Abstract: Modern combat presents many challenges to combat arms, particularly in relation to manoeuvre warfare. Many theorists claim that the manoeuvre as a fighting approach is obsolete, suggesting that other approaches, such as attrition, are more relevant to the modern battlefield. To support the thesis, they argue that a manoeuvre is less relevant in conflicts like the war in Ukraine and Gaza. However, the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives demonstrate the effectiveness of manoeuvre. Additionally, the war in Gaza shows that manoeuvre is feasible even in urban centres. These examples indicate that manoeuvre warfare, in its revised form, remains relevant in contemporary conflicts.

Problem statement: Why is manoeuvre warfare portrayed as obsolete in the example of the war in Ukraine?

So what?: Manoeuvre warfare should remain a cornerstone of military doctrine. The use of adaptable forces, mission command, and disciplined disobedience should continue to be a standard. However, combat arms must adapt to new technologies that challenge the application of manoeuvre warfare. Nevertheless, despite the extensive use of attrition warfare, decisive actions at all levels of command will still most likely result from a manoeuvrist approach.

A Contested Form of Conduct

Manoeuvre warfare is the concept that entails utilising disruption, disorganisation, and movement integrated with fires to obtain an advantage over the enemy at all levels of command. It entails employing the joint and combined arms forces in an orchestrated manner to complete the mission and achieve the desired end state. It is widely questioned and contested among military academics and theorists. Those who argue that manoeuvre warfare is obsolete often claim that rapid technological advances, especially regarding Intelligence, Surveillance, Target-acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), make its application in the modern environment questionable.[1]

Additionally, according to Garret, critics argue that because most of the world’s population resides in urban areas, manoeuvre, as a vital part of manoeuvre warfare, becomes irrelevant due to the challenges of conducting conventional operations. In contrast to manoeuvre warfare, they propose that long-lasting attritional conflicts will characterise modern wars.[2]

Critics argue that because most of the world’s population resides in urban areas, manoeuvre, as a vital part of manoeuvre warfare, becomes irrelevant due to the challenges of conducting conventional operations.

Moreover, modern conflicts must be viewed as multidimensional, encompassing both military and economic dimensions, and analysed in different domains. These conflicts will most likely involve both attritional and manoeuvrist elements. The attrition phase may be prolonged and, therefore, more visible, leading to the mistaken conclusion that the war is primarily attritional in nature. However, decisive actions (actions that directly achieve the purpose of a given mission) at all levels will, most likely, be achieved through manoeuvre. The question regarding the redundancy of manoeuvre warfare has gained attention, particularly following the onset of the war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2022 serves as an example of an action that resulted in the liberation of the large occupied area and was conducted solely through manoeuvre.[3]

The application of manoeuvre in urban environments can be seen by analysing the war in Gaza, which, despite being unconventional, demonstrates manoeuvrist principles. Despite the perception that current technological advances and the geopolitical situation render manoeuvre obsolete, it remains irreplaceable.

Manoeuvre in Theory

The Croatian Armed Forces define manoeuvre as the use of forces through a combination of movement and fires to achieve an advantageous position relative to the opponent. The definition complies with the NATO definition of manoeuvre, as “employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.” This differs from movement, which is defined as the transfer from point A to point B. The concept of manoeuvre has been widely discussed for centuries. Sun Tzu explored elements such as deception and surprise, flexibility, adaptability, terrain and speed, all of which are closely tied to the manoeuvre of forces. [4],[5]

Furthermore, Carl von Clausewitz, in his famous work On War, discusses the vital role of manoeuvre in defeating an enemy. He introduces constructs such as the centre of gravity, which is the source of the enemy’s power and stability and must be attacked to achieve victory. This can be accomplished through offensive manoeuvres and elements related to manoeuvre warfare rather than through attritional, positional warfare. Clausewitz also describes the culminating point of victory as the moment after which further offensive operations would be counterproductive. Advancing any farther than the culminating point may result in overextension of forces and supply chains, leaving attacking forces vulnerable to enemy counterattacks.[6] ,[7]

It is essential to mention the manoeuvrist approach. According to the NATO definition, this operational philosophy focuses on destroying the enemy’s will to fight rather than the enemy’s physical forces. The concept entails targeting the enemy’s morale by seizing and exploiting initiative. By applying a manoeuvrist approach, forces undermine the enemy’s comprehension and destroy his cohesion. The manoeuvrist approach uses mission command as the core command and control philosophy. Mission command allows the tactical level commanders to decide to swiftly exploit opportunities and target the enemy’s vulnerabilities through decisive actions. This concept strongly aligns with Sun Tzu’s theory. Tzu emphasised that the highest and purest type of victory is defeating the enemy without fighting by breaking his will to fight. Sun Tzu notes that “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” NATO adopts this philosophy as a core doctrine for land operations.[8]

According to the NATO definition, this operational philosophy focuses on destroying the enemy’s will to fight rather than the enemy’s physical forces.

