Abstract: Manoeuvre is still the most challenging phase of military operations. However, it has changed from the temporal-spatial coordination of physical combat power factors to a more mentally based control of, among other things, the intensity progression of armed conflicts. The targeted use of the culmination principle offers armed forces — in particular those characterised by the continental European leadership philosophy and based on the war theory findings of Carl von Clausewitz — a unique opportunity to at least partially compensate for physical inferiority through mental agility — in other words, to ´outmanoeuvre´ the enemy in a figurative sense.

Problem statement: In what way does the cultural history of continental Europe provide fertile grounds for implementing the culmination principle to solve problems in the modern military context?

So what?: Defence ministries of European states (each on their own or in joint approaches) must create the intellectual prerequisites for military leaders at all levels to understand, learn and apply principles such as the targeted use of culmination or the enemy’s Centrum Gravitatis, mission tactics, or the examination of orders received for ethical compliance. An efficient, university-level recognised, core subject-based military science would be a mandatory prerequisite in this respect.

Manoeuvre

The manoeuvre should rightly be classified as the most challenging phase of the operation. It differs in principle from the other phases. The fundamental functional principles that distinguish it and why it deserves to be considered the most intellectually demanding phase of the operation are explained in detail below. To give an initial overview, it can be said that manoeuvre, in contrast to deployment, which is essentially determined by the available resources and based on advance planning, is like a duel in which every move causes a multitude of opposing moves and advance planning is, therefore, impossible. The main difference between the battle and exploitation phases and the manoeuvre phase is that a faster sequence of necessary combat decisions leaves less time for implementing large-scale options.

Planning vs. Independent Evaluation in the Manoeuvre Phase

“The more systematically man proceeds, the more effectively coincidence strikes him”,[1] concludes Dürrenmatt in his work ‘The Physicists’, claiming that preconceived plans must always fail in an uncertain future.

The German phrase ‘planen’ as well as its English counterpart ‘to plan something’ trace their roots to the Latin words ‘planta pedis’, meaning the ‘sole of the foot’. The origin for this may be rooted in the image of the Roman architect who drew the ‘footprint’ of a house desired by a client by walking in the sand. This was not a proactive or creative activity but rather merely a technical implementation of the client’s idea — without any significant judgment on the architect’s part. Such an understanding of ‘planning’ is likely to have focused on implementing an order based on given resources and a given purpose and without a significant own assessment performance.

The German phrase ‘planen’ as well as its English counterpart ‘to plan something’ trace their roots to the Latin words ‘planta pedis’, meaning the ‘sole of the foot’.

The extent to which the idea — that the primary achievement of military leadership lies in such ‘planning’ — has become entrenched is reflected in the phrase ‘planned general staff-like,’ which is used to denote a perfectly executed operation. Nothing does less justice to the capability profile of the general staff officer than determining them on such planning. Rather, what should be considered includes visionary approaches in the context of finding a purpose, creativity in finding possibilities, and independent judgement and will — in other words, precisely the skills without which the manoeuvre could not develop its intended performance.[2]

Thus, deployment must be planned in the above sense because it is largely determined by the given resources and the predetermined purpose and because, by definition, it takes place outside the enemy’s sphere of influence. Once the manoeuvre phase has commenced, the enemy’s ability to intervene and the free play of two opposing wills suddenly results in an overwhelming multitude of possibilities that require a fundamentally different quality of operational leadership.

According to Clausewitz, armed conflict can be compared to a duel that is, the clash of two independent wills, in which each decision of one opponent entails many possible response options for the other.[3] Thus, after just a few ‘moves’, there is an exponentially increased number of possibilities that cannot be controlled by rigid preplanning in contingencies.[4]

The transition from the deployment to the manoeuvre phase thus represents the point at which preplanning ends. From this point onwards, the operational leader must develop visionary strength and creativity to find surprising possibilities such that even an opponent with superior resources can be overcome. Furthermore, they must prove that they are able to make the best possible use of the freedom of mission granted to them through independent judgement and, thus, achieve successes that go beyond the result expected by the superior command.

The phases in which preplanning is the means of choice and those in which it must give way to independent judgement in the given combat situation are bridged by Moltke the Elder’s insight. This is often broken down into the simplified theorem: ‘Planning up to the first encounter with the enemy – from then on, leadership’.[5] Moltke is often misinterpreted to mean that he was fundamentally opposed to planning. In contrast, he focuses on the point from which the clash of two independent wills causes the number of enemy options to increase so exponentially that rigid preplanning is not possible. Only from this point onwards would independent judgment have to replace preplanning.

