Abstract: Technological innovations such as ubiquitous drones have led to a stalemate in the current war in Ukraine. Western observers who see the war of attrition as a disadvantage ask whether it can be transformed into a war of manoeuvre. We argue that this is only possible if the West succeeds in exploiting competitive advantage through innovations that are not accessible to or exploitable by opponents. To show this, we first extend the dichotomy to a triad of “guerrilla – attrition – manoeuvre”, including strategic shifts such as “unfreezing and freezing”. Drawing on civil literature on innovation, we argue that the unfreezing of attrition into manoeuvre corresponds to exploiting competitive advantages gained through innovation. However, because today’s cutting-edge innovations come from civilian industry, they lack rarity and inimitability, and their respective advantages are, therefore, not sustainable. Until this situation is rectified, manoeuvre warfare will remain dead. The only way out is to develop decisive non-civil innovations or to focus on those competitive advantages, such as soft power, that the enemy cannot exploit.
Problem statement: How can stalemate be overcome in modern war?
So what?: Western militaries unwilling to rely on the strategic choice of attrition have two options: They can persuade their government to increase military research and development spending significantly or embrace and exploit innovations for which totalitarian regimes lack organisational support.
Source: shutterstock.com/metamorworks
The Opponent’s Strength
Sun Tzu’s alleged words of advice, “Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak,” remain true ever since he spoke them. This adage remains valid because the perceived—not the actual—strength of the opponent is decisive for one’s course of action, our strategic choice—be it attrition or manoeuvre. When it comes to conventional, that is, state-on-state, warfare, manoeuvre warfare has arguably been the central approach of Western, high-tech armed forces since the Second World War, particularly from the 1980s onward.[1] However, after more than two years of war in Ukraine, many observers note that manoeuvre warfare may be losing its credibility as the West’s preferred strategic choice against an aggressive Russia, and presumably also against other totalitarian states hostile to the West.[2], [3] Many wonder what needs to be done to revive manoeuvre warfare, and some even call for the West to learn and adopt much more attritional warfare, even in non-interstate wars.[4], [5]
When it comes to conventional warfare, manoeuvre warfare has arguably been the central approach of Western, high-tech armed forces since the Second World War, particularly from the 1980s onward.
A multitude of factors are involved in strategic decision-making processes, as evidenced by the practice of political, military and business leaders, as well as by research in strategic studies, military science, leadership and economics. However, in this paper, we are deliberately focussing on the military domain. This allows us to understand the essential factors that lead to the interplay between manoeuvre, attrition and—as we propose to complete the model—guerrilla warfare.
Yet strength, or its perception, can change for many reasons. As long as there is no single best strategy for all configurations, such a change may lead to a shift in strategy. Assuming that it’s always better to be stronger (not necessarily looking stronger), confronting parties are usually willing to make considerable efforts to increase their own strength. Business literature illustrates that the primary driver for improving one’s own capabilities, or “gaining competitive advantage over an opponent”, is innovation.[6] However, literature suggests that only qualified types of innovation create sustainable competitive advantage. Western countries must consciously attempt to obtain the right kind of innovations, or they will have to bury manoeuvre.
Guerrilla – Attrition – Manoeuvre
Wars are complex interactions between people and are characterised by constant change, unclear relationships and intentions, non-linear interactions, and complex or unpredictable dependencies and coincidences.[7]
Wars are complex interactions between people and are characterised by constant change, unclear relationships and intentions, non-linear interactions, and complex or unpredictable dependencies and coincidences.
