Abstract: There is a lack of common understanding of the NATO doctrinal concepts of manoeuvre warfare and the manoeuvrist approach among practitioners and students. One reason is that after 30 years of stability and counterterrorism operations, NATO is now facing a perceived return to peer-to-peer conflict without fully considering the changes in context. Another is the use of these concepts across different doctrinal levels of warfare, and a third one is the expansion of their use into non-physical domains of warfare without the needed theoretical basis for this expansion. Coherent doctrine needs a standardised set of definitions. To achieve this, the context of the doctrine needs to be defined.

Problem statement: How to understand the reason for doctrinal misunderstandings of manoeuvre warfare?

So what?: NATO and others must not continue regurgitating mantras about manoeuvre warfare and the manoeuvrist approach in their doctrine without critically analysing the continuing relevance of these concepts.

Origins of the Confusion

In many cases, the professional experiences of field-grade Western army officers consist of participation in expeditionary stability and counterinsurgency operations. These experiences often clash with current NATO doctrinal concepts, such as the manoeuvrist approach. This is problematic, given the prominence of this concept in current NATO and other Western doctrinal publications. A lot of ink has already been spilt on the subject, which should be seen as a warning that the concept might not be unanimously understood. Three interdependent factors create ambiguity regarding the meaning of the concept, and they will be briefly explained in this article. Subsequently, a partial explanation of why these factors have come to the fore will be offered before ending with recommendations on how the current situation might be improved.

The first factor creating ambiguity is an overwhelming lack of common understanding of the concept of manoeuvre warfare and related concepts, with often as many interpretations as there are discussion partners around the table or authors of opinion pieces in professional publications.[1], [2] The second factor is the tendency to use the terms manoeuvre warfare or manoeuvrist approach loosely across different doctrinal levels of warfare. The third and final factor is the current tendency to import these terms into different domains, sometimes far removed from their historical origin in land operations.

A Lack of Common Understanding

A quick scan of official publications and scholarship on the topic immediately shows a vast array of different interpretations, ranging from “gaining a positional advantage relative to the enemy” over “attacking the enemy’s understanding, will and cohesion” to “the disruption and disorganisation of the enemy”.[3], [4] To be fair, most interpretations have in common that they contrast manoeuvre warfare with an approach they baptise attritional warfare, although some–critical of this perceived dichotomy–take a different view.[5], [6] And then there are those who see a dichotomy, just not with attritional warfare, and speak of positional warfare as the antithesis of manoeuvre warfare. This is worrying for a concept of which NATO currently states that it is one of the four key tenets of how it fights its wars.[7] As it is the most common view, one might take the manoeuvre-attrition dichotomy as the starting point for the present text.

Most sources, including NATO doctrinal references, have one thing in common: they view manoeuvre as the superior of two or more potential approaches. On a side note, this is not the only instance where NATO doctrine might be perceived as hubristic.[8] Usually, as a counterbalance to this more intelligent approach, attrition warfare is described in a simplified and caricatural way and, logically, has no quasi-religious followers the way manoeuvre warfare has.[9], [10]

Most sources, including NATO doctrinal references, have one thing in common: they view manoeuvre as the superior of two or more potential approaches.

While important and commendable efforts have been made to publish recent iterations on a coordinated timeline to improve mutual coherence and avoid overlap, the current hierarchy of NATO doctrinal publications does not completely agree with itself on the matter. The capstone publication, AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine, contrasts the manoeuvrist approach with “attrition or annihilation,” but poorly defines and distinguishes these two other approaches.[11] One of its important subordinate publications, AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, first defines manoeuvre in a very technical and visual way as “the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission” after which it is summarily contrasted only with attrition (without defining the latter).[12]

