Abstract: Eighty years after the founding of the United Nations (UN), international conflicts—in particular those escalating into wars, such as in Ukraine and in the Middle East—became a matter of the international community consisting of 193 countries with the right to vote in the General Assembly. In this part of the newsletter series, different positions of a selection of state representatives from NATO member states, Ukraine, as well as BRICS nations and countries of the Global South regarding the war in Ukraine are presented and contrasted with one another. Moreover, arguments in international jurisprudence over the past 26 years that illustrate the partly opposing viewpoints of the representatives are highlighted. In this context, a highly relevant and frequently debated aspect of the peace negotiations is examined: territorial compromises regarding Ukraine and their implications for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Problem statement: How will the war in Ukraine be resolved in the context of international jurisprudence and historical precedents as well as with the support of the international community?

So what?: State representatives from all countries, including those from the major powers Russia and the USA, must return to the principles of the UN Charter and respect the territories of other states. On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the UN, a thorough review of international jurisprudence and the precedents of the past 80 years seems necessary to create, in the long term, a unified legal framework applicable to all, without exceptions for major powers.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin have outlined fundamental conditions for a lasting peace incompatible with each other. The following two geopolitically relevant core points stand in contrast to each other:

Zelensky demands the withdrawal of Russian troops from the entire Ukrainian territory based on Article 2 of the UN Charter, which ensures the integrity and sovereignty of member states,[1] as well as Ukraine’s accession to NATO or the assurance of security guarantees.[2], [3], [4]  Putin demands the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk,[5] Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia.[6] The regional administrations of these areas declared their independence from the central government in May 2014[7] based on Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the UN Charter. They applied for incorporation into Russia, which was confirmed in 2022.

Furthermore, the Russian side demanded neutrality following the “Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine” of July 16, 1990, which was agreed upon before the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[8], [9] This declaration outlined the intention for Ukraine to become “a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear free principles: to accept, to produce and to purchase no nuclear weapons.“[10]  

With the inauguration of US President Donald Trump on January 20, 2025, the negotiation situation for a peace agreement between both conflict parties changed. Former U.S. President Joe Biden continuously approved the worldwide largest financial aid and weapon deliveries to Ukraine from 2022 until December 30, 2024.[11], [12]

During a parliamentary vote in the United States on April 20, 2024, 112 Republican members voted against issuing further aid packages, while 210 Democrats and 101 Republicans voted in favour.[13], [14] Trump, therefore, announced during his election campaign that he would stop these aid packages immediately after taking office.[15] He stated that he would use the suspension or doubling of this aid as leverage for Zelensky and Putin in negotiations.[16]

After two years, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz became the first head of government from a Western democracy to initiate a personal phone conversation with Putin on November 15, 2024, to restore direct dialogue.[17] This followed the dissolutions of the governments in Germany and France, as well as the election of Trump as US. However, during the conversation, neither head of state changed their positions.[18], [19], [20]

Diplomacy on a Global Level: The Formation of Two Political Blocs

From a global perspective, significant changes in the positions of state representatives from various countries concerning demands for resolving the Ukraine conflict can be observed in the international diplomatic sphere between 2022 and 2024.

For example, Resolution A/ES-11/L.1 “Aggression Against Ukraine“[21] contains the demand for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. During the UN General Assembly on March 2, 2022, 141 state representatives voted in favour, accounting for 73.0% of the UN. Five voted against, including Russia and its close allies, while 35 abstained, among them China, India, and South Africa. Twelve were absent.[22]

On June 15 and 16, 2024, a conference on peace in Ukraine was held in Bür­genstock (Switzerland), where Zelensky promoted the implementation of his ten-point peace formula.[23], [24] The final communiqué was signed by 89 state representatives (including Kosovo, which is not recognised as an independent state by the UN), representing 46.6% of the UN. Fifteen refused to sign. In total, 90 state representatives did not attend the conference; 35 were not invited, and 55 declined the invitation, including Kazakhstan,[25] Angola,[26] and Azerbaijan.[27] An analysis of the 2022 General Assembly vote and the 2024 Bür­genstock conference provides a rough overview of the different diplomatic positions, revealing the formation of two political blocs.

