Abstract: A conventional force imbalance in Europe cannot be offset by increased capabilities in the near future, this will take time. Consequently, a limited military escalation remains possible or even probable as long as this situation endures. If NATO is unable to react to this, it will likely lose its cohesion and significantly reduce the security of its European members. A manoeuvrist approach at the strategic level is likely to be a solution to this conundrum. Firstly, all existing military resources must be focussed on flexible, delay-free force projection. At the same time, the political process must again become agile to ensure unity of purpose in any escalation.

Problem statement: How can the conventional military gap be closed in time, thus creating a new equilibrium to prevent future military conflicts?

So what?: The European nations must first and foremost ensure transatlantic force projection. The reconstitution of their armed forces must be subordinated to this. The timely implementation of this force projection in the event of a military crisis must be prepared and practised within NATO and its member states.

Strategic Centres of Gravity

Symmetrical war has returned to Europe, and nuclear power—Russia—is a belligerent. Any strategic analysis of a war must begin with the question of who the opposing parties actually are. One answer can be found in the strategic centres of gravity.[1] Russia sees its strategic centre of gravity in unhindered access to the world market for exporting its raw materials as a prerequisite for importing technically high-quality products—access which is physically limited by perpetual ice in the north and impassable mountains in the south. Furthermore, access cannot be taken for granted in the southeast, as China is also a strategic competitor. Russia can potentially become paralysed by U.S. and alliance military bases to the west and east, turning the U.S. and its allies into adversaries, at least from a Russian strategic perspective.[2] However, as long as foreign trade takes place, the Russian economy will function. Consequently, Russia can produce or procure war materiel and the population’s support for political goals is maintained.

Apart from the casualties in its border regions and Ukraine’s occasional long-range strikes, the war has had no serious impact on daily life in Russia. The currency is stable, and the economy is developing positively not least due to an enormous increase in the Russian defence industry.[3] Russia has ensured the protection of this centre of gravity politically with great prudence—at least so far.

Apart from the casualties in its border regions and Ukraine’s occasional long-range strikes, the war has had no serious impact on daily life in Russia.

Over the course of the war, Ukraine has found ways to hit the Russian oil industry far into the hinterland, causing a significant drop in production at times. However, Ukraine is not in a position to take decisive action against the Russian centre of gravity on its own. Ukraine’s supporters are trying to achieve this by non-military means, for example, through sanctions, albeit with limited effect so far.[4] Becoming a party to the war is not an option for Ukraine’s supporters, if only because of Russia’s status as a nuclear power. Nevertheless, this shows that at the strategic level, Russia is confronted not only by Ukraine, but others—even if below the threshold of war. As a result, this centre of gravity analysis identifies the actual opponents at the strategic level: Russia and the NATO-centred security architecture,[5] both seeking to protect their centres of gravity while attempting to degrade the adversaries’.

The chosen term is somewhat cumbersome. However, simply using NATO here would not adequately reflect Russia’s adversary’s actual complexity and factual heterogeneity. European countries that are not NATO members and yet are not neutral in this conflict, Ukraine supporters outside NATO, such as Australia, are also opposed to Russia and coordinate their actions with NATO members. On the other hand, NATO is currently not a monolithic bloc. Some of its member countries show considerable differences in their security policy, including with Russia. Although there is no self-declaration of this NATO-centred security architecture, NATO’s definition applies: the centre of gravity is alliance cohesion.[6]

However, Russia is also unable to combat this centre of gravity with its armed forces decisively, as it is located outside Ukraine, meaning that a military escalation would also entail incalculable risks. Consequently, Russia is attempting to undermine cohesion and thus the political will to support Ukraine by hybrid means,[7] ranging from diplomacy and strategic communication to means such as espionage and sabotage, and they are having some effect.[8] However, Russia has also been unable to end support for Ukraine.