Then, there are a couple of outliers, critical of the wisdom of the crowd, venturing out to try to come up with a more satisfactory framework. One of these is U.S. Army Major Andrew Fox, who offers a triad of manoeuvre warfare, attrition warfare, and positional warfare, with the three approaches equally worthy and their utility dependent on battlefield conditions.[13] Maybe even more of an outlier is a recent publication by the Institute for the Study of War,  seemingly triggered by what the authors perceive as an unnecessarily gloomy outlook on the current situation in Ukraine.[14] The authors identify an unjustified tendency to brandish the terms “attritional” and “stalemate” alongside each other as quasi-synonyms describing the present state of affairs and react to this outlook by providing the reader with some very useful historical doctrinal background, offering the concept of “positional war” as described by Alexander Svechin in his 1926 work Strategy.[15] These two publications have a lot of merit. They put the finger on the sore spot and acknowledge that there is room for improvement in the current Western doctrinal realm.

All in all, it is clear that there is a lot of worthwhile reflection on the topic, but unfortunately, none of the proposals is completely satisfactory to the critical reader. Even worse, their contradictory nature creates more chaos than it lifts the fog of war in this debate.

Using the Terms across Different Doctrinal Levels of Warfare

Historically manoeuvre warfare has been contrasted with attrition warfare, the latter, according to some having been invented by manoeuvre warfare proponents to serve as a counterweight for their own theory.[16], [17] A question that is too rarely asked is at which echelon this comparison is supposed to take place. For this discussion, this article will use the habitual classification of warfare’s strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Below the tactical level, it will add a procedural level describing physical battlefield actions at the lowest possible level of execution, sometimes referred to as battle drills. Finally next to the different levels of military doctrine, it also has merit to think in the realm of military theory. In the next few paragraphs, all these levels will be briefly assessed to identify for each the sense or lack of sense of the current conventional wisdom regarding manoeuvre warfare and–ideally–to identify a logical conceptual space in which to define manoeuvre warfare and its antithesis of attrition.

Starting with military theory, one of the historically recurring topics of study is the endeavour to identify the timeless principles of war.[18] Many nations have their own national list, often borrowing from each other if they are culturally or historically connected. The U.S., probably the most influential nation in the Western hemisphere, has a list of nine principles, one of which is manoeuvre. This is summarily explained as “gaining positional advantage”.[19] Looking forward into the Information Age when he wrote more than 25 years ago, Robert Leonhard argued it should be called “advantage” instead of “manoeuvre”.[20] Without any intent to compare the relative merit of each of the existing lists, one quickly realises that the term attrition or any variation thereof is included in none. Therefore, the field of military theory seems unlikely to provide the conceptual framework in which to situate the manoeuvre-attrition dichotomy or any other clear way to define manoeuvre warfare and its potential alternatives.

At the strategic level of warfare, depending on how finely one distinguishes different strategies, often there is only talk of the two options of annihilation and attrition.[21] More commonly still, three possible strategies are presented: annihilation, attrition, and exhaustion.[22] And sometimes, a distinguished scholar brings the total up to ten different strategic options by adding dislocation, coercion, deterrence, terror, terrorism, decapitation, and targeted killing.[23]

At the strategic level of warfare, depending on how finely one distinguishes different strategies, often there is only talk of the two options of annihilation and attrition.

Again, the point here is not to try and judge each of the many existing lists on their merit, but the fact that attrition as a strategic option is almost always part of the list, and manoeuvre never is. So, the term most widely regarded as the dumber alternative to the manoeuvrist approach is firmly established at the strategic level, while manoeuvre is completely absent here. This means that a comparison between the two is not possible at this level. Thus, the solution for the present conundrum does not lie here.

Historically, the operational level of warfare is the most recent addition to the strategic-operational-tactical triad. Here, we find the practices of translating strategic objectives into operational ones, drawing campaign frameworks, and attacking the enemy’s centre of gravity with a direct or an indirect approach. The latter, targeting the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities, is equated with a manoeuvrist approach. Attrition – even though with its quantifiable character, it underlies several of the measures of performance in many real-world campaign frameworks – is a term rarely used at this level. Strachan is quoted as having said that attritional warfare as a method belongs at the tactical level, while manoeuvre warfare belongs at the operational level.[24] So, like the realm of military theory and the strategic level, the operational level of warfare doesn’t allow for a comparison of the manoeuvrist and the attritional approach.