First, we reduce our analysis to two actors, i.e. blue vs red. This means we ignore third parties on the battlefield (e.g. insurgents with their own preferences) or in the strategic context (e.g. allies). This does not preclude the possibility of integrating them into the considerations at a later stage. However, too much complexity would be more of a hindrance than a necessity in addressing the fundamental issues of attrition and manoeuvre. Second, we assume all actors to be rational. Put simply, a rational actor is an entity that acts logically and deliberately to achieve its goals. This involves a process of weighing up the available options, considering the potential consequences and probabilities, and then selecting the course of action that is deemed the most favourable based on a given set of preferences.[10] Third, we assume that actors make decisions based on their perceptions. It is not necessary to start from the psychological or neurological characteristics of perception. For our purposes, reference to Boyd’s OODA (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act) loop is sufficient.[11] According to Boyd, we create a mental image of the reality of war based on observations, experiences, culture, genetics, and our analysis/synthesis. This, of course, includes the errors that occur in the process. It is this very image that serves as the basis for our decisions. To illustrate: An actor doesn’t decide to attack position A because his opponent is weaker there but because he suspects him to be weaker there—or, in a different tactical context, because he suspects himself to be stronger there.
Having established the general assumptions, we can proceed to our first theorem. The subject of our paper is the question of when Blue opts for a war of attrition, when for a manoeuvre approach and what other strategies, if any, complement this choice. Various doctrinal writings see the balance of power as a decisive clue to distinguish between attrition and manoeuvre.[12], [13] British doctrine puts it most succinctly: “Generally, it [Manoeuvre Warfare] aims to apply strength, in the form of firepower, against weakness, in contrast to attrition where strength tends to be applied against strength.”[14] This follows from the very idea of manoeuvre warfare, which attempts to decisively defeat the opponent where he is perceived to be weak, or at his ‘Zentrum der Kraftentfaltung’, which also presupposes one’s own superiority at that point. Blue will only abandon such a war-shortening approach if it perceives that red is not weak enough. Only then will Blue choose the war-lengthening strategy of attrition, based primarily on the assumption that Red will surrender before Blue does.
Sun Tzu already mentioned different strategic approaches depending on the force ratio towards the enemy. The translation by John F. Sullivan, Retired US Army China Foreign Area Officer, reads:[16]
- When ten times his strength, surround him;
- When five times his strength, attack him;
- When double his strength, divide him.
- When equal in strength, be capable of engaging him in battle;
- When inferior in strength, be capable of defending [your position];
- When you cannot match your opponent’s strength, be capable of evading him.
A balance of power in favour of Blue favours offensive – or manoeuvring – action. A balanced relationship or slight (the other translations in Sullivan’s hands suggest that ‘inferior’ is not meant in the strong sense) inferiority allows the fight.
Obviously, many details remain open when we reduce the difference between manoeuvre and attrition to an overall perceived force ratio. Force ratios can vary in terms of time, space and command level. All these specifications may influence whether attrition or manoeuvre is favoured in a given situation. However, it always comes back to the original question: is Red perceived as weaker, the same or stronger at a particular time, in a specific place or at a certain level? We thus deliberately leave these contextual issues open.
However, a gap remains open. The enemy can not only be weaker (manoeuvre) or equally strong (attrition) but also stronger. This corresponds to what Sullivan has translated as ‘cannot match’ [16]. In our understanding, to evade means to avoid conventional, that is, peer-to-peer warfare. We use the umbrella term ‘guerrilla’ for this. To cover this case and thus complete the spectrum of strength rations, we set up the following:
Thesis I: If Blue perceives Red to be weaker, its strategic choice will be manoeuvre warfare.
If Blue perceives Red to be of equal strength, its strategic choice will be attrition warfare.
If Blue perceives Red to be stronger, its strategic choice will be guerrilla warfare.
It seems advisable to define the three forms of warfare: Manoeuvre warfare is the “employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission”.[17] Attrition warfare is “a style of warfare characterised by the application of substantial combat power that reduces an enemy’s ability to fight through loss of personnel and equipment. Essentially, it aims at the physical destruction of the enemy”.[18] Finally, guerrilla warfare as “military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular[…] forces”.[19]
Manoeuvre warfare is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.
