Abstract: Recent conflicts underscore the practical relevance of simulation-based and gamified approaches to military training. From the use of commercial platforms for pilot familiarisation to incentive-based systems for drone operators in Ukraine, gamified logic is increasingly shaping how military personnel train, adapt, and perform under operational conditions.

Based on an exploratory field trial and drawing on the long-standing educational mandate attributed to Maria Theresa, this study frames gamification not as a technological novelty but as a contemporary medium for experiential learning.

For the trial, officer cadets participated in competitive tactical scenarios using a commercial PC-based simulation (WARNO). Repeated questionnaires, an intermediate diagnostic intervention, and qualitative experiential reports were used to examine learning effects, including decision-making under time pressure, understanding of combined arms operations, and the role of structured reflection.

Problem statement: Can the integration of commercial PC games into military training programs meaningfully enhance tactical competence, decision-making skills, and understanding of combined arms operations among officer cadets?

So what?: Military education institutions should deliberately integrate low-threshold, commercial simulations into tactical training as complementary learning environments, not as substitutes for live exercises. This requires instructors to actively frame learning objectives, enforce doctrinal clarity, and institutionalise structured reflection, such as hot wash-ups. Conceptually, the focus must shift from teaching procedures to creating decision-making situations – spaces where future officers can test principles, make mistakes, and learn to assume responsibility before they formally engage in real-world combat and war-like situations.

On Gamification in Military Training and Education

Any approach to tactical education must ultimately proceed through the lens of leadership, for tactics serve leadership and its practical exercise. This understanding has a long-standing tradition within Austrian military thought. Empress Maria Theresa famously instructed Field Marshal Count Daun to “Make for me capable officers and upright men from them” in 1751.[1] Implicit in this command lies the foundation of leadership training itself: the officer is, above all, a leader. Leadership manifests itself not only through orders but through the ability to decide,  communicate intent, and shape understanding under conditions of uncertainty.

Make for me capable officers and upright men from them.

Decision-making is therefore the central cognitive task of tactical leadership. It requires integrating doctrinal knowledge, situational awareness, time pressure, and responsibility for subordinates. Tactical education must consequently aim at more than procedural competence; it must foster judgment, adaptability, and the ability to translate abstract principles into concrete action. This enduring educational challenge forms the conceptual backdrop against which contemporary discussions on digital tools, simulation, and gamified learning environments must be situated.

In recent years, gamification has gained prominence as an instructional approach within higher education, including military contexts. In educational research, gamification is commonly defined as the deliberate integration of selected game elements—such as points, competition, feedback loops, or scenario-based challenges—into non-game environments to boost motivation and improve learning outcomes. It is distinct from so-called serious games, which are fully developed game environments designed specifically for training purposes. Gamification, by contrast, embeds game-like mechanics into existing educational structures and curricula.

For military education, the appeal of gamification lies less in entertainment than in its capacity to simulate decision-making under pressure, provide immediate feedback, and enable repeated practice in a controlled environment. Gamified learning environments are most effective when they reinforce, rather than replace, doctrinal instruction and leadership development.[2]

The growing interest in game-based and role-based learning is not confined to military education. Contemporary pedagogical discourse increasingly highlights the value of analogue and digital gaming formats across educational domains. Recent academic discussions have, for instance, emphasised the educational potential of pen-and-paper role-playing games in fostering creativity, collaboration, and structured problem-solving.[3], [4], [5] From this perspective, it is worth reconsidering whether traditional military planning procedures already embody similar characteristics.

The Austrian Military Decision-Making Process, as taught at the Theresan Military Academy, can be understood as a structured form of role-based simulation.[6] Participants operate within clearly defined rules, phases, and constraints, guided by a doctrinal handbook that specifies movement rates, spatial requirements, and permissible actions.[7] The process unfolds through interaction, anticipation of adversary behaviour, and iterative refinement of plans. Viewed in this way, tactical planning itself resembles a rule-governed role-playing exercise—one that long predates contemporary digital gamification. The current educational emphasis on experiential and gamified learning thus reinforces an insight that is deeply embedded in military tradition: learning through structured simulation and reflection.

The Austrian Military Decision-Making Process, as taught at the Theresan Military Academy, can be understood as a structured form of role-based simulation.