At the tactical level, one of the go-to references for any NATO officer is its ATP-112 describing all officially authorised task verbs. However, again, “manoeuvre” is not even mentioned. “Attrit” is explicitly mentioned as not being a NATO task verb and ATP-112 tells us to use capture, defeat or destroy instead. The closest we get to the concept under study is the task verb “support by fire”, meaning to engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another manoeuvring force.[25] Once more, the comparison between a manoeuvrist and an attritional approach cannot be made at this level.

Finally, at the procedural level, describing concrete physical actions–often trained to the level of automatism–in the field, one might see plentiful use of the verb manoeuvre as a type of positioning relative to the enemy, in most cases explained as a combination of troops moving. In contrast, others support the movement with (the possibility of) fires,[26] similar to the tactical level. This is the level that is closest to the harsh reality of battle losses, but attrition is not a common term here, even though in a very direct way it has its influence when speaking of the combat effectiveness of friendly and enemy units. More importantly, at this level, there is no debate about the relative merit of an action in battle (the movement) and a consequence of battle (losses). Consequently, one will look in vain to find the basis for a universal theory of manoeuvre and attrition.

Apparently, there is not a single doctrinal level where the terms of manoeuvre warfare and attrition are both commonly used, which would allow a coherent comparison of the two. This means that current doctrine doesn’t allow to solve the problematic potential for misunderstanding between discussion partners, each having a specific echelon in mind or a specific background or experience.

Apparently, there is not a single doctrinal level where the terms of manoeuvre warfare and attrition are both commonly used, which would allow a coherent comparison of the two.

A possible conclusion at this point might be that to improve common understanding, at least part of the solution might come from the creation of a coherent theoretical-doctrinal construct, considering all doctrinal levels, and clearly defining the appropriate terms within each level and using them at this appropriate level only.

The Use of Terms in Other Domains than Initially Intended

The third factor contributing to the present confusion is the tendency to use the manoeuvrist approach as a doctrinal concept in a much broader spectrum of contexts than historically intended. For years, the idea has been transposed from its birthplace, the physical land domain, where offensive and defensive operations are conducted in an almost two-dimensional environment, to the world of joint doctrine. Thus far, this is not overly problematic, as an indirect operations approach targeting the opponent’s weaknesses still seems to make sense in a context where supported and supporting component commands are identified and where military actions can be envisioned in a physical domain.

More recent trends have seen the use of the concept of manoeuvre warfare–often leaving behind any mention of its associated opposites or counterparts and thus making it even more challenging to truly understand it–expanding into other dimensions. These dimensions include time, but are definitely also included in the construct of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO),[27] which the proponents insist is more than just the addition of the Space and Cyber domains to the pre-existing Joint construct. As such, manoeuvre warfare finds its way into non-physical domains of warfare and even into cognitive warfare.[28] One can be forgiven for not having a clear mental picture of what a positional advantage in the dimension of time,[29] manoeuvre in cyber operations[30] or Information Manoeuvre[31], [32] are supposed to look like. Using a term in a way so far removed from its origin must be done only when this is helpful in creating a common understanding, which is what is expected of doctrine. This is not always the case. Another relatively recent victim of a similar fad was the term “hybrid”, which, in paraphrasing the late Colin S. Gray, became “a conceptual vessel holding too much water to be useful”.[33]

In some cases, the choice to use a doctrinal or theoretical term in a new environment might be very purposeful, intending to import its perceived advantages into the domain. The situation is reminiscent of what happened when the U.S. Army in 2012 decided to rebaptise its warfighting function[34] Command and Control (C2) into Mission Command in all its relevant doctrinal publications. This may have been well intended in an effort to pass on the qualities of a Mission Command approach to all doctrine readers. In reality, it created a confusing situation in which a single term overnight came to mean three different things: a command philosophy, a warfighting function and finally, even the physical means, procedures and structures used to conduct command and control.