To continue to rely on ready-made contingency plans in the manoeuvre phase would rob the manoeuvre of its unique performance. The problematic nature of forward-looking instructions for action is also clearly shown in Martin van Creveld’s judgement of the exuberant U.S. planning staff and their contingency plans in the Second World War.[6] One must avoid viewing war deterministically and treating it as a phenomenon that can be captured or determined in numbers and algorithms. This leads to the fatal but seductive misconception that it can be calculated mathematically in advance, and, therefore, be ‘directed’ by means of instructions for action. Jomini was one of the most prominent proponents of this thesis.[7]

The challenges operational leaders face when exposed to the largely unpredictable will of the enemy, which depends on their own previous move, clearly show that manoeuvre requires far greater intellectual effort than the deployment phase.[8] In terms of the need for independent judgement in the given combat situation, battle and exploitation are in no way inferior to manoeuvre, although the faster sequence of necessary combat decisions means that there is generally less room for developing larger-scale options with which to surprise the enemy.

The challenges operational leaders face when exposed to the largely unpredictable will of the enemy clearly show that manoeuvre requires far greater intellectual effort than the deployment phase.

Regarding the time required for command-and-control procedures, a dilemma arises in operations management based on mission-type tactical thinking. On the one hand, independent judgement in the context of mission-type command and control can help compensate for resource inferiority and also overcome numerically superior opponents. On the other hand, the time required for judgement increases the time to impact on the battlefield, which also gives advantages to an opponent operating according to rigid but faster contingency plans.

One possible solution would be to exploit the advantages of independent assessment within the framework of mission-type command and control[9] at the operational level. This is because large formations have to be moved in the course of the manoeuvre, and this would provide time for a more in-depth estimate. At the tactical level, the faster pace of operations and the drastic reduction in reaction times resulting from the possibilities offered by computerised battle management and information systems would require switching to shorter commander’s procedures, waiving assessment at the intermediate levels.

The officer of the future must, therefore, be capable of both mission-type and order-type command and control, as well as of recognising when it is necessary to switch from one procedure to the other in the course of battle. Under no circumstances, however, should this lead to mission-type command and control being neglected in officer training for the tactical levels. Mission-type command and control has been and remains the core of the leadership philosophy of continental Europe and the German-speaking world in particular, and the basis for understanding all the skills resulting from it.

Development of the Manoeuvre

Starting with the major European wars of the late 18th and 19th centuries, one would realise that the military thrust aimed at the capital favoured by Napoleon was the dominant operational method. The defender had few options other than to set up defence just outside the capital and await the enemy’s thrust. Because the defender had the advantage of the inner line, the attacker’s line of deployment made little difference.

Frederick the Great was already developing large-scale encircling operations. Manstein’s `Sichelschnitt-Plan`(sickle-cut plan) demonstrates the overwhelming potential for success of a manoeuvre conceived according to the ‘revolving door principle’.[10], [11] In addition, the ‘Blitzkrieg tactics’ generated an attacking momentum that strained the enemy’s immediate ability to react, regardless of the combat strength ratio, which already points to the use of the culmination principle[12] as a component of the manoeuvre.

Frederick the Great was already developing large-scale encircling operations.

In contrast, Hitler’s Russian campaign was still characterised by the idea of a thrust aimed at the capital. The General Staff had vehemently insisted on the thrust on Moscow, whereas Hitler had envisaged an ‘architectural vault’ in his ‘Flügelschlagplan’ (wing beat plan[13]), which would have rested on two large encircling thrusts that would have only met in the depths of the Russian territory and in which Moscow would have played the role of the final ‘keystone’.

During the Second World War, one operational concept followed another. However, these will not be discussed in detail because, apart from the Blitzkrieg idea, they did not introduce any fundamental innovations concerning the utilisation of the culmination principle.

Almost a decade later, the original NATO defence was organised according to the ´layer cake´ principle, which would have provided little operational movement apart from the shifting of reserves and the staggered occupation of the initial deployment. Only with the FOFA (Folllow-on-Forces Attack) concept and the AirLand Battle Doctrine was a defence concept envisaged with the idea of the ‘operational counter-concentration’, in which manoeuvres would play a decisive role. General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr.’s approach to Baghdad in the second Gulf War is also an example of the success of an operation essentially determined by manoeuvre. Shortly afterwards, many specialist journals wrote ‘Clausewitz is back’ or ‘Renaissance of operational thinking’,[14] indicating that experts were well aware of where the foundations of manoeuvre successes, achieved through independent assessment in the system of mission-type command and control, were to be found.

The Performance-Generating Principle of the Manoeuvre

As explained above, manoeuvre remains to be the most demanding phase of the operation, because here large-scale creative possibilities for the movement of large formations must be found and selected from among them, with which the enemy can be defeated also despite superior resources. In contrast to the phase of deployment, in manoeuvres the operational commander is exposed to the unpredictable will of the enemy, which depends on his, the commander´s own latest move.

The NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations addresses the importance of the moment of will for the ‘manoeuvrist approach’. However, whether it fully recognises the importance of the will, as implied in Clausewitz’s ‘duel’ metaphor, is a question that remains. Specifically, the decision tree of duel-like combat leads to such an exponential increase in the number of possibilities after just a few moves that contingency planning can no longer control them. Such a situation requires the principle of mission-type leadership, whose compelling philosophical prerequisites are mainly found in continental European, particularly in German-speaking countries. A superficial glance may give the impression that the duel metaphor has already been sufficiently addressed. However, the context presented here distils the innermost core of the philosophy of leadership that goes back to Clausewitz: Manoeuvre is the clash of opposing and independent moments of will. Instead of relying on contingency planning, the one who leads according to the principle of mission-type command and control will retain the upper hand.

The NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations addresses the importance of the moment of will for the ‘manoeuvrist approach’.

Etymologically,[15] the term manoeuvre is derived from the Latin word manuopera (handwork), or manuoperari, which means ‘to manage by hand’; here, the second half, operari, is the root word for operation. The meaning of the term later changed to refer to the tactical movement of military troop units, ships, etc.; wartime exercises of army and naval units; fixed activity sequences on board ships; as well as skilfully executed turns and tricks. Thus, from the 18th century on, outmanoeuvring has been understood to mean ‘outwitting by skilful action’. Since then, the term (derived from the French ‘manoeuvrer’) has also meant ‘to skilfully steer to a place’ and ‘to bring to a certain position’. This perception already points to the essence of manoeuvring as we understand it today. The aim is to outmanoeuvre opponents, even ones with superior strength, through the creative development and selection of options, skilful and surprising moves in terms of technology and terrain, or forcibly increasing the intensity of the battle.

Prerequisites for Manoeuvring Capability

Manoeuvring capability, as described above, requires technology- and terrain-related movement superiority, which envelops the opponents faster than they can direct their defensive main effort towards the unexpected approach. Technology- and terrain-related components are linked as the ability to surprise the opponent via unexpected, longer, or less passable attack axes, depending on the technological ability to achieve the necessary movement parameters. Thus, the advantage of the inner line becomes a disadvantage as soon as the attacker can move more quickly along the outer line than the defender along the inner line (e.g., Sichelschnittplan, Gulf War II).

In addition, manoeuvring capability demands command-and-control procedures that generate the creativity necessary to develop and implement unexpected manoeuvre options at the required speed through independent assessment within the framework of mission-type command and control. On the one hand, this refers to the attack’s direction, with which the opponent can be surprised. On the other hand, this includes procedures to force the opponent to accelerate the course of the necessary command-and-control performance. The latter point is in the direction of a more mentally based control of, among other things, the intensity progression of armed conflicts, that is, the implementation of the culmination principle in a manoeuvre in the figurative sense.

In the case of the Sichelschnittplan (sickle-cut plan), the revolving door effect represented the technology- and terrain-related component of the manoeuvre. In contrast, the blitzkrieg tactic represented the dimension of the manoeuvre based on the culmination principle. Another similar example is of Wallenstein, who marched laterally in front of the enemy units without touching them, consuming all food and fodder from the region and thus, forcing the enemy — unless he didn´t want to put up with remaining stationary due to a lack of food and fodder — to march at a speed that must have overstrained them.

The blitzkrieg tactic represented the dimension of the manoeuvre based on the culmination principle.

Other equally important prerequisites for manoeuvring capability include technical reconnaissance and command-and-control equipment that enables the above-described procedures at the required speed. The most basic requirements for manoeuvring capability, which should be given a higher priority in higher officer training, are the development and selection of operational commanders, characterised by creativity, visionary power, and a strong will, capable of independent judgement within the framework of mission-type command and control.

Key Elements of a Command-and-Control Philosophy Ensuring Successful Manoeuvres

The command-and-control philosophy that allows fulfilment of the above requirements rests on two pillars: first, an understanding that perceives leading and following as a synallagmatic connection, and second, the principle of responsible leadership. Accordingly, the following discussion explains how the intellectual history and leadership philosophy of continental Europe, particularly in the German-speaking world, form the basis for command and control in today’s manoeuvres.

The Synallagmatic Relationship between ‘führen´ (approximately: lead) and ‘folgen´ (follow)

The unique principle[16] that most clearly distinguishes military thinking in continental Europe from civilian leadership thinking on the one hand, and military command-and-control philosophy of other cultural areas on the other hand, and from which several other performance-generating specifics of this perception of military leadership can be derived, is the mutually dependent relationship between the leader and the led, which requires acceptance on both sides.

In German, the term Führung (approximately: leadership) is derived from the verb führen (approximately: to lead) or fahren machen (i.e., to make someone travel)). This etymologically results in a reciprocal, synallagmatic conditionality of the relationship between the leader and the follower. The synallagma of the relationship implies that the leader only leads unchallenged as long as the follower is convinced and follows voluntarily, trusting in the intellectual and character abilities of the leader. Furthermore, the metaphorical wagon train will only follow as long as the leader leads the way successfully and on a ‘goal-oriented’ path.

