Abstract: Traditionally, ideal-typical officers are conservative and right-leaning both in terms of value-based and redistribution policies. In spite of the appearance of a new type of conservatism, our findings indicate that this is still the case: Intrinsic motivation is strongest among cadets whose personal values align with classical conservatism.

Problem statement: In a time when the armed forces are trying to expand their recruitment pool in competition with other public and private organisations, which type of values should future military leaders embrace?      

So what?: Provided that strong intrinsic motivation makes it easier to maintain employees, the findings suggest that recruitment screening could benefit from taking applicants’ personal values into consideration. However, this also raises the question of whether the values of those most likely to stay are also the values that should represent the organisation.

Demographics as a Challenge

With the reappearance of defence issues across Europe, questions of soldier recruitment and retention have also entered the political agenda. The number of potential recruits is shrinking because the European populations are ageing. Politicians may be calling for more active-duty personnel. Still, the Armed Forces are fishing in the same pond as other public and private organisations, competing for the same available, competent, and willing servicemen- and women.[1] To “catch” and maintain the right people, military organisations need to consider the motivation of their future personnel.

The Armed Forces are fishing in the same pond as other public and private organisations, competing for the same available, competent, and willing servicemen- and women.

It is easy to see how self-sacrifice can be regarded as a core military quality and how it can be expected to correlate strongly with traditional conservative norms. Thus, following Inglehart’s classical distinction between ‘materialist’ and ‘post-materialist’ positions,[2] cadets with a high degree of self-sacrifice motivation ought to lean towards the right regarding value-based and redistribution policies. However, in light of the upheaval of the European political landscape, it is worth inquiring whether this is about to change: Traditionally, officers are perceived as predominantly conservative.[3] Is this still the case or are modern officers different? After all, it is not only the war in Ukraine that has changed our perspectives over the years. So does the notion of what conservative values entail. Accordingly, this article examines whether the appearance of what has been seen as the ‘new right’, a new constellation of values linking social awareness with a traditional norm-based conservatism, may also be seen as challenging the traditional conservatives’ monopoly of defence readiness.

Self-Sacrifice as Intrinsic Motivation

Self-sacrifice is a particular type of intrinsic motivation. Initially coined by Richard Ryan and Edward Deci, intrinsic motivation signifies the willingness to act because doing that simply makes you feel good.[4] Conceptually, it is often understood in opposition to “extrinsic motivation”. If you are extrinsically motivated, the reward is not linked directly to the action. Instead, it is given as either a payment or compensation, typically in the form of money or material goods, but social recognition or promotion may also count as extrinsic drivers. Yet, as emphasised by Ryan and Deci, it is more accurate to perceive the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as a difference in degree rather than as a difference in kind.[5] This is also substantiated by studies showing that sometimes intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can reinforce each other.[6]

Importantly, intrinsic motivation can also be seen as an umbrella term. Following Ryan and Deci’s definition, intrinsic motivation is easy to see as being purely about pleasure, “doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable”.[7] Yet, intrinsic motivation is not necessarily only about you. One of the most intensely studied concepts in modern Public Administration Research, “Public Service Motivation” (psm), is conceptualised as intrinsic as well and also altruistic.[8] Initially coined by James Perry,[9] psm is defined as “an individual’s orientation to delivering service to people to do good for others and society”.[10] In that respect, it is seen as having four subdimensions: Commitment to the public interest (cpi), compassion (com), attraction to policy making (atp) and self-sacrifice (SeSa). Here, the author focuses on the latter for two reasons. First, it is generally regarded as the “fuel” underlying other aspects of psm.[11] This makes sense as the willingness to put your own needs aside to serve the greater good can be seen as constituting a necessary condition for meaningfully serving others and society. Secondly, the concept is also particularly interesting in the context of military studies, where sacrifice is not only about inconvenience but potentially about giving up everything; ultimately about sacrificing your own life for the sake of society.

Self-sacrifice may be affected by several antecedents. What we focus on in this paper is the importance of personal values. Notably, we inquire about the “deal-typical” values, not the statistically dominant ones underlying this notion. This is because we are interested in the values characterising military servicemen–or women–who are willing to walk the extra mile to do something beyond what is normally expected. Traditionally, the military is seen as a conservative institution,[12] and following the idea that employees align their values with those of the organisation–through self-selection, through socialisation or because those who are not able to align leave[13]–military servicemembers have accordingly been predominantly conservative.[14] Moreover, and pivotal in this case, the ideal-typical soldier, bearing the values of the military and serving as an example for others, has also been the emblem of traditional conservatism.

