Abstract: The emergence of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) represents a clear shift in warfare and raises critical questions about the impact this change will have on soldiers’ morale on a 21st-century battlefield. The complex effects that such technology has on military morale are highlighted through historical parallels to previous, similar military innovations and supplemented by analyses of the ongoing drone warfare in the Ukraine War. Narratives surrounding military technologies mould both soldier and morale to defend, a dynamic that is explored through Annens’ tripartite theory of morale. It is made clear that morale is not closely linked to the invention of military technologies themselves but rather to how these technologies are implemented and the narratives that surround them. To bolster future fighting capabilities, these narratives must be actively constructed to face the changing organisations and psychological stresses of military service.

Problem statement: How do autonomous weapons and the narratives surrounding them affect soldiers’ service-, combat- and morale to defend in the midst of a war?

So what?: To navigate the complex field of autonomous weapons systems and their effect on soldier morale, military leaders and politicians must proactively form narratives around integrating the new technologies with the pre-established military ethos. To preserve service morale, there is a need for investments in support systems, as well as adapting organisations to include new career paths for the operators. At the same time, societal ties and the morale to defend one’s nation must be secured through openness and clear guidelines for the ethical use of such weapons, guaranteeing human accountability for their use. A balanced approach must be adopted to ensure operational efficiency and future recruitment opportunities.

Shaping Military Morale in the Age of Drones and AWS: A Narrative Analysis

The increasing sophistication of drones and autonomous weapons systems (AWS[1]), amplified by advancements in AI, poses questions regarding their impact on military effectiveness and the human[2] element in warfare. These developments raise questions about how technological changes might impact the psychological state of soldiers already facing immense pressure on the battlefield. If the individual soldier is not of strong constitution, there is little chance of them fighting in a controlled manner towards an end goal. As soldiers with low morale face constant doubts,[3] which could be deadly in combat, it’s paramount that soldiers maintain the highest possible level of morale.

The increasing sophistication of drones and autonomous weapons systems, amplified by advancements in AI, poses questions regarding their impact on military effectiveness and the human element in warfare.

Accordingly, this paper employs a narrative analysis to explore how narratives surrounding military technological advancements, particularly drones and AWS, influence soldier morale (i.e., in combat and service) and morale to defend (vis-à-vis national defence), as evidenced by historical and contemporary examples.

Methodological Approach

The following examination employs a narrative-analysis methodology. This qualitative approach involves examining and interpreting historical accounts of technological innovations in warfare, as well as contemporary reports and analyses of the Ukraine conflict. The objective is to construct a coherent and critically informed narrative that illuminates the complex relationship between the introduction of new military technologies and shifts in soldier morale.[4]

Scope and Limitations

This study is exploratory in nature and does not provide an empirical quantification of morale. Access to direct soldier testimony, especially from the contemporary war in Ukraine, is limited, necessitating reliance on secondary and tertiary analyses and reports.

Morale and Narratives in the Military Context

What is Morale in Military Psychology?

Morale in psychology is generally defined as the psychological resilience, confidence, and overall well-being of individuals and groups in the face of challenges,[5] influenced by factors such as motivation, cohesion, discipline, belief in the mission, leadership, and unit effectiveness.[6], [7] In a military context, high morale enhances performance and increases stress resistance, whereas low morale can lead to decreased effectiveness or even combat refusal as a final result.[8], [9] Another factor is the use of narratives to build legitimacy and support for future goals,[10] each narrative conveying its own core message, creating a tale of events clearly biased to an end-goal.[11] With their ability to offer meanings and assumptions, they are a guidance tool for personally justified actions.[12]

In a military context, high morale enhances performance and increases stress resistance, whereas low morale can lead to decreased effectiveness or even combat refusal as a final result.

