Abstract: Emerging and Disruptive Technologies are fundamentally reshaping modern warfare, creating a paradox where military forces are empowered and constrained by digital advancements. Western militaries, particularly NATO, face growing friction as their force structures struggle to adapt to the constantly evolving Russian way of warfare witnessed in Ukraine. This paper introduces the concept of digital friction, the operational strain caused by overreliance on networked warfare in environments where war remains fundamentally analogue and unpredictable. By examining historical and contemporary conflicts, this study highlights the risks of digital determinism and advocates for a balanced approach where digital capabilities enhance rather than replace traditional warfighting competencies, as organised violence is inherently analogue.

Problem statement: How can the military balance embracing digital innovation and maintaining adaptability through analogue methods?

So what?: True force readiness and resilience means integrating digital advances without discarding analogue warfighting skills, ensuring forces can operate in denied, degraded, or disrupted environments to their advantage.

“So, Trooper, You’re Not Too Worried About Fighting The Arachnids?”

Science fiction has long served as a mirror for contemporary issues, offering cautionary tales about the dangers of unchecked technological optimism. Paul Verhoeven’s Starship Troopers (1997) is no exception. The film’s satirical depiction of a militarised, technology-dependent society waging war against a seemingly primitive enemy serves as a prescient warning for modern military forces. In Verhoeven’s fictional universe, overreliance on digital warfare results in catastrophic battlefield failures. While every move is broadcast live by media, orbital bombardments miss their targets, troop deployments land soldiers in lethal kill zones, and command-and-control (C2) systems collapse under unexpected enemy pressure.

In contrast, the analogue, swarm-based tactics of the Arachnids expose the humans’ vulnerability, forcing survivors to adapt through brute-force learning rather than technological sophistication. In hostile and unfamiliar environments, improvisation becomes the key to survival, as no amount of technological superiority can fully account for the uncertainty and chaos of war.[1] Unfounded confidence in military technology crumbles when confronted with unanticipated battlefield conditions, ultimately reducing warfare to its archaic elements. As Storr asserts: “Fundamentally, three things occur on the battlefield: men think, move, and commit violence. All other activities support these functions.”[2]

Unfounded confidence in military technology crumbles when confronted with unanticipated battlefield conditions, ultimately reducing warfare to its archaic elements.

This theme cuts to the heart of modern Western military doctrine, where Clausewitzian uncertainty is met not with adaptability but with the rigid confidence of technological determinism. At the heart of this paradox lies digital friction, the unforeseen resistance that arises when meticulously engineered and digitised algorithms collide with war’s visceral, chaotic and unpredictable nature.[3]

When Shock Without Awe

Since the Cold War’s end, NATO has bet heavily on precision warfare, network-centric operations, and multi-domain integration, expecting technological superiority to guarantee battlefield dominance in a manoeuvrist sense. Increasingly, humans monitor and administer Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, Act-loop (OODA) instead of being directly involved in its execution.[4] The expectations, just as with the implementation of the U.S. AirLand-battle concepts of the 1980s, lie squarely with the vision of a high-paced, high-intensity offensive that will maximise calibrated force at precise pressure points while making its own AI-supported OODA-loop run circles around the enemy. This vision culminates in a document published in 2023 by Mark Milley, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. military. Milley introduced the “new Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC)” as the “guide to that future,” in which “seamless integration of all military Services across all warfighting domains” would enable them to “function as a unified force.”[5] He continued by expanding the vision of “synchronised planning, shared situational awareness, and effective communication” to become “fully aligned and interoperable with key allies and partners,” implying that NATO’s interoperability goals would quickly adapt to American-set standards and operational requirements.[6] Other documents and visions provided by a swath of international think tanks, EU white papers and NATO capstone concepts on future warfighting emphasise this ambitious and optimistic perspective, following a “North Star” of digitised military superiority to guide all that would ostensibly be required to break the enemy’s capacity for war swiftly and his will, eventually.[7]

Loosely paraphrasing these general strategic trajectories of Western warfare, the sceptic might conceive that all that is necessary is a highly motivated, all-volunteer, interoperable NATO fighting force with a digital backbone in a double-paced manouevrist approach. This force will be equipped, trained, and mentally aligned to operate with minimal friction across inter-service boundaries. Multinational and diverse in its composition, it will cover thousands of miles eastward through urbanised Europe at short notice under a unified leadership that harmoniously transcends national caveats, doctrine, ethics and laws. Such a force, in theory, will rapidly shock and awe any Russian offensive into a physically and morally shattered retreat, thereby maintaining its momentum, strong supply chains, and sufficient reserves to the Western hemisphere’s disregarded borders. Borrowing the words of the great British philosopher Jeremy Clarkson, “What could possibly go wrong…”[8]

More Inoperable Than Interoperable?