The military is seen as a conservative institution, and following the idea that employees align their values with those of the organisation, military servicemembers have accordingly been predominantly conservative.

Inquiring about whether this expectation can still be substantiated may appear as the scientific equivalent of running through an open door. It is, however, worth keeping in mind that while conservatism focuses on maintaining things as they are, what it means to be conservative has always varied significantly. There are numerous subtypes of conservatism, and its relation to other ideological strands has also varied over time.[15] In the 19^th century, conservatism remained in staunch opposition to liberalism in terms of both individual freedom and economy. Granted, Otto von Bismarck famously succeeded in reaching out to the liberals in the critical phase of the establishment of the German Empire. However, his subsequent social reforms in the late 1870s led to a class with his ‘new’ allies and re-emphasised the two ideologies’ fundamentally different views of man and society. Christian Conservatism has remained sceptical regarding the potential dangers of untamed economic liberalism. On the other hand, the strongest proponents of untamed economic liberalism in the late 20^th century–Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan–both branded themselves as staunch conservatives.

Also, a new kind of conservatism has emerged in the past decades. In some ways, it points back to the original notion that institutions must be defended to preserve society against humankind’s faults—including the dangers linked to untamed economic freedom. In other ways, it is characterised by its opposition to sexual emancipation and especially by holding strong anti-immigration views.

Due to both historical reasons and the demands of parliamentary balance, the political systems’ adaptations of this new conservatism vary significantly across Western countries. The movement’s electoral appeal is, however, very difficult to ignore. Accordingly, it is also very difficult to ignore the fact that a large proportion of the military will share the views and values of this new type of conservatism.

Notably, this is not just a matter of representativeness but also of the characteristics and attraction of military institutions. First, geopolitical realities have led European countries to upgrade their military capacities, including launching new recruitment campaigns to increase the number of servicemembers or reinstall compulsory service. This means, by default, that more people, including those holding views aligning with the values of the new conservatives, will be joining the Armed Forces in the future, even if the proportion stays the same. Second, there is no guarantee that the proportion will stay the same. Notwithstanding any other views signifying this group, the will and perceived need to defend society remain a core characteristic of the new type of conservatism as well. For that reason, values characterising the new right will likely be more prevalent in the Armed Forces going onwards, even in democratic countries.

Whether this prospect constitutes a problem per se depends on a number of factors. What we focus on here is whether a particular constellation of values predicts the cadets’ reported self-sacrifice. If it is true that appeals to increase the defence readiness of the public resonate particularly well with those sharing the values of the new right, we may expect that to be the case for this group. This forms the background of our main hypothesis.

H1: Compared to other servicemembers, those whose personal values align with the views of the new conservatism are more likely to see Self-sacrifice as a main motivational driver.

This hypothesis is tested on a ceteris paribus basis. Thus, this analysis controls for sex, age, and recruitment background, as they all constitute potential confounders.

Methods

This hypothesis was tested using a dataset of over 100 Danish cadets who started at the Army and Air Force Officer Academies in 2018. In the context of European Defence policies, Denmark plays very little role, and in that respect, the findings in this study may not make it possible to infer directly from other contexts. That said, it is worth keeping in mind that Denmark constitutes a critical case when it comes to the part played by the new right. The influence of new right parties is still very controversial throughout Europe. In Denmark, however, the Danish People’s Party was allowed a key role in mainstream politics from the early 2000s. Moreover, the views it advocated – support for the welfare state and a tough stand on immigration – have been adopted by all the major mainstream parties since then.[16] Thus, when interpreting the results, it should be kept in mind that this value constellation, which may raise concerns elsewhere probably, appear as close to mainstream by these respondents.

The influence of new right parties is still very controversial throughout Europe.

The data analysed constitutes is a subset of a larger dataset collected from 2016 to 2023. While the main data are longitudinal, information concerning the cadets’ Public Service Motivation-values only allows cross-sectional analyses. While cadets only represent a subset of the military population, future officers are important because their views will characterise the Armed Forces in the future.