Comparable developments can be observed in other professional fields, such as medical education, where simulation-based and gamified approaches are increasingly employed to train complex decision-making and team coordination.[8] These interdisciplinary parallels suggest that gamification should not be understood as a technological novelty, but as a pedagogical strategy that aligns with long-standing principles of experiential learning.

Within the military realm, game-based approaches have been employed for decades, initially most visibly as recruitment tools. One prominent example is America’s Army, launched by the U.S. Army in 2002 to familiarise potential recruits with military culture and practices.[9] Although such initiatives were not primarily designed as formal education tools, they contributed to a broader acceptance of digital environments as vehicles for conveying military concepts and decision-making frameworks. Over time, this acceptance has facilitated the integration of simulation and gamification into professional military education.[10] Armed forces have increasingly adopted gamified and simulation-based methods beyond recruitment. Virtual and mixed-reality environments, adaptive learning platforms, and competitive assessment formats are now used to supplement traditional instruction, often with the aim of reducing costs associated with live exercises while increasing training intensity and accessibility.[11] In parallel, recent conflicts have demonstrated that gamified logics can extend beyond education into operational contexts. Examples from Ukraine, such as performance-based incentive systems for drone operators or the use of commercial flight simulators (e.g., Digital Combat Simulator) for pilot familiarisation, illustrate how game-like mechanisms can influence behaviour, training efficiency, and resource allocation even under combat conditions.[12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17] One prominent example for this is the Ukrainian Armed Forces Brave1 Marketplace, a digital platform where frontline units can acquire equipment using a point-based system, matching operational needs with technological solutions and thereby reinforcing the gamified logistics increasingly reflected in modern military innovation.[18], [19]

At the same time, the application of gamification in military contexts raises important concerns. Research on potential negative effects highlights risks such as superficial motivation, manipulation of scoring systems, or a shift in focus from meaningful performance to easily quantifiable outcomes. In operational environments, competitive metrics may inadvertently incentivise short-term, “scorable” actions at the expense of broader mission objectives – not only rooted in gamification, but this trend acts as a multiplier. In the military non-permissive environment, training and operations involve rapid ethical judgment and responsibility over and for human lives, which requires caution in the design and application of incentive structures.[20]

In the military non-permissive environment, training and operations involve rapid ethical judgment and responsibility over and for human lives, which requires caution in the design and application of incentive structures.

Taken together, these developments indicate that gamification has evolved from isolated experiments into a structural element of contemporary military education and training. Numerous studies emphasise its potential positive effects on motivation, engagement, and learning outcomes.[21], [22], [23], [24], [25] Yet its effectiveness depends critically on instructional design, contextual integration, and reflective debriefing. Gamification does not replace leadership education; rather, it can serve as a medium through which leadership, decision-making, and tactical principles are practised and internalised.

This understanding underpins the design of the present study. By employing commercial off-the-shelf PC-based simulations in a competitive yet instructional setting, the study examines how gamified tactical scenarios influence officer cadets’ understanding and application of tactical principles. Particular attention is given to the role of structured reflection, especially post-exercise hot wash-ups, in translating simulated experience into learning outcomes. Yet, the true potential of gamification lies not only in efficiency but in its ability to embody enduring educational imperatives. Maria Theresa’s injunction to Count Daun to “make capable officers and upright men” can today be reinterpreted through the lens of exercises that test judgment and adaptability under stress.

Methodology

The study employs an exploratory mixed-methods design combining repeated questionnaire surveys with qualitative written reflections to examine the effects of PC-based tactical simulations on officer cadet education at the tactical level. The methodological approach was deliberately designed to reflect the iterative and adaptive nature of military training, wherein instructional formats are continuously adjusted in response to observed learning needs.

The study was conducted with a cohort of nine officer cadets at the same training level and with the same professional background. All participants fulfilled identical entry requirements and initially assumed comparable roles within the training environment. During the simulation phases, participants were free to self-organise into functional roles, primarily distinguishing between combat-oriented and support-oriented tasks. This self-assignment reflected realistic decision-making dynamics commonly observed in tactical exercises.