“We are not ready for what is coming our way in four to five years,” Mark Rutte, NATO’s newly appointed Secretary General, bluntly stated at the end of 2024.[10] Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea uncovered the actual state of Western military preparedness regarding great power conflict. In ignoring the uncomfortable and disruptive realities that had accumulated beneath the eastern part of the “Grand Chessboard,” warfare in Ukraine has since consumed vast amounts of NATO members’s materiel and financial resources.[11] After eight plus three years of reciprocal slaughter, the Russian Federation seems closer to reaching its ends in Ukraine than any other party involved in the conflict, a fact openly admitted by members of the Trump administration.[12] By deliberately targeting Ukrainian forces and infrastructure with crude yet effective means, such as glide bombs, motorcycles, and waves of low-trained soldiers, Russia’s “tactical opportunism” has not only worn down Ukrainian defences but also undermined the foundations of Western political and military cohesion.[13] However, both belligerents’ ability to rapidly adapt to battlefield conditions, spontaneously exploit emerging vulnerabilities, and seize unexpected opportunities at the tactical level demonstrate a keen learning curve beneath the superficially dumb warfare of attrition.[14] Consequently, prevailing assumptions on modern warfare have been uprooted, revealing how high-tech forces have become acutely vulnerable to protracted low-tech responses in static environments. In short, the evolution of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Ukraine exhibits the urgent need for NATO to prepare for a peer adversary accustomed to actual warfare of its own making. Russia has again proven capable of disrupting, degrading, outlasting and out-suffering its opponents.[15]

Electronic Warfare (EW), attacks on the power grid, cyberattacks, and logistical breakdowns lay bare the bloodstained chasm between digitised war planning and the unforgiving, ultimately analogue, realities of combat. Denying and restricting force multipliers and operational enablers on both sides has proven essential for levelling the battlefield and disrupting an opponent’s ability to seize the initiative.

Electronic Warfare, attacks on the power grid, cyberattacks, and logistical breakdowns lay bare the bloodstained chasm between digitised war planning and the unforgiving, ultimately analogue, realities of combat.

Under pressure to sustain the war, European worries about American military support and defence reliability have shed new light on old force readiness issues and the current state of military entropy in peacetime.[16] The British Army, once a global armoured powerhouse, has retained fewer Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) than horses for royal ceremonies.[17] Denmark’s military lacks operational artillery because it gave all its systems to Ukraine.[18] Not long ago, the German military infamously resorted to mounting broomsticks on armoured personnel carriers (APCs) due to a shortage of guns during a NATO certification exercise for its Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).[19] At the same time, it has spent over a decade awaiting new infantry rifles ever since former Defence Minister and current EU Commission President von der Leyen deemed the existing models unfit for service.[20] Adding insult to injury, the new rifle contracts are severely limited in quantity and burdened by extended delivery timelines, failing to provide even one new rifle per active duty soldier under current peacetime conditions, let alone during wartime mobilisation.[21] Despite its vast military-industrial base, even the U.S. is struggling to replenish its ammunition stockpiles depleted by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, with defence analysts warning that supplies are “woefully insufficient for modern war.”[22]

These anecdotal shortfalls highlight a broader crisis in Western military preparedness, where decades of downsizing, administrative self-indulgence, and strategic disorientation in fighting international terrorism and then a pandemic have left European headquarters ill-equipped for conventional or nuclear large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer adversaries.[23] Western arsenals of democracy encompass multiple doctrinal and technological eras, comprising dozens of weapon systems that range from cutting-edge to de facto inoperable. Nevertheless, things are changing rapidly. For instance, sending outdated Soviet-era equipment to Ukraine has freed eastern NATO members’ forces to absorb modern replacements. Along NATO’s eastern flank, Poland has emerged as the most ambitious member in terms of procurement and defence spending relative to its economic capacity, and it is leading the way in European rearmament.[24] However, the need for tempo and cost-efficiency means securing a significant number of new systems from South Korea, thus creating new interoperability issues in the process.[25] Meanwhile, the Baltic Sea is now shared with Sweden and Finland, whose accession introduces distinct and unilateral force designs into NATO’s diverse military framework.

It is a dilemma: each new addition to NATO adds complexity to integrating 32 distinct national military forces and cultures into a unified fighting force. Despite increasing force readiness and funding, interoperability remains a persistent issue. This results in a further fragmented mix of analogue and digital capabilities, constantly pressured by the need to anticipate the right means to win the next war.[26]

Nevertheless, history proves that NATO is not stagnant, nor is it by any means brain-dead. On the contrary, its assessment of the Russian threat is severe and sobering while its secretary general is tackling the challenges and fears caused by the new American administration. Despite repeated political and structural rifts in the global order, the alliance has remained crucially relevant to European defence, mainly through its capability for innovation and transformation on a strategic level, celebrating over 75 years of collective security in 2024.[27] As a first indicator of things to come, NATO’s new Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR) will demand a significant increase in personnel and spending to counter the eventuality of attritive and prolonged conflicts, according to media reports.[28]

As a first indicator of things to come, NATO’s new Minimum Capability Requirements will demand a significant increase in personnel and spending to counter the eventuality of attritive and prolonged conflicts, according to media reports.

The establishment of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in 2003 as a dedicated headquarters for accelerating force modernisation and standardisation (i.e. STANAG processes) historically reflects NATO’s recognition of the urgency to adapt to future needs.[29] ACT is key in fostering interoperability, integrating Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) and preparing NATO forces for multi-domain operations.[30] In doing so, it mitigates some of the strategic disadvantages its giant superstructure inherently provides, compared to hard power under individual governance. Instead, it benefits from combined procurement and development alternatives. Additionally, initiatives such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) are intended to streamline the adoption of EDTs and ensure that technological developments from today’s battlefields will eventually be incorporated into NATO’s ever-evolving, high-tech force structures.[31]

Carnivores and Herbivores

What future wars may look like remains the subject of intense debate. Admiral Vandier, former head of NATO ACT, described the war in Ukraine as “the mix between World War I and the war of the future,” providing critical insights into how the Russian Way of Warfare is evolving.[32] One of the most experienced military leaders alive, former Ukrainian Chief of Defence Valerii Zaluzhnyi, warned in 2024 that “the ongoing technological revolution has ushered in a new era of warfare, one centred on attrition, where the path to achieving political objectives lies in systematically exhausting the enemy’s resources and capabilities.”[33] In response, NATO think tanks are beginning to acknowledge this paradigm shift and suggest that the alliance must prepare for a similarly “destruction-based approach” to warfare.[34] Pilster and de Souza’s assessment warns in late 2024: “Rather than seeking NATO’s military defeat through a quick and decisive operation, Moscow may instead aim to systematically inflict military losses and civilian casualties along a broad front, at scale and in a sustained manner.”[35] Strategic patience trumps operational hyperactivity, or, employing Clausewitz’s analogy of two wrestlers in a multi-round match, the final victory determines the outcome, not the initial rush or early gains.