In some cases, the choice to use a doctrinal or theoretical term in a new environment might be very purposeful, intending to import its perceived advantages into the domain.

Coming back to the present subject, the case made here is certainly not that these “newer” domains or what we do in them are not important. On the contrary, it is probably a disservice to them not to allocate them a well-devised terminology of their own instead of the mostly well-intended importation of manoeuvre warfare, which may be more likely to create confusion rather than anything else.

The Lack of Concrete Context to the Current Set of NATO Doctrinal Publications

The period since the end of the Cold War has distanced NATO, and especially its European members, from the major combat[35] doctrine which characterised the last decades of that period. Since then, Western militaries have experienced over three decades of expeditionary operations with the purpose of supporting peace, bringing stability and/or countering insurgencies. This was accompanied by the publication of more appropriate doctrine, such as the U.S.’ well-known FM 23-4 in 2006[36] and by a tendency to discredit previous doctrine as outdated. Subsequently, and since roughly a decade now, NATO has known a rude awakening and has concluded that its warfighting doctrine needed a dusting off. However, both previous periods had a very clear context in which their doctrines were developed and written.

During the latter decades of the Cold War, the very concrete context of NATO’s doctrine was the need to deter the Soviet Union and, in the worst-case scenario, to militarily defend Western Europe.[37] The best-known doctrines from that era were Active Defence, followed by AirLand Battle.[38] This clear situation allowed participating nations to develop military capabilities[39] and detailed defensive plans and exercise their units and troops to a collective level unheard of since.[40] In conversations with veterans of the era, it is not unusual to hear them describe how, during annual field training exercises, they would reconnoitre their assigned defensive positions to counter a real Soviet offensive down to the squad level.

After the end of the Cold War and during much of the 30-plus years of out-of-area stability and counterinsurgency operations, the specific conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan provided the context that informed most of the development of new doctrine. This was accompanied by a certain measure of arrogance towards the predecessors, who were depicted as never having experienced real combat, and towards the opponent.[41]

The constant rotational nature of the deployments of this era also meant that there was less time available for training the “old” combat procedures that seemed less and less likely to be needed ever again. At some point, when nations had to decide how to spend their shrinking defence budgets, even organisational tables and main equipment of units began to evolve to better suit the missions of the moment. Notably, this often meant a departure from the objectives agreed on in the NDPP.[42] In some nations–like Belgium–this evolution was compounded by a terrorist threat on the national territory, triggering national deployments of the military, eating into the training time of units even more.

The doctrines that were published initially had an aura of specialness.[43] Writers from the time of the post-World War II decolonisation conflicts, like David Galula and Robert Thompson, were rediscovered, and their ideas were integrated in new publications. With operations dragging on over decades, previous generations who had spent the Cold War preparing for a fight that never came were now jokingly belittled as never having had to fight longer than a couple of days.

With operations dragging on over decades, previous generations who had spent the Cold War preparing for a fight that never came were now jokingly belittled as never having had to fight longer than a couple of days.

As the might of Western militaries was brought to bear against local insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was tempting to be overly confident. With operational-level headquarters developing and then executing campaign frameworks, any military action by the opponent seemed to happen at such a low organisational level–comparable to the company level at most–that it could be perceived as only grains of sand in the cogs of the gigantic machine, incapable of stopping the execution of the campaign framework.[44] This execution entailed analysing the local system and applying effects, on a timeline of the coalition’s choosing.[45]

The static nature of in-country headquarters, the impression of being able to decide the rhythm of operations and the ever-increasing technological means feeding the quest for certainty led to the feeling that it was possible for headquarters to have an up-to-date bird’s eye view on everything happening in the field and to take tactical-level decisions from there as well. Another facet of the same diamond is the one of medical support to operations, with the application of ever more stringent medical evacuation timelines and the application since 2006 of the so-called Golden Hour.[46] It is important to note that medical evacuation timelines–combined with a low-risk acceptance translated into national caveats–eventually impacted operations, limiting NATO or coalition troops’ physical reach beyond the relative safe zones around FOBs and COPs.