Data collection was integrated into the training sequence and consisted of three main survey phases (pre: before the training started, intermediate: in between the two rounds of playing, after: after the second round of gaming and a hot wash-up) supplemented by an intermediate diagnostic instrument. Prior to the first simulation round, participants completed an initial questionnaire that captured baseline self-assessments of their understanding of tactical planning procedures, tactical principles, decision-making under time pressure, and combined arms considerations. All questionnaire items were measured using a six-point Likert scale to avoid neutral midpoint responses and encourage differentiated self-assessment. Each questionnaire also included a short open-response section.

Following the first simulation round, a second questionnaire was administered. Analysis of responses from the first two survey phases revealed that, despite prior doctrinal instruction, participants did not share a sufficiently consistent or precise understanding of what was meant by tactical principles and related doctrinal concepts. This finding indicated that subsequent learning effects could not be reliably interpreted without further clarification.

In response, an intermediate questionnaire and clarification phase was introduced. The purpose of this additional step was diagnostic rather than evaluative. The intermediate questionnaire focused specifically on participants’ interpretations of tactical principles and heuristics, allowing the instructor to identify conceptual ambiguities and divergent understandings. Based on these results, targeted explanatory instruction was provided to establish a shared conceptual baseline before continuing the simulation-based training. The inclusion of this intermediate phase was considered essential to ensure that observed changes in later survey phases could be meaningfully attributed to the training intervention rather than to differing initial conceptions.

After completion of all simulation rounds and the concluding hot wash-up, a final questionnaire was administered to assess consolidated learning outcomes and perceived applicability of tactical principles. Across all questionnaire phases, participants were assigned anonymised identification codes, enabling longitudinal within-subject comparison while preserving confidentiality.

In addition to the questionnaire data, each participant completed an individual written experiential report guided by structured prompting questions. These reports captured subjective perceptions of the training, emotional and cognitive responses during the simulations, perceived learning progression, and reflections on the applicability of PC-based tactical simulation within officer education. Particular emphasis was placed on participants’ assessments of the post-exercise hot wash-ups and their role in facilitating understanding and reflection.

Quantitative data were analysed descriptively to identify trends across the different survey phases. Given the small sample size and exploratory character of the study, no inferential statistical testing was conducted. Qualitative data from open questionnaire responses and experiential reports were analysed using thematic content analysis, focusing on recurring patterns related to learning processes, decision-making, and perceived instructional value. The combination of quantitative self-assessment data and qualitative experiential reflections enabled methodological triangulation and provided a nuanced perspective on both perceived learning outcomes and underlying learning mechanisms.

During data collection, it was identified that one participant consistently interpreted the Likert scale in the opposite direction across all questionnaire items. As this misinterpretation was systematic and internally coherent, the corresponding responses were recoded prior to analysis to align with the intended scale direction. This adjustment was documented transparently and did not alter the overall descriptive trends observed in the dataset.[26]

During data analysis and manuscript preparation, generative artificial intelligence tools were used in a supportive role. These tools were used to assist in structuring, synthesising, and refining qualitative data, as well as in formulating descriptive interpretations of quantitative trends. The analytical judgments, thematic categorisations, and interpretive conclusions, however, remained the sole responsibility of the author. Artificial intelligence was not used to generate empirical data, nor to replace human interpretation, but served as an auxiliary instrument to enhance clarity, coherence, and methodological rigour.

Results

Quantitative Results: Interdependent Development of Tactical Planning and Combined Arms Understanding

The quantitative questionnaire data reveal coherent developments across all assessed dimensions over the course of the training intervention (i.e., pre, intermediate, and after).

A key finding concerns the near-identical development of tactical planning competence and combined arms understanding across all survey phases. While this overlap results in limited visual differentiation between both curves in the graphical representation, it constitutes one of the central analytical results of the study.

Rather than indicating redundancy or insufficient sensitivity of the measurement instrument, the parallel trajectories suggest that participants increasingly perceived tactical planning and combined arms thinking as inseparable elements of a single cognitive process.

Within the PC-based simulation environment, planning decisions were immediately translated into visible interactions between manoeuvre elements, fire support, air defence, reconnaissance, and logistics. As a result, planning was no longer experienced as an abstract or sequential procedure, but as an activity whose validity directly depended on the coordinated employment of multiple capabilities. The quantitative convergence of both dimensions thus reflects an integrated form of tactical understanding fostered by the simulation-based training design. From the author’s perspective, the deliberate integration of mutual support, the mitigation of vulnerabilities, and the exploitation of complementary strengths constitutes tactical understanding per se; whether termed combined arms warfare or otherwise is immaterial—the essential requirement is recognising that one already possesses a full hand of capabilities and must merely employ them with coherent intent.