In addition to this centre of gravity analysis, Russia’s self-declarations place its strategy in the context of opposition to NATO.[9] Incidentally, this strategy is designed to be defensive by its objectives: in contrast to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Russia has no recognisable intention to conquer all of Europe. However, NATO’s eastward extension has been perceived as contrary to Russia’s security interests.[10] It must be recognised here that the former Warsaw Pact states also sought to join NATO as a hedge against Russia.[11] The antagonism between NATO and Russia never disappeared entirely: the nuclear arsenal has always been present. From an unbiased military strategic perspective, the further east NATO’s edge is, the higher the level of security for its members; the further west, the higher the level of security for Russia, as long as this antagonism exists. Therefore, it is rational from a strategic perspective to end this extension by military means if necessary or if the opportunity presents itself. The fact that Russia did not answer Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO accession is no deviation from the strategy but a back draw that can currently not be mitigated by Russia.

NATO’s eastward extension has been perceived as contrary to Russia’s security interests.

Furthermore, Russia’s security is to be increased by extending its reach and, where possible, moving its military assets westwards.[12] The further west Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities reach, the greater the warning time and the more secure Russia. By adding an A2/AD base in, e.g. Transnistria in addition to the already far westward Kaliningrad base, the whole area of the former Warsaw Pact would become a zone where major NATO movements would be paralysed and the opportunity to block access to international trade with military means via the western axis would effectively be reduced.

This strategy might be contradictory to the law of armed conflict, to the idea of a multilateral security policy, and to ethics. Moreover, it is not irrational from a strategic point of view, which is good news: strategy development begins with analysing the opponent’s course of action, which can only succeed if the opponent behaves rationally. However, the war in Ukraine has shown that both sides are taking this strategy seriously: Russia by advancing this strategy through the war itself, and the states of the NATO-centred security architecture by also considering the continuation of this strategy through military action on NATO territory to be possible[13] or, under certain conditions, even probable.[14]

Conventional Imbalance

The fact that the war in Ukraine is an emanation, but not the endpoint, of this Russian strategy is also demonstrated by the reallocation of large parts of Russia’s industry to armaments production. Together with the procurement of equipment abroad and the steadily increasing recruitment and, therefore, strength of the Russian armed forces, it is becoming progressively clearer that Russia is not limiting itself to reconstituting its losses in the Ukraine war. On the contrary, Russia is growing militarily.[15] In military nomenclature, there is no longer a political-military end state in Europe, as such a state, by definition, permanently rules out open hostilities.[16] On the contrary, Europe is moving away from this end state due to Russia’s military build-up, which is currently not even being matched by European efforts.

The war in Ukraine has also proven that a nuclear balance alone does not guarantee this end state as long as no nuclear power is existentially threatened. Under these conditions, it is possible, at least with some self-restraint, to use conventional superiority and wage war below the threshold of nuclear war, as illustrated by the behaviour of the US as the only state that can decisively contribute to a clear victory for Ukraine with its own forces or through significant material support. Yet, in practice, the US is dosing its support to avoid—by its own admission—putting Russia in existential danger and thus bringing it close to the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, Ukraine’s military success is not in the vital interests of the US to such an extent that it would use all means at its disposal, even accepting nuclear escalation. Conversely, although Russia has repeatedly emphasised the possibility of using nuclear weapons, it has regularly linked such a use to the precondition of an existential threat.[17] Consequently, nuclear balance hedges war, but only a conventional balance creates a strategic end state.

Although Russia has repeatedly emphasised the possibility of using nuclear weapons, it has regularly linked such a use to the precondition of an existential threat.

From the outset, the European NATO-centred security architecture was based on the military strength of the US.[18] It is not necessary at this point to trace the path of the European armed forces in detail since the end of the Cold War. Rather, it is sufficient to note that since 1991, the focus has been on capabilities for international crisis management for many years, while national and alliance defence were erroneously treated as a secondary priority. If we look at the total defence spending of all European countries, the problem is obviously not purely quantitative.[19] Training and equipment were focussed on the performance of internal security tasks in third countries. The ability to engage in combined arms combat in large formations against a peer opponent was only retained as the nucleus of a reconstitution option. Two highlights may illustrate this: the capabilities for accompanying air defence for ground forces were largely abandoned, as no opponent with a functional air force was expected.[20] There are no large formations and, therefore, no longer any organic command structures above division level,[21] and even divisions are no longer equipped with organic deployment capability. As a result, most European armed forces today have the same structure, albeit with certain differences between the individual countries. Overall, too few forces in Europe today contribute to the conventional balance through training and equipment, organic deployability, interoperability and leadership capability.

