using compact two-piece ammunition (propellant charge and shell), as used by Russian T-models, but preferably in storage outside the tank (e.g., in the rear end of the turret). Using such machinery, the reload times could be boosted up to 14 rounds/minute, bringing the reduced kill chain to full effect.[18]

Cannons with calibres ranging from 140 mm up to 152 mm are already being developed in defence industries.

That said, a Generation-5 tank must be capable of providing indirect fire in addition to direct fire. This function is currently unavailable in most Western tanks but is needed (as seen in Ukraine) to fill short-range artillery shortages (especially in attritional surroundings).[19] It opens the possibility of artillery support on lower tactical levels (i.e., company- and battalion-level) during a combat situation wherein the need for support arises. Still, the joint fires of the higher echelon are unavailable. This function can be implemented by simply adapting the gunner’s sights and providing suitable ammunition (e.g., high explosive [HE]—and top attack rounds).

To complement indirect fire capabilities, future tanks must fire guided missiles to attack targets exceeding the effective firing range of the main cannon. This technology is already used by some modern IFVs (e.g., SPz PUMA[20]), and could be implemented as either a gun-launched anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) or an external tube-launched ATGM for tanks. Therefore, the missile’s non-line-of-sight (NLOS) capability to assign targets via a distant spotter or drone is crucial. ATGMs like the Israeli “Spike NLOS”, with an effective range of up to 25 km, could fulfil this requirement.[21]

By providing precise direct fire, short-range indirect fire, and long-range indirect fire, tanks regain their relevance as mobile and protected fire platforms on the battlefield.

Enhanced Protection

The protection of a Generation-5 tank must primarily comprise measures against direct fire and top-attack weapons, including drones. The traditional method of countering direct fire with thick layers of (composite) armour is reaching its technical limit, as this increases the tank’s weight, thereby reducing its mobility. Further improvement of protection is only possible through added explosive reactive armour (ERA) against shaped charges (HEAT) and armour piercing rounds (APFSDS).[22]

At the moment, ERA is usually applied in the form of plates or small “bricks” onto the surface of the tank, leaving gaps without protection. Future tanks will solve this problem by combining ERA as a basic layer of the classical (composite) armour, forming a continuous layer of reactive armour around the tank (as already used by the Russian T-14 and its “Malachit”-armour[23]). In case of a hit, the affected part of the armour is replaced, making a modular structure of the tanks outside indispensable. To compete in APFSDS rounds, the ERA needs to be further developed. Ukrainian “NOZH”-ERA, for example, contains small-shaped charges that can cut the dart penetrator before it impacts the actual armour.[24]

Future tanks will solve this problem by combining ERA as a basic layer of the classical (composite) armour, forming a continuous layer of reactive armour around the tank.

By using improved ERA against direct fire, future tanks can reduce their classical (composite) armour and, thereby, their weight (or, at least, stagnate at the current level).

The second part of protection concerns top-attack weapons, including drones. The top of a tank is traditionally less armoured than its front or side, making it particularly vulnerable to ATGMs and, as evident in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Russo-Ukrainian War, to drones.

As a first step, Russian (and Ukrainian) troops started applying improvised slat armour to their turret tops (“cope cages”) to counter incoming threats from above. These proved so effective against drones that the Russian manufacturer UVZ began fitting them as basic parts on their new and refurbished tanks.[26] This kind of armour’s development reached its climax in the use of “turtle tanks”—AFVs that are fully covered in an additional plate or slat armour, forming a shed- or turtle-like shape. Though effective, the downside of this kind of protection against top-attack weapons is that it impacts the function of tanks. With growing dimensions, manoeuvrability in confined spaces (e.g., wooden or urban areas as in Western Europe) is limited. In the extreme case of the turtle tank, traversing the turret is no longer possible due to the plate armour covering the tank, seriously reducing its scope of observation and field of fire. Furthermore, slat armour changes the silhouette of a tank, making it larger and, therefore, harder to conceal.

Russian (and Ukrainian) troops started applying improvised slat armour to their turret tops to counter incoming threats from above.