Such a relationship must be continuously nurtured by the leader ‘leading by example’ and a leadership performance that proves to be consistently successful. Therefore, Führung clearly distinguishes itself from concepts such as ‘command’[17] as well as ‘management and leadership’. The key achievement of this principle, which reveals a clear cultural area specificity, is that loyalty can necessarily only be thought of in both directions. What is unique about this understanding is that it establishes a leadership relationship that requires acceptance on both sides.

This principle gives rise to the right to resist orders that violate human rights (an essential prerequisite for the democratic and political reliability of armed forces) and the performance-enhancing function of a camaraderie that works across leadership levels. As the ‘authorisation’ to evaluate the leader’s decisions results in the de facto participation of those being led in these decisions, this principle further gives rise to the will to participate in the unit’s success based on one’s intellectual ability to judge the leader’s decisions. It thus forms the basis for the principle of mission-type command and control.

The principle described herein requires an ‘ethical’ corrective to dissuade leaders from abusing the trust of subordinates for purposes contrary to human rights and prevent subordinates’ right of resistance from giving rise to mere insubordination. Responsible leadership, according to Clausewitz, offers such a corrective.

The Clausewitzian Approach to Responsible Leadership

This approach, which derives most directly from the reciprocal relationship between leading and following, is the categorisation of the requirements for military officers into three pillars, which can be traced indirectly back to Clausewitz.[18] These include the military-technical dimension, the ‘character’ dimension, and the educational dimension.[19] This approach achieves its goal by controlling the interaction between the categories, creating an ‘ethical’ corrective and, thus, the precondition for responsible military leadership.

Clausewitz analyses that an overemphasis on the military dimension leads to specialists who lose an understanding of horizontal cooperation and cross-divisional thinking. An overemphasis on the character dimension leads to an easier ideologisation of subordinates and troops, which, as military history shows, was expressed, among other things, through soldiers carrying out ethically unjustifiable orders as long as the ‘soldier’s virtue’ of unconditional loyalty to orders was complied with. Lastly, as for the demand for a high degree of broad-based education, Clausewitz wanted to avoid one-sided perceptions and create the conditions for responsible military leadership behaviour. At the same time, the above-average level of education, even at the lower levels, would fulfil the mandatory prerequisite for the principle of mission-type leadership. With this ‘third pillar’, Clausewitz´s On War demands an above-average general humanistic education rolled out across all hierarchical levels, which, as derived above, forms a de facto ‘ethical’ corrective against the overemphasis of one of the first two pillars.[20]

Clausewitz analyses that an overemphasis on the military dimension leads to specialists who lose an understanding of horizontal cooperation and cross-divisional thinking.

The two approaches that build on each other, that is, the ‘synallagmatic understanding of leadership’ and Clausewitz’s third pillar, are the starting point and mandatory prerequisites for (ethically) responsible leadership, the soliders’ right of resistance at all levels, and mission-type leadership. Both approaches arise from a philosophical basis and, thus, also from the leadership-philosophical breeding ground derived from it, which is characteristic of and thus, unique to the continental European/German-speaking cultural area. As the derivation should show, the prerequisites listed above for exploiting the possibilities that manoeuvre could offer, are largely present in this cultural area.

Therefore, the manoeuvre of a will-driven, creative, self-responsible leadership performance would not have the same success against a different philosophical/leadership-philosophical backdrop (i.e., in a different cultural area). To promote the independent assessment ability of leaders at all levels within the framework of mission-type leadership, an above-average level of humanistic general education rolled out across all hierarchy levels is required as an ethical corrective that stems from Clausewitz’s theory and prevents freedom of mission from leading to insubordination. Adherence to contingency plans would be evidence that one does not really agree with such an independent assessment. If one wants to promote decision-making and creativity that can go beyond the given mission but is not prepared to allow a deviation from the given mission, the manoeuvrist approach will not be able to develop its full effect.

Suppose one perceives “aiming at vulnerabilities”, as Antulio J. Echevarria II.[21] analyses it in ‘Clausewitz’s Centre of Gravity’, from an Anglo-American perspective and not as the geometric centre of gravity in the triangle of people-ruler-armed forces (i.e. the ‘miraculous trinity’ according to Clausewitz),[22] which Lennart Souchon further developed into a possibility of recognising or controlling even state collapse scenarios at an early stage, an effect-enhancing supplement through the manoeuvrist approach is dispensed with.[23]

Thus, if an attempt is made to ‘copy’ the models that have brought success in the history of armed conflict without knowing the leadership philosophical foundations behind them, or without the willingness to adopt them in one’s own leadership philosophy, then the expected success is highly unlikely to materialise – then the manoeuvrist approach will be perceived as something artificially imposed. If the manoeuvrist approach is also to be applied from the perspective of other cultural areas, it would be advisable to at least examine its most important success-generating, leadership philosophical foundations.