The first bloc consists of 32 NATO member states, 15 European countries without NATO membership, and 42 countries in Asia, Oceania, South America, and Africa. The geopolitical significance of this bloc includes all ‘advanced economies’ as defined by the International Monetary Fund, which account for 40.7 % of global economic output (as of 2023)[28] and 13.8% of the world’s population. This includes all G7 nations as well as four other G20 members. Among them, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council.

This bloc also includes eleven micro and small island states with a population of less than 500,000 and a share of global GDP of less than 0.001 %.[29] Due to association agreements, three of these states are obligated to consult the United States on foreign policy matters.[30]

All representatives of this bloc voted unanimously in favour of the resolution in 2022 and signed the communiqué of the conference in Switzerland in 2024. Additionally, sanctions were imposed on Russian officials, oligarchs, banks, companies, and entire economic sectors in the advanced economies.[31] At the same time, the majority of the financial and military aid for Ukraine was provided.[32]

The second bloc consists of emerging and developing countries in Asia, South America, Africa, and Europe, primarily the ten member states and nine partner countries of the expanded BRICS+ alliance since 2024/2025.[33], [34] These countries account for 42.2% of global economic output and 54.6% of the world’s population (as of 2024).[35] Six countries from this bloc are members of the G20; Russia and China hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council.

Despite the war in Ukraine, trade relations with Russia continue unabated or have even been intensified in all these countries. At the same time, their positions and actions on the diplomatic level differ fundamentally in several aspects. The majority of this bloc neither fully shares the views of Russia’s representatives nor those of NATO member states. Furthermore, they highlight that the war indirectly affects them, for instance, through cumbersome transportation routes or disrupted supply and production chains.

Fifteen state representatives from this bloc attended the conference 2024 but did not sign the communiqué; all others either declined to participate or were not invited.[36], [37] During the 2022 UN General Assembly vote, they either voted against the resolution, abstained, were absent, or voted in favour at that time. In a vote at the UN Security Council on September 30, 2022, representatives from India, China, Gavon, and Brazil also abstained from the demand for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, while then, out of 15 other members, voted in favour, and Russia voted against.[38]

From this, six distinct groups of countries can be identified, in which each founding member of the BRICS holds an individual position:

 

The communiqué of the Bürgenstock conference includes three demands. The wording used was advantageous for the Ukrainian government, as Ukrainian diplomats contributed to their formulation.[39], [40], [41] For example, it calls for ensuring nuclear security under Ukrainian administration, including for the nuclear plant in Zaporizhzhia, which is occupied by Russian troops, the return of Ukrainian women and children from Russia, and the territorial integrity of Ukraine as a condition for peace negotiations.[42], [43]   

The EU Foreign Minister Josep Borrell, who served from 2019 to 2024, clarified: “It’s not a peace conference because Russia–the aggressor–will not be there. (…) It is a conference about peace.“[44] According to Borrell, the conference aimed to gather as many signatures as possible from state representatives to give weight to the demands of the Ukrainian government on the international stage. According to the comment by a former Swiss ambassador, the focus was less on “bridge-building for immediate peace”.[45]

The Positions in the Global South: War Hinders Economic Growth

Already in Europe, the President of Columbia, Gustavo Petro, abruptly cancelled his participation in the conference in Switzerland after his visit to Sweden on June 14, 2024, and after having reviewed the communiqué.[46] On June 17, he wrote on platform X: It “is not a free forum for discussing the paths to peace between Russia and Ukraine. Its conclusions are already predetermined.”[47]

Petro and other heads of state from countries in the Global South, such as Kazakhstan,[48] [49] and Saudi-Arabia,[50] stated that they maintain good political and economic relations with both NATO member states and Ukraine, as well as with Russia. Therefore, they have no fundamental interest in aligning with either of the two conflicting parties. Furthermore, many, like India and Vietnam, are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, which was founded in 1961 during the Cold War, and they refer to their policy of non-alignment in this context.[51] They call for bilateral dialogue and the “respect for human rights for the populations of both Ukraine and Russia“.[52], [53]

The Position in Russia: Precedents Apply to the Entire International Community

Russian government representatives, such as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, refer to historical precedents in the context of the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine. They primarily cite the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, NATO airstrikes in Yugoslavia in 1999, and the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008. According to their argument, NATO member states introduced deviations from international law, which must, therefore, apply to the entire international community.[54]

