Abstract: France’s influence in its former Sub-Saharan African colonies has been slipping. Russia has been capitalising on popular anti-French sentiment, weak state security, and vulnerable infrastructure to advance its geopolitical goals on the continent. This is done through the use of the Wagner Group, a Russian-based Private Military Contractor (PMC), which has proved to be a veritable actor in international security. Per Neoclassical Realism, Wagner is the child of the Russian state’s view of global politics. Thus, Wagner has been created as a sustainable alternative to meet Russian foreign policy objectives without directly using Russian forces.
Problem statement: How does the Wagner Group advance Russian foreign policy objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa?
So what?: Wagner’s actions and its consequences are part of a greater trend not just in Africa, but in many conflict-torn countries that turn to alternative international partners for securitisation and economic cooperation. For a situation this grandiose, there is no single answer. The most effective solution is to target Wagner’s and associates’ persistent expansionism with sanctions and other restrictions while encouraging the use of traditional, less partisan security partners, such as the United Nations.
Source: shutterstock.com/Fly of Swallow Studio
A Change in Africa…
France’s influence in its former Sub-Saharan African colonies has been slipping. This has never been clearer than in the last three years, when the region experienced a wave of coups d’état. The events are nearly identical; a TV broadcast from the capital city shows heavily armed soldiers announcing their control over the country, the former president is thrown in prison or exiled, and the streets swell with parades of people in celebration. These people almost always are seen displaying two flags – that of their home country, and that of the Russian Federation. This has been the case following the coups in Mali in August 2020, Burkina Faso in January 2022, and most recently Niger in July 2023.[1] Shortly after the dust had settled, each new government announced strategic partnerships with Moscow, openly welcomed more direct Russian influence, and demanded the withdrawal of any Western troops from their country.[2] Russia is expanding its geopolitical goals for influence and power in the region by capitalising on popular anti-French sentiment, weak state security, and vulnerable infrastructure.[3] Russian influence in Africa is rapidly filling the French vacuum. However, this did not occur overnight.
There is an unseen force; a network of covert military operations, political dealings, and economic persuasions. It has been a hand that has guided, assisted, and encouraged the spread of Russian influence across West and Central Africa; an invisible empire in the shadows. This is Gruppa Vagnera – the Wagner Group. Since 2017, the Russian-based Private Military Contractor (PMC) has proved to be a veritable actor in international security in their Sub-Saharan African operations.[4] Even after the short-lived mutiny in June 2023, and the death of their leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a mysterious plane crash, Wagner’s African operations are continuing to thrive.[5] Wagner is not leaving Africa any time soon.[6]
The Russian-based Private Military Contractor (PMC) has proved to be a veritable actor in international security in their Sub-Saharan African operations.
Analysing Wagner
The most effective way to analyse the use of Wagner by Russia is through neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism states that understanding the links between power and policy is complex, and the context in which the state forms its foreign policies must be understood.[7] The flexibility of using PMCs allows states to possess a wider array of military capabilities without mobilising and deploying portions of the state’s domestic population abroad, and saving national resources.[8] A state may elect to employ PMCs to achieve its goals rather than use the state military because it is cheaper, less risky, flexible, and less vulnerable to international and domestic backlash through plausible deniability.[9] As a result, Vladimir Putin’s perception of relative material power against his enemies has led him to expand Russia’s international reach to ensure Russian security and achieve its military aspirations. David Isenburg, in his research on PMC groups employed by the U.S., introduces the idea that states that employ PMCs can shift international blame and responsibility for any actions the PMC might take.[10] According to Isenberg, a PMC is a corporate entity whose primary objective is to increase profit for its shareholders, like any other company.[11] Consequently, if its shareholders or employers hold any specific political or nationalistic ideologies, so can the PMC itself.[12]
To demonstrate Wagner’s role in Africa, this paper analyses a case study of a major Sub-Saharan hub for the group: the Central African Republic (CAR).[13]
Blackwater Walked so Wagner Could Run
The general analytical consensus among researchers is that Wagner acts as a hybrid of a PMC and a semi-proxy force for the Russian state in Africa. Thus, it cannot be considered as a real PMC.[14] This concept of “fake PMCs” being used as proxies by other state powers to advance their national interests abroad is not new. For example, the case of the employment of the PMC known as Blackwater by the U.S. Government in Iraq during the early Bush Administration bears a few similarities.[15] In his book, The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade, Andrew Feinstein touches on the role of American mercenary groups used abroad. The Blackwater Corporation has origins similar to the Wagner Group. Eric Prince, the founder of Blackwater, was an American soldier and connected with members of the government.[16] Prince recruited other people, who were connected to the Blackwater board of directors, most of whom were from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DOD), who brought in their own connections.[17] Members of the U.S. intelligence community recall that there was a “revolving door” between the private sector and the military.[18] These PMC leaders were former U.S. policymakers, generals, and intelligence members who attended DOD meetings and received security clearances.[19]
The general analytical consensus among researchers is that Wagner acts as a hybrid of a PMC and a semi-proxy force for the Russian state in Africa. Thus, it cannot be considered as a real PMC.