There is divergence[13] in different types of morale conceptualisation and terminology. However, all theories contain some or all of these defining characteristics of morale: an internal view (soldiers’ willingness to fight in extreme situations), an external view (society’s willingness to support war), and the group view (groups’ shared will to fight).[14] Synthesising the three factors into one concept provides a definition of morale coherent with Annen’s[15] tripartite theory. Each type of morale affects overall morale and stems from distinct factors.[16]

• Morale to defend refers to the societal support of war. This includes the acceptance of the armed forces, the necessity of a functioning military and regarding military service as a societal responsibility.[17] Public support is crucial in all systems, but especially so in conscription-based armies like Switzerland, where military service depends on the population’s involvement. Militaries rely on willingness to serve[18] but also on general support.[19] To increase the morale to defend there is a need to control the narratives surrounding war, as the general public often lacks a comprehensive understanding of the practical consequences of warfare. Historically, war was considered as an accepted political tool,[20] however, today’s social perspective in the West puts an extreme weight on morally correct justifications to wage war. The legitimacy of a war is therefore a deciding factor in societal support of war. On the one hand, a war perceived as just, like a war in defence of one’s nation, increases the willingness to participate and support.[21] As such, social narratives can be created to influence morale to defend, either by the civilian population themselves or through government campaigns.[22] On the other hand, wars perceived as unjust or imperialistic can make recruitment efforts more difficult.[23]
• Service morale refers to the individual soldier’s commitment to daily military duties in the long term. It is shaped by personal beliefs, the leader’s behaviour, and organisational conditions. Clear task structures, meaningful work, and appropriate recognition enhance service morale, while a lack of career prospects or a negative service environment can weaken it.[24]
• Combat morale refers to a soldier’s willingness to fight under extreme conditions; it is influenced by factors like group cohesion, trust in leadership, and clear mission objectives.[25] The most important factor for combat morale is mental resilience.[26] Narratives play a central role here as well. Even when fighting under the toughest conditions, narratives of success, heroism or duty increase combat morale.[27]

Evolving Technologies in Modern Warfare

Modern Drones

Drones have developed to become a staple of modern war, defined as:

A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, […] can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, […] and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. […]”.[28] Drones can be categorized broadly as: tactical drones in NATO classes I (<150kg) and II(<600kg), and strategic drones (>600kg).[29]

Drones can be categorized broadly as: tactical drones in NATO classes I (<150kg) and II(<600kg), and strategic drones (>600kg).

The ethical debate surrounding drone warfare remains controversial. Critics fear that the distance between the operator and the physical battlefield lowers the inhibition threshold for killing and promotes morally decoupled warfare.[30] Supporters, however, emphasise the precision of drone missions and their potentially lower civilian casualty figures. On one hand, the danger from drones might harm combat morale. On the other hand,  the availability of effective, complementary drone support, providing overwatch, reconnaissance, or counter-drone capabilities, may act as a morale booster, helping restore soldiers’ sense of control and security. Enhanced situational awareness through drone observation can, in specific contexts, bolster combat morale rather than degrade it.

Autonomous Weapons Systems

Fully AWS are becoming inevitable as technology progresses. While no universally agreed upon definition of AWS exists, it is defined by the U.S. DOD as “Weapons using special sensors and computer algorithms, [which] are able to, when in use, individually choose targets, and use lethal or non-lethal force to attack their targets.”[31] Earlier semi-autonomous weapons needed some human guidance, while the weapons systems currently being developed into AWS require no human input once activated,[32] using AI and sensor fusion to identify, select, and engage targets independently. This raises critical concerns over accountability,[33] algorithmic errors, and bias challenges, particularly relevant in democratic societies, where public trust is essential for defence policy. While even man-in-the-loop systems do not guarantee moral action, as humans act within bounded rationality, it at least provides a clear legal framework for accountability.

Historical Cases

New Communications Technologies

Attitudes towards war are primarily shaped by individual perceptions, which are significantly influenced by external factors such as public narratives, especially so when individuals are not directly involved in the conflict themselves.

A sensationalistic style of reporting called yellow journalism emerged in the late 19th century. Exaggerated headlines, scandal-mongering, and emotional appeals characterise it. At the time, sensationalised war stories portrayed conflict as a patriotic duty, prompting policymakers to adopt aggressive stances. These reports provoked public outcry and reduced the room for diplomatic solutions. Emotionally charged stories, which portray the enemies as brutal beasts, make war seem inevitable and necessary.[34] For example, exaggerated reports of German war crimes and aggressive propaganda campaigns increased voluntary enlistment in the U.S. and British armies during the First World War.[35] Similar tactics were used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, wherein mass media narratives reinforced the urgency of military action based on the threat of WMDs.[36] These historical precedents demonstrate the power of information technology in shaping public opinion and influencing the societal context surrounding military service, thereby impacting recruitment and the collective morale to defend.