One argument is that the two military interventions by the USA and NATO, comparable to the Russian intervention in Ukraine, were carried out without UN approval or a mandate from the UN Security Council. In 2003, the President of France Jacque Chirac,[55] the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder,[56], [57] the President of Russia, Putin, and the President of China Hu Jintao[58] unanimously announced that they would veto the military intervention in Iraq, led by the USA, the UK, and Spain, in the Security Council. The intervention was based on a suspicion of weapons of mass destruction. According to the then-U. S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, U. S. President George W. Bush explicitly agreed to the military operation even without any legal basis.[59]

As a reason for NATO’s military intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 without a UN mandate, NATO Deputy Secretary General Klaus-Peter Klaiber referred to a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo caused by the suppression and displacement of ethnic Albanians by Serbian military personnel and security forces.[60] Geographically, this crisis was localised within NATO’s security area, which had previously been extended to cover all of Europe.

According to this argument, the sovereignty of a state may be violated in the defence of humanitarian law.[61] However, as U. S. Secretary Condoleezza Rice stated, representatives of NATO member states insisted it was an exceptional case due to the unique situation in Kosovo in 2008.[62]

Another relevant argument refers to the right of peoples to self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter, the unilateral declaration of independence by regional governments from central governments, and how such situations are handled within the international community.

After nine years of unsuccessful negotiations between the Serbian and Kosovar governments, Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008. U. S. President Bush and other representatives of Western democracies recognised it shortly thereafter, followed by approximately 100 UN member states out of 193.[63] The governments of Serbia, Russia, China, and around 90 other countries continue to refuse to recognise it to this day.[64]  

In this context, an armed conflict broke out again in August 2008 between the Georgian government and separatists from the two regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are considered part of Georgia. The separatists were supported by Russian troops, who, with the permission of the Georgian government, remained stationed on the territory as peacekeepers alongside Georgian and South Ossetian forces.[65] The original conflict began in 1991 when Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union, and the two regions declared their independence from Georgia in 1991 and 1992, respectively.[66]

Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation from 2008 to 2012, along with representatives of four other countries, recognised the unilaterally declared independence of the two regions based on the precedent of Kosovo’s independence.[67]

The Georgian government and more than 100 countries worldwide, including China, do not recognise this independence and consider both territories as occupied regions of Georgia.[68]

Although Russian officials have opposed legal deviations since 1999, they now use them—just as the United States did before—as justification for their military intervention in Ukraine. Consequently, they reject any development of a peace plan that excludes their participation or disregards these stated points.[69], [70]

The Position in China: Dialogue for the Preservation of State Integrity and Sovereignty

Chinese representatives declined to participation in the conference in Switzerland 2022. Like representatives from the Global South, they called for peace negotiations under the conditions that they are „recognised by both Russia and Ukraine, with equal participation of all parties as well as fair discussion of all peace plans“.[71] By doing so, they support the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations—including their own, with reference to Taiwan and that of Ukraine.[72], [73]

The Chinese ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, stated: „Ukraine is a sovereign state, while Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory. The Taiwan question is an internal Chinese affair. It does not make sense for people to emphasise the principle of sovereignty on Ukraine while hurting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on Taiwan.”[74]

After the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Taiwanese government never officially declared independence from the People’s Republic of China. However, to this day, Taiwan is treated as a de facto independent country, particularly by the United States and Western democracies, including having its own defence system as well as economic and political relations with other countries.[75] From  1949 to 1971, until Resolution 2758 in the UN General Assembly, the government in Taiwan also represented the entire mainland of China in the UN, including holding a permanent seat on the Security Council.[76]

To de-escalate the Russia-Ukraine-conflict with equal participation of both parties, Chinese and Brazilian diplomats initiated the peace initiative “Friends for Peace”. They are calling on all countries to observe the following three principles: 1. No expansion of the battlefield, 2. No escalation of the fighting, 3. No intensification of hostilities by any warring party, particularly no use of weapons of mass destruction and no attacks on nuclear power plants or other nuclear facilities.[77]