We illustrate this triad by looking at the Russian-Ukrainian war at three different points in time—for once, with Russia as the blue side. After the annexation of Crimea, the conflict in Donbas had the character of a guerrilla war in many places.[20], [21] It was obvious that the forces supported by the Russian side in the Donbas were weaker than the Ukrainian armed forces – which did not prevent them from keeping the conflict alive. With the start of the so-called ‘special military operation’ on February 24, 2024, Russia apparently switched to a manoeuvre approach. In the—false—perception that their superiority would be enough to defeat the opponent within days, they attempted a decapitation strike on what they assumed to be the Ukrainian centre of gravity, the capital Kyiv.[22] After this perception turned out to be wrong, Russia was forced to switch to a war of attrition by regrouping – and sacrificing considerable operational depth.[23] Thus, in a decade, this conflict has clearly and unambiguously, in each case in accordance with the perceived—and not actual—force ratios, taken on the three forms of guerrilla, manoeuvre and attrition.
Considering the above exemplification of the thesis I, we posit two corollaries:
Corollary Ia: Whereas attrition warfare is static in nature, both manoeuvre and guerrilla warfare are dynamic in nature.
While this assignment is obvious for attrition and manoeuvre, an explanation is required for the statement concerning guerrilla. Even if it does not show the shifting of borders on the map, guerrilla warfare is dynamic in itself, as it operates across space and is as difficult for the enemy to predict as the manoeuvre. This may be explained by attritional warfare being closer to equilibrium than the two forms of war in disequilibrium. It seems that in the case of a trial of strength between unequal actors, more movement is involved than with comparable actors. This also has a consequence for the command:
Corollary Ib: Detailed command is the preferred style of command in static warfare, and mission command is the preferred style of command in dynamic warfare.
The summary of Thesis I and the two corollaries [Ia and Ib] is summarised in Figure 1, providing the basis for further analysis.
The preferred strategy depends on the perceived relative strength of the opponent; Source: Author.
According to our assumptions, actors choose strategies according to the perceived strength of the enemy. However, this perception can change throughout a conflict. There are many reasons for this, and it doesn’t matter whether it is through an initial misperception, successful deception, real change in strength, enemy innovation, or any other events on the battlefield. Given that actors behave rationally, such a change of perception must result in a strategic shift once it is substantial enough to change an enemy’s perception from one category to another, say from “weaker” to “equal”. Rationality implies using any available advantage to win; therefore, such strategic shifts are necessary and to be expected.
If the perceived relative strength of the opponent changes, the rational actor will shift his strategy; Source: Author.
Based on the previously presented concept of the enemy’s strength perception and resulting strategic choice, we distinguish four possible strategic shifts. These shifts depend on the strength ratio between actors and the corresponding change in it. The shifts may be gradual, i.e., evolving, or substantial. In our model, we assume that once the strength relationship falls into another category, such a shift occurs. We denote these four shifts specifically.
‘Intensifying’ is what we call the strategic shift from a weaker to an equal position of strength. Guerrilla actions will intensify to weaken the enemy so much that a conflict of attrition with favourable results for the formally weaker position is possible. Neither side, however, can obtain the initiative resulting in static actions, given that initiative and freedom of action are essential to offensive action. Such a development was noticeable and led to the complete withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan. Successful guerrilla operations brought further potential and territorial control. This enabled the Taliban to increase their training effort, which steadily increased their capabilities.[24] This guerilla war was, against the background of declining US interests in Afghanistan, effective enough to endure until the US administration was forced to negotiate.[25]
‘Hiding’ is the strategic shift from an equal to a weaker position of strength. In such a case, Blue cannot realistically win a war of attrition if it perceives the enemy to be stronger than it is, so it must strive to minimise its visibility and vulnerability to avoid taking damage. Conversely, they will only attack the enemy when the cost-benefit scale is favourable. Ceding terrain to an enemy force will result in different movement possibilities (hidden or camouflaged) and the emergence of dynamic actions. This process can be seen in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, where the Taliban collapsed after losing the battle of Mazar-e-Sharif on November 09, 2001, unable to withstand the advances of the Northern Alliance and Pashtun forces backed by US air strikes. Even with forces stationed in Afghanistan, peaking at around 100,000 US soldiers in 2011, the stalemate in the combat against insurgent groups was not broken.[26]
‘Unfreezing’ is the strategic shift from an equal to a stronger position of strength. The capability to apply pressure to the enemy at a desired location and time, or its shortcoming to prevent that, enables one to strike the enemy where they are weak and take on favourable fights. The enemy will take severe hits to their fighting capability. This ensures that the initiative can be sustained and leads to dynamic action to exploit the advantage. The increase and success of Ukrainian offensive actions in the Black Sea is evidence of this. By using long-range missiles and unmanned surface vessels, Ukraine has managed to destroy or damage several warships of the Russian fleet or damage headquarters. Ukraine has forced a partial retreat of the Russian fleet further west, away from Crimea.[27]
Ukraine has forced a partial retreat of the Russian fleet further west, away from Crimea.