The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in 2024 critically assessed NATO’s capacity to balance “the ‘iron triangle’ of trade-offs between readiness, modernisation, and force structure,” concluding with a somewhat sceptical “Si vis pacem, para bellum” to emphasise the urgent need for further effort in military preparedness.[36] More bluntly, the Ukrainian Zaluzhnyi argued that NATO remains overly invested in “expensive weapons systems, including missiles, fighter jets, and aircraft carriers,” instead of embracing the full potential of industrially scalable EDTs.[37]

However, recalibrating the iron triangle is slowed by NATO’s four-year defence planning cycles (the current one started in 2023) under the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). While the framework ensures long-term coherence between the 32 allies, it comes at the cost of potentially paralysing delays in responding to EDTs from outside NATO’s sphere of influence.[38] This creates a critical advantage for NATO’s strategic rival, Russia: With digital and digitised EDTs catalysed by a war NATO is not directly involved with, developments are outpacing the rate of adaption. The NDPP simply can not keep up, potentially generating the dilemma that its battlefield relevance may already be obsolete whenever a new capability is approved, procured, and deployed. Additionally, many NATO members are inherently reluctant to adopt the results of the NDPP. Entangled in alternative motivations for non-collective development and procurement, such as national caveats, economic egotisms, sovereignty issues, or simple distrust, their inaction questions the general credibility of NATO’s core principles.[39] The resulting lags and glitches undermine force agility, preventing NATO from swiftly integrating combat-proven innovations into its doctrine and force structure, a vulnerability that uni-lateral adversaries will know to exploit ruthlessly.[40]

Recent conflicts in Armenia, Ukraine, Israel and Syria have shown how EDTs can rapidly reshape the battlefield, accelerating innovation cycles while ruthlessly exposing ineffective Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and materiel.[42] In a 2024 address to defence industry leaders, Vandier warned: “Just like the dinosaurs—you see the smoke of volcanoes and simply say you are in changing times. Most Europeans are herbivores; they think there is sufficient grass to feed on. This is not the case.”[43] From fragile logistics networks and software dependencies to the increasing role of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and procurement models optimised for peacetime efficiency rather than wartime endurance, the very architecture of the adjacent WarTech Nexus may buckle under the stresses of protracted LSCO in Europe.[44] Alliance members have yet to rigorously improve their collective resilience appropriately.

Technological Determinism and the “Cult Of The Offensive.”

Maslow’s observation that “it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail” offers a summarising critique of technological determinism.[45] In the age of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), one might translate this into: When all you have is a computer – everything becomes code.

Undeterred by the sobering realities of NATO force readiness, the persistent belief in technological superiority as a guarantor of battlefield success has led Western militaries and the WarTech Nexus to embrace a digital-first approach to future warfare. The reliance on digitalised force multipliers has become existential in countering the dwindling numbers of materiel and personnel in Western militaries. At the same time, military commanders and planners have consistently preferred offensive over defensive operations, as shown by Weissmann and Ahlström.[46] In contrast, democratic leaders have become increasingly reluctant to choose direct engagement since the end of the “forever wars,” as the Trump administration terms them. However, in cases of war by proxy, this does not necessarily apply. The paradoxical Western enthusiasm for military solutions beyond its immediate sphere of responsibility is evident in cases such as Ukraine’s 2023 offensive, Western support for Israel against its neighbours, and repeated military actions against Houthi militias in Yemen. According to Schneider, a prevailing “digital cult of the offensive,” the belief that aggressive, technologically advanced forces will inevitably dominate the battlefield, has repeatedly drawn the necessary military and strategic attention away from the defensive realities of declining Western hegemony.[47] Combined with systemic optimism in calculating risks and rewards, this mindset can lead to flawed advice followed by poor decision-making, effectively updating Snyder’s 1984 critique of military determinism for the present day.[48]

In other words, the hypernormalised notion of how warfare must be conducted increasingly marginalises the why in a broader, more political and strategic sense due to availability, political reasoning and the legal straightjacket of decade-long procurement contracts. Under these conditions, a firm reliance on digitised force multipliers and technological advancements in C4ISR might not improve but obscure military judgement.[49] An overloaded informational domain represents the fog of war of the 21st century.[50] The logical solution, it seems, is for AI to assist in dealing with this information, thus creating a cycle: digital means of warfare increasingly exclude war’s analogue ends.

The hypernormalised notion of how warfare must be conducted increasingly marginalises the why in a broader, more political and strategic sense due to availability, political reasoning and the legal straightjacket of decade-long procurement contracts.