The Position in South Africa: The Bias of Western Democracies

At the conference in Switzerland 2024, the National Security Advisor of South Africa, Sydney Mufamadi, called for all parties to adhere to the UN Charter, international law, and human rights.[78] In this context, he simultaneously pointed out the contradiction in that Israeli representatives participated in the peace conference and signed the communiqué. Just a few days earlier, the Human Rights Council had published evidence of several war crimes committed by the Israeli government in Gaza since October 7, 2023.[79]

South African legal representatives are suing the Israeli government before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for genocide in Gaza. In this context, 14 other countries, including Spain, Belgium, Colombia, and Mexico, will present their legal positions on the matter.[80] Legal representatives from Nicaragua also sued the German government for assisting in the genocide.[81]  

The contradiction lies in the fact that representatives of NATO member states, such as Biden,[82] EU President Ursula von der Leyen,[83] and Zelensky[84] are calling for the condemnation of Putin for war crimes in Ukraine. At the same time, NATO supports the Israeli government militarily and financially while it commits war crimes, and the USA has blocked an investigation into this matter by the ICJ.[85]

Current Aspects in the Negotiations on Ukraine

According to the US Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia since 2025 Keith Kellogg[86] as well as French President Emmanuel Macron,[87] Russian troops are currently unable to be moved out of the four Ukrainian regions (about 20% of Ukraine) through either military or diplomatic means.

To this day–17 years after the war in Georgia–Russian troops remain present in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which the Russian government refers to as peacekeeping forces. Negotiations have regularly taken place but have been unsuccessful within the framework of the Geneva talks.[88], [89] Given the current political discourse and the legal foundation, including all past precedents, the four regions in eastern Ukraine are expected to remain occupied for several years.[90]

According to US Vice President J. D. Vance, one option is to temporarily create a new border in Ukraine with a demilitarised zone, similar to the ones in North and South Korea, the Greek and Turkish parts of Cyprus, and formerly West and East Germany.[91] Additionally, the Russian government would be given a guarantee that Ukraine will not join NATO.[92], [93]

In Europe, French President Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer have initiated efforts to form a European peacekeeping force to secure the border on the unoccupied side of Ukraine.[94] German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has set a ceasefire as a precondition before German troops would be involved.[95] Trump stated that the US will not deploy troops to Ukraine.[96] According to Starmer, however, the initiative’s implementation depends on the involvement of US troops, given the required defence capabilities.[97] The Russian government has stated that it would tolerate peacekeeping troops, but the deployment of European combat troops to Ukraine would lead to the continuation of the war.[98]

These measures would de-escalate and freeze the conflict, but no long-lasting solution would be reached. As in Georgia, the further negotiation process could take decades. The development of the unoccupied part of Georgia has simultaneously been associated with several advantages. Even without EU membership, Georgia now benefits from a free trade agreement with the EU, including tariff reductions, easier market access,[99] and visa-free travel to the Schengen Area.[100] Georgia is not a member of NATO, but it participates in joint exercises and missions,[101]  receives military support from NATO countries, arms shipments, and benefits from close security cooperation, without any formal security guarantees.[102] Despite the compromised sovereignty, these aspects, which are connected with a long-lasting ceasefire, could also benefit Ukraine.

A ceasefire would also entail that presidential elections in Ukraine be held, as President Zelensky’s term ended in May 2024 and is currently only valid under martial law. Russia, the USA, and the Ukrainian Parliament itself are also calling for presidential elections in Ukraine. Zelensky has extended the martial law until May 9, 2025, the day when the Soviet Union triumphed over Nazi leadership in Germany 80 years ago.[103] This aligns with the statements made by Trump and US Special Envoy Kellogg, who, in January 2025, announced a period of around 100 days to end the war.[104]

In the election year 2024, Georgia also held significant parliamentary and presential elections. The new government is once again establishing closer ties with Russia. According to Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, on this basis, there is a willingness to discuss the withdrawal of Russian troops from the two Georgian regions.[105]

The BRICS members, meanwhile, advocate for the reform of the UN and the Security Council to allow countries from South America, Africa, and Asia to have representation with veto power.[106] A new vote in the UN General Assembly on February 24, 2025, regarding Resolution A/ES-11/L.10, in which Russia is not explicitly named as the aggressor, highlighted further significant changes in the diplomatic positions of the international community: Compared to the vote on the resolution in 2022, 18 countries voted against it, including the USA, along with Russia, the microstates of Palau and the Marshall Islands, which always vote with the USA, Israel, and Hungary. Furthermore, 48 countries less voted in favour, and 30 more abstained.