If an attempt is made to ‘copy’ the models that have brought success in the history of armed conflict without knowing the leadership philosophical foundations behind them, then the expected success is highly unlikely to materialise.

It must be emphasised that cultural areas that have developed a different leadership philosophy are by no means assumed to have lower operational capabilities. The continental European states, in particular, in which the leadership philosophy of mission-type tactics has reached its peak form, have promoted it because they hardly had any other option to compensate for resource inferiority. Therefore, states that do not have the problem of resource inferiority do not need to invest a disproportionately high and uneconomical amount of training in armed forces, especially when these forces are many times stronger in terms of numbers. Although this personal judgement can hardly be substantiated by publications that would have appeared in such resource-rich states, it is striking that the principle of mission-type command and control has never achieved the same significance in the American or the Soviet/Russian armed forces that it continues to have in German-speaking countries. This might be because, in view of the enormously high troop strength of both strategic players, an above-average level of training rolled out across all levels would be uneconomical from a budgetary point of view.

The Use of the Culmination Principle as a Component of the Manoeuvre in the Figurative Sense

This section serves the understanding of the cultural and philosophical roots of the culmination principle. It will be shown how Clausewitz developed his culmination thinking from these foundations and how the latter can be applied in an abstracted form in modern manoeuvres.

The possibility of using the culmination principle envisaged by Clausewitz as a primarily intellectual, supplementary component of manoeuvre in a figurative sense also arises from the substrate of the above-average humanistic general education rolled out across all military hierarchy levels.[24] It represents one of the most sophisticated achievements of the philosophical approaches to leadership that go back to Clausewitz.

In very simplified terms, the manoeuvre involves surprising the opponent with an unexpected movement. This movement can be understood as related to the terrain in which it takes place and be technically enabled or represent a mental achievement. The latter can be based on either the command and control procedures and the communication means, which ensure the speed required for the surprise, or the utilisation of the possibilities opened up by the principle of culmination.

In the armed forces of states with limited resources, where science and education, which also extended to weaker socio-economic strata, were highly valued, military command and control procedures, whose intellectual component was able to at least partially compensate for the lack of resources, were often developed to achieve a level of success that would otherwise have been unattainable based on physical combat power factors alone. This also applies, in particular, to the most challenging phase of the operation, the manoeuvre. It has lost none of its importance and still has both physical combat power and a mental component that could be perceived as manoeuvre in the figurative sense.

Whereas the emphasis was placed on coordinating the factors of “armed forces” and “space” in a narrowly defined temporal context in the age of large-scale operations, a mental component of the operation, in the form of a manoeuvre in the figurative sense, is now coming to the fore. Herein, the aim is to recognise and influence the acceleration of the intensity of armed conflicts and, thus, compensate for material and personnel inferiority (i.e., for unfavourable physical force ratios). This would be possible by utilising the principle of culmination if the intellectual prerequisites for this were created in officer training.

The admiration Clausewitz is known to have had for the German mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz suggests that he derived his culmination thinking from the curve discussion developed by the latter. He relates the intensity progression of an operation and, thus, the necessary growth of one’s abilities, to the dimension of time.

The admiration Clausewitz is known to have had for Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz suggests that he derived his culmination thinking from the curve discussion.

The principle of culmination described by Clausewitz is often taken up in civilian management theory — albeit interpreted differently than in military science.[25] The discussion of curves, which can be traced back to Leibniz, is also referred to, but the supposed culmination point is wrongly equated with the vertex of a curve. Although this is possible, it does not provide any useful insight — especially not for forward-looking strategic or operational management.

Suppose the decline in the capacity of an element is only recognised at the point in time (vertex) at which it is already losing performance. In that case, it is hardly possible to counteract. In fact, however, it is the inflexion point that is important, because it is the point at which the y-value of the curve is still increasing, whereas the function graph already changes its curvature behaviour. The essential thing about this culmination point is that, at the time of the change in the curvature behaviour of the function graph, it is already possible to roughly estimate when the vertex can be reached and at what height this is likely to happen.[26] Applied to military operations, this means that the fact that a mission can no longer be fulfilled, or defeat can no longer be averted, is recognisable well before one’s forces and resources are exhausted. Conversely, the exhaustion of an opponent with superior forces and resources can be provoked by forcing an increase (‘acceleration’) in the necessary command performance on him during the course of the operation, which he cannot keep up with, although the peak of the combat power, achievable by his forces (‘maximum speed’) would be sufficient to win.