Self-assessed decision-making and intent formation under time pressure showed a moderate but consistent increase over time. Although baseline values were already relatively high, participants reported growing confidence in forming and implementing decisions under conditions of uncertainty and rapid change. This effect became more pronounced following the intermediate clarification phase, indicating that conceptual alignment contributed to more stable and meaningful self-assessments.

The dimension of tactical principles displayed a clearer positive development following scale alignment. While initial self-assessments suggested heterogeneous baseline understandings, scores increased consistently across the intermediate and final survey phases. This pattern indicates not merely increased confidence, but a progressive consolidation of participants’ understanding of tactical principles as explicit analytical tools rather than implicit or assumed knowledge. The observed trend aligns closely with the introduction of the intermediate clarification phase and subsequent structured reflection.

Motivation remained consistently high across all survey phases and increased slightly toward the final assessment, indicating sustained willingness to engage further with PC-based tactical simulations to reinforce tactical competence and decision-making skills.

Given the exploratory character of the study and the limited sample size, all quantitative findings are presented descriptively. Nevertheless, the observed patterns align closely with the instructional design of the intervention and are strongly corroborated by the qualitative data.

Qualitative Results: From Procedural Planning to Relational Tactical Thinking

The qualitative analysis of open-ended questionnaire responses and seven experiential reports revealed a high degree of thematic convergence across participants. In particular, the data provide strong explanatory depth for the quantitative finding that tactical planning and combined arms understanding developed in parallel.

Across all qualitative sources, participants rarely described planning as a standalone or purely procedural activity.[27] Instead, planning was consistently framed in relation to the interaction of reconnaissance, fire support, air defence, logistics, and reserve management. Participants emphasised that planning decisions only became meaningful when their consequences unfolded dynamically within the simulated battlespace. Several reflections highlighted that plans that were conceptually correct nevertheless failed when insufficiently supported by reconnaissance, logistics, or protected fire support.

A recurring theme concerned the visibility of interdependencies. Participants reported that the simulation environment made the effects of poor coordination immediately apparent. Failures in reconnaissance led to premature losses; insufficient air defence rapidly neutralised manoeuvre elements; neglected logistics resulted in operational paralysis despite tactical success in earlier phases. These experiences were frequently described as decisive learning moments, as they transformed doctrinal abstractions into tangible outcomes.[28]

Decision-making under time pressure emerged as a closely linked theme. Participants described situations in which rapidly evolving enemy actions, losses of key capabilities, or unexpected breakthroughs forced immediate prioritisation. In these moments, planning was experienced not as a linear sequence of steps, but as a continuous process of reassessment and adaptation. Several participants noted that their understanding of planning shifted from “following a checklist” toward “managing interrelated effects,” particularly in relation to reserve employment and the timing of supporting fires.[29]

The importance of combined arms coordination was emphasised in all experiential reports. Participants repeatedly reflected on the necessity of synchronising reconnaissance, fire support, manoeuvre, and protection, as well as the other parts of the (joint) functions shown in the picture above. In many accounts, learning occurred through failure: isolated employment of individual systems consistently resulted in rapid defeat, while coordinated action—often developed only after initial setbacks—significantly improved outcomes. These experiences reinforced doctrinal principles such as the primacy of reconnaissance, the protection of combat support assets, and the necessity of maintaining a viable reserve.

Structured reflection during post-exercise hot wash-ups played a decisive role in consolidating these insights. Participants frequently stated that understanding often emerged only after collective discussion and guided analysis of what had occurred. These reflection phases enabled them to articulate causal relationships, identify flawed assumptions, and relate their experiences explicitly to tactical principles and leadership responsibilities. One participant articulated this delayed realisation of learning particularly succinctly, stating that he “often only realised afterwards that he had actually learned something”.[30]

Finally, participants also identified clear limitations of the simulation environment. The absence of subordinate leaders, an overextended span of control, and technical constraints were repeatedly mentioned as distortions of subjective interpreted and expected real command conditions. Importantly, these limitations were not perceived as invalidating the learning experience. Rather, they were understood as contextual factors that required conscious reflection and instructor guidance. In several reports, participants explicitly distinguished between lessons transferable to real-world leadership and those attributable to the specific characteristics of the software environment.