Elements such as offensive manoeuvre and counterattack are critical components of manoeuvre warfare. Clausewitz acknowledged that these elements can be attributed to the attritional type of conflict. He emphasised that wars typically include both manoeuvrist and attritional elements; most conflicts cannot be classified as entirely manoeuvrist or attritional but rather contain elements of both in varying proportions. Modern wars are no exception.

Mission Command in the Ukrainian Military

The Armed Forces of Ukraine have shown remarkable resilience against a materially stronger enemy. Many authors, such as Junius, attribute this to a mission command philosophy, among other factors.[9]  Mission command is a command and control philosophy which puts the focus on the commander’s intent and decentralised execution resulting in the achievement of the desired end-state defined by the commander. A commander defines boundaries in which a subordinate can make decisions and act without the direct commander’s input. This enables swift reaction to rapidly changing battlefield situations. Mission command correlates with manoeuvre warfare. The mission command philosophy stands opposed to the centralised, detailed command, which gives little freedom to the subordinates when it comes to decision-making. Russian forces tend to utilise detailed command, which is a Soviet legacy.[10]

Mission command in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has existed since 2014, according to Junius. Ukraine conducted various military reforms, many entailing military cooperation with the United States and the Allies. This has resulted in the Ukrainian military’s slow but steady acceptance of a mission command culture. However, due to the solid Soviet influence among the senior Ukrainian leadership, the employment of the mission command among the Ukrainians is far from perfect.[11]

General Zaluzhny, the former Ukrainian commander-in-chief, was a strong advocate of mission command. He promoted its use, which, in conjunction with collaboration and training with the Western forces, resulted in a more agile approach to warfare than that applied by Russia.[12]

Mission command was promoted at all levels of command. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has assessed the initial performance of the Ukrainian military as very good. Noting that the Armed Forces of Ukraine “were competitive against their adversaries not because of superior equipment in the early phases of the war but because they were adaptable—especially at the tactical level—and rapidly innovated new capabilities and concepts of employment to address specific areas of vulnerability where the Russians had achieved overmatch.”[13]

Mission command allowed the Ukrainians to be adaptive and react quicker to the rapidly changing situation on the battlefield, in contrast to sluggish Russian forces. Even though its senior leadership still lacks a profound acceptance of the mission command philosophy, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have a great potential to exploit mission command, especially at the tactical levels fully.[14]

The War In Ukraine

Attritional Warfare

The Russian war in Ukraine, since 2022, has seen industrial use of drones, high precision armament, and hybrid warfare; these are some of the many characteristics that pose a challenge in waging a war of manoeuvre.

Testifying the scale of the drone problem in Ukraine, RUSI estimates that the Ukrainian Armed Forces alone lose 10,000 drones per month. Technological advancements and new technological solutions being utilised on the Ukrainian battlefield, especially regarding drone usage, mostly favour the defence forces. Such extensive drone employment, typically for surveillance and intelligence gathering, makes the manoeuvre challenging since it is hard to make any movement and concentrate forces without getting detected.[15]

RUSI estimates that the Ukrainian Armed Forces alone lose 10,000 drones per month.

First Person View (FPV) drones are some of the most frequently used drones in the war. These drones—initially produced for civilian use—are typically very robust since they were designed for rigorous environments of high-speed races. They are usually not very expensive; the prices of a single drone are sometimes less than $500.[16]

FPV drones can target enemy infantry and armoured vehicles; since they are very manoeuvrable, they are often used to target the armoured vehicles’ hatches, antennas, optics, and radars. By using FPV drones for high-precision strikes, the Ukrainian Armed Forces compensated for Ukraine’s artillery deficiency, especially during the earlier stages of the conflict.[17]