The special significance of the military scientific analysis of the culmination principle lies in the fact that it makes it possible:

• for an inferior defender to retain the upper hand if they succeed in forcing premature culmination on their opponent;
• for an attacker, who is not sufficiently superior, to still be victorious if they succeed in undermining the acceleration in the opponent´s build-up of the defence effort;
• or finally, to avoid certain defeat by recognising it early enough and breaking off the battle or postponing it.[27]

An impressive parallel to this can be seen in the ‘clipper phenomenon’ in civilian management theory. After sailing ships had dominated seafaring for centuries and could only increase their transport performance with difficulty, the slim, light clippers with their knife-shaped bow emerged, sailing at a much higher risk of leaking but at a much higher speed. The reason for this development was, as can easily be imagined — the first steamship. The clipper phenomenon thus became a metaphor for the fact that the last powerful upsurge of an exhausted technology is an unmistakable indicator of its imminent, final replacement.

At first glance, this principle appears to be merely a dispensable arabesque of the culmination discussion. However, numerous major corporate bankruptcies can be traced back to the fact that a technological revolution was recognised too late, stubbornly, and with an unjustifiable expenditure of resources invested in the further development of a doomed technology (e.g., sailing ships, steam locomotives, storage media for consumer electronics before the transition to ‘streaming’, supersonic passenger flight, and possibly, individual electromobility).

Examples of the effective use of the culmination principle can be found in Hannibal’s campaign against Rome; Wallenstein’s tactic of marching sideways in front of the enemy and thus depriving him of food and fodder; the ´Blitzkrieg´-tactic as a supplement of the ´Sichelschnittplan´; the ´wing beat plan´ in Hitler’s attack on Russia; the attempt of Russia to break up the coherence of the European NATO states and shake their confidence in the alliance through the application of the so-called ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ in eastern Ukraine, and the consequent NATO plans to strengthen the north-eastern flank against a Russian attack on the Baltic states. In abstract form, the culmination principle can also be successfully applied in strategy, politics or the private sector.

Utilising the culmination principle presupposes that the intellectual capabilities of military leaders at all levels are systematically strengthened in training. This requires an institutionalised, university-recognised, core subject-based military science research and teaching. The intellectual component of operational command supports armed forces with limited resources. Continental European countries, in particular, would have a culturally specific advantage in developing this intellectual dimension of operational command.

Utilising the culmination principle presupposes that the intellectual capabilities of military leaders at all levels are systematically strengthened in training.

A Unique Advantage

Players who are inferior in terms of numbers or resources can gain a unique advantage by using the culmination principle in the understanding of a manoeuvre in the figurative sense. However, this can only succeed if leaders recognise what level of intellectual ability must be achieved at all levels and if officer training takes place accordingly at educational institutions based on military science.

The use of the culmination principle, mission-type command and control, and the creation of a sensorium for recognising unethical orders require effective military scientific research and a broad theoretical as well as humanistic general education rolled out across all levels of command.

The institutionalisation of an independent military science that is recognised at the university level, focuses on the core subjects of war theory, command and control philosophy, strategy, operational command and control, tactics and logistics, and based on a military (not security policy) assessment logic could create the mandatory prerequisites for the necessary intellectual quality of officer training. Such defence universities could be created by the respective European states alone or in a European network. This would make it possible to create the intellectual skills that are necessary to understand, learn, internalise and apply principles such as the targeted use of the culmination principle, mission-type command and control or the examination of orders received for ethical compliance. In addition, such an institutionalised military science would enable policy advice based on military assessment logic concerning strategic purpose-finding.

A particular advantage of military universities created in cooperation between European states would be making culturally specific command and control principles, such as culmination thinking, usable for all participating states through the joint research and teaching of the respective intellectual-historical foundations. To motivate them to take on the above-mentioned endeavours, the European states, in particular, should bear in mind that just like many security policy experts (but also some military experts with a shorter strategic horizon), were wrong to predict that Russia would not be able to launch an offensive after 1991, so misguided was the hope that the West would no longer need the operational command and control capabilities of large formations. If NATO continues its efforts to strengthen the alliance’s eastern flank, which is to be assumed, then this will require procedures for a more advanced operational counter-concentration. For a promising manoeuvre phase of such operations, functioning the procedures designed in the Airland Battle Doctrine will be a mandatory prerequisite. The study by the RAND Corporation has shown that essential procedures necessary for the manoeuvre were no longer practised at all during the ending bloc confrontation.[28] It is precisely this belief in the supposed period of peace, which had lasted since 1991, that is likely to have paved the way for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s current attack on Ukraine.

If NATO continues its efforts to strengthen the alliance’s eastern flank, which is to be assumed, then this will require procedures for a more advanced operational counter-concentration.

It must not be overlooked under any circumstances that the culmination principle also works at the strategic level, and probably, has a more serious impact there than in operational manoeuvres. Looking at the concentration of Russian forces close to the border with the Baltic states, one can see that, although there was no actual intention to launch a deep strike on NATO treaty territory, the mere possibility of reaching the Tallinn-Riga line in 72 hours without NATO being able to react in time put the West under strategic pressure to significantly intensify its defence efforts.