During the Global War on Terror (GWoT), NATO’s two-decade failure to successfully adjust to the complexities of asymmetrical violence exposed the limitations of doctrinal and technological determinism in this context. The dogmatic overreliance on high-tech solutions for low-tech problems led to the application of ill-suited military forces in the Middle East, further obscuring the hazily defined strategic objectives. In one case in 2017, the U.S. military dropped “the mother of all bombs,” the largest conventional bomb in the arsenal, to level a tunnel network used by ISIS-K.[51] However, the strike was widely seen as a domestic show of force by newly elected President Donald Trump rather than a tactically necessary or strategically significant operation. After the dust had settled, several outlets questioned its long-term impact on opposition forces in the region. At the same time, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) raised concerns about its compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL).[52] Gray, in 2015, critically stated the American “obsession with the exciting technical and tactical promise in [Revolution in Military Affairs] RMA, and [..] with the challenge of attempting to counter terrorism and insurgency in distant and culturally ill-understood lands”, as a form of deterministically neglecting low-tech realities.[53]

As military technologies condition each other reciprocally, the enemies of the West have adapted and ruthlessly utilised new, sub-digital means of warfare. One of the most consequential yet unremarkable weapons of the beginning of the 21st century was the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Despite its crude simplicity, the IED forced Western forces to relinquish the initiative on the ground, compelling them to rely more heavily on (chronically limited) air power than on direct engagement.[55] Combined with suicide attacks and a general disregard for human life and international conventions, the IED became a defining feature of early 21st-century warfare, contrary to Western doctrinal expectations of how modern conflicts should unfold.[56]

The impact of the IED extended far beyond the battlefield due to their rudimentary simplicity and cost-effectiveness, mainly when employed at scale. New generations of military vehicles were designed and procured with IED resistance as a priority. At the same time, infantry training and medical treatment protocols shifted focus toward mitigating IED-related threats rather than conventional combat scenarios. These weapons exploited a key vulnerability of Western democracies engaged in limited expeditionary conflicts, where public sensitivity to casualties shaped strategic decision-making. Within Zambernardi’s “Impossible Trilemma” of Counterinsurgency (COIN), which balances force protection, distinguishing combatants from noncombatants, and the physical elimination of insurgents, the IED was at least disruptive, if not even revolutionary.[57]

Specifically unspecific and essentially versatile, it shared commonalities and allowed synergies with other dual-use technologies such as the Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG), the motorbike, the pickup truck (aka the technical), and the mobile phone. Each of these, in its own way, challenged the presumed superiority of Western technological advancements, demonstrating the power of decentralised adaptation, human resilience and sacrifice. Combined with strategic patience and clear political goals, IED warfare prevailed over Western interventionism. Today, an IED delivered by First Person View (FPV)-drone represents the natural progression of this (R-)Evolution of Military Affairs (R-EMA).[58] As this capability proliferates and matures, asymmetric warfare and COIN operations will likely escalate in tempo and brutality, as demonstrated in Syria and various African conflicts.[59] While this paradigm shift in warfare is unfolding, NATO and the U.S. may consider themselves fortunate to have concluded the GWoT.

Are Commercial Drones Revolutionising the WarTech Nexus?

Evolving in various shapes and sizes, drones controlled via radio signals, fibre-optic cables, or autonomous AI-driven systems have become a defining feature of today’s wars. “70 per cent of all Russian and Ukrainian casualties” are caused by drones, the New York Times quotes a senior Ukrainian defence official in 2025. “It is, they say, a feeling of a thousand snipers in the sky,” the report further paraphrases.[60] In hindsight, emerging drone technologies may be regarded as just as decisive as the IED was during the GWoT. Necessity being the mother of invention, advances in drone warfare emerged from the ingenuity of soldiers on the battlefield, seeking tactical advantages their leaders had not initially provided. In a short timeframe, their effectiveness has been extrapolated by reciprocal adaptation, commercial availability, and scalability, and they are primarily facilitated by a robust Asian supply chain accessible to all sides.[61] When armed, drones serve primarily as Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) assets, offering exceptional cost-efficiency by delivering high impact at minimal expense.

Evolving in various shapes and sizes, drones controlled via radio signals, fibre-optic cables, or autonomous AI-driven systems have become a defining feature of today’s wars.

Like many post-industrial commercial success stories, affordability and scalability suggest that swarms of drones will also play a dominant role in future conflicts, profoundly influencing the global evolution of the WarTech Nexus. Consequently, the EDTs comprising the nexus distinguish it starkly from the classical “Military Industrial Complex” of post-Eisenhower days.[62] The battlefield is no longer shaped primarily by top-down defence industry giants dictating development and procurement. Instead, frontline necessities drive innovation, gaining prominence at military exhibitions and conferences.[63] For instance, at the World Defense Show 2024 in Saudi Arabia, more and more minor defence associations and start-ups based on uncrewed technologies helped increase the bandwidth of customers and contracts significantly.[64]

The growing enthusiasm for EDTs also signals the onset of a new global arms race, solidifying AI as a core element of military innovation and future doctrinal development.[65] Currently, the integration of AI in autonomous systems is regularly field-tested in Ukraine and is led by major U.S. tech firms, with Chinese competitors rapidly advancing.[66] In late 2024, NATO Secretary General Rutte underscored the strategic importance of EDTs, warning of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) rapid progress in “disruptive technologies of tomorrow, including AI, quantum, and space,” and calling on NATO to “boost” its industry to “outpace” its “competitors.”[67] However, relying on state-run enterprises to develop and supply these technologies traditionally involves longer production cycles and escalating costs. As a result, there is growing momentum for more flexible procurement models, including PPP, Project, Programme, and Portfolio Offices (P3O), and broader outsourcing of force multipliers within the expanding WarTech Nexus.[68] The effects are palpable: even in Germany’s traditionally restrictive defence sector, this shift is evident, with the tech start-up Helsing now producing thousands of semi-autonomous strike drones for Ukraine from its Munich facility, a stark indication of the private sector’s increasing role in modern conflicts.[69]

There is growing momentum for more flexible procurement models, including PPP, Project, Programme, and Portfolio Offices, and broader outsourcing of force multipliers within the expanding WarTech Nexus.