Compared to the latter decades of the Cold War, and the thirty-odd years of peace support and counterinsurgency operations, the context for current NATO doctrine is less clear.[47] To a U.S. Navy sailor in the Pacific, it will probably be the geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China materialising there. An Estonian conscript might call it Cold War 2.0, but now in the Baltics. Finally, NATO soldiers training their Ukrainian counterparts will probably see the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as the determining factor of the current context. To this debatable geopolitical context, one must add increasingly rapid technological developments.[48] Writing and correctly interpreting doctrine becomes challenging without a clear context. Current doctrinal publications, on the one hand, seem repetitive, echoing each other in their idolatry of the manoeuvrist approach and comparing it with other approaches (mostly attritional, sometimes positional) that, in turn, they don’t explain unless in an oversimplified way.

Current doctrinal publications, on the one hand, seem repetitive, echoing each other in their idolatry of the manoeuvrist approach and comparing it with other approaches that, in turn, they don’t explain unless in an oversimplified way.

Paragraphs like the following one are problematic:[49] “The manoeuvrist approach provides the mindset required to achieve behaviour-centric outcomes by exploiting the inherent friction, uncertainty and human fallibilities found within competition. It represents an indirect approach that seeks to out-think and out-manoeuvre unsupportive or hostile actors (rivals, adversaries and enemies), and discourage stakeholders from becoming unsupportive or hostile actors); it focuses on degrading their will to contest.” In a logical sequence, a mindset would precede the application of an approach and not the other way round. Cryptic phrases like “behaviour-centric outcome” should be explained. Stating that a manoeuvrist approach seeks to out-manoeuvre is not helpful to the readers’ understanding.

Doctrine is not just an intellectual exercise; it is supposed to help its readers prepare for and fight their wars. As a former SACEUR said at a conference in 2024, deterrence is based on readiness, and readiness is based on trained people, equipment, the will to use them and the doctrine to use them.

Is Manoeuvre Dead?

Western militaries seem to be on a path of labelling everything they do, in every domain of warfare, as being part of a manoeuvrist approach. This way, the concept may fall victim to its own popularity because a theoretical construct that is asked to cover everything ends up losing its meaning. Secondly,  the discord between NATO doctrines and the reality on current battlefields does leave one with questions. The following three recommendations to current and future doctrine writers may offer a way out of the current situation.

First of all, it would be useful to reconsider the current set of doctrinal definitions, and this in its entirety. Concepts like manoeuvre warfare or the manoeuvrist approach must be correctly situated in contrast with other concepts. Still, the latter must also be defined correctly, coherently, and preferably based on factual data without the tempting cherry-picking of historical examples.[50] A good starting point might be to refocus definitions on their historical meaning in the context of physical terrain and a physical enemy.

Concepts like manoeuvre warfare or the manoeuvrist approach must be correctly situated in contrast with other concepts.

Reviewing the entire set of doctrinal definitions would allow for the hierarchy of NATO doctrinal publications to provide a clear framework of definitions, determining which terminology to use at which echelon and in which domain. AJP-01, the capstone document, could provide a strategic frame of reference. In contrast, subordinate publications like AJP-3, AJP-3.2, ATP-3.2.1, etc. could fill in the blanks for the operational and component or tactical levels, all the while respectful of the framework created at the strategic level and each publication clearly delineating where and when it – and its terminology – applies in relation to others. Nations must also take heed and not copy-paste NATO doctrine into their national publications without much-needed reflection and adaptation to the national context.[51] It is not realistic to expect that a single set of supranationally developed doctrinal publications can inform the conduct of operations for all nations involved. A potential option is to be less ambitious when developing NATO doctrine to leave more space for national military thought, considering different national contexts.[52]

Secondly, as doctrine shouldn’t be written in an ivory tower, when working on new doctrinal publications, writers should verify that it passes the litmus test of current conflicts. A superficial observation of ongoing conflicts such as the war in Ukraine or operations in Gaza, or current stand-offs like around the island of Taiwan, shows some incredibly rapid technological evolutions. If these can’t find a logical place in our doctrine, then maybe it’s our doctrine that needs adapting. Lastly, it is time for us to collectively think about warfare in a less emotional way.