With the attack on Ukraine, Putin has further increased this pressure to act, forcing Europe, in particular, to build up its defences at a pace that will lead to domestic political and economic problems in the individual states, and, thus, strain the coherence of the alliance. Should European states begin to slow down the necessary conventional military build-up under this pressure and, due to the resulting domestic political problems, lift the sanctions against Russia and withhold support from Ukraine, then Putin would have reached the culmination point of Western defence and made Europe’s strategic ability to act lastingly impossible in the future as well.

 

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Brigadier General (ret.) MMag. Wolfgang Peischel, PhD. Strategy research, creation of an institutionalised, core-subjects-based military science. Peischel, Wolfgang: „Militärwissenschaft – eine Modellbildung“, Nutzen, alleinstellende Leistung, Funktionsprinzipien und Struktur einer kernfachbasierten Militärwissenschaft, Carola Hartmann MILES-Verlag 2023, in complexu peer-reviewed; Peischel, Wolfgang / BILBAN, Christoph [Eds.]: Building Military Science for the Benefit of Society, International Society of Military Sciences, Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag 2020, in complexu peer-reviewed etc. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the Austrian MoD.

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[1] Friedrich Dürrenmatt, “Je planmäßiger der Mensch vorgeht, um so wirkungsvoller trifft ihn der Zufall,“ 21 Punkte zu den Physikern, Punkt 8 (geschrieben 1962); Werksausgabe Bd. 7 (1998, 91 – Diogenes Verlag).

[2] Manoeuvre warfare, or manoeuvre warfare, is understood here as “a military strategy which emphasises movement, initiative and surprise to achieve a position of advantage. Manoeuvre seeks to inflict losses indirectly by envelopment, encirclement and disruption, while minimising the need to engage in frontal combat”. It should be noted, however, that in German-language leadership theory, manoeuvre is a phase of operations and not a function of military strategy.

[3] Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Erstes Buch, Erstes Kapitel, 2. Definitionen, 18. Und 19. Auflage Bonn 1973.

[4] Wolfgang Peischel, Militärwissenschaft – eine Modellbildung, Nutzen, alleinstellende Leistung, Funktionsprinzipien und Struktur einer kernfachbasierten Militärwissenschaft, Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag 2023, 54.

[5] Ibid., 266.

[6] Ibid., 153.

[7] The main work of Antoine-Henri Jomini, ‘Précis de l’art de la guerre’, is characterised throughout by the principle of the mathematical controllability of war.

[8] Naturally, there is little published evidence to support this thesis. However, experience from operational case studies, e.g., at the National Defence Academy in Vienna, shows that course participants face the greatest hurdles and the strongest pressure to make decisions during the manoeuvre phase.

[9] Mission-type command and control is the leadership philosophy originating in the German-speaking world and based on the above-average education of subordinates at all levels, which gives the commander of each level freedom of action within the limits defined by the mission. In contrast, order-type command and control gives the subordinate both the tactical objective and the method of implementation and, therefore, leaves hardly any leeway for independent judgment.

[10] The knowledgeable reader would probably also expect Moltke to be mentioned here. However, the operationalisation of the Schlieffen Plan (at least in its later implementation) did not bring the expected success and, moreover, only Manstein’s Sickle Cut Plan contains the component that indicates the use of the culmination principle – the ‘Blitzkrieg tactic’.

[11] This metaphor describes the basic operational idea behind the sickle-cut plan: Apart from the surprise advance of Army Group A across the Ardennes; the plan was based on luring the enemies into the `Belgian trap` by means of a binding attack and phased retreat, tempting them to proceed more quickly, and thus, making them all the more vulnerable to the heavyweight flanking thrust. The more the enemy pushes one wing of the revolving door in front of him, the more the next wing presses into his back.

[12] The culmination principle refers to accelerating the course of battle to overwhelm the opponent in an early phase of the operation to such an extent that he can no longer end the operation victoriously despite having more resources.

[13] Bernhard Zürner, Der verschenkte Sieg – Warum Hitlers Urplan „Barbarossa“ 1941 scheiterte, Druffel-Verlag, Berg am Starnberger See, 1. Auflage 2000, ISBN 3-8061-1131-6, 15-16; The thrust in the north should have been aimed at Leningrad (elimination of the armaments centre), the thrust in the south at Ukraine (wheat harvest and oil from the sunflower fields) and the area of the Dnieper, Donets to Rostov and the Black Sea (raw materials, power stations and industrial centres).