The solution for countering the top attack and, especially, the drone threat in the long term may, therefore, not lie in slat armour but rather in hard- and soft-kill active protection systems (APS) and electronic warfare (EW) jammers combined with a very short-range air defence (VSHORAD) system. EW-jammers are already used on AFVs to block the frequencies used to control drones in a certain radius around the vehicle. Russia recently unveiled a portable tank-mounted jammer (“Volnorez”), which operates in a spectrum of 900-3000 MHz, providing 360° protection of remote-controlled aerial vehicles within a range of about 1km. It also used other comparable systems successfully in the Ukrainian war.[28] However, drone technology and anti-EW measures are constantly evolving, and some drones use inertial navigation systems, rendering jammers ineffective. This supports the necessity of further hard—and soft-kill capabilities. The challenge for current hard-kill APS, like Iron Fist, Trophy (both Israeli), or Arena (Russian), is that their effective range is vertically limited, making it impossible to intercept objects coming from above.[29] This could be solved with effectors pointing skywards, obliging the crew to keep the hatches always closed. As a first step to counter the drone threat, remote-controlled weapon stations (RCWS, e.g., machine guns) with the ability to autonomously acquire and neutralise targets could be a feasible option.

The challenge for current hard-kill APS, like Iron Fist, Trophy, or Arena, is that their effective range is vertically limited, making it impossible to intercept objects coming from above.

Soft-kill capabilities are required to round off the protection systems of a Generation-5 tank. Systems like Shtora-1 (Russia) or MUSS (Germany) can counter ATGMs via infrared (IR) beams and smoke screens but face the same problem as their hard-kill counterparts in being vertically restricted and, therefore, unusable against drones.[30], [31] Concerning the high mobility of UAVs, a countermeasure using smoke seems inadequate. A solution using high-powered lamps or lasers to dazzle the optical instruments of an incoming (FPV-)drone may be more suitable.

To sum up, the protection of future tanks must comprise a (modern form of) classical armour, hard- and soft-kill, and EW measures (the latter requirement could also be fulfilled by separate vehicles which may be part of the company headquarters). However, the best protection for a tank is undetectability, which is where signature management comes in.

Signature Management

Camouflage in the 21st century requires reducing signatures throughout the electromagnetic spectrum, especially in the fields of radar, IR, and optical frequencies. A full spectrum, multi-domain effort with active and passive systems is needed to render a tank difficult to locate and even harder to target. These technologies include:

• Future tanks with low profiles and advanced surface technologies (e.g., stealth technologies of aircraft) to reduce their radar cross-section and thermal signature. To lower acoustic emissions, new forms of power packs (see chapter “Enhanced Mobility”) in combination with noise-reduced (rubber-) tracks could be used;
• Multispectral camouflage nets, already in use with armies globally (e.g., BARRACUDA, Nakidka, etc.), can significantly reduce the IR signature of a tank.[32] Including such IR- and radar-absorbing materials in the tank’s surface (e.g., in its paint or as a layer of its armour) is, therefore, mandatory. However, the function of optically distorting the tank’s profile cannot be replaced simply by paint, making camouflage nets indispensable in the future as well;
• Active camouflage systems, like colour-changing materials, can help fully merge a tank with its surroundings. Prototypes in the area of IR-merging have already been tested: BAE’s “ADAPTIV”-system uses around 1000 Peltier panels, which can be either heated or cooled using electricity to distort a vehicle’s IR signature or even deceive sensors by creating different vehicle shapes.[33] Doing the same with the optical signature (i.e., creating a “chameleon tank”) is part of ongoing research. Using metamaterials to manipulate the index of light refraction could be the next step for a Generation-5 tank, as this may help in achieving near-invisibility and fully blending in with surroundings;[34] and

• Finally, with the increased use of communication systems (e.g., radio and battle management systems [BMS]) on the battlefield, the masking of friendly signals and data links will be highly important in the future. This requires a multitude of specialised weapon systems to effectively protect friendly emissions or jam those of the enemy, barrage enemy sensors with false readings, or directly attack the enemy’s EW capabilities, effectively requiring a separate branch in the army to take up this task. However, AFVs may function as a relay for EW measures in the future, as they are highly protected assets close to the frontline.

Enhanced Computing Power, AI and Human Factors

Computer systems have undergone a rapid evolution over the last decades, significantly improving their capabilities and fields of application, including for AFVs. With further research and development, it is a matter of time before artificial intelligence (AI) finds its way to future tank forces’ command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems. AI offers the possibility to simultaneously gather, analyse and disseminate information from various sensors. This significantly reduces the burden for a tank commander confronted with all this information and accelerates the kill chain. It could help identify targets within a permanent, sensor-based 360° picture of the tank’s surroundings, lock on, choose the adequate effector and hit the enemy’s weakest spot with maximum hit probability.

In a HOTL (human on the loop) approach, the gunner’s position could be completely replaced by an AI system that runs through the kill chain until the final verification and command to fire by a human operator (tank commander) is given.[36] If provided with appropriate firepower, future tanks could engage multiple targets while performing adequate measures for masking their movement, provided that AI sufficiently supports the human operator. Systems like “Skynode” (used for drones) are already trying to implement these AI-based technologies, and they will certainly be found in future tanks as well.[37]

Systems like “Skynode” are already trying to implement these AI-based technologies, and they will certainly be found in future tanks as well.