In the countries of the NATO-centred security architecture, the Russian build-up, the intensification of the conventional imbalance and the associated threat have now become part of the political and public debate.[22] Ways of regaining a conventional balance in Europe through rearmament are being discussed. In some countries, the reconstitution has already begun: compulsory military service has been reintroduced in Sweden, rearmament has begun in practically all countries on NATO’s eastern flank following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and in virtually all other countries, defence budgets have been increased, in some cases significantly. However, even if all European countries consistently pursue the path to regaining their military capabilities and thus one day achieve a conventional balance, the stable end state will not be reached, at least not until then. As a result, this development paradoxically increases the risk of further military conflicts in the near future: if the armed forces in Europe are on a path of growth at the end of which there will again be a conventional equilibrium, this means, conversely, that the danger of at least a limited military confrontation within the framework of Russia’s strategic goals is even greater until this equilibrium is reached. A favourable opportunity can only be exploited as long as it exists. To reach a new satisfactory end state, Europe has to move away from it temporarily. In other words, after the end of hostilities in Ukraine at the latest, Europe may find itself in the most dangerous security situation since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In the countries of the NATO-centred security architecture, the Russian build-up, the intensification of the conventional imbalance and the associated threat have now become part of the political and public debate.

After the end of hostilities in Ukraine, regardless of where the ceasefire line will be, the Russian armed forces will return to their garrisons, rearm and pass on their war experience to a new generation of soldiers. In Europe—with the exception of Finland—Russia may only face armed forces whose reconstitution has, at best, just begun.

Manoeuvrist Approach at the Strategic Level

Simply accepting this situation and hoping that Russia will let the opportunity for which it is making such efforts pass by contradicts all strategic principles and the core mission of armed forces and, indeed, of governments. Ending the imbalance through armament alone would require accelerating this armament to be completed after one or two years at the latest. This is objectively impossible: even if European countries were to maximise their resources on a military build-up from now on (which is not foreseeable at present), armament capacities would have to be created, personnel would have to be recruited and trained, armed forces could not be multiplied within one or two years, at least not as long as there is no complete orientation towards a war economy, which would have massive economic and social consequences. A realistic way must be found to significantly reduce and possibly close the conventional gap by the end of the war in Ukraine.

Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations declares that the “manoeuvrist approach” is “an indirect and sophisticated” approach that “focuses on applying strength against vulnerability and recognises the importance of cohesion and will”.[23] Two years of deliberate warfare in Ukraine have clearly revealed Russia’s strength, maximising the use of economic resources to build up and expand a military force, as well as its weakness, flexibility: after some manoeuvrist attempts, Russia returned to the linear operational concept of the Soviet Union. The strengths and weaknesses of NATO-centred security architecture are complementary: restraint in armament is offset by flexibility. Therefore, a response in the sense of a strategic manoeuvrist approach[24] is an obvious solution where, at least for a limited period and locally, every offensive Russian force can be countered flexibly by a prohibitive force. And the only factor within the NATO-centred security architecture that can close the gap is the US armed forces. It is true that after the Cold War, the armed forces of the US also underwent a similar development to Europe’s armed forces, but without ever losing their ability to project force, which they were able to demonstrate in the Balkans, in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other places.

To summarise, the manoeuvrist approach to regaining the conventional balance in Europe in good time consists of ensuring the availability of a force dispositive in any place where a military escalation is imminent through transatlantic force projection.

Unacceptable Conditions

However, strategically speaking, three unacceptable conditions stand in the way of this manoeuvrist approach.

Even if we assume that the US is still prepared to guarantee the security of its European allies by deploying its armed forces, there is still the issue of the practical feasibility of force projection across the Atlantic. Assuming that the US has sea lines of communication, air sovereignty, and sufficient transport capacity all over the Atlantic, Europe’s task is to ensure the reception, staging, and onward movement up to deployment. This primarily includes non-military, logistical tasks, which are not currently guaranteed. Transport infrastructure within Europe does not meet the requirements of such scenarios. Stationing facilities are not available to a sufficient extent. This situation is exacerbated with regard to the consequences of going to war: the prisoner-of-war system, the transport and care of the wounded and the casualty system are just as unprepared as a civil defence system that would ensure the functionality of this zone. Exercises have revealed many of these deficits–but they have yet to be overcome. This logistical weakness is the first unacceptable condition that stands in the way of a manoeuvrist approach.