Manoeuvre warfare is a projection onto the future of the sorts of wars most Western militaries would like to fight.[53] It is an alluring idea, easily and widely promulgated, sometimes without much depth to the construct. Attacking an enemy’s will also seems to suggest we can terminate a military conflict without too much bloodshed. However, other approaches, such as an attritional – gruesome as the term may be – or a positional one, can and should be considered valid alternatives.[54] Finally, it is easy to emotionally prefer a manoeuvrist approach because it somehow looks cleaner and more glorious than the perceived alternatives, which are, to paraphrase Isserson, “just too scary and too repugnant.”[55]

 

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Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Jeroen Verhaeghe is an Infantry officer, heading the Department of Land Operations of the Belgian Defence College. He holds an MA in Social and Military Sciences and an MA in Political and Military Sciences, and is currently pursuing an MSc Education. Research interests include land operations at the Brigade level and above, leadership, doctrine and its origins, and (adult) education. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the Belgian Defence, Belgian Army or Belgian Defence College.

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[1] Note that a lack of common understanding does not suggest that individuals cannot have a clear understanding, only that these individual understandings are too seldom shared.

[2] Jeroen Verhaeghe, “Is NATO Land Operations Doctrine Aiming Too High?,” War On The Rocks, August 06, 2021, warontherocks.com/2021/08/is-nato-land-operations-doctrine-aiming-too-high/.

[3] Heather Venable, “Paralysis in Peer Conflict? The Material Versus the Mental in 100 Years of Military Thinking,” War On The Rocks, December 01, 2020, Paralysis in Peer Conflict? The Material Versus the Mental in 100 Years of Military Thinking – War on the Rocks.

[4] G.I. Wilson, “The ‘Manoeuvre Warfare’ Concept”, Marine Corps Association, July 17, 2019, The ‘Maneuver Warfare’ Concept – Marine Corps Association (mca-marines.org).

[5] William F. Owen, “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud,” Royal United Services Institute, August 21, 2008, The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org).

[6] Christopher Tuck, “Concepts of Land Warfare,” in Understanding Modern Warfare, ed. David Jordan et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 95 and Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 65.

[7] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Publication 01: Allied Joint Doctrine, Edition F Version 1 (Brussels: NSO, 2022), 1.  In the previous (2020) version of AJP-01, it was one of only two “pillars” of NATO doctrine.

[8] See, for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Publication 01: Allied Joint Doctrine, Edition F Version 1 (Brussels: NSO, 2022), 57 on the moral component of fighting power: “NATO’s advantage in the moral component is derived from its professional military culture, and the moral legitimacy gained through the conduct of its military forces.”  This seems naïve , to say the very least, and possibly arrogant, not to mention that paradoxically, it gives short shrift to NATO’s own description of the moral component of fighting power.

[9] Thadeus Drake Jr., “The Fantasy of MCDP 1: Is manoever warfare still useful?,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 2020, The-Fantasy-of-MCDP-1-1.pdf (mca-marines.org).

[10] Jan Angstrom and J.J. Widen, Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 113.

[11] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Publication 01: Allied Joint Doctrine, Edition F Version 1 (Brussels: NSO, 2022), 82.

[12] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Publication 3.2: Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Edition B Version 1 (Brussels: NSO, 2022), 51.

[13] Amos C. Fox, “A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver-Warfare Doctrine”, Armor, Fall 2017, 17-26, ARMOR_Fall_2017_edition.indb (army.mil).