‘Freezing’ is the strategic shift from a stronger to an equal position of strength. This is caused by the impossibility of pressuring the enemy at a desired place and time or their efforts to prevent this. To avoid an initiative loss to the enemy, damage is now inflicted wherever it can be realised and has an economic benefit. If the enemy doesn’t have the strength to take the initiative either, this results in a war of attrition and static actions. An example of such a shift would be how the Ukrainian forces defeated the initial Russian campaign in its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. After the initial airborne and mechanised operations to seize Kyiv, Ukrainian forces managed to halt Russian advances and even push them back. In doing so, Ukraine forced the Russians to accept a pause in operations and develop a plan for a new campaign, which ultimately led to the conditions for a prolonged stalemate.[28]
These four strategic shifts can vary in severity, extent, and speed. However, a significant change in actual or perceived strength must occur to change the underlying nature of action from static to dynamic or vice versa. We define such a shift as the obtainment of a competitive advantage. A competitive advantage could consist of one or more strategic capabilities and is gradual; it can thus be stronger or weaker in appearance. A competitive advantage over our enemy allows for a more right-sided choice of strategy:
Thesis II: Armed forces tend to choose strategic options as right as possible on the spectrum to exploit their competitive advantage over their enemies.
The crux of this thesis may not be immediately apparent. However, the key to understanding it lies in the concept of a ‘competitive advantage’. Since both opponents are rational actors, they will utilise a competitive advantage as soon as it presents itself. Not exploiting a perceived weakness of the opponent is tantamount to a non-rational decision.
Building on this, we can now show innovation’s crucial importance in overcoming a static form of combat, namely a war of attrition. Innovations enable temporary competitive advantage. What applies to civilian actors can also apply to military actors. Thus, we have recognised the basic prerequisite for tearing conflicts such as the current Russian-Ukrainian war out of stasis and returning them to a dynamic form, namely manoeuvre warfare.
Corollary II: Innovations allow for new opportunities and are thus a precondition to unfreezing attrition warfare.
Civilian and Military Innovations
Barney presented a model he later developed into the VRIO (Value, Rare, Imitate, Organise) model.[29] The acronym stands for the questions that need to be asked if the competitive advantage is to be assessed based on a given resource or capability:
- Does a particular resource or skill add value (V) to the company by allowing it to exploit its opportunities or neutralise its opponents’ threats?;
- Are the resources or abilities rare (R) so that only our company obtains them and no (or only a few) opponents?;
- Are these resources or abilities impossible to imitate (I), or at least is it costly and time-consuming for an opponent to do so?; and
- Is the company organised (O), and, therefore, ready and able to use this resource or ability?
Only a minor adjustment is needed to apply this model to the context of military conflicts. In concrete terms, it is helpful to speak not of values in the economic sense but of combat values. In this sense, we recommend that military innovations be assessed using a CRIO scheme, where C stands for Combat Value. In the civilian world, ‘value’ refers to resources or capabilities that give a company a competitive advantage by allowing it to exploit opportunities or neutralise threats. In the same sense, we understand combat value to be those resources—such as weapon systems or ammunition—and capabilities that enable armed forces to develop such competitive advantages, eventually leading to the concept of capability-based planning for armed forces.[30]. Therefore, we set up:
Military innovations must fulfil the same requirements as civilian innovations to gain a sustainable competitive advantage; Source: Author.