As these systems increasingly supplement and, in some cases, replace traditional assets like crewed strike aircraft, field artillery, and mechanised infantry, the relevance of longstanding Western doctrine and procurement strategies with traditional arms manufacturers is challenged. The shift has led to calls for cancelling long-term crewed weapons programs in favour of uncrewed solutions, a recently highlighted perspective by Elon Musk, who questioned the continued investment in fighter jets such as the F-35 and advocated adopting drone warfare.[70] Given Musk’s significant influence within the Trump administration, his increasing role in digitising and automating American hard power is becoming increasingly apparent.[71] Just as Howard Hughes shaped the aeronautical industry during the 1940s, Elon Musk might personify a revolution within the WarTech Nexus of the 21st century. His remarks during a Pentagon address in early 2025, his advancements in space technology through SpaceX, and his strategic role in supporting Ukraine’s communications via the Starlink satellite constellation all highlight his capacity and ambition to shape future battlefields.[72] Moreover, the development of SpaceX Starshield, a military-grade satellite network designed to provide secure communications and advanced surveillance capabilities, underscores the increasing militarisation of commercial space assets and their potential to redefine C4ISR in modern warfare.[73]

The Capability–Vulnerability Paradox

As the positive effects of battlefield digitisation are undeniable and overall military effectiveness has been dramatically boosted by technological advancements, a sensitivity to the risks should not be mistaken for ignorant conservatism. With new capabilities, there are new vulnerabilities. An unchecked reliance on AI risks maladaptations which could undermine a nation’s ability to project hard power in sub-digital warfare environments. For instance, Tesla’s ongoing struggles with autonomous driving publicly highlight AI’s current real-world limitations, where minor road variations or signposts led to accidents that algorithms failed to anticipate. In 2021, a notably humble Musk acknowledged these challenges, stating, “Nothing has more degrees of freedom than reality.”[74] Even when backed by a multi-billion-dollar effort, the stark contrast between theoretical promise and practical constraints underscores autonomous military technology’s potential unpredictability. Similarly, Israel’s AI-driven targeting of militant positions in Gaza in 2023 and 2024 has faced significant criticism due to its high margins of autonomous error, resulting in collateral damage on a yet (independently) unconfirmable scale.[75] This raises serious concerns for NATO forces preparing for EDT-driven LSCO scenarios in Eastern Europe, a region with densely populated areas and countless potential urban battlefields. If left unexamined, flawed or uncontrollable, AI applications risk becoming the defining failures of a digital fallacy, where technological overconfidence blinds military planners to the enduring complexities of war and war-related crimes.

Even when AI is used merely to augment crewed platforms, the interdependence of network-reliant weapon systems introduces potential flashpoints for friction and operational vulnerabilities. The ongoing debate over the capability and feasibility of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter, a central asset to NATO defence plans, highlights such critical concerns. Though somewhat anecdotal, the F-35 is deeply interconnected with the underlying doctrine of Network-Centric-Warfare, the adjacent TTPs and the overall military strategy of NATO allies. The German Luftwaffe is currently procuring 35 F-35As at significant budgetary cost, almost entirely financed by national debt, to uphold Germany’s role in NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement. Its role is to ensure the country retains the ability to deploy American B61-12 tactical nuclear bombs in the event of a nuclear conflict with Russia, thus strengthening central European deterrence.[76] However, the F-35’s reliance on connectivity with external systems, many of which civilian contractors maintain from primarily the U.S., raises concerns over national sovereignty and responsibility.[77] In a high-intensity conflict, where C4ISR could be degraded or denied by the opponent, political differences with allies and partners or electronic disruption, the F-35’s ability to execute its deterrent role becomes highly uncertain, potentially undermining its strategic credibility before it is even deployed.[78]

Even when AI is used merely to augment crewed platforms, the interdependence of network-reliant weapon systems introduces potential flashpoints for friction and operational vulnerabilities.

“Shall We All Commit Suicide?”

Suppose digitally enabled warfare was abruptly neutralised at a large scale, whether through counter-drone technologies, electronic warfare, or significant power disruptions, the battlefront of an LSCO could quickly resemble early 20th-century warfare.[79] A similar thought arose nearly 100 years ago, as a war-scarred Sir Winston Churchill mused on the repercussions of future scientific breakthroughs transforming the battlefield into the antithesis of modern technology. In an essay from 1924, he wrote:

“It might have been hoped that the electro-magnetic waves would in certain scales be found capable of detonating explosives of all kinds from a great distance. Were such a process discovered [..] War would in important respects return again to the crude but healthy limits of the barbarous ages. The sword, the spear, the bludgeon, and above all the fighting man, would regain at a bound their old sovereignty.”[80]

Churchill’s predictions on this subject did not materialise, nor did the permanent peace through the League of Nations he advocated for at the end of his essay “Shall we all commit suicide?.”[81] Much like the relentless Allied attacks on refineries and Axis supply lines during the Second World War, which crippled the fuel-dependent Juggernaut of Axis powers, modern armies risk seeing their highly digitalised and mechanised forces rendered ineffective if deprived of electricity or an undisrupted electromagnetic spectrum. The sudden loss of digital enablers would compel forces to rely more heavily on conventional fieldcraft, decentralised tactics, and analogue warfighting methods. Without stable power, data, and signals, anything reliant on a plug, battery, or antenna could become obsolete, forcing militaries to fall back on more primitive yet resilient solutions. Just as Churchill predicted, such a shift would push warfare toward a resemblance to earlier forms of conflict, eliminating digitised capabilities and vulnerabilities but reintroducing layers of analogue friction and logistical constraints that modern forces have largely overcome. It would favour senior commanders skilled in traditional warfare, improvisation, and independent decision-making, while disadvantaging those accustomed to micromanaging operations through C4ISR, or worse, those who have grown dependent on being micromanaged.