The option to employ private contractors was appealing to the U.S. They could be used to advance American interests abroad more cost-effectively but also avoid criticism from the American public and create plausible deniability.[20] For example, Blackwater mercenaries enjoyed lax punishment for any condemnable actions they committed because they were not subject to local law, given their legal status as contractors.[21] When Blackwater came under international scrutiny in 2007 for the massacre of 14 Iraqi civilians, those responsible did not face justice for crimes committed in Iraq. Instead, those responsible returned to the U.S., where a small fine was paid, a congressional hearing was held, and the company continued its government contracts like usual.[22]
The Russian Connection
There is a prominent theory among researchers that the use of Blackwater and other PMCs inspired the Russian Defense Ministry to employ the same strategy.[23] Jones et al. put forth a theory that high-ranking Russian officials took this inspiration and applied their perception and understanding of how a PMC functions to achieve Russian politico-military goals.[24] Russian leaders, like Valery Gerasimov, noted the use of “irregular” U.S. forces, including PMCs, to spread U.S. influence in Libya, Ukraine, and the Middle East, and publicly voiced their findings.[25] At a press conference in 2012, Vladimir Putin himself announced his support for creating a “system of private military companies that could provide security services and training to foreign military personnel without the participation of the Russian state”.[26] The idea was publicly proposed to Putin by a State Duma deputy as an instrument to spread Russian influence.[27] Putin responded: “ … I believe that this (PMCs) is a tool for realising national interests without direct participation of the state… I think that yes, this can be thought about and considered”.[28] It should also be noted that after the death of Wagner’s leader in 2023, its mercenaries were ordered to officially swear an oath of loyalty to Russia, fully proving their commitment to its national interest.[29]
Putin and other officials in the Kremlin were inspired by Blackwater and other American PMCs, and have applied their utilisation of the PMC as a direct interpretation of how the U.S. expands its power.[30] Norwegian scholars Ostensen and Bukkvoll highlight this higher level of direct control that the Russian government has over PMCs by noting several explicit differences between Western and Russian versions. They distinguish that Western PMCs, like Blackwater, typically exist in a “neoliberal” market where clients and providers enter into contracts in a voluntary exchange for services.[31] Whereas, Russian PMCs typically fall into the “hybrid market” category. In a hybrid market, the state controls the market in which the company operates, and the providers, that is, the PMCs, only function in accordance with state approval.[32] This means that Wagner operates only where, when, and how the Kremlin wants it to. This is because the legal framework governing Wagner’s existence is flexible and can be applied selectively. Russian foreign policy has a large role in shaping the industry’s demand and character.[33] Should Wagner fall out of favour or were Russian foreign policy to suddenly change, the Kremlin can easily abolish it under legal guidelines given that PMCs are illegal under Russian law.[34], [35]
Putin and other officials in the Kremlin were inspired by Blackwater and other American PMCs, and have applied their utilisation of the PMC as a direct interpretation of how the U.S. expands its power.
Like Blackwater, Wagner was formed by two men who had personal and professional connections to the state, when that state was engaged in pursuing military action abroad. Confirmed details of the group’s origins are hard to come by, and it is unlikely anyone outside the higher ranks of the Russian government will ever know the full story. However, this is the general overview: Dmitry Utkin, like Eric Prince, was a former soldier, and personally well-connected to the government. Utkin was a former member of the Russian Chief Intelligence Agency.[36] It is suspected that Utkin and several others like him, under the guidance of and with funding from the Russian government, formed groups of mercenaries in Eastern Ukraine in 2014.[37] Afterwards, Wagner continued expanding and stayed tied to the GRU and other Russian agencies.[38]
Prigozhin’s beginnings are relatively unknown, but what is confirmed is that he entered the inner circle of the governing Russian class by running a successful catering company, even earning his famous nickname, “Putin’s Chef”.[39] His close relationship to Putin and overall success as a businessman allowed him to fill the role as the financier, banker, and spokesperson for the Wagner empire.[40] Unlike Utkin, Prigozhin became a celebrity in his own right, appearing in promotional videos, social media posts, memes, and even comic books. Prigozhin owned a series of shell companies connected directly or indirectly to the Wagner apparatus.[41] Many scholars, such as Candice Rondeaux, theorised that Prigozhin was allowed control over the mercenary group based on his prior government links as long as his leadership remained beneficial to the Kremlin.[42]
Prigozhin may be gone, but his legacy lives on through the corporations he left behind. These shell corporations are the driving forces behind the Wagner Group, making it profitable for its investors. Prigozhin’s web of companies funnel money from gold and diamond mining companies connected to Wagner in Africa.[43] The funds provided from this resource extraction, intercompany loans, and government contracts give a revenue stream to Wagner’s apparatus, a Russian media investigation found in 2019.[44]
Prigozhin may be gone, but his legacy lives on through the corporations he left behind.