[14] Pieter Garicano, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Positional Warfare in Alexander Svechin’s Strategy,” War Studies Occasional Paper Series, 2024, Positional Warfare in Alexander Svechin’s Strategy | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org).

[15] Aleksander A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992).

[16] William F. Owen, “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud,” Royal United Services Institute, August 21, 2008, The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org).

[17] Jan Angstrom and J.J. Widen, Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 113.

[18] John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory – The History of The Principles of War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982)

[19] Antulio J. Echevarria II, Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 8.

[20] Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998), 53-61

[21] Thomas Bruscino, “Reflections on Military Strategy: Killing Annihilation vs. Attrition,” War Room Online Journal, August 14, 2020, REFLECTIONS ON MILITARY STRATEGY: KILLING ANNIHILATION VS. ATTRITION – War Room – U.S. Army War College.

[22] Robert Bateman, “There Are Three (And Only Three) Types of Military Strategy,” Esquire, December 1, 2015, There Are Three (And Only Three) Types of Military Strategy (esquire.com).

[23] Antulio J. Echevarria II, Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 8.

[24] Jan Angstrom and J.J. Widen, Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 115.

[25] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Standardization Office, Allied Tactical Publication 112: Mission Task Verbs for Use in the Planning and Dissemination of Orders, Edition A Version 1 (Brussels: NSO, 2020), 2-19 and 2-21.

[26] At the squad and platoon level, “fire and manoeuvre” is a commonly used terminology to describe this.

[27] US Army, US Army Futures Command, Futures and Concepts Center, Army Futures Command Concept for Brigade Combat Team Cross-Domain Maneuver 2028, AFC Pamphlet 71-20-2, (Fort Eustis: US Army Futures Command, 2020), 20200814-afc-pam-71-20-2-afc-concept-for-bct-cross-domain-maneuver-final.pdf (army.mil).

[28] Robert A. Warburg, “Cognitive Maneuver in the Operating Environment,” NSI, June 2016, Cognitive Maneuver in the Operating Environment | NSI (nsiteam.com).

[29] Christopher Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” in Advanced Land Warfare, eds. Mikael Weissmann and Niklas Nilsson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 29.

[30] Scott D. Applegate, “The Principle of Maneuver in Cyber Operations,” 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012), CyCon_2012_book_web_sisu.indd (ccdcoe.org).

[31] Judith T. van de Kuijt (TNO), Naomi Keja (TNO) and Jacoline C. Slaager (TNO), “The concept of Information Manoeuvre: Winning the Battle of Perceptions,” Information-based behavioural influencing and Western practice paper series, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, May 2023, 03-The-Concept-of-Information-Manoeuvre.pdf (hcss.nl).

[32] Nick Reynolds, “Performing Information Manoeuvre Through Persistent Engagement,” Royal United Services Institute, June 11, 2020 Performing Information Manoeuvre Through Persistent Engagement | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org).

[33] https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1560&context=monographs.

[34] The US Army uses the term “combat function” much like NATO doctrine used to, however NATO abandoned the use of “combat function” after the 2016 AJP-3.2 and the 2018 ATP-3.2.1, only using the term “joint function” in more recent doctrinal publications.  Both concepts remain similar enough to be compared though.

[35] I use this common term as it is widely understood. Other terms currently in use–with or without a strict NATO reference–are warfighting, Article 5 operations and Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). To practitioners, these have similar meanings, all within the context of peer-to-peer or near-peer conflict.

[36] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “TRADOC and the Release of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency”, Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, July 7, 2023, DVIDS – News – TRADOC and the Release of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (dvidshub.net)

[37] Robert G. Rose, “Returning Context to Our Doctrine,” Military Review, October 2023, online exclusive article, Rose – Returning Context to Our Doctrine (army.mil)

[38] Frank Jones, “War on the 21^st Century Battlefield: Revisiting General Starry’s Conceptual Framework,” War Room Online Journal, May 16, 2024, WAR ON THE 21ST CENTURY BATTLEFIELD: REVISITING GENERAL STARRY’S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK – War Room – U.S. Army War College.