Discussion

The findings of this exploratory study indicate that PC-based, gamified tactical simulations can meaningfully support officer cadet education at the land tactical level when embedded within a structured instructional framework. Crucially, the educational value of such simulations does not lie in isolated skill acquisition, but in their capacity to foster integrated tactical thinking, in which planning, decision-making, and combined arms coordination are experienced as inseparable.

Gamification as a Catalyst for Integrated Tactical Cognition

One of the most significant outcomes of the study is the near-identical development of self-assessed tactical planning competence and combined arms understanding. Rather than representing a limitation of measurement or visualisation, this convergence reflects a substantive educational effect. The simulation environment encouraged participants to experience planning not as a procedural checklist, but as a relational activity whose validity depended on the coordinated interaction of reconnaissance, manoeuvre, fire support, air defence, logistics, and reserves.

This finding challenges a common tendency in military education to treat planning and combined arms coordination as distinct instructional realms. The results suggest that gamified simulations can help dissolve this artificial separation by making interdependencies immediately visible and operationally consequential. In doing so, they promote a holistic form of tactical cognition that closely aligns with the realities of modern combat operations.

Decision-Making Under Pressure: Experiencing Consequences

The qualitative data further indicate that decision-making under time pressure constituted a key learning mechanism. Participants consistently described situations characterised by uncertainty, rapid change, and incomplete information—conditions that forced prioritisation and acceptance of imperfect solutions. Errors were not abstract or delayed, but immediate and visible, allowing participants to connect decisions directly with outcomes.

This accelerated feedback loop distinguishes PC-based simulations from many traditional instructional formats. By compressing the temporal distance between decision, action, and consequence, the simulation created an environment in which learning emerged through experience rather than instruction alone. Importantly, this process did not eliminate the need for doctrinal grounding; instead, it exposed gaps in understanding that could be addressed through targeted clarification and reflection.

Reflection as the Decisive Learning Mechanism

A central insight of the study is that learning effects were consolidated primarily during structured post-exercise hot-wash-ups. While the simulation provided the experiential foundation, reflection is what helped transform experience into understanding. The intermediate questionnaire played a crucial diagnostic role by revealing divergent interpretations of tactical principles, thereby enabling instructional realignment.

This finding underscores that gamification is not a self-sufficient educational method. Without deliberate conceptual framing and guided reflection, the simulation risks remaining an engaging but superficial experience. When properly embedded, however, it becomes a powerful tool for exposing assumptions, reinforcing doctrinal principles, and fostering critical self-assessment among officer cadets. This effect was also reflected in a measurable increase in participants’ explicit understanding of tactical principles, suggesting that clarification and reflection transformed previously implicit assumptions into consciously applied analytical frameworks.

Limits, Risks, and Instructional Responsibility

Despite its potential, the study also highlights inherent limitations of PC-based tactical simulation. Participants repeatedly pointed to the absence of subordinate leaders, overextended spans of control, and technical abstractions as distortions of real command conditions.[31] On the one hand, these factors can shift cognitive load toward system management, risking the misrepresentation of leadership dynamics if left unaddressed and should therefore be mitigated. But on the other hand, the operational observations suggest that the constraints perceived by cadets within the simulated digital environment should not be interpreted as artificial limitation by game mechanics. Rather, such constraints may represent functional analogues to adaptive pressure encountered in real-world military scenarios. What appears as limitation may be an early exposure to operational friction and should be considerably kept.

Such limitations do not invalidate the educational approach, but they place increased responsibility on instructors. Gamified environments must be explicitly contextualised, with clear distinctions drawn between transferable lessons and simulation-specific artefacts. Failure to do so risks either overgeneralization or unwarranted dismissal of the learning experience.

Implications for Military Education

Taken together, the findings suggest that gamified PC-based simulations are most effective when employed not as standalone tools, but as deliberately framed learning environments within a broader educational architecture. Their accessibility, high motivational appeal, and rapid iteration capacity make them particularly well-suited for reinforcing integrated tactical thinking and decision-making under pressure.

The study supports a conceptual shift in military education: from teaching tactical components in isolation toward creating environments in which tactical interdependencies must be actively managed. In this sense, gamification does not simplify tactical education—it complicates it productively, confronting future officers with the complexity, uncertainty, and responsibility inherent in command.