Source: CNN[45]
History of CAR
CAR is a poor, remote country in Central Africa. It is rich in natural resources, notably gold, diamonds, and lumber.[48] After becoming independent from France in 1960, the country witnessed a series of brutal dictatorships.[49] The most notable was the ten-year reign of Jean-Bedel Bokassa, who crowned himself “emperor”.[50] After a French military intervention deposed Bokassa, the country again plunged into political instability until an election was held in 1991.[51] CAR experienced ten years of peace until fighting broke out in 2003, when a military officer named Francois Bozize overthrew the civilian government and restructured the country as yet another military dictatorship.[52] Bozize was ousted by a militia of majority Muslim rebels, known as the Seleka, and fled the country.[53] The Seleka government could not properly control the country outside of its capital, Bangui. The concern was so grave that in 2014, the UN launched MINUSCA, a UN peacekeeping mission that is still active today.[54]
An election was held in 2016, with French oversight, ending the Seleka transition government and starting President Faustin-Archange Touadera’s tenure.[55] At the end of Touadera’s first term in 2020, Francois Bozize returned from exile in a bid to run for the presidency. Bozize’s return sparked a wave of rebel activity, seeing the Christian and Muslim anti-Balaka and Seleka militias put aside their differences to create an anti-Touadera militia, known as the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC). The rebels, suspected to be led and funded by Bozize, rapidly took over two-thirds of the country by the end of 2021.[56]
Touadera remained in power long past his term, and it seemed like it was all over for him as the rebels advanced towards Bagui. Then suddenly, Touadera’s government was able to retake most of the southern and western parts of the country. This was because Touadera had enlisted the help of the Wagner Group.[57] As of 2023, Touadera’s regime still controls most of the country, and a constitutional reform has abolished term limits, effectively making Touadera president for life.[58] The Wagner group still operates in CAR to this day.
Operations in the Central African Republic
Military Operations
In CAR, military operations constitute only a fraction of Wagner’s presence in the country. Wagner troops act publicly, wear identifying patches, and are seen patrolling the streets in the open. Wagner troops’ objectives are to train, supply, and support pro-government forces against insurgents, and defend areas of economic interest, such as mines, from rebel forces. Since the commencement of military operations, the CAR government has become heavily reliant on Wagner forces to support its regime. Through a bilateral agreement struck by Touadera and Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, Moscow would provide “civilian military advisors to the CAR’s Armed Forces.[59]
Since the commencement of military operations, the CAR government has become heavily reliant on Wagner forces to support its regime.
Wagner’s shell companies represented the legal channel in which the mercenaries could be deployed into CAR while being sourced from a company that did not legally exist.[60] Prigozhin and Utkin also established this complex web of companies to manage Wagner’s operations in the country with the assistance of Touadera’s government.[61] The first officially confirmed Russian presence appeared in CAR in January 2018, when the UN allowed Russian weapons to be brought into the country to aid Faustin Touadera’s crumbling regime, at his request.[62]
Multiple independent investigative reports from Russian, U.S., and European sources confirm that the first waves of mercenaries crossed into CAR from a base in Sudan’s southern border and started a large counteroffensive with government troops against the rebels.[63] The first wave of 170 Wagner personnel arrived and established a base of operations southwest of Bangui at Berengo.[64], [65] Ironically, Wagner’s CAR empire started where another ended – in the ruins of Jean-Bedel Bokassa’s palace.[66] Satellite images show that Wagner rebuilt the late emperor Bokassa’s compound and converted it into a training facility. They built a firing range, a small airstrip, and barracks.[67]
Wagner’s top representatives work with President Touadera as security advisors, and manage the network of Wagner-affiliated corporations within the country.[68] It is assumed Prigozhin created several sub-companies registered to addresses in Bangui, mainly the Officer’s Union for International Security and Sewa Security Services, as a proxy for the Russian government.[69] These two security firms function as legitimate fronts to funnel in Wagner troops to operate in the country as “instructors” to government troops.[70] As seen in many photos, Sewa directly protects Faustin Touadera and his entourage as personal bodyguards.[71] Wagner members worked closely with government soldiers and pro-government militias at the training base in Berengo.[72] Notably, this presence spiked in 2020-2022 as the conflict intensified. Wagner mercenaries took a direct and more public role and did not try to mask their involvement within the conflict or the government.[73] MINUSCA peacekeepers noticed many Russian personnel leading the local forces loyal to the government.[74] Rwandan and MINUSCA peacekeepers began to jointly operate with Wagner against the CPC militias, until 2021, when the UN severed all joint operations due to Wagner’s frequent atrocities committed against civilians.[75]
Russia had informed the UN Panel of Experts on CAR that the number of instructors never surpassed 550. They emphasised that these instructors were unarmed and had a restricted role, focusing on training and ferrying national armed forces to military operation zones. Additionally, the instructors provided advisory and logistical aid and facilitated medical evacuations. Despite this, the UN Panel highlighted in its 2021 report “the direct involvement of Russian instructors in combat activities on the field.” Numerous sources observed that these instructors frequently took the lead instead of following FACA as they progressed into various towns and villages.[76] By the end of 2021, when joint Wagner-UN operations ceased, it was estimated that around 2,600 Wagner personnel were in CAR as soldiers, security, or advisors.[77] This number seemingly decreased as Wagner forces pivoted to Ukraine in 2022; however, Wagner forces remain engaged in the ongoing counter-offensive against CPC forces, and have ostensibly become the primary force in pro-government violence against civilians and dissidents.[78] The government forces, with Russian-supplied weapons and training, have essentially become “armed auxiliaries” of the Wagner group.[79]
By the end of 2021, when joint Wagner-UN operations ceased, it was estimated that around 2,600 Wagner personnel were in CAR as soldiers, security, or advisors.