Overcoming Digital Friction in the Informational Space

In the ongoing war in Ukraine, both sides have increasingly relocated non-combat operations underground, seeking refuge in bunkers, trenches, and urban subterranean infrastructure to mitigate exposure to persistent aerial threats.[82] While this adaptation has enhanced resilience in the protracted war of attrition, it has also solidified static frontlines, limiting operational initiative beyond the tactical level. Above ground, the constant threat of drones and Russian strikes on Ukraine’s power grid and communication lines has severely disrupted military operations, forcing rapid reactions to energy shortages and compromising C4ISR capabilities.[83]

In the ongoing war in Ukraine, both sides have increasingly relocated non-combat operations underground, seeking refuge in bunkers, trenches, and urban subterranean infrastructure to mitigate exposure to persistent aerial threats.

To maintain minimal C2, the Ukrainian military swiftly implemented stopgap solutions, including mobile generators, portable solar panels, and energy-efficient technologies.[84] In parallel, they heavily leveraged open-source chat groups and mobile phone networks to supplement traditional digital communication systems, intuitively overcoming digital friction.[85] Redundant and decentralised communication systems, such as Starlink and secure radio frequencies, enabled Ukrainian forces to reestablish a flexible ISR network with direct Western support.[86] Also, new intelligence-sharing agreements with European allies further enhance Ukraine’s access to satellite imagery and secure data links, bolstering strategic communication.[87] Notably, in 2024, the German defence firm Rheinmetall, funded by the German Ministry of Defence, began supplying ICEYE satellite imagery to Ukraine.[88] While these developments demonstrate the effectiveness of PPP and the WarTech Nexus in wartime, they highlight Ukraine’s growing reliance on foreign support, a vulnerability with long-term strategic implications.[89]

Beyond the tactical sphere, the dominance or denial of space-based enablers remains critical in modern warfare. Space assets form the digital backbone of global communications, with thousands of satellites facilitating navigation, surveillance, and coordination. However, history has demonstrated the fragility of this infrastructure.

In 1962, Operation Starfish Prime unintentionally showcased the devastating effects of a high-altitude nuclear detonation, generating an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) capable of disrupting or destroying satellites within line of sight.[90] Such a blast could irradiate orbital space, rendering unshielded satellites inoperable and producing satellite debris that may trigger a cascading Kessler Syndrome effect, severely degrading space-based capabilities.[91] In short, the consequences of yielding nuclear weaponry in space are so severe and unpredictable that no further attempt has been made in over 60 years.

However, this is changing rapidly. Major global military powers have increasingly invested in Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capabilities, a well-documented development in academic research.[93] These weapon systems are currently insufficiently regulated and opaque in terms of their true capabilities, nurturing concerns about whether Russia can already yield nuclear-supported weapons able to disrupt American satellite constellations such as StarLink or StarShield, thus massively impacting global communications and navigation.[94]

Retaining information dominance is a cornerstone of Western military doctrine, essential for deterrence and operational initiative. Overcoming cascading effects of digital friction, including the loss of space-based enablers and force multipliers, is existential for survival in future conflicts. Any adversary contemplating the systematic dismantling of digital infrastructure must recognise that such actions could ultimately disadvantage them in an environment where analogue warfare remains an untested equaliser in large-scale, high-tech conflicts. To ensure deterrence through analogue resilience, mitigating and ultimately overcoming digital friction should compound the centre of gravity in future Western military education, leadership training and exercise regimen, reducing the cult of the offensive in its doctrinal dominance.

Breaking Inertia: Resuming Snap Drills and Large-Scale Field Exercises

The combat effectiveness of large NATO battlegroups under digital and analogue conditions has not been subjected to an unscheduled stress test in decades. Instead of confronting operational uncertainty through realistic field exercises, many states rely on theoretical wargaming, scripted drills, and doctrinal refinements. Despite frequent rhetoric on rebuilding military readiness for peer conflict, this is at odds with the unpredictable realities of military uncertainty. As Matlack paraphrases Clausewitz: “If war is merely the continuation of politics by other means, what role does the dress rehearsal of war play in military exercises?”[95]

Addressing this “exercise gap” requires the return of LSCO-level exercises, conducted without prior scheduling, to ensure soldiers confront operational conditions akin to those experienced in wartime, with the explicit expectation of large-scale failure in training as a necessary means for wartime success.[96] Historically, unscheduled, large-scale exercises have been crucial for identifying vulnerabilities, forcing doctrinal evolution, and enhancing force agility. Nevertheless, few senior NATO officers have ever experienced such drills, as these measures were largely abandoned during the post-Cold War peace dividend of the 1990s.[97] To regain adaptability and deterrent credibility, NATO must resurrect the concept of snap drills, akin to Russia’s ZAPAD drills or NATO’s Cold War-era ReForGer series. It must rigorously stress-test assumptions and expose weaknesses before they manifest in combat.[98] Training in such an environment requires ingenuity, improvisation, and a command philosophy rooted in self-reliance. These attributes enable military leadership to break free from administrative inertia, helping forces adapt to the shock of war. More importantly, such adaptability might allow commanders to seize the initiative in combat situations where reliance on digital infrastructure becomes a liability. This principle remains particularly relevant in an era where digitised dependencies introduce formerly unknown digital friction, requiring forces to prepare for the full spectrum of war’s unpredictability.