While the war in Ukraine might initially appear as a classic example of positional, attritional warfare, it would be incorrect to assume that attrition was the original strategy or goal. Firstly, the war in Ukraine began as a war of manoeuvre, characterised by rapid, mobile operations aimed at achieving swift and decisive victories. Russia launched a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, with the intent of toppling the Ukrainian government. The assault on Hostomel Airport is a prime example of a tactical manoeuvre with potential strategic consequences. The goal of the assault was to establish the airbridge, which would allow Russia to advance towards Kyiv swiftly and potentially take down the Ukrainian government. The Hostomel assault portrays how manoeuvre can achieve decisive actions with war-ending potential if planned and executed correctly. However, the Hostomel assault failed due to poor execution, and Russia failed to achieve the initial goal.[18], [19]

During the initial stage of the invasion, Ukraine responded with a defence-in-depth strategy and mobile defence, eventually transitioning to an offence. Ukrainian forces demonstrated excellent resistance in urban centres such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mariupol, which slowed the Russian advance.[20], [21]

The transition to attrition occurred because of operational factors and the evolving situation on the battlefield. Several factors may have influenced this shift:

• Logistical challenges: Russian forces faced significant logistical issues, including overstretched supply lines, fuel shortages and maintenance problems affecting armoured, motorised, and mechanised units;
• Counterattacks: effective local counterattacks by Ukrainian forces slowed the Russian advance;
• Urban and rural centres: Ukrainian forces fortified both urban and rural centres, establishing strong defensive positions;
• Sanctions: international sanctions imposed on Russia contributed to a prolonged conflict;
• International support: continued military aid from the West helped Ukraine sustain its defence;
• Morale: Russian conscripts mostly have low morale and are unwilling to fight. Professional units, however, usually do not face the same problem so extensively. There were, however, examples of the Russian soldiers witnessing the low morale among the troops. Low morale levels usually slow the operational tempo;[23]
• Unclear strategic goals: the objectives of “denazifiying” the Ukrainian government and preventing alleged genocide against the Russian population in Ukraine are not quantifiable and lack clear measures making the desired end state of the Russian invasion ambiguous.

According to Gady and Kofman, the long attritional phase of the war in Ukraine has made tactical, as well as strategic, manoeuvre possible.[24] Prior to the 2022 Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensive, the Ukrainian Armed Forces worked to diminish Russia’s troops’ will and eagerness to fight by targeting the command and control nodes, logistical centres and other support systems, which is a demonstration of a manoeuvrist approach. However, this was mainly achieved through attrition, with mass fires, rather than through manoeuvre and precision strikes. The decisive manoeuvre was made possible after the conditions were set through the attritional phase.[25]

During the 2022 counteroffensive, Ukraine managed to liberate more than 6,000 square kilometres in the Kharkiv region. Whether this manoeuvre was so vital that it can be described as a war’s turning point can be debated. The manoeuvre was enabled by attrition. As Gady and Kofman say: “Manoeuvre warfare proved successful when prolonged attrition made it easy.” This supports the claim that modern wars will most likely consist of both manoeuvrist and attritional phases. Nevertheless, most decisive actions have been achieved through manoeuvre, made possible by attrition. It would be wrong to conclude that manoeuvre warfare is obsolete simply because the war in Ukraine is currently in a prolonged attritional phase. Although the attritional phase is long and, therefore, much more visible, decisive actions have been achieved using manoeuvre warfare. It should be emphasised that the attritional phase of the conflict sets the conditions for the manoeuvre to happen.[26], [27]

During the 2022 counteroffensive, Ukraine managed to liberate more than 6,000 square kilometres in the Kharkiv region.

Manoeuvre Warfare In Ukraine

Manoeuvre warfare has been a critical component of the war in Ukraine since its beginning. During the initial phase, extensive use of manoeuvre was evident at all levels of command. Russian troops launched attacks with coordinated groups from various directions, from the north aiming to capture Kyiv, from the south tasked with securing control over the North Crimean Canal, Energodar and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, surrounding Mariupol, taking control of the bridges over the Dnipro and advancing along the right bank to Voznesensk, to seize the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, and from the east, focusing on enveloping Ukrainian forces in Donbas.[28]