Wagner has had significant success in CAR. Scholars’ notion of plausible deniability that makes a PMC so versatile and flexible is demonstrated by the fact that this was achieved with hardly any official Russian troops presence in the country. It lays the groundwork for further bilateral cooperation between the Russian state and its host countries. Wagner forces have fostered arms exchanges, military cooperation, and Russian securitisation abroad all without sending any official military detachments.
Wagner does not need to beat the rebels; it already achieved its military goals when Touadera became entirely reliant on them for state security. This has left the door wide open for introducing non-Western security partners in the region, not just for Russia but even for other ambitious actors like the People’s Republic of China in the not-too-distant future. However, Wagner’s influence does not stop at military conquest.
Political Influence
As was noted by The Sentry in an interview with a recently defected Wagner commander, the organisation does not solely function as a profit-driven business. Still, it seeks to expand Russian influence in Africa.[80] The group carries heavy political weight within CAR. Several Russian nationals connected to Prigozhin and Wagner hold high positions within the country. Valery Zakharov is the most notable of these individuals. Zakharov was officially employed as Touadera’s national security advisor (NSA) while also being a known Wagner employee.[81] Multiple sources claim that Zakharov acted as NSA and the head of Wagner’s operations in CAR simultaneously.[82] In 2021, Zakharov was replaced as head of Wagner in CAR by two other Wagner chiefs, Dmitri Sytii and Vitali Perfilev. Through Wagner’s apparatus, Sytii and Perfilev continued to foster cooperation between the Russian government and Touadera’s regime.[83]
Sytii, Zakharov’s former assistant and the head of two CAR-registered companies, Lobaye Invest and the cultural centre Maison Russe, reportedly worked for the Internet Research Agency (IRA), according to U.S. Treasury sanctions and other journals.[84] IRA was a Prigozhin-owned disinformation farm that interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.[85] Although Sytii and Perfilev shared responsibility for running Wagner’s activities in CAR, focusing on security, politics, economy, finance, information, and propaganda, Perfilev specifically handled security and defence matters and seemed to be Utkin’s right-hand man in CAR. This network enables him to oversee various aspects of operations in Bangui, including managing meetings and handling matters related to weapons and the military.[86] While an exact date is unknown, plans for a future Russian military base to house between 5-10k troops have been agreed upon between Russian and CAR officials.[87]
Wagner does not stop at high political influence; it spreads its message at a local level to win the hearts and minds of the CAR community. In the centre ville of Bangui, there can be found a statue of four Wagner soldiers standing in front of a statue of a mother and child, their guns pointed out, protecting them from potential assailants.[88] On the day of Prighozin’s death, the residents of Bangui came to mourn and place flowers at the feet of the soldiers.[89] A pro-Russian radio company owned by a company linked to Prigozhin’s empire spreads pro-Russian propaganda to the CAR citizens, relaying the message that Wagner and Russia are uniquely qualified and successful in their pursuit of peace and development in the country, and that any other external forces, including MINUSCA, are not to be trusted.[90]
Likewise, on Facebook, Wagner-affiliated groups are engaged in an information war against French propaganda campaigns that attempt to shed doubt on the sincerity of their activities, such as their use of Bokassa’s former palace.[91] Russian ministers are inserted into the highest levels of government, and a large propaganda campaign is broadcast in the local language to spread information to fuel anti-French and Western sentiment, doing nothing more than to further Russian financial and geopolitical interests.[92] The main target is the population of Bangui.[93] Participants in this information war include members of the CAR government – for example, one of President Touadera’s chief ministers, Fidele Gouandjika, often uploads Russian- Wagner-related social media posts.[94]
On Facebook, Wagner-affiliated groups are engaged in an information war against French propaganda campaigns that attempt to shed doubt on the sincerity of their activities, such as their use of Bokassa’s former palace.
A post from Gouandjika on Facebook.[95]
Toudera’s government serves as a host regime to the international interests of the Russian government.[97] The policy agenda of the CAR and Russian governments should be considered the same. Wagner’s presence in CAR serves as a “prime example for state capture in Africa”.[98] The group acts as a bridge to close the gap between the Russian and Central African governments to establish a government that is friendly to the Russian Federation. If the CAR government should ever take action that might pose a risk to Russian influence, it could face consequences inflicted by the PMC, which is propping the government up. President Touadera is indebted to President Putin and the Wagner group for their role in saving his regime.