The current state of most European armed forces not only means that, for the time being, a flexible conventional balance can only be achieved through transatlantic force projection and that the necessary prerequisites must be prioritised over the lengthy reconstitution of our own armed forces. However, this conclusion only applies to a limited extent. Protection of rear areas against sabotage and the effects of long-range weapons or air attacks are still military tasks and indispensable additions. In other words, the military must guarantee protection against Russian hybrid activities, deep special operations, and A2/AD capabilities. Though the overall national logistics task takes priority, the military must contribute. In addition to the provision of military logistical capabilities, this primarily includes air defence, homeland security and cyber defence. The capabilities for front-line combat can be retained where available. However, their further expansion is initially of secondary importance, as the lack of force protection capabilities is the second unacceptable condition.

The current state of most European armed forces not only means that, for the time being, a flexible conventional balance can only be achieved through transatlantic force projection and that the necessary prerequisites must be prioritised over the lengthy reconstitution of our own armed forces.

Even if a North American force posture, reinforced by suitable European forces, were ready and could be physically deployed to any point where enemy preparations suggest a new conflict, it remains questionable whether the political-strategic leadership process between recognising the signs and triggering force projection would be fast enough. During the Cold War, a case of collective defence would have had to be formally declared in the North Atlantic Council before the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) could have implemented the General Defence Plan. However, this decision-making process was highly formalised and regularly rehearsed. All the political preparatory work had long been completed, including the military policy process within NATO. The democratic states of NATO were involved in a constant political and media discourse on strategic issues. In addition to their practical purpose, compulsory military service, NATO alerts and field exercises, to name just a few, have always contributed to information and credibility, both for their own public and with regard to their opponents.[25] NATO has been working on a new family of plans since 2014, ensuring implementation by the member states and aligning its exercise activities accordingly.[26] What remains problematic, however, is what happens between the SACEUR’s military advice or a member state’s request for a state of alliance and its determination in the political process.

NATO has been working on a new family of plans since 2014, ensuring implementation by the member states and aligning its exercise activities accordingly.

Suppose a Russian convoy transporting military goods crosses the Belarusian-Lithuanian border unannounced and without waiting for normal routine border procedures, threatening to use military force and firing warning shots from accompanying combat vehicles, and after an hour, reaches Russian territory in Kaliningrad Oblast. It is important to understand that this is only a scenario, not a forecast or even an assumed most dangerous course of action. In general, any limited military escalation is conceivable, which would have to trigger NATO’s immediate unanimous decision for collective defence. It can only be speculated how long the political process would take, and how it would proceed, if governments in every single alliance member state would be supported by their public and their polity and whether or not the result would be the declaration of a state of collective defence, authorising planned SACEUR measures or only an ultimatum in the event of a recurrence. Overall, it can currently be assumed that the political preparation for escalation has not yet progressed far enough, which we recognise as another unacceptable condition.

Mitigation

These unacceptable conditions share the common element of standing in the way of a rapid, flexible response, making it impossible to immediately establish a deterrent force posture in every potential theatre of war through a united effort of will. In short, the existing unacceptable conditions prevent the application of the necessary manoeuvrist approach that could counteract the conventional imbalance in a timely manner.

The member states must first realise that time no longer permits the misallocation of resources. Where parts of the armed forces already represent a deployable force posture, they must be earmarked exclusively for this mission. Where it is possible to strengthen this force posture from the current inventory by reorganising and relocating resources, this must be done. Tying up military resources for international crisis management or other tasks must take a back seat until further notice.

The increase in military capabilities must focus on the deficits in the protection of allied territory. Reconnaissance into the entire depth of the enemy, air defence, including the necessary capabilities to act against A2/AD,[27] and protection of critical infrastructure in the rear areas must be the priority armament projects before further growth of projectable forces. These deficits must be remedied as urgently as possible, which usually prioritises the procurement of market-available solutions. Industrial policy interests or long-term strategic armament goals are also of secondary importance.