Unscheduled, large-scale exercises have been crucial for identifying vulnerabilities, forcing doctrinal evolution, and enhancing force agility.

A unique but often overlooked challenge to NATO’s force readiness is the digital generational divide within its officer corps. Today’s senior military leaders, having begun their careers in an analogue era before transitioning to digital warfare, possess dual exposure that allows them to operate in contested environments where digital infrastructure is compromised. This skill set is critical for contingency planning amid growing digital friction. Future generations, however, risk losing this adaptability, particularly as networked warfare becomes second nature and reliance on cyber, electronic warfare, and GPS-based systems increases.

Ironically, NATO’s ongoing recruitment and retention crisis has inadvertently preserved this hybrid expertise. With many Western militaries struggling to attract and retain younger personnel, an ageing force structure has emerged, extending the service of officers trained in analogue and digital methods. While this prolongs institutional knowledge, it also presents a physical resilience challenge—as older personnel may struggle to withstand sustained, high-intensity combat under analogue conditions.

A similar paradox exists in NATO’s modernisation and standardisation efforts. Despite pains to adopt next-generation warfare systems, its slow procurement cycles mean that many core member states still rely on outdated platforms. Germany’s Bundeswehr, for example, continues to field primary weapon systems dating back to the 1970s, some being partially retrofitted and digitised while others have deteriorated, reflecting decades of deliberate underfunding, strategic indecision and entropy.[99] Even a significant portion of the infamous “Taurus” cruise missiles, seen as both a symbol of Germany’s commitment to Ukraine and a source of tension with Russia, have fallen into disrepair over the past decades.[100] However, this technological inertia may have inadvertently preserved pre-digital warfighting competencies, as many legacy systems rely on outdated but proven TTPs.

Germany’s Bundeswehr continues to field primary weapon systems dating back to the 1970s, some being partially retrofitted and digitised while others have deteriorated, reflecting decades of deliberate underfunding, strategic indecision and entropy.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld captured the essence of this dilemma with a blunt assessment: “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have later.”[101] Since military planners can never expect forces to be truly ready for a war of defence due to the lack of initiative, preparing for the unknown is the only option left.

Preparing for the War of Today

The increasing reliance on digital warfare presents a strategic paradox for Western militaries. While networked capabilities provide unmatched lethality, they also introduce significant vulnerabilities, ranging from cyber disruptions to overdependence on fragile C4ISR. To avoid this self-imposed digital fallacy, Western militaries must adopt a balanced approach by:

• diversifying force readiness and ensuring human leadership will overcome digital friction and operate effectively under degraded conditions;
• reassessing procurement priorities and moving away from expensive, high-tech prestige projects toward scalable, resilient warfighting capabilities and sub-digital contingencies that can withstand contested environments;
• reintroducing LSCO-level exercises and including unscheduled stress drills that identify weaknesses before adversaries exploit them; and
• bridging the generational gap in military leadership and leveraging the hybrid expertise of officers trained in both analogue and digital warfare.

To achieve this, Western militaries must ensure both analogue and digital resilience to meet the demands of LSCO. The prevailing Zeitgeist may resist a more conservative approach, misinterpreting it as institutional inertia rather than strategic prudence. However, as this essay demonstrates, actual preparedness lies in mastering both past and future methods of warfare, ensuring that forces are ready for the unpredictable conflicts of the present.

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Alexander Schäbler is a Captain (OF-2) in the German Armed Forces, currently tasked with informing the German public on defence and security matters. His military career includes various positions in the military medical branch of the German Armed Forces and deployments to Afghanistan and Mali. He holds an MA in Strategic Studies. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the German Armed Forces.

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[2] Jim Storr, The Human Face of War (Birmingham: Helion & Company, 2009), 36.

[3] Digital Friction refers to the obstacles, delays, and inefficiencies that arise from the use of digital systems and information technology in warfare. It is an extension of the classic Clausewitzian concept of friction into the realm of computers, networks, and data.

[4] John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September 3, 1976.

[5] Mark A. Milley, “On War and Future Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly 110 (3rd Quarter 2023): 7, 12, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-110/jfq-110_6-15_Milley.pdf.

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[42] Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) refer to the standardized methods and practices used by military forces to achieve operational objectives. Tactics involve the specific maneuvers and strategies employed in combat, techniques describe the detailed execution of tasks within those tactics, and procedures outline the structured steps necessary to carry them out effectively. TTPs evolve based on battlefield experience, technological advancements, and adversary capabilities, ensuring adaptability in modern warfare.

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[44] Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in the military context refer to cooperative agreements between government defense institutions and private sector companies to develop, procure, and sustain defense capabilities. These partnerships are increasingly used to integrate emerging technologies, enhance logistical resilience, and streamline procurement processes, but they also raise concerns about dependency on private industry for critical military functions, supply chain vulnerabilities, and cost efficiency in Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO).

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[77] Several international customers of the F35A, such as Switzerland, India or the UAE have expressed doubts whether the weapons system can still operate effectively without the benevolence of the manufacturing nation and are considering stepping back from the contract, marking the F35A as a symbol of global American ambiguity.