Currently, talks are taking place between the various parties involved in the conflict, primarily between the USA and Russia or Ukraine. Among other things, Trump is negotiating the extraction of rare earth elements in Ukraine in exchange for the military and financial aid provided by the USA. So far, no direct dialogues have been organised between representatives of Ukraine and Russia.

On January 19, 2025, a temporary ceasefire was established between the Israeli government and the Islamic Hamas.[107] One aspect of long-term peace includes the recognition of Palestine as an independent state with a seat in the UN. In the Strait between mainland China and Taiwan, warships from China, Germany, the USA, and Canada have been increasingly operating since September 2024.[108]

To be continued…

 

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Maria Thiele; Multilingual Journalist specialising in international relations between the USA, the EU, Russia, and China. MA in International Journalism & Global Communication. Author of the newsletter series “Scan the Horizon“, Part 1: The Election Year 2024: Government Changes in Europe and the USA, access here: https://tdhj.org/blog/post/election-europe-usa/. The author is responsible for the contents summarised in the article. A continuation is presumably published every two months.

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[4] President of Ukraine Volodymir Zelenskyy. „President: We Must Apply Pressure Together To Make Real Peace.“ Februar 15, 2025. https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-mi-mayemo-tisnuti-razom-shob-dosyagti-spravzhnogo-96097

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[6] RBC. „Референдумы в ДНР, ЛНР, Херсонской и Запорожской областях. Главное.“ September 29, 2022. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/29/09/2022/6329d5c89a79474c0f7ad167

[7] Российской газеты. „Референдумы в ДНР, ЛНР, Херсонской и Запорожской областях. Подсчет голосов.“ September 27, 2022. https://rg.ru/2022/09/27/referendumy-v-dnr-lnr-hersonskoj-i-zaporozhskoj-oblastiah-den-piatyj-onlajn.html

[8] Putin, Vladimir. „Meeting with Foreign Ministry senior officials. Vladimir Putin held a meeting with the senior officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry.“ President of Russia, Juni 14, 2024. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74285, Russian version with Video: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74285

[9] Vedemosti. „Лавров заявил об уважении территориальной целостности Украины.“ September 24, 2023.

https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2023/09/24/996803-lavrov-ob-uvazhenii-territorialnoi-tselostnosti-ukraini

[10] Верховна Рада України. „Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine.“ Juli 16, 1990. https://static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/Declaration_of_State_Sovereignty_of_Ukraine_rev1.htm

[11] Biden, Joe. „Statement from President Joe Biden on U.S. Support for Ukraine’s Defense“, Dezember 30, 2024.

The white house, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/12/30/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-u-s-support-for-ukraines-defense/

[12] The White House. Budget of the U.S. Government. Fiscal Year 2025. U.S. Government Publishing Office, n. D. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/budget_fy2025.pdf

[13] CNN. „Cheers followed by outbursts after Ukraine aid bill passes House.“ n. D. https://edition.cnn.com/videos/politics/2024/04/20/ukraine-aid-vote-passes-house-digvid.cnn

[14] Iyer, Kaanita; Shania Shelton uns Isabelle D’Antonio. „House passes key foreign aid package.” CNN, April 20, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/politics/live-news/house-vote-ukraine-israel-taiwan-aid-04-20-24#h_30753837f6b276a7383d0f0e96934af8

[15] Hayden, Jones. „Trump threatens to cut US aid to Ukraine quickly if reelected.” Politico. Juni 16, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-ukraine-russia-war-threatens-cut-aid-election-2024/

[16] Walker, Shaun. „’Now all the rules are different’: Ukraine braces for dealmaker Trump to enter negotiations.“ The Guardian, Januar 04, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/04/ukraine-dealmaker-trump-putin-war-russia-zelenskyy