Exaggerated reports of German war crimes and aggressive propaganda campaigns increased voluntary enlistment in the U.S. and British armies during the First World War.

Another example is that of the Vietnam War, as the first significant conflict televised to a global audience, exposing the raw brutality of war to millions. Unlike previous wars, the media was not government-controlled, and televisions in all U.S. households showed uncensored images of combat, casualties, and suffering civilians. These images shifted the public opinion on the war.[37] The graphic footage of wounded soldiers, napalm victims, and massacres fuelled widespread outrage. Symbols like the “Napalm girl”, and tragedies like the My-Lai massacre, deepened public distrust[38] in government,[39] and intensified anti-war protest,[40] directly challenging the war’s perceived legitimacy and eroding the morale to defend, making recruitment significantly more difficult. This reflected both falling public support (morale to defend) and a growing reluctance among eligible individuals to serve (service morale), driven by ethical concerns and perceived risks. Consequently, many young men tried to avoid conscription by fleeing or resisting. The anti-war movement, which was clearly fuelled by shocking televised images, painted military service as morally questionable[41] and personally perilous. The 1968 Tet Offensive was a turning point in public opinion on the war. While the U.S. government claimed progress, television broadcasts showed intense combat, including the destruction of the U.S. Embassy and the execution of a VietCong prisoner. These images created a huge “credibility gap” and reinforced public scepticism. Meanwhile, on the field, troop morale plummeted. By seeing the protests, soldiers felt isolated and began questioning their purpose, undermining service morale. The idea that they were fighting an unpopular war with dwindling public support led to disillusionment, resentment, and even acts of defiance; soldiers started deserting and abandoning their posts, unwilling to risk their lives for a politically and morally untenable war.

As a result of this growing opposition, Nixon introduced Vietnamization, withdrawing U.S. troops and handing over the reins to South Vietnam.[42] Still, recruitment efforts continued to decline, leading to a greater reliance on draftees often reluctant or openly resistant to serving. This created an army that increasingly comprised individuals who lacked morale or faith in the mission, further exacerbating morale issues.

Nixon introduced Vietnamization, withdrawing U.S. troops and handing over the reins to South Vietnam.

Television transformed warfare by making its consequences impossible to ignore. The war’s extensive coverage not only eroded public support but also undermined recruitment efforts and troop morale. After Vietnam, the U.S. reevaluated its military policies and transformed its army into an all-volunteer force and came up with new strategies for media control in the following conflicts.

Early Industrial Warfare Technologies and Morale

Military progress depends on technology; modern armies rely heavily on electronic communications and computerised systems. If these fail or are disrupted by the enemy, it can lead to insecurity and a drastic drop in morale.[43]

A case in point of how a new technology can affect the battlefield is that of the Canadian troops’ who witnessed the first use of tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, 1916.[44] Although the tanks had technical shortcomings and presented logistical challenges, they had a significant psychological impact on the infantry. Their mere presence on the battlefield boosted infantry combat morale by providing protection and offensive power against machine guns, altering the perceived risk-reward calculation of assault.[45] The impact of the tanks on morale was most evident in the increased sense of security it provided to the infantrymen.[46] It also caused panic for the enemy, demonstrating the potent demoralising effect of a novel, intimidating technology on enemy combat morale. Soldiers[47] often describe tanks as a decisive factor for their courage in battle.

Another example of a technological shift affecting morale in combat can be seen in the British Navy during the First World War. It was the first industrialised naval warfare with unknown parameters like the use of submarines, torpedoes and long-range artillery.[48] Compared to traditional battles with direct confrontations, the new, constant danger from enemy submarines and mines impacted crew morale. This resulted in degraded service morale due to the chronic stress of unseen threats, while also lowering combat morale because of the perceived randomness and lethality of the attacks.[49] Naval command recognised this new psychological burden, countering targeted measures by increasing training on systems for sailors.[50] These efforts were explicitly aimed at restoring service morale and maintaining combat effectiveness by enhancing technical understanding (reducing fear of the unknown) and reinforcing discipline crucial for survival in the new technological environment. The introduction of these systems also required stricter discipline, as small mistakes could have fatal consequences. For example, the improper storage of ammunition outside of safe areas led to some cruisers exploding, even in afternoon-critical hits.