Thesis III: Military innovations provide only temporary competitive advantage if they are rare and add combat value. To be sustainable, innovation must be both inimitable and organisationally supported.
A few examples from the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict may illustrate these capabilities and give the argument for Thesis III. To do this, the actor, context, and time must be determined, as competitive advantages can change accordingly. For the example, we assume that the actor is Ukraine, the context is the ongoing war, and the time since the Russian invasion of February 24, 2022. Nuclear weapons represent a type A capability: Ukraine simply doesn’t have the corresponding combat value. Mini drones are an example of type B capabilities: their combat value is undisputed. However, they are not uncommon due to their civilian origin and, therefore, cannot be imitated and are thus used by both sides. Short-range ballistic missiles such as ATACMS (Army TACtical Missile System) represent a type C capability. Their combat value is undisputed, and compared to the current opponent, they are a rare resource. However, the competitive advantage is only temporary—until Russia develops and deploys comparable systems. It is more difficult to identify a type-D competence, which could indicate that Ukraine does not currently have any unexploited competitive advantages. Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) are an excellent example of type E capabilities, which give Ukraine a sustainable advantage in the Black Sea. However, their applicability is inimitable, as the Ukrainian Black Sea fleet does not offer the corresponding targets for a comparable Russian approach.
The last example shows that the four categories cannot be evaluated independently. It even seems that in the CRIO model, and thus in the military context, the possibility of neutralisation by an opposing action can lead to entanglement. In this way, an actor can maintain a competitive advantage even if the opponent can imitate the capability—as long as he does not provide the corresponding organisational support. This is well illustrated by the separate French, British and German efforts to develop and implement a series of revolutionary offensive, defensive and combined arms doctrines; however, only the German Imperial Army somehow managed to provide organisational support for its stormtroopers through assessment, command, and training.[31]
Only the German Imperial Army somehow managed to provide organisational support for its stormtroopers through assessment, command, and training.
Having supported Thesis III’s statement with examples, we can draw an immediate conclusion that helps us to understand the challenges of innovation in 21st-century armed forces:
Corollary III: To enable a shift towards manoeuvre warfare, armed forces in a static state are dependent on sustainable innovations to shift the balance of power in their favour for a sufficient period.
This conclusion follows precisely from the fact that we understand a balance of power in our favour as an expression of a competitive advantage. It is worth reiterating at this point that due to the symmetrical nature of the war, the mere supply of additional forces—such as recruiting additional cohorts, increasing armour production, or concentrating forces on a particular section of the front—is generally not enough to overcome the stasis of the war of attrition. A new balance can tip to one side or the other. However, by its very nature, such an increase is exactly attrition—indeed, this strategy consists precisely of such an approach. Only a qualitative change can lead to overcoming the stasis and—whether again or for the first time—choosing a manoeuvrist approach.
It should be added that innovation is not limited to technological advances. The above-mentioned example of the German stormtroopers shows that tactics can also break the stalemate. However, such procedural innovations apply the same conditions outlined in Thesis III. The stormtrooper tactics have a proven combat value and were undoubtedly rare when introduced. Yet their value was only sustainable as the enemy was unable (or unwilling) to imitate, and their own organisational support was available.