Self-sacrifice is measured using four items drawn from a set of validated and internationally recognised public service motivation questions.[17] These items address whether respondents are willing to put their own needs aside and suffer deprivation to serve the greater good. A factor analysis and a subsequent reliability test confirm that these four items are strongly correlated. The index has been recoded 0-1, where 0 represents the lowest possible, and 1 represents the highest possible score on the self-sacrifice scale.

The cadets’ personal values are measured by drawing on the distinction between materialist and postmaterialist values, coined by Ronald Inglehart.[18] Although Inglehart’s conceptualisation has been met with a lot of criticism, for instance, by Scott Flanegan,      advocating a different distinction between left-right values on the one hand and libertarian-authoritarian on the other,[19] the two frameworks correspond closely and without disregarding the initial critique, we refer to Inglehart’s terminology in the following. Materialist values are about redistribution, and in that sense, they align closely with the traditional political left and the traditional political right. If one sees it as important that economic goods are redistributed, one would be likely to be left-leaning on a material value scale. If one, on the other hand, prefers that the money stays in the pockets of the citizens, they would be right-leaning.These regard the views of economic equality and control of private investments through taxation and state interventions. A low score on the materialism-index indicates a strong embracement of redistribution (left-leaning). A high score, the opposite (right-leaning).

Postmaterialist values signify a different distinction between left and right. If you are left-leaning in a post-materialist sense, you embrace individual freedom and the right to self-expression. If you are right-leaning, you embrace the maintenance of existing norms and social order. Postmaterialist topics change over time. In recent years, the focus has especially been on immigration. Hence, in the reflective index we use to measure postmaterialism, three out of four items link to immigration issues, whereas the fourth regards the importance of traditional values in maintaining society. A high postmaterialism index score indicates a strong embracement of social norms (right-leaning). A low score, the opposite (left-leaning).

Postmaterialist values signify a different distinction between left and right. If you are left-leaning in a post-materialist sense, you embrace individual freedom and the right to self-expression. If you are right-leaning, you embrace the maintenance of existing norms and social order.

The value items were identified using a factor-analyses clearly showing two dimensions, a finding that was also supported by the subsequent test of the internal validity of each of these indices. Placed in a two-dimensional space, materialist and postmaterialist scales establish a “political space” with four quadrants. If you are left-leaning in terms of both materialist and postmaterialist values, you are likely to sympathise with the traditional socialist left. If you find yourself in the opposite quadrant, right-leaning in terms of both materialist and postmaterialist values, you would be more likely to embrace the values of the traditional – or perhaps the 20^th century – conservative, emphasising both the importance of economic autonomy and strong societal norms. In the lower-right quadrant, we find those liberal regarding both economy (right-leaning in terms of materialism) and personal rights (left-leaning in terms of post-materialism). Lastly, in the upper-left corner, we find the fourth constellation, right-leaning regarding social norms but left-leaning regarding redistribution, resembling the combination of values often associated with the new right.

Sex, age and enrolment background are all self-reported measures drawn from the survey. Sex is coded binarily (0 for men, 1 for women). Age is a continuous variable, and to test for enrolment background, we distinguish between three categories: Those who are enrolled solely based on their civilian merits (our reference category), those who enter the Armed Forces from the military, and those who have served before–either as conscripts or during deployment– and now return to pursue a career as officers after having achieved a civilian degree.

To test the hypothesis that those who embrace the values of the new right are also most likely to defend society, we will need to assess the combined effect of materialist and postmaterialist values on self-sacrifice. In other words, we must examine how postmaterialism moderates the effect of materialism (or vice versa). In practice, this is done by conducting a two-step multiple regression analysis. Step one examines the correlation between materialism and postmaterialism with self-sacrifice, controlling for sex, age and enrolment background. Step two then adds the interaction term–the product of the two main independent variables–while maintaining the other controls to ensure the findings are not confounded.

Findings

Model I shows how materialism correlates with self-sacrifice, controlled for postmaterialism and the other antecedent variables. While materialism here correlates negatively and significantly with self-sacrifice, postmaterialism does not appear to have any effect. The model’s explanatory power is quite low, as it only explains about three per cent of the variation in self-sacrifice.