Compared to traditional battles with direct confrontations, the new, constant danger from enemy submarines and mines impacted crew morale.

New Generation of Unmanned Systems in Ukraine’s Warfare and Soldier Morale

Unmanned systems, including ground, maritime and aerial systems, “have become one of the defining features of [modern] war”.[51] The reliance on drones has triggered an arms race, creating innovation-counter-innovation-cycles occasionally leading to large gaps in technological advances between the competing parties.[52] The shifting power dynamics create periods of insecurity for soldiers, possibly affecting the three types of morale.[53]

Russia’s 2022 invasion significantly increased drone integration in Ukraine. The conflict commenced with a large-scale conventional assault – the main tools being trenches, tanks, and artillery.[54] Russian forces used quick, WW1-style raids in a hit-and-run fashion to reestablish manoeuvre. Nowadays, these tactics are carried out by “drone pilots, in the safety of bunkers”.[55] The reliance on drones intensified, through 2023,[56] as massed low-cost systems, particularly FPV drones, became integral to combat operations and altered battlefield dynamics,[57] with drones responsible for 70%-80% of deaths in the Ukraine-Russia war in 2025.[58]
Additionally, drones offer a huge price advantage[59] over other military material; as such, Ukraine has reevaluated its doctrine[60] and adapted a “robot first” doctrine using drones instead of soldiers, conducting robot-only assaults,[61] and primarily using drones to fight other drones.[62] This trend mirrors the First World War, where new technologies forced continuous adaptations leading to even newer technologies (e.g., tanks). This is also seen in Ukraine today, where strategic class III drones no longer make up the main arsenal. The combatants rather employ tactical class I and II drones due to their size, speed, versatility and availability.[63] Tactical drones are mainly used for precision payload delivery, surveillance, loitering munitions, and EW.[64]. While Ukrainian soldiers have adapted to artillery threats over time,[65] the boundary between drones and loitering munitions has become increasingly blurred, with Molloy stating, “loitering munition drones represent a bridge between precision-guided weapons and future autonomous weapon systems”.[66] The rising number of different drones on the battlefield means that soldiers live under permanent observation, termed “a thousand snipers in the sky”.

This constant presence of drones imposes a qualitatively different psychological strain on soldiers than regular warfare.[67] Persistent surveillance and unpredictable strikes[68] challenge the combat morale of drone operators, who often operate in physical and social isolation. The negative impact on their service morale and operational efficiency can be attributed to a high workload and exposure to traumatic imaging, as well as their not being able to reap the same psychosocial benefits that their comrades do as part of larger groups.[69] “[…] one of the most significant drivers of morale [lies in] the fellow soldier”.[70] In addition to the lack of emotional support, the nature of class I and II tactical drones means that the operators are seldom far from danger themselves, often within shooting range of enemy weapons. This might heavily influence how drone operators perceive their own service morale.[71]

Persistent surveillance and unpredictable strikes challenge the combat morale of drone operators, who often operate in physical and social isolation.

The war has brought with it an increased mediatisation, whereby both the civilian population and the soldiers are exposed to vast amounts of gruesome imagery, which,  on the one hand, creates awareness by strengthening existing narratives,[72] and on the other hand, potentially damages the defence morale of those watching comrades in bad situations. Fighting on home soil has been a significant factor in boosting morale among all three levels of the Ukrainian armed forces.[73] Additionally,  the ingress of Russian territory through the Kursk operation and the implementation of specially trained morale and psychological support officers have raised morale.[74], [75] The mediatisation of the war has made it possible for civilian populations to aid in intelligence support through social media. This is proving to be an important asset in some ways, but it also increases the risks of leaks and misinformation, which have a negative influence on morale and narratives.[76]