Although technically possible, a HOOTL (human out of the loop) system is currently not the focus of development due to ethical concerns.[38]

Networking and Robotic Systems

Combined arms warfare will remain the fundamental pillar of wars in the 21st century, leading to the requirement of connectivity and networking between different weapon systems. The ability to receive, analyse and distribute information from sensors not only of a single vehicle but from various elements on the battlefield (including those in the air, e.g., UAV-reconnaissance pictures) will enhance situational awareness and improve commanders’ assessments. The vast amount of information that will be interchanged between vehicles should be refined and condensed (using AI) and provided via a reliable BMS to support the commander in his decision-making process.[39]

Apart from such a multi-domain BMS, future tanks must be able to establish networks for attached unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). With current technologies, it may be difficult to incorporate enhanced firepower, active/passive protection measures and signature masking all in a single tank. Therefore, a multi-platform concept could replace the present main battle tank (MBT) concept. As technology improves and the number of soldiers dwindles in Western countries (e.g., due to low birth rates), it can be expected that future tank platoons will consist of one manned and several unmanned platforms. These robotic wingmen need to be commanded (not controlled) and able to follow orders and simple battle drills given by a human operator.[40]

UGVs will represent an integral part of future tank formations, beginning at the platoon level, either in high-risk operations (e.g. reconnaissance tasks) or to provide additional firepower on the battlefield. This is provided that sufficient and reliable networking capabilities are available for the (manned) commander’s tank.

Russia has already experimented with unmanned tanks in Ukraine (URAN-9) with mixed but promising results.[41] Furthermore, the German-French MGCS project (aiming to replace current European MBTs) plans a multi-platform solution for future tanks, comprising a manned version (direct fire and C2) as well as three attached UGVs (direct fire, indirect fire, and support vehicle), forming a tank platoon. The project is expected to present its first results in the 2040s.[42]

Tank Production and Procurement

Tank procurement has always balanced military needs and political and financial will. A Generation-5 tank will have a higher price per unit than current MBT models (Leopard 2A8: ca. 18m €/unit[44]). However, compromising technical capabilities to reduce costs would be unwise, as the end product would be similarly unsustainable as the Generation 3 or 4 tanks. It is, therefore, imperative for political actors to provide sufficient financial means for future tank procurements.
The process of designing a new tank should be performed in trans-national initiatives (e.g., EU’s EDIP or NATO’s DIANA[45]) to reduce research and development costs, merge nations’ various (industrial) capabilities, and promote structural unity by using a one-tank model, thereby simplifying logistics and maintenance. Previous tank projects (e.g., the German-American concept MBT-70) failed due to national interests and caveats. By emphasising the benefits of transnational projects (as described above) and promoting the value added for the industries involved in the production, governments could be more inclined to participate in such a venture. At the very least, the projects of various nations could be compared in a selection process (done by a transnational committee), and the winning system could be distributed via government-to-government sales.

Tank production must start during peacetime so that the requirements for both battalions or brigades and reserves are fulfilled. Defence industries are primary targets in a hybrid or full-scale war, making it necessary to have a buffer on equipment to replace losses instantly and enough resources to withstand an attritional war over a longer period. Russia, for example, is expected to produce around 80 pieces of its most modern tank (T-90M) by the end of 2024, all while having the choice of falling back on the arsenals of the Soviet era. In contrast, the output of Western defence industries can be found somewhere in the low double-digit area.[46] The defence industries need high-volume/large-quantity procurement orders to ramp up production while keeping the costs per unit low. These procurement orders, however, require strategic foresight and a financial foundation from political actors and governments.

Tank production must start during peacetime so that the requirements for both battalions or brigades and reserves are fulfilled.

Tactics, Logistics and Organisation

The battlefields of Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine raise the question of technological improvement and tactical, logistical, and organisational adaptations.

Necessary Tactical Adaptations

The battlefields of the 21st century are saturated with drones, making them transparent and undetectable movements almost impossible. Therefore, the order of the day for future battles is dispersion on all levels. Dispersion will not prevent being hit by enemy (indirect or precision) fire, but it will significantly reduce losses of own forces.
Current tactical handbooks require tank companies to operate in assembly areas (AA) with an extent of ca. 2-3 x 2-3 km. These numbers need to be extended to give a company at least 5×5 km of space to disperse its vehicles and keep its signature low. Securing the company must then be handled by drones (to form a permanent observation screen) and a mobile reserve element (of the tank battalion) to counter upcoming threats.