When the interaction term is added in Model II, the explanatory power increases significantly (although it is still fairly low), and the strength, direction and significance of the main independent variable coefficients change substantially. Most importantly, the interaction effect is significant. This implies two things for our interpretation. First, this indicates that the main terms–the correlation coefficients of materialism and postmaterialism, respectively–cannot be interpreted independently of each other: The effects of materialism on self-sacrifice depends on the level of postmaterialism (and the effect of postmaterialism also depends on the level of materialism). Second, as a result of this interrelation, the operational signs of the effects may be different than they initially appear (they may change from negative to positive or vice-versa). For example, while the main effect of materialism on the propensity of self-sacrifice is still negative, the combined effect is reversed and becomes positive.

Thus, when interpreting the combined effect of the two value dimensions, we can say which groups are more and less likely to score high on self-sacrifice. Respondents scoring low on postmaterialist values (meaning those either in the lower left or the lower right quadrant) become less likely to embrace self-sacrifice as they move up–rightwards–on the materialism scale. In other words, respondents placed in the lower right quadrant – linked to classical liberalism–are less motivated by self-sacrifice than those placed in the lower left quadrant–linked to classical socialism.

Respondents scoring low on postmaterialist values become less likely to embrace self-sacrifice as they move up–rightwards–on the materialism scale.

Respondents scoring high on postmaterialist values (meaning those either in the upper left or the upper right quadrants) become more likely to embrace self-sacrifice as they move rightwards. In other words, the hypothesis is rejected. Based on our data, the notion of the classical conservative as the ideal-typical soldier seems to prevail: If you are both right-leaning in terms of materialism and right-leaning in terms of social order, you are more likely to regard the need to give up your own well-being for the benefit of society as a main motivational driver.

Classically Conservative

The cadets most likely to be selfless are classically conservative in the sense that they are right-leaning both in terms of materialism and post-materialism. Thus, the expectation that the new model army is signified by the new right cannot be supported. Leading back to the overall concern about recruitment challenges, the finding that self-sacrifice correlates with personal values – and thus seem to differ within the cadet population–still raises two questions worth considering.

Before addressing these, it might be worth recapitulating what the findings show: The personal values linked to the most selfless group combine economic liberalism with anti-immigration issues. Both sets of values are contested, and although Danish mainstream parties have adopted a tough stand on immigration, this issue, in particular, has been subject to intense debates during the past 25 years. Accordingly, neither of the value constellations is dominant in the general population. Moreover, as shown by the analyses, no constellation dominates this dataset. Still, these values characterise those most likely to see self-sacrifice as an important factor. In other words, a subset of the cadets differs, both in terms of values and motivation.

The personal values linked to the most selfless group combine economic liberalism with anti-immigration issues.

The first point worth considering regards the subset holding this constellation of personal values. Is it a problem that those most willing to give up their well-being for the greater good also seem to hold a particular–traditionally conservative–value constellation? On the one hand, this can, of course, be instrumental in designing recruitment campaigns to pinpoint those who are most likely to be motivated for the right reasons. On the other hand, this may be seen as a controversial step because it entails prioritising some values over others. Thus, it may add to the concerns raised by Morris Janowitz in opposition to Huntington that seeing military professionals as an example to others would ultimately lead to a “Praetorian” military institution, turning the officer corps into a state within the state.[20] Granted, a correlation only shows general trends. There may be exceptions to the rule. While cadets from this subset, on average, are more likely to be selfless, some are not, and vice versa. Still, showing this correlation demonstrates the continuous importance of being aware of Janowitz’ concerns.

The second point regards how we should view how we should view the other cadets in the light of these findings. Given that ‘their’ constellation of values does not correlate with the type of motivation which we would expect all military personnel to embrace, we may inquire whether they are in it for other reasons and whether we think of those reasons as valid. Moreover, and just as seriously, we may also inquire whether they will be accountable when service is needed.

This study has several advantages and some disadvantages. The data provides a unique look into the views of future officers, who will define the framework of the military professions in the years to come. Moreover, the analyses also provide valuable knowledge about the correlation between value domains and motivation. These findings raise important questions that need to be addressed within the Armed Forces and in defence politics–now and in the future- especially because the number of people serving is going to increase across Europe.