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[80] Winston S. Churchill, Shall We All Commit Suicide? (London: Nash’s Pall Mall Magazine, 1925), 190.

[81] Winston S. Churchill, Shall We All Commit Suicide? (London: Nash’s Pall Mall Magazine, 1925), 184.

[82] Oleksiy Vasyliuk, “Military Fortifications in Ukraine: What Comes Next?” UWEC Work Group, January 29, 2024, https://uwecworkgroup.info/military-fortifications-in-ukraine-what-comes-next/.

[83] Theresa Sabonis-Helf, “The Electricity Front of Russia’s War Against Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, February 03, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/the-electricity-front-of-russias-war-against-ukraine.

[84] Theresa Sabonis-Helf, “The Electricity Front of Russia’s War Against Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, February 03, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/the-electricity-front-of-russias-war-against-ukraine.

[85] Roman Horbyk, “The War Phone: Mobile Communication on the Frontline in Eastern Ukraine,” Digital War 3, no. 1–3 (2022): 9–24, https://doi.org/10.1057/s42984-022-00049-2.

[86] The Economist, “Fighting the War in Ukraine on the Electromagnetic Spectrum,” The Economist, February 5, 2025, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2025/02/05/fighting-the-war-in-ukraine-on-the-electromagnetic-spectrum.

[87] Theresa Hitchens, “Spurred by Ukraine War, 18 Western Countries Plan to Share Remote Sensing Data,” Breaking Defense, February 15, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/spurred-by-ukraine-war-18-western-countries-plan-to-share-remote-sensing-data/.

[88] Rheinmetall, “Rheinmetall and ICEYE Are Supplying Ukraine with Satellite Imagery,” Rheinmetall, November 11, 2024, https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2024/11/2024-11-11-rheinmetall-and-iceye-are-supplying-ukraine-with-satellite-imagery.

[89] Recent political comments made by the US administration and Elon Musk at the time of writing this essay highlight the risk of such arrangements, since both have the power to turn off the backbone of Ukrainian mobile communications at any moment.

[90] Robert Vincent, “Getting Serious About the Threat of High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations,” War on the Rocks, September 23, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/getting-serious-about-the-threat-of-high-altitude-nuclear-detonations/.

[91] Brian Gutierrez, “Why the U.S. Once Set Off a Nuclear Bomb in Space Called Starfish Prime,” National Geographic, July 15, 2021, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/premium/article/why-the-us-once-set-off-a-nuclear-bomb-in-space-called-starfish-prime; Tony Phillips, “Starfish Prime: The First Accidental Geomagnetic Storm,” Space Weather Archive, July 8, 2022, https://spaceweatherarchive.com/2022/07/08/starfish-prime-the-first-accidental-geomagnetic-storm/; European Space Agency (ESA), “The Kessler Effect and How to Stop It,” ESA, accessed February 27, 2025, https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Engineering_Technology/The_Kessler_Effect_and_how_to_stop_it.

[92] AI-generated image, “Starfish Prime-Inspired Nuclear Detonation in Low Earth Orbit,” created by DALL·E, generated on March 4, 2025.

[93] Jaganath Sankaran, “Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapons: An Asymmetric Response to U.S. Aerospace Superiority,” Arms Control Today 52, no. 3 (March 2022), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-03/features/russias-anti-satellite-weapons-asymmetric-response-us-aerospace-superiority.

[94] Malcolm Davis, “The Re-Emerging Threat of Orbital Nuclear Weapons,” King’s College London, March 07, 2024, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/the-re-emerging-threat-of-orbital-nuclear-weapons.

[95] Jon-Wyatt Matlack, “Analysis: Military Maneuvers—Mock Battles or Harbingers of War?” Federal Agency for Civic Education (BpB): Russia Analyses no. 417, https://www.bpb.de/themen/europa/russland-analysen/nr-417/507103/analyse-militaermanoever-scheinschlachten-oder-vorboten-des-krieges/.

[96] Jon-Wyatt Matlack, “Analysis: Military Maneuvers—Mock Battles or Harbingers of War?” Federal Agency for Civic Education (BpB): Russia Analyses no. 417, https://www.bpb.de/themen/europa/russland-analysen/nr-417/507103/analyse-militaermanoever-scheinschlachten-oder-vorboten-des-krieges/.

[97] Jon-Wyatt Matlack, “Analysis: Military Maneuvers—Mock Battles or Harbingers of War?” Federal Agency for Civic Education (BpB): Russia Analyses no. 417, https://www.bpb.de/themen/europa/russland-analysen/nr-417/507103/analyse-militaermanoever-scheinschlachten-oder-vorboten-des-krieges/.

[98] Dave Johnson, “Zapad 2017 and Euro-Atlantic Security,” NATO Review, December 14, 2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2017/12/14/zapad-2017-and-euro-atlantic-security/index.html.

[99] Kyle Mizokami, “NATO’s Real Problem: Germany’s Military Is Dying,” The National Interest, December 6, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/natos-real-problem-germanys-military-dying-102362.

[100] Tagesschau, “Bundeswehr Plans to Modernize Its Taurus Cruise Missiles,” Tagesschau, March 3, 2025, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/bundeswehr-taurus-modernisierung-100.html.

[101] Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Response to a soldier’s question about equipment shortages,” U.S. Department of Defense Town Hall Meeting, Camp Buehring, Kuwait, December 8, 2004. Transcript available at U.S. Department of Defense Archives.

[102] AI-generated image, “Female Soldier in Dropship Giving Thumbs-Up in 4:3 90s Sci-Fi Style,” created by DALL·E, generated on February 27, 2025.