Economic Endeavours
The Russian government has used Prighozin’s death as an opportunity to assume more direct control over the Wagner group’s apparatus in the country.[99] This has effectively given Russia further political power over the government and CAR’s economy. The primary economic activity Wagner takes part in is mining.[100] According to The Sentry’s report, mining concessions were an essential topic between CAR and Russian authorities in 2017, when initial contact took place.[101] The extensive report done by ACLED noted that the Wagner Group’s entry into CAR was facilitated by their control over natural resources, evidenced by contracts exchanged for mining rights between Wagner-affiliated companies and the CAR government starting in late 2017. Prigozhin-associated firms, like Lobaye Invest, Midas Resources, and Diamville, obtained contracts to operate gold and mineral sites in CAR, while Russian PMCs provided security services to these mines and political figures.[102] Connections were also found between Wagner and a logging company named Bois Rouge.[103] Wagner’s influence extended to dominating the independent diamond mining sector in CAR, with one diamond industry insider noting that “the majority of independent collectors are financed by the Russians… Today, an independent collector cannot operate without collaborating with Wagner.”[104]
Wagner’s influence extended to dominating the independent diamond mining sector in CAR, with one diamond industry insider noting that “the majority of independent collectors are financed by the Russians… Today, an independent collector cannot operate without collaborating with Wagner.”
Wagner-related violence often centres around these sources of extraction, typically mines and logging fields owned by Wagner-affiliated companies, which have received concessions or hold permits to mine, with 70% of all violence in 2020 alone involving Wagner directly or indirectly.[105] It is in Wagner’s interest to keep these mines under its control not only as part of its contractual obligations with the CAR government, but also because these mines reap a significant financial benefit.[106] For example, the Ndassima Gold Mine, owned and operated by Midas Resources, increased its mining operations and its security in 2022 to maximise profitability when Russia was targeted by several waves of economic sanctions by Western countries in response to the invasion of Ukraine.[107] Based on the timeframe, ACLED concluded that “The ability to increase production at sites such as Ndassima is particularly important to Russia as it seeks to smuggle gold and other raw materials to loosely regulated markets in order to offset the damages of Western sanctions”.[108] Indeed, the U.S. Treasury concluded that individuals, like Dmitry Sytii, are targeted by sanctions due to their involvement with Russian actors to evade economic sanctions.[109] It is estimated that the Ndassima mine is the largest gold mine in CAR, and is capable of producing up to $290 million annually.[110]
Wagner-related economic activities do not stop at resource extraction. One of CAR’s main industries is brewing.[111] A French company, Castel, historically had a monopoly on the region’s brewing and beer sales until the arrival of a new brand – Africa Ti L’Or. Simultaneously, an anti-Castel campaign was launched with the arrival of Africa Ti L’Or, commonly known as Biere Russe (Russian Beer).[112] Flyers were distributed locally with text saying that every bottle of Castel sold was another penny to France and its colonial interests.[113] The new Biere Russe is an investment of $25 million and is sold much cheaper than Castel.[114] Unsurprisingly, the Biere Russe company is owned by none other than Dmitri Sytii, Wagner’s chief in CAR and a good friend of President Touadera.[115]
A Model for Success?
Wagner’s playbook in CAR follows a similar pattern in other parts of Africa with varying levels of success. An example of this is in Mali. Wagner’s economic ventures in Mali remain limited due to a greater focus on political and military activities to maximise profits for the company. The group seems content to leave it this way for now; however, the door could potentially open for Russian extractive companies to enter the region in the future. Wagner’s influence has solidified Russian ties with Mali, leaving open the potential for future economic benefits. In 2021, three Wagner-related companies were established, as in the CAR, but these were unsuccessful in securing mining contracts because four other foreign companies dominated the extraction sector.[116] Thus, it should be noted that Wagner is paid for its services in cash rather than mining concessions as of 2023, and this is where the primary economic benefits originate.[117] Wagner has been involved in the capture and protection of mining sites, and the Malian government has signed an agreement with the Russian government to build a gold refinery; however, this is the extent of its ventures into the gold sector.[118] This is for two reasons: First, the monopoly is held by other gold companies in the sector.[119] There is a lack of available control over the country. All mines are controlled by the rebels in the north or the government in the south. The government in Mali is far more militarised and bureaucratic than that of the CAR.[120] Private companies are monitored heavily and must pay large fees to the government, and thus, it is far harder for Wagner to penetrate the sector as a private entity.[121]
Wagner has been involved in the capture and protection of mining sites, and the Malian government has signed an agreement with the Russian government to build a gold refinery; however, this is the extent of its ventures into the gold sector.
Second, there is no need for the Malian government to pay Wagner with any mining concessions. Over 50% of taxes paid to the government come from gold mining, providing the government with plenty of money to pay Wagner for their services.[122] Wagner’s operations in Mali involve an alleged monthly fee of $10 million, which is charged to the transitional government of Mali.[123] This amount, if paid consistently over the course of Wagner’s presence in the country, amounts to nearly 3% of Mali’s GDP.[124] As of now, this is the extent of Wagner’s economic ventures in Mali. However, it is content to operate as a primarily political and military entity to reap its profits.[125]
This demonstrates that Wagner’s success in the CAR doesn’t mean its modus operandi will be as effective in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Filling Gaps Swiftly
Russia’s readiness to swiftly fill the gaps left by Western powers in vulnerable conflict zones to benefit the Kremlin’s geopolitical goals through a proxy organisation thinly veiled as a private entity has helped shape Africa’s political, military, and economic future. Wagner tries to shape these three aspects of each African country it occupies.