From the outset, Russian forces exhibited significant flaws in the decision-making process at the operational and tactical levels, as well as in the planning and tactical preparedness, which seriously impeded their operational tempo. Their forces were thus susceptible to deception, highly inert to the changes on the battlefield. They showed a lack of training and readiness at the tactical levels. All levels of command demonstrated a tendency for false reporting, leading to poor decision-making. At the tactical levels, Russian forces lacked the situational awareness and understanding of how their actions fit into the overall strategic plan.[29] Russian forces still appear to rely on a more detailed command-and-control (C2) system rather than a mission-oriented command approach, according to Junius.[30]

They tend to execute given orders, even if these are no longer suitable for the current situation. In contrast, Ukrainian forces employ mission command and disciplined disobedience, allowing them to adapt more effectively to changing battlefield conditions, thus outperforming the Russian C2 system. These factors contributed to slowing the Russian advance, forcing them to revise their initial plans and enabling Ukrainian reactions and local counterattacks.[31], [32]

Initial territorial gains achieved by the Russian forces were most likely a result of the shock and surprise, which are the elements of a manoeuvre warfare doctrine. Through manoeuvre warfare, Ukraine aimed to achieve its goals swiftly. However, the initial territorial gains can also be attributed to the Ukrainian defence-in-depth, which entailed trading space for time. Although Russia did not achieve its main objectives within the planned timeframe, Russia captured 27% of Ukrainian territory by March 2022 (Crimea included). This period of conflict was inherently manoeuvrist in nature. It featured manoeuvres at all levels of command on both sides. However, Russians failed to adhere to the basic principles of manoeuvre warfare, such as effective use of combined arms, decentralised command and quick, disciplined decision-making, particularly at the lower levels of command. Additionally, there was a lack of exploitation of the effects and gains achieved, according to Lojka and Du.[33]

Initial territorial gains achieved by the Russian forces were most likely a result of the shock and surprise, which are the elements of a manoeuvre warfare doctrine.

Furthermore, later periods of the war also saw extensive use of manoeuvre warfare. The Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kherson and Kharkiv exemplify how manoeuvre principles can lead to decisive actions. These counterattacks show that, when manoeuvrist principles are effectively applied, classical manoeuvre techniques at all levels can still be successful, despite the technological advances and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and anti-armour weaponry that favour the defence. [34]

The Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives highlight two key factors that increase the success rate of offensive manoeuvres on the battlefield, according to Lojka and Du.[36]

The first is the effective integration of combined arms, particularly incorporating long-range precision armament, armour and small, dismounted infantry elements with specialised sensor systems and anti-tank capabilities. The second is the concentration of forces and achieving numerical superiority in specific areas of the battlefield at critical times. It is also important to note the trade-off between terrain and time in military decision-making, where maintaining the initiative is crucial during defensive operations. The Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives demonstrate the effectiveness and necessity of manoeuvre warfare.[37]

The Key Takeaways from the Conflict

The war in Ukraine is the latest example of how decision-making processes and command culture can directly impact the success of military operations. According to Junius, Ukrainian doctrine favours the use of the mission command, disciplined disobedience, and decision-making based on the commander’s intent.[38]

In contrast, Russian forces continue to use a detailed command structure, which limits the freedom of manoeuvre to subordinate commanders in a rapidly changing environment. Russian forces were organised into battalion tactical groups (BTGs). These large units demonstrated high efficiency during the Crimean crisis when operating in a much smaller area of operations. However, these units have shown a lack of cohesion and poor command culture in the broader theatre of the Ukraine war.

Furthermore, the Russian forces’ C2 system lacks a single commander responsible for the entire Ukrainian theatre. This absence complicates the employment of combined arms. It slows the decision-making process, resulting in the inability to conduct large-scale manoeuvres. The inefficiency of the C2 system was evident in the initial Russian attempts to capture Kyiv.[40]

The modern battlefield demands integrating multidomain operations. Such integration enhances the effects of manoeuvre. To date, there has been limited use of multidomain operations to achieve common tactical, operational or strategic goals. This is more evident on the Russian side, according to Chadwick, who emphasises that the Russian military wasn’t doctrinally prepared for the war since they had spent years before the invasion preparing for “active defence”, a doctrine which doesn’t match the current, ambiguous goals of the invasion.[41] To witness this statement, Max Boot says: “The Russians fight ‘by the book.’ Trouble is, they’re using the wrong book.”[42] The lack of multidomain operations, combined arms manoeuvre, and poor command culture have led to the extensive use of attritional warfare in the Ukrainian war.