To conclude, drones are not a main influence on soldier morale, but, in different ways, have a reinforcing effect on it; this is especially true of the drone operators’ morale. Not only do they have to carry out missions with their drones at the risk of their own lives, but they also have to watch gruesome live images of the mission, with little agency to change the situation themselves.[77] By witnessing these scenes, it is understandable that those operators fall into narratives which make their actions more justified than those of their opponents.[78]

The high usage of drone technology in the war has also facilitated the implementation of AWS. Semi-autonomous drones, like loitering munitions and pathfinding weapons, have been increasingly implemented in recent years,[79] leading to speculations that the Russian assault on Ukraine accelerated the development of fully autonomous weapon systems, even including drones enabled with artificial intelligence.[80]  This opened up the Ukraine theatre as a “war lab for the future[81] for weapons manufacturers. A case in point, many of the drones now used in the war have taken on a modular approach, whereby the same model can be used in a litany of ways with just some small changes.[82] It should be noted that Ukraine does not have any fully AWS yet; however, there is no doubt that the war is facilitating the extreme progress of such technologies.[83]That said, Ukraine is expected to launch autonomous swarms of drones against Russian forces in the near future.[84]

Discussion

Historical and contemporary records reveal consistent narratives on emergent technologies’ impact on soldier morale, drawing on Annen’s tripartite theory of morale: of combat morale, service morale and the morale to defend, as well as insights from the psychology of remote warfare and military-ethical debates. A narrative perspective shows how technologies, such as drones, are embedded in soldier and societal narratives, either strengthening or weakening morale depending on the framing. History shows that new technologies might inspire resilience or create dissolution. Thus, the narratives surrounding individual technologies are pivotal.

Historical and contemporary records reveal consistent narratives on emergent technologies’ impact on soldier morale.

Technological Shifts and Combat Morale

There are powerful stories told about how new military technologies affect frontline soldiers’ will to fight.  In WWI, British sailors described German submarines as a constant, unseen threat causing stress and helplessness,[85] parallel today in Ukraine with drones described as a thousand snipers in the sky,[86] constantly surveying and attacking positions from unknown directions.  On the one hand, invisible threats like mines or drones reduce the individual’s subjective sense of control over the situation. The result might be a narrative amongst the soldiers about the unstoppable enemy, a tale fostering fatalism and reducing combat morale. On the other hand, technology can also strengthen morale by boosting protection or firepower. Access to drones in the sky, which can spot the enemy before soldiers are spotted themselves, helps regain initiative and situational awareness of the battlefield, thus strengthening combat morale.

Technology is a double-edged sword when it comes to combat morale: morale rises or falls depending on its impact. When technology increases vulnerability and insecurity, combat morale declines; when it provides a sense of superiority, combat morale increases. Are soldiers hunted by invisible danger, or are they equipped with tools giving them an upper hand over their enemy? The future of AWS will undoubtedly affect this balance – a scenario with swarms of autonomous killer robots might further strengthen the perception of an invincible enemy among those exposed, similar to the impact drones are currently having. Conversely, operating such systems may boost soldiers’ morale and sense of exceptionalism. Again, pitfalls exist. If soldiers believe themselves invincible and the systems fail as they inevitably do, the impact on combat morale could be more damaging than if the systems were never in place.  In other words, the effect on combat morale when encountering AWS depends on which narrative dominates: the story of lost control or full battlefield dominance. History indicates military leaders must actively shape these narratives through training, doctrine, and communication, ensuring new technology integrates within a robust framework supporting mental robustness.

Technology is a double-edged sword when it comes to combat morale: morale rises or falls depending on its impact.