In CAR, Wagner has established itself as a strong, economic, political, and military partner of Touadera’s regime. In Mali, Wagner tried and failed to break into the economic sector, and focused more on political manoeuvring and strategic alliances with the government to fill power vacuums left by the departing forces, with less emphasis on direct community engagement, but more so on aggressive and violent propaganda techniques. Both scenarios have proven effective in accumulating profit through contracts or other economic endeavours, promoting pro-Russian narratives to push the host state politically closer towards Russia and farther away from others, increasing pro-Russian military presence and securitisation as the new major security actor in ongoing conflict zones with vulnerable power vacuums.
Both scenarios have proven effective in accumulating profit through contracts or other economic endeavours, promoting pro-Russian narratives to push the host state politically closer towards Russia and farther away from others, increasing pro-Russian military presence and securitisation as the new major security actor in ongoing conflict zones with vulnerable power vacuums.
Wagner’s involvement in the mining sector of both countries is suggestive of the group’s modus operandi when venturing into a new country with exploitable resources. Diversification of economic activities in CAR shows that their modus operandi is flexible, and up for variation. This rudimentary economic strategy demonstrates that the Wagner group functions primarily as a military and political force for the Russian state, with additional profits from non-military endeavours collected as a sort of “bonus” source of income in contrast to what is typically portrayed in the media. Therefore, by using the identity and structure of a PMC group, the Wagner group has succeeded at operating as an alternative form of power expansion and exploitation of foreign and domestic resources for the Russian government’s interests abroad.
Travis Hinton is a recent graduate of International Relations at the Anglo-American University in Prague, Czech Republic. His research focuses on Eastern Europe and Africa. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the Anglo-American University.
[1] AJLabs, “Mapping Africa’s Coups d’etat across the Years,” Al Jazeera, August 31, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/mapping-africas-coups-detat-across-the-years.
[2] Mohamed Eldoh, “The Geopolitics of Russia’s Foray into West Africa,” Geopolitical Monitor, August 10, 2023, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-geopolitics-of-russias-foray-into-west-africa/.
[3] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/movin g-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagn er-group-operations-around-the-world/, 55.
[4] Tim Lister, Sebastian Shukla, and Clarissa Ward, “Putin’s Private Army Is Trying to Increase Russia’s Influence in Africa,” CNN, August 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/08/africa/putins-private-army-car-intl/.
[5] Vox, “Russia’s Private Military Force, Explained,” YouTube, February 14, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=65bNr6D0Db0&t=1s.
[6] Mohamed Eldoh, “The Geopolitics of Russia’s Foray into West Africa,” Geopolitical Monitor, August 10, 2023, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-geopolitics-of-russias-foray-into-west-africa/.
[7] Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 144–72, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100007814, 147.
[8] Perry, “Purchasing Power Is Defence Privatization a New Form of Military Mobilization?,” 16.
[9] Isenberg, Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy, 44.
[10] Idem.
[11] Bujar Ahmedi and Besian Ahmeti, “Private Armies in Contemporary International Politics,” European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 3, no. 3 (August 24, 2018): 45–53, https://doi.org/10.26417/ejms.v3i3.p45-55, 46.
[12] Bujar and Ahmeti, “Private Armies in Contemporary International Politics,” 47.
[13] Alexis Arieff, report, Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress §, IF12389 (2023), 2.
[14] Nathaniel Reynolds, “Putin’s Not-so-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and The …,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 08, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/08/putin-s-not-so-secret-mercenaries-patronage-geopolitics-and-wagner-group-pub-79442.
[15] Ibrahim Al-Marashi, “Blackwater Paved the Way for Wagner,” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/8/12/blackwater-paved-the-way-for-wagner.
[16] Andrew Feinstein, The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2013), 408.
[17] Ibid., 408.
[18] Ibid., 405.
[19] Idem.
[20] Isenburg, Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy 43-44.
[21] Melanie W. Sisson et al., “The Dark Truth about Blackwater,” Brookings, May 10, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-dark-truth-about-blackwater/.
[22] Andrew Feinstein, The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2013), 409.
[23] Ibrahim Al-Marashi, “Blackwater Paved the Way for Wagner,” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/8/12/blackwater-paved-the-way-for-wagner.
[24] Seth G. Jones et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” CSIS, July 2021, https://www.csis.org/russiascorporatesoldiersglobalexpansionrussiasprivatemilitarycompanies, 12.
[25] Ibid., 12-14.
[26] RIA News, “Putin Supported the Idea of Creating Private Military Companies in Russia,” RIA News, April 11, 2012, https://ria.ru/20120411/623227984.html.
[27] Idem.
[28] Idem.
[29] Candace Rondeaux, “The Legacy and Future of the Wagner Group,” Brookings (lecture, Online Event, September 21, 2023).
[30] Seth G. Jones et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” CSIS, July 2021, https://www.csis.org/russiascorporatesoldiersglobalexpansionrussiasprivatemilitarycompanies, 13-14.
[31] Østensen, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies (Oslo, Norway: FFI, 2018),13.
[32] Idem.
[33] Idem.
[34] Idem.