On the downside, it may not be possible to infer from findings based on a subsample of Danish cadets the realities of military institutions elsewhere. Moreover, although the results are fairly clear and the findings are significant, the moderate or even low explanatory power of the analyses suggests that self-sacrifice is also driven by factors other than the personal values we have focused on in this context.

 

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Morten Brænder is an Associate Professor in Political Science at Aarhus University and is affiliated with King Frederik’s Center for Public Leadership. His list of publications includes articles in Armed Forces & Society, Qualitative Psychology and Public Administration Review. Morten Brænder’s research centres on soldier motivation, officer education and the relationship between the military and society. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the Danish Armed Forces.

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[1] Nana A. A. Acheampong, 2021, “Reward Preferences of the Youngest Generation: Attracting, Recruiting, and Retaining Generation Z into Public Sector Organizations,” Compensation & Benefits Review 53, no. 2: 75-97, https://doi.org/10.1177/0886368720954803.

[2] Ronald Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson, 1999, “Measuring Postmaterialism,” American Political Science Review 93, no. 3: 665-677, https://doi.org/10.2307/2585581.

[3] Samuel Huntington, 1985, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

[4] Craig C. Pinder, 2008, Work Motivation in Organizational Behavior. New York: Psychology Press.

[5] Richard Ryan and Edward Deci, 2000, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation: Classic Definitions and New Directions,” Contemporary Educational Psychology 25: 54-67.

[6] Lotte B. Andersen and Thomas Pallesen, 2008, “Not Just for the Money? How Financial Incentives Affect the Number of Publications at Danish Research Institutions,” International Public Management Journal 11, no. 1: 28-47.

[7] Ibid.; Richard Ryan and Edward Deci, 2000, “Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: Classic definitions and new directions,” Contemporary Educational Psychology 25: 54-67.

[8] Jaclyn S. Piatak and Stephen B. Holt, 2020, “Prosocial Behaviors: A Matter of Altruism or Public Service Motivation?,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 30, no. 3: 504-518, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muz041.

[9] James L. Perry and Lois R. Wise, 1990, “The Motivational Bases of Public Service,” Public Administration Review 50, no. 3: 367-373.

[10] James L. Perry and Annie Hondeghem, eds, Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

[11] Sangmook Kim and Wouter Vandenabeele, 2010, “A Strategy for Building Public Service Motivation Research Internationally,” Public Administration Review 70, no. 5: 701-709.

[12] Samuel Huntington, 1985, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

[13] Amy L. Kristof, 1996, “Person-Organization Fit: An Integrative Review of Its Conceptualizations, Measurement, and Implications,” Personnel Psychology 49, no. 1: 1-49;

Benjamin Schneider, 1983, “Interactional Psychology and Organizational Behavior,” in: Research in Organizational Behavior 5: 1-31.

[14] Heidi A. Urben, 2021, Party, Politics, and the Post-9/11 Army, New York: Cambria Press.

[15] Kenneth Newton and Jan W. Van Deth, 2005, “Political Ideologies: Conservatism, Liberalism, Christian Democracy, and Socialism,” in: Foundations of Comparative Politics: Democracies of the Modern World, 241-262, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Newton.

[16] Anna-Sophie Heinze, 2022, “Dealing with the Populist Radical Right in Parliament: Mainstream Party Responses Toward the Alternative for Germany,” European Political Science Review 14, no. 3: 333-350, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773922000108; Mads H. Nicolaisen, 2024, “Normalizing and Absorbing the Radical Right: The Danish People’s Party,” in: Democratic Defence as Normal Politics, edited by Angela K. Bourne, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-60483-6_11.

[17] James L. Perry, 1996, “Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and Validity,” Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory 6, no. 1; Wouter Vandenabeele, 2008, “Development of a Public Service Motivation Measurement Scale: Corroboration and Extending Perry’s Measurement Instrument,” International Public Management Journal 11, no. 1: 143-167.

[18] Ronald Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson, 1999, “Measuring Postmaterialism,” American Political Science Review 93, no. 3: 665-677, https://doi.org/10.2307/2585581.

[19] Ronald Inglehart and Scott C. Flanagan, 1987, “Value Change in Industrial Societies,” American Political Science Review 81, no. 4: 1289-1319, https://doi.org/10.2307/1962590.

[20] Morris Janowitz, 1957, “Military Elites and the Study of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, no. 1: 9-18.