Changes in Soldiers’ Role and Service Morale

Historical transitions show that technological changes might create identity crises and difficulties that challenge service morale. The situation today can be paralleled with the introduction of submarines in the First World War, where invisible enemies created fear and altered traditional battlefield roles. This remains relevant as modern soldiers experience how drones and AWS alter traditional roles. Especially in Ukraine, the emergence of drone units and operators has created a new type of soldiering, with operators controlling weapons remotely from bunkers. Safer than trench soldiers, they face other psychological stressors that threaten morale. Drone personnel face higher risks of emotional exhaustion, stress, and PTSD at levels rivalling or exceeding those of fighter pilots.[87] Operators suffer from psychological whiplash, alternating between long surveillance tasks and sudden intense stress, all due to viewing footage from high-definition cameras. Unlike fighter pilots, operators witness the consequences of their attacks in detail. The constant exposure without physical distance deepens guilt and powerlessness.[88] At the same time, these soldiers might lack the traditional social net that frontline soldiers have. Camaraderie weakens when personnel operate in isolation in bunkers for extended periods. Some even return home and miss sharing their experiences with fellow soldiers.[89] The lack of shared situational awareness and physical risk can make it more difficult to build esprit de corps–the unique form of community that creates a buffer against latent stress.  Drone operators may lack recognition by being seen as technicians rather than warriors.[90] Such experiences may reduce motivation to remain in service over time. These challenges highlight the need for more effective norms and robust support systems. New narratives must place drone operations on equal footing with traditional fighting in terms of dignity and value.  Otherwise, technologically-oriented soldiers may feel undervalued or misunderstood, lowering service morale, cohesion and retention. Again, technology is not the deciding factor. What matters is how the organisation and the personnel frame the narrative. Goal-driven efforts can prevent fragmentation and integrate autonomous systems while maintaining reliability, job satisfaction, and pride.

Public Opinion and the Morale to Defend

Public narratives shape the morale to defend, and are influenced by military technology. Historical cases show that the presentation of war is the dominant factor for how and if the general public continues to support national defence or withdraws trust, thus weakening morale to defend.  At the end of the 19th century, yellow journalism and propaganda films began to glorify war: German atrocities against civilians during the First World War were also heavily exaggerated, fuelling patriotic fervour and making conscription more acceptable to the public.[91] Creating a narrative about the enemy as an inhuman monster has been commonly used to empower populations to increase morale to defend. When a war is perceived as just, enlistment tends to increase due to stronger public belief in its necessity. The morale to defend and individual soldiers’ service and combat morale are deeply intertwined through the narrative of war. Extreme effects like fraternising with the enemy, insubordination, and even violence against own officers, called fragging, became increasingly common during the Vietnam War’s final phase – all signs of how a decline in service morale occurs when the narrative leads to a breakdown in the morale to defend.

Public narratives shape the morale to defend, and are influenced by military technology.

In Ukraine, social media has created a double-sided effect: citizens are funding drone efforts and supporting narratives framing soldiers as freedom fighters. Additionally, some narratives can also help in boosting morale to defend; for example, drone attacks as revenge for Russian attacks.[92] However, real-time footage of the war can also cause fatigue and a decline in morale. Videos of fallen soldiers, destroyed cities, and civilian casualties can be spread uncontrollably. Over time, this may lead to disillusionment among the population. Unfiltered images of suffering might create fatigue, fear, or moral discomfort among the population, especially in small states with a people’s army model, such as Switzerland, where trust in the military’s ethical standards is essential.

Indeed, AWS has triggered strong ethical resistance in civil society, with campaigns such as “stop killer robots” and UN initiatives.[93], [94] A central argument for critics is that deadly autonomous systems create detachment from warfighting and remove the human factor, which now still allows moral judgment and ethical decisions during combat. [95] Images of conscience-free robots killing soldiers or civilians break many popular perceptions about war’s moral boundaries. A fatal malfunction, such as targeting civilians, could undermine public trust and risk a narrative collapse. In short, the use of AWS might damage morale to defend, similar to the Vietnam War and the recruitment crisis that followed it, albeit for different reasons.

Nonetheless, some argue that AWS might uphold or strengthen moral decision-making in war if handled correctly. An argument from the philosophical world says that everyone has some moral duty to use technology to protect their own soldiers.[96] By reducing losses of soldiers’ lives through the deployment of drones and robots on the battlefield, families and societies can be spared the pain of losing loved ones and having to mourn their deaths. In the long run, this reduction might help boost morale to defend and support necessary military operations due to the low risk. From this perspective, AWS represents humanitarian progress. A narrative could be created about a “pure war” without the blood sacrifice of one’s own troops. However, such narratives only hold if meaningful human control remains.[97] There exists a clear need for humans[98] to govern and be responsible for AWS’ actions, otherwise the systems and technology may lose legitimacy.[99] Without such control, moral choices are left to machines, which may erode the ethical foundation upon which the morale to defend depends, namely, the upholding of societal standards for ethical behaviour. The balance is therefore delicate. Although the public would like to avoid unnecessary military losses, there is a reasonable belief that fully autonomous warfare may not yet be acceptable, especially if no one can be held accountable for a tragedy. The morale to defend is shaped by this tension between security and responsibility concerning AWS.