However, this increase in military capabilities is only part of the overall national task of enabling the rapid projection of capabilities within Europe or North America.[28] Expanding and ensuring the reception capacities of seaports and airports, the efficiency of transport routes for military movements (to mention a few examples: bridge capacities and the availability of railway transport wagons), the provision of stationing facilities, including training grounds, and the further course, capacities for the care and convalescence of the wounded and the safekeeping of prisoners of war are prerequisites for the indispensable projection of forces. In the event of a conflict, however, these tasks must be accomplished in parallel with direct military action on national territory. In countries close to the conflict, this includes evacuations and supply shortages for their population, as can also be observed in the rear areas of Ukraine. However, countries in the liaison zone will also have to reckon with military effects, at least if they are located in the area of the A2/AD weapons.

This increase in military capabilities is only part of the overall national task of enabling the rapid projection of capabilities within Europe or North America.

As far as the military leadership’s ability to react and act is concerned, the best NATO planning and exercises are useless if valuable time is lost in political processes in the event of a crisis. It would be even more disastrous if the alliance were condemned to inability to act due to political disagreement. If there is no appropriate response to a limited military provocation, this would be the end of NATO’s mutual promise of security. If Russia saw a low-risk opportunity to bring NATO to the end of its raison d’être, this would be an invitation to limited aggression. Therefore, parallel to the prerequisites for a transatlantic or intra-European force projection, the political processes that ensure military freedom of action in a crisis must be advanced and finalised as far as possible. This concerns primarily the political processes between governments and the member states’ public and between NATO and other participants in the NATO-centred security architecture, which take far more time than the formalised political processes between the NATO states themselves. Such political processes can be unpopular, as we have seen, for example, with the NATO Dual-Track Decision and its political implementation from 1979 onwards.[29] Here, however, the reasons of the state must take precedence over avoiding domestic political conflict.

Conclusion

There is a conventional imbalance in Europe that cannot be offset quickly enough by an increase in capabilities. A limited military escalation remains possible or even probable as long as it exists. If NATO is unable to react, the alliance will likely collapse, leading to a significant loss in the security of each state. A manoeuvrist approach at the strategic level shows the solution. Firstly, all existing military resources must be focussed on flexible, delay-free force projection. New capabilities must also be aimed at implementing and securing this projection. At the same time, the political process must be finalised to ensure unity of purpose in any escalation.

NATO, most of its member states and other like-minded nations are already beginning to address all of these points. However, at the same time, we repeatedly see delays, even countervailing tendencies.[30] The manoeuvrist approach at the strategic level, therefore, does not claim to provide an entirely new direction. Still, it creates a frame of reference for examining the meaningfulness of current developments and assessing future decisions. International crisis management may still be important, but like all other tasks, it must take a back seat in national and collective defence for the time being. Armament projects that will only lead to increased capabilities in a few years, however desirable they may be from an industrial policy perspective, must not consume resources that, if deployed elsewhere, would immediately bring about significant improvements in the ability to act. An expansion of the armed forces is initially of secondary importance compared to ensuring that existing forces can be projected without delay. Political decision-making processes that guarantee NATO’s ability to act in real-time must be finalised immediately and without regard to popularity for reasons of state. In the event of a crisis, it is too late.

NATO, most of its member states and other like-minded nations are already beginning to address all of these points.

The elephant in the room, of course, remains the willingness of the US to throw its military weight into the balance in Europe for as long as Europe is unable to restore the balance itself. This, in turn, suggests that Europe may never really want to achieve strategic autonomy because it is still cheaper to outsource significant parts of its external security to the US.

It remains to be seen how this game will end. In the short term, however, even with a consistent manoeuvrist approach, it is hardly conceivable that the prevailing imbalance can be offset without US capabilities until an end state is reached again.

 

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Colonel (GS) Stephan Behrenz is a section head at the Joint Planning and Command Staff of the Federal Ministry of Defence, in charge of force planning, armaments, budget, as well as cyber and information technology. His previous assignments include capability planning for the army and within NATO as head of the office for the Commander Joint Force Command Brunssum. He has held command assignments up to and including battalion level. He has successfully completed the General Staff Officer Course at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College and a Master’s degree in business administration.

Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Daniel T. Kleffner is a desk officer for force planning policy at the Joint Planning and Command Staff of the Federal Ministry of Defence. He has served as a company commander (air and missile defence) and as head of a NATO operational planning team. He has completed the General Staff Officer Course at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College. He holds a Master’s degree in aerospace engineering.

Colonel (GS) Matthias Puschnig is the Head of Special Staff Ukraine at the Federal Ministry of Defence. He has had assignments in the fields of military policy, strategy and operational command and control. He has held command and management assignments as a deputy brigade commander and a battalion commander as well as positions in the civilian industry. He has published several articles on European security architecture and strategic issues regarding the war in Ukraine. He has completed the General Staff Officer training at the Canadian Forces College. He holds a Master’s degree in business administration.

The views contained in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the German Federal Ministry of Defence.

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[1] On the concept of centre of gravity see Nils Jorstad, “Emperor’s new clothes, Manoeuvre Warfare and Operational Art,” PhD diss., University Glasgow, 2004.

[2] Deutscher Bundestag/Wissenschaftliche Dienste, “Die russische Sicherheitspolitik seit dem Jahr 2000. Formelle Grundlagen, Entwicklung, ideologischer Überbau,” 8, accessed April 18, 2024, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/918488/30971c4459f7f97cf215b8a321dd5699/WD-2-071-22-pdf-data.pdf.

[3] Elina Ribakowa, “Russia’s new economy may end up prolonging its war,” Financial Times, May 02, 2024, accessed August 18, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/3fd6b61b-f9f4-47dc-9369-27909868a0b6.

[4] The Military Balance 2024, “Defence Economics Russia,” in: The Military Balance 2024, 172-174, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2024.

[5] Carnegie Europe, “The War in Ukraine will either forge or splinter Europe – 2024,” https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/92250.

[6] NATO Joint Forces Training Centre, “A truly cohesive event,” NATO Exercise LOYAL LEDA 2022 concluded at JFTC, December 09, 2022, accessed October 18, 2024, https://www.jftc.nato.int/articles/loyal-leda-2022; Steven Metz and Frederick M. Downey, “Centres of Gravity and Strategic Planning,” Military Review (April 1988): 141, accessed October 18, 2024, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2022/Metz-Centers-Gravity-1988/.

[7] Serhii Maksymenko, Dmytrovich Derkach, Lidiya Mykolayevna (2023), “Understanding Modern Cognitive War in the Global Dimension, its Genesis in the Ukrainian Context: A Review and Directions for Future Research,” [Porozumění modern cognitiví vàlce v globálním rozměru, její geneze v ukrajinském kontextu: Přehled a směry budoucíno výzkumu] Univerzita Obrany, Ustav Strategickych Studii, Obrana a Strategie, 2023(1): 126-148. https://doi.org/10.3849/1802-7199.23.2023.01.126-148.

[8] Council of the European Union, “Press Release: Hybrid threats/Russia,” Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Russia’s continued hybrid activity against the EU and its Member States, October 08, 2024, accessed October 18, 2024, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/08/hybrid-threatsrussia-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-russia-s-continued-hybrid-activity-against-the-eu-and-its-member-states/.

[9] Michael Kofman, et. al., “Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts,” Washington D.C.: CNA (Centre for Naval Analyses), 2021, 8.

[10] Paul Dibb, “How will Russia’s war on Ukraine end?,” Newstex, March 01, 2024, https://www.proquest.com/blogs-podcasts-websites/how-will-russia-s-war-on-ukraineend/docview/2933181152/se-2?accountid=211844.

[11] Maria Mälksoo, “NATO’s new front: deterrence moves eastward,” International Affairs, Vol.100, Issue 2, (2024): 531–547, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae008.

[12] Igor Delanoë, “Streit um das Asowsche Meer,“ Le Monde Diplomatique, last modified January 10, 2018, https://monde-diplomatique.de/artikel/!5562266.

[13] NATO Headquarters Allied Air Command, “NATO’s new flag series exercise will execute air defence tactics,” April 17, 2024, accessed October 18, 2024, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2024/ramsteinflagannouncment.

[14] Carolina Drüten, “Wie die Nato für das Kaliningrad-Szenario trainiert,“ Die Welt, last modified October 18, 2024, https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/plus254053144/Verteidigung-Wie-die-Nato-fuer-das-Kaliningrad-Szenario-trainiert.html.