Although the attritional phase of the war is currently prolonged, historical examples, such as the Iran-Iraq war, suggest that decisive actions, whether resulting in the liberation of occupied territories or further advances, will likely result from manoeuvre warfare. However, modern manoeuvre tactics must adapt to current conditions and technological advancements, favouring the defending forces. Nevertheless, it is believed by many authors that manoeuvre warfare will continue to play a vital role in combat, as demonstrated by the initial phases of the war in Ukraine and the Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives.[43], [44]

The War In Gaza

The War of Attrition – Elements

The 2023 Israel-Hamas war is a highly controversial and widely disputed conflict which has divided global opinion. However, controversies aside, it serves as a great example of modern conflict, illustrating the use of manoeuvre warfare in an asymmetric and contemporary environment. Like many of the wars in the past, modern conflicts exhibit elements of both attritional and manoeuvre types of war.[45]

Firstly, the war has been marked by a high casualty and destruction rate. As of July 17, 2024, over 40,000 people have been killed. According to the EU-UN-World Bank’s Interim Damage Assessment, the estimated damage to critical infrastructure in just the first four months of the conflict amounts to more than $18.5 billion. These figures indicate that the combat has been sustained and very intense.[46]

Moreover, the damage and the casualty rates are high due to the fact that a conventional military force is fighting in densely populated, urbanised areas where it appears Hamas aims to employ an attritional strategy against Israel.

Secondly, the war has seen many sieges and blockades. Israel has maintained land and naval blockades of the Gaza Strip, intending to prevent weapons and supplies from reaching Hamas. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has conducted ground operations to encircle urban centres such as Rafah and Khan Younis to isolate Hamas fighters, cut their supply lines, and prevent reinforcement.[47]

The War of Manoeuvre – Elements

Despite many elements of attritional warfare, the Israel-Hamas conflict also includes aspects of manoeuvre warfare, demonstrating that manoeuvre tactics are not obsolete in urban combat, as seen in Gaza. Firstly, the IDF mainly concentrated its efforts on high-value targets and strategic objectives, such as the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor, the locations allegedly used by Hamas for smuggling weapons and resources. Targeting specific critical nodes, rather than merely inflicting casualties, is the element of the manoeuvrist approach. The raid on the Hamad Towers in Khan Younis, for instance, was a precise attack aimed at destroying alleged Hamas infrastructure and strongpoints. From the military perspective, the attack represents an example of manoeuvre warfare in an urban setting, countering the claim that manoeuvre tactics are obsolete in such scenarios.[48]

Furthermore, the IDF showed rapid, organised and flexible movements rather than inert and static engagements. The adaptability to intelligence reports and the ability to swiftly shift focus indicate a manoeuvrist approach. The employment of combined arms, integration of ISTAR, electronic warfare (EW) and mission command reflect the presence of manoeuvre tactics in the conflict. The war can be characterised as asymmetrical and unconventional; the aforementioned characteristics indicate that the manoeuvre warfare still continues to be relevant in the urban environment.

The Role Of Manoeuvre In The Modern Environment

A modern battlefield presents numerous challenges for manoeuvre forces. UAVs, ISTAR, and anti-armour weapons make manoeuvre difficult. Furthermore, the high levels of urbanisation contribute to an increasing percentage of the global population living in urban areas.

As seen in the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, manoeuvre warfare remains relevant. Many wars in the past exhibited elements of both attritional and manoeuvre. The war in Ukraine illustrates how attrition and manoeuvre can coexist. However, the attrition phase tends to be prolonged due to geopolitical conditions, diplomacy, the overexertion of belligerents and economic pressures. This fact may lead some theorists to prematurely declare manoeuvre warfare obsolete. A similar conclusion could have been drawn many times in history, for instance, in the aforementioned Iran-Iraq war. Yet, the war eventually ended as a typical war of manoeuvre (operations Tawakalna ala Allah, for instance) once the conditions were set for manoeuvre operations at all levels of command.[50]

The same analogy can be applied to the war in Ukraine. Even though there are indeed many facts that might suggest that manoeuvre warfare is obsolete, a decisive action leading to strategic progress and military victory will most likely be achieved through manoeuvre warfare, which is made possible by attrition. However, modern manoeuvre tactics must be adapted to the challenges that were not present in the past, such as the extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

The current local advances on both sides of the Ukrainian battlefield, which result from attrition warfare, are unlikely to result in decisive action. In contrast, a concentrated force which employs a combined arms approach and conducts multidomain operations is more likely to execute a decisive manoeuvre. The Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives illustrate that thesis.