Some argue that AWS might uphold or strengthen moral decision-making in war if handled correctly.

General Implications for Future AWS

The collective analysis of the narratives discussed above suggests that technologies affecting soldiers are not deterministic and rather pliable. New technology can provide a morale boost or a decline, depending on the human and organisational boundaries surrounding its use. For military leaders and decision-makers, this means that the integration of AWS has to be carried out in tandem with a certain pre-decided narratives. This is necessary to control the culture and sentiments around the weapons. Moreover, combat morale must be maintained by teaching soldiers to handle and understand the technology in use. They must still perceive some autonomy and control on the battlefield, even with AI as a co-player or adversary.  Service morale must be protected by integrating new roles into the existing defence structure in a manner that values both technological competence and traditional warrior ethos. This means creating career paths, specific media campaigns and bolstering a support system focused on camaraderie for “technology soldiers”.  This is essential to bolster unity and solidarity among the different types of soldiers and armed forces in a country. The morale to defend in society is nurtured through openness and ethical behaviour. The populace needs assurance, supported by policy and regulations, that AWS are subject to human judgment and legal responsibility.

If one succeeds in resolving this tripartite problem, it is possible to integrate new technological systems that enhance the overall morale of the forces and the country.  It would help soldiers feel better protected and more competent, leading to a higher combat morale; a coherent and evolving organisational structure and culture would foster a stable service morale; and the civilian population’s recognition of the military as a compelling and legitimate force would boost morale to defend. If narratives are not controlled, AWS may become a double-edged sword, demoralising troops and undermining the populace’s support. Analysis suggests that morale is the soul of war, and even autonomous machines will operate in the shadow of existing human narratives. If future warriors, human or artificial, are to succeed in war, control of the narratives is essential. This demands a critical consciousness about how to unite technological development with the psychological and ethical grounding that motivates soldiers to fight and society to support them. Facing a new era of weapons means confronting both technological and moral innovation. Maintaining humanity is the moral compass amid modern war’s autonomous storm; this challenge will define whether autonomous weapons become a strength or a weakness for future military organisations.

If narratives are not controlled, AWS may become a double-edged sword, demoralising troops and undermining the populace’s support.

The provided analysis remains conceptual and explorative. Due to the lack of empirical data in the still-developing sphere of AWS, the direct impact of AWS on soldier morale can not be fully assessed at this time. Furthermore, differences in cultures might play an important factor in the actual role of narratives in the use of AWS, these limitations restrict generalisability, and offer opportunities for further research. Future research should be done to explore said differences in the morale impacts of AWS in different cultures. There is also a need for a longitudinal empirical study on a large population base.

 

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André Korsmo Berntsen, Master of Philosophy in Organisational Leadership at the University of Oslo. He is a researcher in the interdisciplinary “MEMCOD” (Mission Command, Military Ethics, Organisational Design) team of the leadership and communication chair at the Military Academy at ETH Zurich. He also has previous training as a logistics NCO for the Norwegian Army. He is currently pursuing a PhD focusing on the cascade of cognitive styles at the University of Bergen.

First Lieutenant Cyrill Kischel commands a military police staff company on a deputy basis. He is pursuing a bachelor’s degree at the Military Academy at ETH Zurich to become a career officer in the Swiss Armed Forces. His study interests are military sociology, psychology and ethics. As a future career officer, he will mainly be involved in coaching and teaching reservists of the Swiss Armed Forces.

First Lieutenant Nick Husmann commands a mechanised infantry platoon. He is also pursuing a bachelor’s degree at the Military Academy at ETH Zurich to become a career officer in the Swiss Armed Forces. His study interests are military sociology and psychology. As a future career officer, he will mainly be involved in coaching and teaching reservists of the Swiss Armed Forces.

The views contained in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the Swiss Armed Forces.

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