[14] Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift ASMZ 11/2016, 40, “Renaissance des operative Denkens,” Jahrbuch der Clausewitzgesellschaft 2013, 175; “Clausewitz is back” eine “Renaissance des operative Denkens,” Interkulturalität als Instrument für Einsatz und Führung Teil 2, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 5/2013, 31; “Renaissance des operativen Denkens,“ Sascha L. Bosezky, … des Generalstabsdienstes in Schriften zur Geschichte des Österreichischen Bundesheeres, Band 7, 98; “Renaissance des operativen Führungsdenkens in der Bundeswehr,“ Philip Eder, Die Entwicklung moderner operativer Führungskunst, in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) 3/2003, 285; “Neuartige Denkansätze sollten die Umsetzung dieses Vorhabens [AirLand Battle Doctrine] möglich machen. Grundsätze der Theorien von Clausewitz und Jomini fanden sich hier genauso wie …“.

[15] Duden Etymologie, Herkunftswörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, 2. Völlig neu bearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage von Günther Drosdowski, Duden Band 7, Stichwort: Manöver, 439                and https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Manoever#herkunft.

[16]         The principle of the synallagma is dealt with in detail in the following subsection. For a better understanding and because of its central, unique significance, the essence of the principle should nevertheless be summarised in a paragraph at the beginning.

[17] Command, derived from ‘in manum dare’, can be understood figuratively to mean that a leader is given command over the follower by the hierarchy, and the latter is ‘given into the hand of the leader’. The German-language term ‘Führung’, on the other hand, is more strongly based on earning trust and voluntary, convinced followership.

[18] The comments on the significance of humanistic general education for military scientific methodology and the tactical leadership philosophy in Uwe Hartmann, 1998, Carl von Clausewitz – Erkenntnis, Bildung, Generalstabsausbildung, with a foreword by Dieter Clauß, General (ret.), Olzog Verlag Munich, 10-11.

[19] However, Clausewitz does not base his understanding of ‘character’ on today’s ethically and morally connoted understanding of the term ‘character’, but rather on the classical soldier virtues (virtus).

[20] Uwe Hartmann, 1998, Carl von Clausewitz – Erkenntnis, Bildung, Generalstabsausbildung, with a foreword by Dieter Clauß, General (ret.), Olzog Verlag Munich, 10 and 40-41; and Wolfgang Peischel, Militärwissenschaft – eine Modellbildung, Nutzen, alleinstellende Leistung, Funktionsprinzipien und Struktur einer kernfachbasierten Militärwissenschaft, Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag 2023, 96.

[21] Antulio J. II Echevarria, Clausewitz´s Centre of Gravity: Changing our warfighting doctrine – again, 2002, The Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, ISBN 1-58487-099-0.

[22] Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, nineteenth edition, anniversary edition with a further expanded historical-critical appraisal by Professor Dr Werner Hahlweg, Bonn, Dümmler 1991, first book, first chapter, 212 -213; respectively Carl von Clausewitz, On War; Indexed Edition, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with a Commentary by Bernard Brodie, Princeton University Press, corresponding chapter.

[23] Lennart Souchon, Carl von Clausewitz – Strategie im 21. Jahrhundert, E.S. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn 2012.

[24] Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, nineteenth edition, anniversary edition with a further expanded historical-critical appraisal by Professor Dr Werner Hahlweg, Bonn, Dümmler 1991, Third part, Sketches to the seventh book, The Attack, paragraph 5, 879-896, respectively Carl von Clausewitz, On War; Indexed Edition, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with a Commentary by Bernard Brodie, Princeton University Press, corresponding chapter.

[25] Wolfgang Peischel, Militärwissenschaft – eine Modellbildung, Nutzen, alleinstellende Leistung, Funktionsprinzipien und Struktur einer kernfachbasierten Militärwissenschaft, Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag 2023, 49.

[26] Ibid., 49; Clausewitz, an admirer of Leibniz, is likely to tie in with his culmination point at the point of inflection of Leibniz’s curve discussion. There, the inflection point is defined as the point at which the graph of the function reaches its highest slope (maximum slope of the tangent, curvature = 0, f‘’= 0, f‘’’= 0). The inflection point is distinguished from the vertex of the curve at which the highest y-value of the graph is reached. In the example of an accelerated movement, the inflection point would therefore represent the highest acceleration and the vertex the highest speed.

[27] The culmination can also be impressively explained by comparing it with the performance parameters of an aircraft: Strategic developments can already be evaluated in terms of their further progression at the time of the most rapid increase in the required resources or command performance (compared to an aircraft’s required climbing performance) in the time unit, and not only at the time of a possible defeat (compared to an aircraft, at the time when it becomes apparent that the service ceiling is not sufficient to fly over a mountain). This makes it possible to react to developments at the inflection point of the trajectory and not only at its peak (compared to an aircraft at the time when it is still possible to react by dropping ballast/dumping fuel or changing the flight route and not only when the propeller begins to bore into the slope).

[28] David A. Shaplak, Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO´s Eastern Flank, War-gaming the Defense of the Baltics, RAND-Corporation 2016.