[17] Die Bundesregierung. „Bundeskanzler Scholz telefoniert mit dem russischen Präsidenten Putin” (Pressemitteilung). November 15, 2024. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/bundeskanzler-scholz-telefoniert-mit-dem-russischen-praesidenten-putin-2320942

[18] Tankersley, Jim, Christopher F. Schuetze und Anatoly Kurmanaev. „Putin Talks With German Chancellor, Breaking Ice With the West.” The New York Times, November 15, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/15/world/europe/scholz-putin-russia-germany-call.html

[19] Die Bundesregierung. „Bundeskanzler Scholz telefoniert mit dem russischen Präsidenten Putin.“ (Pressemitteilung 290), November 15, 2024. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/bundeskanzler-scholz-telefoniert-mit-dem-russischen-praesidenten-putin-2320942

[20] Президент России. „Телефонный разговор с Федеральным канцлером Германии Олафом Шольцем.“ November 15, 2024, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75588

[21] United Nations General Assembly. „Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 March 2022. Aggression against Ukraine.“ United Nations digital library. März 02, 2022. https://www.un.org/depts/german/gv-notsondert/a-es11-1.pdf

[22] United Nations General Assembly. „Aggression against Ukraine: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly.“ United Nations digital library. März 02, 2022. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039?ln=en

[23] Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. „Summit on Peace in Ukraine: Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework“ Juni 16, 2024. https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/das_eda/aktuell/dossiers/konferenz-zum-frieden-ukraine/Summit-on-Peace-in-ukraine-joint-communique-on-a-peace-framework.html

[24] President of Ukraine Volodymir Zelenskyy. „The Participants of the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland Signed the Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework.“ Juni 16, 2024, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/uchasniki-globalnogo-samitu-miru-u-shvejcariyi-pidpisali-spi-91589

[25] Жайык, Ак. „Примет ли Казахстан участие в саммите мира по Украине, ответили в МИД.“ Juli 03, 2024. https://azh.kz/ru/news/view/102639

[26] Interfax. „Zelenskyy invites Angolan President Lourenço to take part in Peace Summit, visit Ukraine.“ Mai 21, 2024. https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/988168.html

[27] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. „Ukraine especially calls on Muslim countries to participate in the Peace Summit in Switzerland, — the Vice-Speaker Olena Kondratiuk.“ Mai 17, 2024. https://www.rada.gov.ua/en/news/News/top_news/249661.html

[28] International Monetary Fund. „World Economic Outlook:Policy Pivot, Rising Threats.“ (2024). Washington, DC. October. https://www.imf.org/en/Search#q=WORLD%20ECONOMIC%20OUTLOOK%202024%20OCT%20Policy%20Pivot%2C%20Rising%20Threats&sort=relevancy

[29] Worldometer. „GDP by Country.“ Zugriff am 03. Februar 2025 unter https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/

[30] Thorhallsson, Baldur. „Small States in the UN Security Council: Means of Influence?”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7, (2012): 135-160. https://uni.hi.is/baldurt/files/2012/08/Small-States-UN-Security-Council-by-Thorhallsson.pdf

[31] Europäische Kommission. „Russischer Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine: Zehntes EU-Sanktionspaket beschlossen.“ (Pressemitteilung). Februar 27, 2023. https://germany.representation.ec.europa.eu/news/russischer-angriffskrieg-auf-die-ukraine-zehntes-eu-sanktionspaket-beschlossen-2023-02-27_de

[32] Deutscher Bundestag. „Die Haltung ausgewählter Staaten außerhalb von EU und NATO zum Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine.” Wissenschaftliche Dienste. Mai 31, 2022. https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/905150/3636f76082f3d373b715a93470d471f1/WD-2-037-22-pdf.pdf

[33] Islam, Tajul. „How Egypt’s BRICS Membership Could Help Create a New World Order.” BRICS, Februar 06, 2025. https://infobrics.org/post/43381/

[34] Governo do Brasil. „Ingresso da Indonésia no BRICS.” Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Januar 06, 2025, https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/ingresso-da-indonesia-no-brics

[35] Norton, Ben. „BRICS expands to 54.6% of world population by adding Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country.” Geopolitical Economy Report. Januar 19, 2025. https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/01/19/brics-expands-population-nigeria-africa/

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