[15] The Military Balance 2024, “Russia,” in: The Military Balance 2024, 164-169, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2024.

[16] “End state describes the set of conditions to meet conflict termination criteria,” Richard E. Berkebile, “Military Strategy Revisited,” Military Review Online Exclusive, May 2018, 2, accessed August 17, 2024, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2018-ole/may/military-strategy/.

[17] On Russia’s nuclear doctrine, see Michael Kofman et al.’s, “Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts,” Washington D.C.: CNA (Centre for Naval Analyses), 2021, 65-67; “Russland-Analysen vom 20.07.2023,” Dokumentation: Die russische Debatte über Sergej Karaganows Artikel vom 13. Juni 2023, “Eine schwerwiegende, aber notwendige Entscheidung. Der Einsatz von Atomwaffen kann die Menschheit vor einer globalen Katastrophe bewahren,“ https://laender-analysen.de/russland-analysen/439/die-russische-debatte-ueber-sergej-karaganows-artikel-vom-13-juni-2023-eine-schwerwiegende-aber-notwendige-entscheidung-der/.

[18] As Lord Ismay, 1st NATO Secretary General, once stated: “The only purpose was to keep the United States in, to keep the Russians out and to keep Germany down,” Peter W. Rodman, “NATO’s Role in a New European Security Order,” NATO Public Diplomacy Division, October 1995, accessed October 18, 2024, https://www.nato.int/acad/conf/future95/rodman.htm.

[19] “Die Mär vom NATO-Defizit,” Herbert Wulf, https://www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik/artikel/die-maer-vom-nato-defizit-7444/.

[20] Rafael Loss, “A Roof Over Europe? Ground-Based Air Defence After the Zeitenwende,” Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, accessed October 18, 2024, https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2024_3.pdf.

[21] Marco Seliger, “Die Nato gibt sich eine Struktur wie im Kalten Krieg, und Deutschland macht wieder einmal grosse Versprechungen,“ Neue Zürcher Zeitung, last modified June 4, 2023, https://www.nzz.ch/international/neue-nato-struktur-deutschland-macht-wieder-grosse-ankuendigungen-ld.1740692.

[22] Chatham House: Myths and misconceptions around Russian military intent – 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/myths-and-misconceptions-around-russian-military-intent.

[23] Jeroen Verhaege, “Is NATO Land Operations Doctrine Aiming Too High?,” War On The Rocks, August 06, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/is-nato-land-operations-doctrine-aiming-too-high/.

[24] On definition and evolution of manoeuvre warfare see Christopher Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” in: Advanced Land Warfare: Tactics and Operations, edited by Mikael Weissmann, and Niklas Nilsson, 28, Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192857422.003.0002.

[25] “Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung: NATO-Stabsrahmenuebung wintex-cimex 89,” Bulletin 18-89, February 2022, 22, accessed October 18, 2024, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/newsletter-und-abos/bulletin/nato-stabsrahmenuebung-wintex-cimex-89-782484.

[26] Nele Lorents, “NATO’s regional defence plans,” International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn 2024, accessed October 18, 2024, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2024/07/No-5_NATOs-Regional-Defence-Plans_Nele-Loorents.pdf.

[27] NATO Defence College, “How to respond to Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)? Towards a NATO Counter-A2/AD Strategy,” by Guillaume Lasconjarias and Alessandro Marrone, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=906.

[28] Sandor Fabian, “The illusions of conventional war: Europe is learning the wrong lessons from the conflict in Ukraine,” Modern War Institute at West Point, April 23, 2024, accessed August 17, 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-illusion-of-conventional-war-europe-is-learning-the-wrong-lessons-from-the-conflict-in-ukraine/.

[29] Ulrike Bosse, “NATO-Doppelbeschluss: Massenprotest gegen nukleare Aufrüstung,“ NDR Info, last modified February 22, 2023, https://www.ndr.de/geschichte/chronologie/NATO-Doppelbeschluss-Massenprotest-gegen-nukleare-Aufruestung,natodoppelbeschluss102.html.

[30] As a German example: Ralf Stegner, “Nukleare Gefahr,“ Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: IPG (February 20, 2024), https://www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik/artikel/nukleare-gefahr-7335/.