[35] Amy Mackinnon, “What Is Russia’s Wagner Group?,” Foreign Policy, July 06, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/06/what-is-wagner-group-russia-mercenaries-military-contractor/.
[36] Seth G. Jones et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” CSIS, July 2021, https://www.csis.org/russiascorporatesoldiersglobalexpansionrussiasprivatemilitarycompanies, 15.
[37] Nathaniel Reynolds, Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group. Vol. 8. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019, 2-3.
[38] Seth G. Jones et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” CSIS, July 2021, https://www.csis.org/russiascorporatesoldiersglobalexpansionrussiasprivatemilitarycompanies, 15-16.
[39] Nathaniel Reynolds, Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group. Vol. 8. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019, 4.
[40] Seth G. Jones et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” CSIS, July 2021, https://www.csis.org/russiascorporatesoldiersglobalexpansionrussiasprivatemilitarycompanies, 17.
[41] Ibid., 18.
[42] Ibid., 76.
[43] Steve Holland and Daphne Psaledakis, “Leader of Russia’s Wagner Helped Boot UN Peacekeepers from Mali, US Says | Reuters,” Reuters, June 30, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/leader-russias-wagner-helped-boot-un-peacekeepers-mali-us-says-2023-06-30/.
[44] Mikhail Maglov, Timur Olevsky, and Dmitry Treschanin, “Part 3. Not Wagner PMC, but Prigozhin’s Army,” Current Time, February 26, 2019, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/yevgeny-prigozhin-investigation-chapter-3/29789949.html.
[45] Tim Lister, Sebastian Shukla, and Clarissa Ward, “Putin’s Private Army Is Trying to Increase Russia’s Influence in Africa,” CNN, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/08/africa/putins-private-army-car-intl/.
[46] Mikhail Maglov, Timur Olevsky, and Dmitry Treschanin, “Part 3. Not Wagner PMC, but Prigozhin’s Army,” Current Time, February 26, 2019, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/yevgeny-prigozhin-investigation-chapter-3/29789949.html.
[47] Steve Holland and Daphne Psaledakis, “Leader of Russia’s Wagner Helped Boot UN Peacekeepers from Mali, US Says | Reuters,” Reuters, June 30, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/leader-russias-wagner-helped-boot-un-peacekeepers-mali-us-says-2023-06-30/.
[48] CIA, “Central African Republic Country Summary,” Central Intelligence Agency, May 07, 2024, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/central-african-republic/summaries/.
[49] “Centrafricaine (REP): Pays: Perspective Monde,” Centrafricaine (rep) | Pays | Perspective Monde, accessed May 11, 2024, https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMPays/CAF.
[50] “Couronnement de l’empereur Centrafricain Jean-Bédel Bokassa 1er: Evenements: Perspective Monde,” Couronnement de l’empereur centrafricain Jean-Bédel Bokassa 1er | Evenements | Perspective Monde, December 04, 1977, https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMEve/532&langue=fr.
[51] “Centrafricaine (REP): Pays: Perspective Monde,” Centrafricaine (rep) | Pays | Perspective Monde, accessed May 11, 2024, https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMPays/CAF.
[52] CPA, “Conflict in the Central African Republic | Global Conflict Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic.
[53] Al Jazeera, “Why Are They Fighting in the Central African Republic? | Start Here,” YouTube, March 07, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2jib-cLz8Y.
[54] CPA, “Conflict in the Central African Republic,” 2023.
[55] Al Jazeera, “Why Are They Fighting in the Central African Republic? | Start Here,” YouTube, March 07, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2jib-cLz8Y.
[56] Idem.
[57] CPA, “Conflict in the Central African Republic | Global Conflict Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic.
[58] CIA, “Central African Republic Country Summary,” Central Intelligence Agency, May 07, 2024, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/central-african-republic/summaries/.
[59] The Sentry, “Architects of Terror,” The Sentry, July 19, 2023, https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/, 7.
[60] Idem., 7, 20.
[61] Mikhail Maglov, Timur Olevsky, and Dmitry Treschanin, “Part 3. Not Wagner PMC, but Prigozhin’s Army,” Current Time, February 26, 2019, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/yevgeny-prigozhin-investigation-chapter-3/29789949.html.
[62] Seth G. Jones et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” CSIS, July 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies, 54-55.
[63] Mikhail Maglov, Timur Olevsky, and Dmitry Treschanin, “Part 3. Not Wagner PMC, but Prigozhin’s Army,” Current Time, February 26, 2019, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/yevgeny-prigozhin-investigation-chapter-3/29789949.html.
[64] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/movin g-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagn er-group-operations-around-the-world/, 24.
[65] Seth G. Jones et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” CSIS, July 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies, 55.
[66] Idem.
[67] Ibid., 56.
[68] The Sentry, “Architects of Terror,” The Sentry, July 19, 2023, https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/, 20.
[69] “Countering the Wagner Group and Degrading Russia’s War Efforts in Ukraine” (US Embassy Bangui, January 26, 2023), US Government, https://cf.usembassy.gov/statement-by-secretary-antony-j-blinken/.
[70] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/movin g-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagn er-group-operations-around-the-world/, 18.