The current local advances on both sides of the Ukrainian battlefield, which result from attrition warfare, are unlikely to result in decisive action.

Furthermore, the ongoing war in Gaza demonstrates that manoeuvre warfare remains viable in urban environments. Although not a conventional conflict, the Israel-Hamas war indicates that manoeuvre tactics are still necessary in urban centres. However, it is essential to note that the war demonstrates how integrating combined arms, fire support, elite units, and modern ISTAR technology supports the manoeuvre of combat arms against guerrilla forces that favour the war of attrition. The employment of the attritional tactics by the Hamas’ guerrilla forces in an unconventional and assymetric conflict in Gaza may make place for criticism of manoeuvre warfare in urban environments in future. However, despite its asymmetrical and unconventional aspects, the conflict shows how multidomain operations facilitate manoeuvre in modern urban environments. It proves that manoeuvre is not obsolete in such conditions; quite the contrary, it is essential to achieve the desired end state. The destruction of Hamas strongholds and the success of hostage rescue missions would not have been possible within the same timeframe without the integration of manoeuvre tactics. This war is an example of how combining traditional tactics with modern technology and with the employment of multidomain operations make manoeuvre possible and all but obsolete.

Still A Key Method

Manoeuvre warfare faces significant criticism from theorists who argue that manoeuvre warfare and the manoeuvrist approach are becoming obsolete in the modern environment.[51]

Critics who argue that manoeuvre is a matter of the past often assert that modern combat favours other military doctrines, such as the war of attrition. Despite the many challenges manoeuvre warfare faces, it remains the critical method of achieving decisive actions on all levels of command. The Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives demonstrate the conditions under which manoeuvre can be effectively employed on the modern battlefield. The ongoing war in Ukraine supports the thesis that modern wars will most likely continue to combine the attritional and manoeuvrist phases. The attrition in Ukraine proved to be very significant in setting the conditions for effective manoeuvre. Therefore, it is exclusive to declare either of the approaches (attritional and manoeuvrist) as obsolete or as a matter of the past.

Furthermore, despite its many controversies, the war in Gaza demonstrates that manoeuvre is indeed possible in urban centres and densely populated areas. Although the war in Gaza entails many characteristics of a war of attrition fought between conventional forces and insurgents in an asymmetrical and unconventional environment, it also features elements of manoeuvre warfare, such as highly adaptable, flexible forces and rapid response to intelligence reports.

Although the war in Gaza entails many characteristics of a war of attrition fought between conventional forces and insurgents in an asymmetrical and unconventional environment, it also features elements of manoeuvre warfare.

The two examples illustrate that modern warfare cannot be described solely as manoeuvrist or attritional. Instead, it contains elements of both but in different ratios. The attritional phase usually lasts longer, which may lead to the perception that manoeuvre becomes irrelevant and impossible. However, when the conditions are favourable, decisive actions that achieve tactical, operational or strategic goals have resulted from the manoeuvre and manoeuvrist approach. Despite the many challenges posed by modern environments, such as the new ISTAR technologies, unmanned aerial vehicles and anti-armour weaponry, manoeuvre, in its revised form, will continue to play a significant role in future conflicts.

 

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Mateo Milaković is an Officer Cadet at the Croatian Defence Academy. His academic work focuses on military engineering and modern challenges regarding the employment of armoured units. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the Croatian Defence Academy.

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[1] Pat Garret, “Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve,” last modified April 15 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/maneuver-warfare-not-dead-it-must-evolve.

[2] Idem.

[3] “DPK 30-12.1 Tenkovski vod,” MORH, 2019.

[4]  Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (AJP-3.2), NATO Standardization Office, 2022

[5] Sun Tzu, translated by John Minford (2009), The Art of War (Croatian translation), Mozaik knjiga, Zagreb.

[6] Carl von Clausewitz, translated by Michael Howard, Peter Paret (1989). On War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 489-492, 531-532

[7]  Nikola Gažević (1975), “Vojna enciklopedija (second edition),” Grafički zavod Hrvatske, Zagreb, 237-238

[8] “Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (AJP-3.2),” NATO Standardization Office, 2022.

[9] Jamon K. Junius, “Mission Command: An Essential Component of Ukraine’s Fight against Russia,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 115-127.

[10] Idem.

[11] Idem.

[12] Idem.