[39] Robert Farley, “Revolutionizing U.S. Military Power: The Impact of the ‘Big Five’ in the 70s and 80s,” The National Interest, February 20, 2024, Revolutionizing U.S. Military Power: The Impact of the ‘Big Five’ in the 70s and 80s | The National Interest.

[40] Jim Storr, “Battlegroup!: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War,” (Warwick: Helion & Company, 2021).

[41] Prime examples of this are to be seen in the numerous “Doctrine Man” cartoons widely circulated from 2008 to 2024, which during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan regularly ridiculed the veterans of the 1991 Gulf War and the host nation nationals.  Steve Leonard, “Goodbye, Farewell, and Amen: the Last Stand of Doctrine Man”, ClearanceJobs, June 04, 2024, Goodbye, Farewell, and Amen: The Last Stand of Doctrine Man – ClearanceJobs.

[42] NATO Defence Planning Process, the process that outlines the capability targets for each nation.

[43] Colleen Bell, “Celebrity Power and Powers of War: The Rise of the COINdinistas in American Popular Media,” Critical Military Studies 4 (3): 244–63, January 2017, (1) Celebrity power and powers of war: the rise of the COINdinistas in American popular media | Request PDF (researchgate.net).

[44] Jim Storr, “Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21^st Century,” (Havant: Howgate Publishing Limited, 2022).

[45] Enemy Lurks in Briefings on Afghan War: PowerPoint – The New York Times (nytimes.com).

[46] Joseph J. Hudack III, “The Origins of the Golden Hour of Medical Care and Its Applicability to Combat Medicine,” (Master’s Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2015), The Origins of the Golden Hour of Medical Care and Its Applicability to Combat Medicine (dtic.mil).

[47] Robert G. Rose, “Returning Context to Our Doctrine,” Military Review, October 2023, online exclusive article, Rose – Returning Context to Our Doctrine (army.mil).

[48] At the tactical level we see these mainly in the fields of unmanned and/or automated systems and of sensors.

[49] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Publication 01: Allied Joint Doctrine, Edition F Version 1 (Brussels: NSO, 2022), 82.

[50] As previously stated my intent is not to propose a concrete set of new definitions, however others have taken some of the steps needed in order to prepare rewriting NATO or other western doctrinal publications, for example Christopher Denzel, “Maneuver Warfare Is Just Operational Art: Rework MCDP-1 to synthesize the science of attrition with the art of maneuver,” Proceedings Vol 149/11/1,449, (November 2023), Maneuver Warfare Is Just Operational Art | Proceedings – November 2023 Vol. 149/11/1,449 (usni.org) or Michael A. Hamilton “Words Matter: Demystifying ‘Maneuver’,” Infantry Magazine (Spring 2023), Words Matter: Demystifying ‘Maneuver’ (army.mil).

[51] A suspected example of this is the British Ministry of Defence, Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Army Doctrine Publication Army Doctrine Primer, AC 71954 (Shrivenham: 2011) ADP Army Doctrine Primer (publishing.service.gov.uk) page 4-3, which seems to echo the 2020 versions of NATO publications.  The Belgian Defence Doctrine is another one.

[52] Jeroen Verhaeghe, “Is NATO Land Operations Doctrine Aiming Too High?,” War On The Rocks, August 06, 2021, Is NATO Land Operations Doctrine Aiming Too High? – War on the Rocks.

[53] Christopher Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” in Advanced Land Warfare, ed. Mikael Weissmann and Niklas Nilsson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 42.

[54] Mick Ryan, “Positional Warfare Is Ukraine’s Friend in 2024: Ukraine Needs to Embrace Positional Warfare in 2024 to Deny Russian Success and Strike Back Harder in 2025,” Futura Doctrina, January 8, 2024, Positional Warfare Is Ukraine’s Friend in 2024 (substack.com).

[55] Georgii Samoilovich Isserson, The Evolution of Operational Art, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 108.