[71] Patricia Huon and Simon Ostrovsky, “Russia, the New Power in Central Africa,” Coda Story, March 04, 2024, https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/russia-new-power-central-africa/.
[72] Seth G. Jones et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” CSIS, July 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies, 55.
[73] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/movin g-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagn er-group-operations-around-the-world/, 17.
[74] “CAR: Experts Alarmed by Government’s Use of ‘Russian Trainers’, Close Contacts with UN Peacekeepers,” OHCHR (UN, March 31, 2021), United Nations, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/03/car-experts-alarmed-governments-use-russian-trainers-close-contacts-un?LangID=E&NewsID=26961.
[75] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/movin g-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagn er-group-operations-around-the-world/, 18.
[76] The Sentry, “Architects of Terror,” The Sentry, July 19, 2023, https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/, 9.
[77] Idem.
[78] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/movin g-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagn er-group-operations-around-the-world/, 19-22.
[79] Andrew McGregor, “Wagner’s Influence in Central African Republic Wanes as American PMC Enters the Scene,” Jamestown Foundation, February 09, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/wagners-influence-in-central-african-republic-wanes-as-american-pmc-enters-the-scene/.
[80] The Sentry, “Architects of Terror,” The Sentry, July 19, 2023, https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/, 32.
[81] “Treasury Increases Pressure on Russian Financier,” US Department of the Treasury, September 23, 2020, United States Government, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1133.
[82] The Sentry, “Architects of Terror,” The Sentry, July 19, 2023, https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/, 20-21.
[83] Ibid., 21-23.
[84] US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Increases Pressure on Russian Financier,” 2020.
[85] Idem.
[86] The Sentry, “Architects of Terror,” The Sentry, July 19, 2023, https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/, 22.
[87] Andrew McGregor, “Wagner’s Influence in Central African Republic Wanes as American PMC Enters the Scene,” Jamestown Foundation, February 09, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/wagners-influence-in-central-african-republic-wanes-as-american-pmc-enters-the-scene/.
[88] Rachel Chason, “In Wagner Group’s Biggest African Base, Russia to Control Mercenaries – The Washington Post,” The Washington Post, September 18, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/18/wagner-central-african-republic-touadera/.
[89] Idem.
[90] Seth G. Jones et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” CSIS, July 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies, 58.
[91] Idem.
[92] The Sentry, “Architects of Terror,” The Sentry, July 19, 2023, https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/, 32.
[93] Idem.
[94] Idem.
[95] “Fidele Gouandjika,” Facebook, 2023.
[96] Idem.
[97] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/movin g-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagn er-group-operations-around-the-world/, 17.
[98] Joseph Siegle, “How Russia Is Pursuing State Capture in Africa,” Africa at LSE, April 06, 2022, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/03/21/how-russia-is-pursuing-state-capture-in-africa-ukraine-wagner-group/.
[99] Ina Verstl, “Wagner’s Sprawling Business Empire in Africa: Gold, Diamonds and Beer,” BRAUWELT, November 23, 2023, https://brauwelt.com/en/international-report/europe-russia/645852-wagner%E2%80%99s-sprawling-business-empire-in-africa-gold,-diamonds-and-beer.
[100] The Sentry, “Architects of Terror,” The Sentry, July 19, 2023, https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/, 26.
[101] Idem.
[102] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/movin g-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagn er-group-operations-around-the-world/, 28-29.
[103] Idem.
[104] Idem.
[105] Ibid., 32.
[106] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/moving-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagner-group-operations-around-the-world/.
[107] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/movin g-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagn er-group-operations-around-the-world/, 32.
[108] Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia, “Moving out of The Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations around the World,” ACLED, August 23, 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/02/moving-out-of-the-shadows-shifts-in-wagner-group-operations-around-the-world/.
[109] “Treasury Increases Pressure on Russian Financier,” US Department of the Treasury, September 23, 2020, United States Government.
[110] Ina Verstl, “Wagner’s Sprawling Business Empire in Africa: Gold, Diamonds and Beer,” BRAUWELT, November 23, 2023, https://brauwelt.com/en/international-report/europe-russia/645852-wagner%E2%80%99s-sprawling-business-empire-in-africa-gold,-diamonds-and-beer.
[111] CIA, “Central African Republic Country Summary,” Central Intelligence Agency, May 07, 2024, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/central-african-republic/summaries/.
[112] Ina Verstl, “Wagner’s Sprawling Business Empire in Africa: Gold, Diamonds and Beer,” BRAUWELT, November 23, 2023, https://brauwelt.com/en/international-report/europe-russia/645852-wagner%E2%80%99s-sprawling-business-empire-in-africa-gold,-diamonds-and-beer.
[113] Idem.
[114] Idem.
[115] Idem.
[116] Elise Vincent, “Exactions et Prédations Minières : Le Mode Opératoire de La Milice Russe Wagner En Afrique,” Le Monde.fr, December 14, 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/12/14/exactions-et-predations-la-methode-de-la-milice-wagner-en-afrique_6105992_3212.html.
[117] Jessica Berlin et al., The Blood Gold Report, December 2023, https://bloodgoldreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The-Blood-Gold-Report-2023-December.pdf, 29.
[118] Ibid., 36.