Conclusion

Tactical education ultimately serves leadership, and leadership manifests itself most clearly in moments of decision under uncertainty, time pressure, and responsibility. Any instructional approach that claims relevance for officer education must therefore be assessed not by its technical sophistication, but by its contribution to judgment, prioritisation, and the ability to translate principles into action. Against this backdrop, the present study examined the educational potential of integrating commercial PC-based games into land tactical training.

The findings suggest that such simulations can meaningfully contribute to the development of land tactical competence, decision-making skills, and understanding of combined arms operations among army officer cadets – provided they are embedded within a coherent instructional framework. The observed learning effects did not arise solely from the game environment, but from a combination of experiential exposure, conceptual clarification, and structured reflection. Rather than reinforcing isolated procedural skills, the simulation environment fostered an integrated form of tactical cognition, in which planning and combined arms coordination were increasingly experienced as inseparable elements of effective decision-making. In particular, the combination of repeated simulation rounds and systematic hot wash-ups enabled participants to connect immediate experience with doctrinal principles, transforming action into understanding.

At the same time, the study highlights important limitations. PC-based simulations do not replicate real command conditions, nor do they substitute for live training or leadership under real human constraints. Technical abstraction, overextended spans of control, and simplified representations of command and logistics inevitably shape how leadership is exercised within the simulation. These constraints are not flaws to be concealed, but characteristics that must be explicitly addressed and reflected upon if learning is to remain grounded and ethically responsible. Simulations do enhance training – never replacing real-world experience.

Seen in this light, gamification should not be understood as a shortcut or a replacement for traditional military education. Rather, it functions as a diagnostic and experiential tool that exposes weaknesses, challenges assumptions, and confronts learners with the consequences of their decisions. Its educational value lies precisely in its capacity to make failure visible without making it fatal, and to allow repetition without the costs associated with live exercises.

Seen in this light, gamification should not be understood as a shortcut or a replacement for traditional military education.

This interpretation resonates with a foundational idea of officer education that predates digital technology by centuries. When Maria Theresa demanded that capable officers and upright individuals be formed, she articulated an educational ambition that remains valid today. Modern simulations cannot create character, but they can create situations in which judgment, responsibility, and ethical awareness are tested and revealed. Whether these situations become genuine learning opportunities depends less on the software employed than on the seriousness with which instructors frame, guide, and reflect upon them.

Ultimately, the integration of gamified PC-based simulations into military education raises the broader question of whether training institutions are prepared to use such tools not merely to engage and motivate, but to challenge and confront future leaders with the demands of decision-making in complex environments. The answer to this question will determine whether gamification remains a technical novelty or becomes a meaningful extension of leadership education in the profession of arms.

[1] Empress Maria Theresa, quoted in Georg Kunovjanek and Georg Maier, Das neue theresianische Führungsmodell: Von der Trinität der Führung, Armis et Litteris 37 (Vienna: Republik Österreich, Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, 2022), 36, https://permalink.obvsg.at/AC16526996.

[2] Tomislav Ivanjko et al., “Gamification in Support of Decision Making in Military Higher Education,” in 2024 47th ICT and Electronics Convention (MIPRO), May 20–24, 2024, Opatija, Croatia: Proceedings, ed. Snjezana Babić (Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 2024), accessed October 23, 2025, https://fdpm.com.hr/radovi/Gamification_in_Support_of_Decision_Making_in_Military_Higher_Education.pdf.

[3] Andrea Albers, “Gaming im Unterricht,” Pädagogik 77, no. 10 (2025).

[4] Lukas Berger, “Gamification und Reflexion,” Pädagogik 77, no. 10 (2025).

[5] Jan M. Boelmann and Lisa König, “Computerspiele als didaktische Umgebung,” Pädagogik 77, no. 10 (2025).

[6] Österreichisches Bundesheer, Taktisches Führungsverfahren (Vienna: Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, n.d.).

[7] Dieter Schadenböck and Gerald Luger, Handakt Taktik (Stand September 2016): Merkblatt für das Bundesheer (Vienna: Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, 2016).

[8] Natalia Stathakarou et al., “Game Elements in the Design of Simulations in Military Trauma Management Training: Protocol for a Systematic Review,” JMIR Research Protocols 12 (2023), https://doi.org/10.2196/45969.