During an attack, attack positions (ATKs) need to be set up at a far greater distance from the line of departure (LD) than used today (i.e., 40+ km instead of 6-10 km). This is necessary to reduce the drone threat (most of the drones used by contemporary land forces have an average range of 10-20 km). The company will then need to use several routes for the advance, pulling its forces together just before taking the objective (OBJ), and attacking at high speed. Maximum dispersion and security for own forces is thus achieved while keeping up the impetus of tanks as a striking force. However, a powerful and reliable BMS for platoon and company commanders will be required to enable the successful command and control of such a highly dispersed tank company in the future.

Necessary Adaptions in Logistics

Dispersion is also the order of the day for logistical elements and combat units. Furthermore, it is of the utmost importance to reduce the dwell time of support vehicles in risk zones (close to combat zones), as they are primary targets for drones and precision fire.

In defensive operations, one way to solve the need for dispersion and reduced exposure times could be to distribute supplies in small packages within a “logistical field” (with an extent of 5-10 x 5-10 km) instead of concentrating the supplies at one point. These supply packages could be delivered during the night, with the positions of the boxes or containers being marked in a BMS so that the tank company could then resupply within the logistical field while preserving a high level of dispersion. Another way, especially in dynamic operations like the attack or retrograde, could be to transport certain goods, such as ammunition or rations, directly via drones from a logistical base of the battalion (70 km+ behind the frontline) to the troops.

In defensive operations, one way to solve the need for dispersion and reduced exposure times could be to distribute supplies in small packages within a “logistical field” instead of concentrating the supplies at one point.

Drones could also improve the transport of wounded soldiers, as they can land close to a hit vehicle or wounded soldier and create an ambulance exchange point (AXP). The Bundeswehr’s first research programs (project “Grille”) are promising.[48]

Organisation of Tank Forces

In addition to future tank concepts and multi-platform solutions, tank companies must comprise at least two platoons to conduct fire and manoeuvre (by forming a fire support and a manoeuvre element). Additional tank platoons (comprising UGVs, improving the company’s firepower and strike capabilities) will also be thinkable in the future.
Further, elements like VSHORAD systems, a drone reconnaissance squad (part of the company headquarters), and rudimental engineering capabilities are needed to strengthen tank companies’ independent deployment and manoeuvrability. The question of which (weapon—) capabilities are given to the company and which capabilities should remain at the battalion level requires a separate discussion.

Obsolete? Or Uncontested?

Since their introduction on the First World War’s battlefields, tanks have continuously evolved. Often declared an obsolete weapon, tanks adapted to new threats and remained the uncontested weapon system of ground forces, delivering mobility, protection, and firepower in a unique way. The same need for adaptation applies to modern times, as new weapons like drones emerge and pose a serious threat to today’s tanks and their deployment on the battlefield. With current AFV models being at their limit regarding further improvement, a new generation of tanks (Generation 5) must be designed. Tanks must incorporate modern technologies, such as AI and UGV-/networking capabilities, to counter present and future threats, and take the classical functions of mobility, protection and firepower to new levels.

Technical developments are always accompanied by tactical, logistical and organisational adaptations. Following the lessons of current conflicts, dispersion can be marked as the order of the day. By keeping forces widely spread and linking them up just before the advance to contact, tank forces’ striking power and manoeuvrability could be restored while maintaining high protection. Current logistical procedures will have to implement dispersion as a general principle, as well as use UGVs to enhance own capabilities. Finally, concerning the organisation of tank companies, a structure of at least two platoons with attached combat support elements is necessary for facilitating manoeuvre and striking independently or as part of the tank battalion.

A comprehensive approach is required to implement the suggestions and possible solutions. First, defence industries need to boost their research and innovation sectors (possibly backed by government funding) to accelerate the development of new tank models (Generation 5). The chosen model’s production and procurement must start immediately (during peacetime). Second, the current education of officers and non-commissioned officers needs to be adapted, especially concerning countering new threats and implementing new (tank design-) assets. Lastly, tank units must undertake practical training and exercises using the newly developed technology. The abovementioned points require adequate time and financial funding, both of which could be critical for transforming tank units.

A comprehensive approach is required to implement the suggestions and possible solutions.

Indeed, there are limitations. Firstly, the information used in this article is based on open-source data. Therefore, especially concerning the technical proposals/recommendations for future tanks, current (and thus secret) arms manufacturers’ developments could not be considered and reviewed. Secondly, the suggestions for adaptations in tank tactics presented in this paper are restricted to the platoon and company level, excluding the effects of lower echelons on the battalion or brigade level. As an example, if the supply chain of a tank company is changed to counter modern threats like drones, the logistics of the tank battalion, brigade and divisional level need to be adapted, too. Thirdly, as the article primarily examines technical and tactical aspects of future tank units, human factors and how soldiers need to adapt to new design features are not the focus of the analysis.