[13] Idem.

[14] Idem.

[15] Ulrike Franke (2023), “Drones in Ukraine and beyond: Everything you need to know,” last modified August 11, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/article/drones-in-ukraine-and-beyond-everything-you-need-to-know/?amp.

[16] Tomas Milasauskas, Liudvikas Jaškūnas (2024), “FPV drones in Ukraine are changing modern warfare,” last modified June 20, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fpv-drones-in-ukraine-are-changing-modern-warfare/.

[17] Idem.

[18] Alex Vershinin (2024), “The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine,” last modified May 20, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine.

[19] Pat Garret, “Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve,” last modified April 15 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/maneuver-warfare-not-dead-it-must-evolve.

[20] Gady, Kofman (2023), “Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition,” Survival, Volume 65, (2), 7-22.

[21] Alex Vershinin (2024), “The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine,” last modified May 20, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine.

[22] “Maps Depicting Russia’s 100-Day Invasion,” The Wall Street Journal, last modified February 15, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-06-03/card/maps-depicting-russia-s-100-day-invasion-gTGeieaQKcjL2wuDiiri.

[23] James Horncastle (2024), “An unstable foundation: Russian morale problems in the Russo-Ukrainian war,” last modified March 15, 2024, https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2024/03/15/an-unstable-foundation-russian-morale-problems-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war.

[24] Gady, Kofman (2023), “Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition,” Survival, Volume 65, (2), 7-22.

[25] Idem.

[26] Steve Maguire (2022), “Yes, Manoeuvre is Alive. Ukraine Proves It,” last modified November 04, 2022, https://wavellroom.com/2022/11/04/yes-manoeuvre-is-alive-ukraine-proves-it/.

[27] “Is Russia on the run?,” The Economist, last modified September 11, 2022, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/09/11/is-russia-on-the-run.

[28] Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi and co. (2022), “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2022,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, London.

[29] Jason R. Lojka and Jason Du, “Russia-Ukraine War Lessons on Maneuver,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 179-193.

[30] Jamon K. Junius, “Mission Command: An Essential Component of Ukraine’s Fight against Russia,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 115-127.

[31] Jason R. Lojka and Jason Du, “Russia-Ukraine War Lessons on Maneuver,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 179-193.

[32] Jamon K. Junius, “Mission Command: An Essential Component of Ukraine’s Fight against Russia,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 115-127.

[33] Jason R. Lojka and Jason Du, “Russia-Ukraine War Lessons on Maneuver,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 179-193.

[34] Idem.

[35] “Is Russia on the run?,” The Economist, last modified September 11, 2022, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/09/11/is-russia-on-the-run.

[36] Jason R. Lojka and Jason Du, “Russia-Ukraine War Lessons on Maneuver,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 179-193.

[37] Jason R. Lojka and Jason Du, “Russia-Ukraine War Lessons on Maneuver,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 179-193.

[38] Jamon K. Junius, “Mission Command: An Essential Component of Ukraine’s Fight against Russia,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 115-127.

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[40] Jason R. Lojka and Jason Du, “Russia-Ukraine War Lessons on Maneuver,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 179-193.

[41] Steven L. Chadwick, “Russia-Ukraine War Lessons for Multidomain Operations,” A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, ed. John A. Nagl (Carlisle: USAWC Press, 2024), 227-244.

[42] Max Boot, “Opinion: Russia Is Fighting by the Book. The Problem Is, It’s the Wrong Book,” last modified November 02, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/11/02 /max-boot-russia-military-doctrine-ukraine.

[43] Pat Garret, “Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve,” last modified April 15 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/maneuver-warfare-not-dead-it-must-evolve.

[44] Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham Wagner (1990), The Lessons Of Modern War, Vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War, Westview Press, Boulder, X-1 – X-69.

[45] Pasi Kesseli, “The Birth and Development of Israeli Operational Art. From Theory to Practice,” (dissertation, National Defense College, University of Helsinki, 2002).

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[47] Majd Abuamer, “Gaza’s Subterranean Warfare: Palestinian Resistance Tunnels vs. Israel’s Military Strategy,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI (May 2024).

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[50] Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham Wagner (1990), The Lessons Of Modern War, Vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War, Westview Press, Boulder, X-1 – X-69.

[51] Pat Garret, “Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve,” last modified April 15 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/maneuver-warfare-not-dead-it-must-evolve.