[9] “America’s Army,” Wikipedia, last modified November 10, 2025, https://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=America’s_Army&oldid=261447011.

[10] “America’s Army,” Wikipedia, last modified September 3, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=America’s_Army&oldid=1309370857.

[11] QinetiQ, “Gamification to Support the Military,” last modified September 22, 2025, https://www.qinetiq.com/en/blogs/gamification-to-support-the-military.

[12] BBC News, “Ukraine Launches New Points for Killing Russians Scheme,” July 18, 2025, accessed September 22, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c80p9k1r1dlo.

[13] POLITICO, “Points for Kills: How Ukraine Is Using Video Game Incentives to Slay More Russians,” April 29, 2025, accessed September 22, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraines-army-have-video-game-like-digital-weapons-store-deadly-realistic/.

[14] Ivan Khomenko, “Ukraine Launches Point-Based Rewards for Drone Operators,” UNITED24 Media, April 30, 2025, accessed September 22, 2025, https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraines-launches-point-based-rewards-for-drone-operators-8002.

[15] Daniel Schurter, “F-16: Ukrainische Kampfpiloten trainieren mit russischem Flugsimulator,” Watson, October 3, 2023, accessed September 22, 2025, https://www.watson.ch/digital/analyse/468066015-f-16-ukrainische-kampfpiloten-trainieren-mit-russischem-flugsimulator.

[16] Gabriel Centeno, “Ukrainische Kampfpiloten nutzen den DCS World-Simulator, um auf der F-16 zu trainieren,” Aeroflap, September 29, 2023, accessed September 22, 2025, https://www.aeroflap.com.br/de/Ukrainische-Kampfpiloten-trainieren-mit-dem-DCS-World-Simulator-auf-der-F-16/.

[17] Howard Altman, “Ukraine Situation Report: Pilots Train on Commercial F-16 Simulators at Home Bases,” The War Zone, September 28, 2023, accessed September 22, 2025, https://www.twz.com/ukraine-situation-report-pilots-train-on-commercial-f-16-simulators-at-home-bases.

[18] “Brave1 Market – Ukraine’s New Online Marketplace for Drones, Kit & Equipment,” The Armourer’s Bench, last modified May 24, 2025, https://armourersbench.com/2025/05/12/brave1-market-ukraines-new-online-marketplace-for-drones-kit-equipment/.

[19] Brave1, “Brave1 – Ukrainian Defense Innovations,” last modified April 29, 2025, https://brave1.gov.ua/en/.

[20] Cláuvin Almeida et al., “Negative Effects of Gamification in Education Software: Systematic Mapping and Practitioner Perceptions,” Information and Software Technology 156 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infsof.2022.107142.

[21] Matthew N. O. Sadiku et al., “Gamification in the Military,” International Journal of Human Computing Studies 5, no. 5 (2023), https://doi.org/10.31149/ijhcs.v5i5.4378.

[22] Park University, “The Gamification of Learning: Engaging Students Through Technology,” last modified May 23, 2025, https://www.park.edu/blog/the-gamification-of-learning-engaging-students-through-technology/.

[23] U.S. Naval Institute, “Gamified Learning Can Be Effective,” last modified February 28, 2023, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/march/gamified-learning-can-be-effective.

[24] Warfighter Podcast, “The Exciting Frontier: What Is the Future of Gamification in Military Training?,” last modified September 22, 2025, https://www.warfighterpodcast.com/blog/the-exciting-frontier-what-is-the-future-of-gamification-in-military-training/.

[25] Warfighter Podcast, “The Role of Gamification in Military Training: Serious Games and Their Applications,” last modified September 22, 2025, https://www.warfighterpodcast.com/blog/the-role-of-gamification-in-military-training-serious-games-and-their-applications/.

[26] Author’s data documentation statement.

[27] See Appendix 4.1, 4.2, 4.6, and 4.8 (questionnaire), available from the author upon request.

[28] See Appendix 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 (questionnaire), available from the author upon request.

[29] See Appendix 4.1, 4.3, 4.5, and 4.7 (questionnaire), available from the author upon request.

[30] Author’s translation; see Appendix 4.3 (questionnaire), available from the author upon request.

[31] See Appendix 4.3, 4.5, and 4.7 (questionnaire), available from the author upon request.