Hence, future research could concentrate on how the current training of officers and non-commissioned officers should be adapted to meet the requirements of next-generation tank units (e.g., modifications of the curriculum). Another question that could be examined is how tank units could bridge the time until new tanks are introduced and counter modern threats with present means. Moreover, as this paper was topically limited to tank forces, the question of how manoeuvre could be restored for other branches (e.g., mechanised infantry) and how combined arms warfare could be conducted in the future may be of interest to scholars in this field.

To sum up, modern technologies have changed the battlefield and severely made manoeuvre for tanks difficult. The suggestions and possible solutions presented in this paper should be seen as an incentive for further action of defence ministries and industries as well as military staff so that tanks will be able to again live up to General Guderian’s (1937) quote: “Whenever in future wars a battle is fought, armoured troops will play the decisive role.”[50]

 

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Stefan Fürst, First Lieutenant (OF-1), OC 1.PzKp/PzB14; research interests: military history, tank technology, and armoured warfare. The views contained in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the views of the Austrian Armed Forces or the Federal Ministry of Defence.

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[1] Jack Watling et al., Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations 2022-23 (RUSI, 2024), 7.

[2] John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Casemate Publishers, 2022), 141.

[3] “How Could a Drone Blow Up a Tank?,” Forbes, accessed August 18, 2024, https://shorturl.at/JgtNj.

[4] John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Casemate Publishers, 2022), 133.

[5] Markus Reisner, “Kamikazedrohnen gegen Panzer,” interview by Lars Lange, Telepolis, accessed August 18, 2024, https://shorturl.at/Xl3Zj.

[6] John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Casemate Publishers, 2022), 130.

[7] “GIS ARTA,” GIS ARTA, accessed August 18, 2024, https://gisarta.org/en/.

[8] Jack Watling et al., Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion in Ukraine (RUSI, 2023), 15-17.

[9] John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Casemate Publishers, 2022), 88.

[10] “Panther/KF 51, rethinking the MBT,” EDR-online, accessed August 18, 2024, https://shorturl.at/h7kGd.

[11] John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Casemate Publishers, 2022), 87.

[12] Basic layout: John Antal, 7 Seconds To Die (Casemate Publishers, 2020), 87, modified by the author. Additional pictures: “Tiger 131,” Tank Museum Bovington, accessed August 18, 2024, https://shorturl.at/VVAzD; “Leopard 2A8,” Spartanat Magazine, accessed August 18, 2024, https://shorturl.at/LtrhV; “Future Tank Concept,” Pinterest, accessed August 18, 2024, https://shorturl.at/QcEue.

[13] “Future Tanks Could Be Powered by Electricity,” Popular Mechanics, accessed August 18, 2024, https://shorturl.at/UEAt1.

[14] John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Casemate Publishers, 2022), 90.

[15] “ASCALON: Nexter’s solution for the MGCS main gun,” EDR-online, accessed August 18, 2024, https://www.edrmagazine.eu/ascalon-nexters-solution-for-the-mgcs-main-gun.

[16] “Overkill: Of 152mm cannons on Russian MBTs,” Armored Warfare, accessed August 18, 2024, https://t.ly/I_0t_.

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[18] John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Casemate Publishers, 2022), 90-91.

[19] Jack Watling et al., Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion in Ukraine (RUSI, 2023), 15.

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[22] Wolfgang Schneider, Kampfpanzer Leopard 2 (Motorbuch Verlag, 2024), 197.

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[33] John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Casemate Publishers, 2022), 105-107.

[34] Ibid.,, 108-110.

[35] “ADAPTIV,” BAE Systems, accessed August 18, 2024, https://shorturl.at/2jVzw.

[36] Wolfgang Schneider, Kampfpanzer Leopard 2 (Motorbuch Verlag, 2024), 200.

[37] “Destroying Russian Tanks Is Just The Start For U.S. AI Drone Autopilot,” Forbes, accessed August 18, 2024, https://rb.gy/jthelq.

[38] Ibid.

[39] John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Casemate Publishers, 2022), 90.

[40] Ibid.

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[47] “Distances and Extents for Future Battles”, created by the author.

[48] “Eine Rettungsdrohne für Verwundete- Die Grille,“ Bundeswehr, accessed August 18, 2024, https://shorturl.at/WI0J9.

[49] “Future Tank Company Structure”, created by the author.

[50] Heinz Guderian, Achtung- Panzer! (Traugott Bautz, 2018), 269.