Given the recognised relevance of innovations for gaining a competitive advantage in military conflicts, it is appropriate to deal with some fundamental statements on military innovation. Given the dominance of the US in military innovation in the 20th and early 21st centuries, it seems permissible to largely focus this analysis on US defence spending and then only extend the analysis to other countries. Looking back over the last century, we can distinguish three phases of military innovation.[32]
Before the Second World War, the military research and development sector consisted mainly of armament factories and shipyards. US defence spending was 1.4% of GDP in 1940, with a correspondingly low proportion of research and development (R&D). With US entry into the Second World War in 1941, defence spending exploded to over 37% of GDP by 1945.[33] During this time, numerous networks and institutions were formed, not least to lay the foundations for the US’ long-term technological superiority—it was the second phase of the military-industrial complex, as Eisenhower and later his critics called it. The third phase came with the end of the Cold War. Defence and research spending were drastically reduced. In the words of the former Deputy Secretary of Defence, William J. Lynn III, “The combined R&D budgets of five of the largest US defence contractors (about $4 billion, according to the research firm Capital Alpha Partners) amount to less than half of what companies such as Microsoft or Toyota spend on R&D”. These figures were published ten years before the appearance of Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, and Tesla.
Evron and Bitzinger show that the defence share of all government R&D spending has declined even more significantly since the end of the Cold War than in the US. The share of the economy in the total R&D expenditure of the respective countries has also increased.[34] Alic et al. also show that this downward trend began long before the fall of the Iron Curtain.[35] Whereas in 1960, the US Department of Defence accounted for the absolute majority of all US government R&D expenditure, by 2020 this share had fallen to around 50%. Over the same period, total US R&D spending shifted from 65% federal and 35% business to a remaining 19.5% federal share.[36]
Civil and military innovations reached a turning point around 1980, when business R&D spending overtook military R&D spending[37]; Source: Author.
In addition to this paradigm shift of the reverse flow of innovation, civil-military cooperation has become more difficult for various reasons. Verbruggen sees, for example, a lack of social connections, different innovation cultures and reservations on the part of many civilian engineers about cooperating with the defence sector.[40] There is also evidence that innovation is not intensified and groundbreaking ideas are not pursued in ongoing wars.[41] Rather, innovation appears to be limited to incremental improvements to existing systems, and additional efforts are more likely to be made to procure such pre-conflict systems in more significant numbers.[42] It is evident that such a tendency favours attrition strategies and thus hinders a strategic shift towards manoeuvre warfare.
The fact that civilian applications are generally ahead of military applications has a decisive influence on the quality of innovations. Even patent protection and proprietary systems cannot change the fact that civilian applications are generally much more accessible to the public and the global public than military systems.
Innovations primarily available today originate from the civilian domain and are, therefore, neither rare nor inimitable from the outset. The first-mover advantage collapses if the opponent observes a technological innovation based on civilian applications; it can make this innovation available within a very short time and implement and remove the competitive advantage. This can explain the rapid spiral of development in drone warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian war. The innovation spiral turns in impressive cycles, from the first drones to jammers to anti-jamming measures to drone defence weapons—this is not because Ukraine or its allies (and certainly not Russia) have R&D spending on the scale of the US in the Second World War. The rapid cycles can be explained solely by the fact that the technology is not only available in principle but is also largely ready for use in the civilian world. In terms of the need for innovation to overcome static combat situations, this does not bode well.
Innovations primarily available today originate from the civilian domain and are, therefore, neither rare nor inimitable from the outset.
Thesis IV (provisional): Manoeuvre warfare will remain dead as long as innovations are primarily based on civilian applications.
So, is it dead? Assuming that democratic constitutional states would prefer the war-shortening manoeuvrist approach, they should, by all means, regain competitive advantage to avoid any war of attrition.[43] This pressure to win the war with a decisive operation and not to endure attrition was also a demand from the West, which the Ukrainian leadership faced in the summer of 2022, which then—encouraged by the interim successes in Kherson and Kharkiv—ended in the unfulfillable promise of a spring offensive which subsequently failed.[44]
A closer look reveals two ways to revive manoeuvre. The first approach is straightforward and ultimately consists of returning the defence sector’s R&D budget to the levels that applied during the Second World War or at the beginning of the Cold War. Given exploding social spending and national debt, with a declining working population, this idea is likely to remain a pipe dream of researchers at military academies. The second approach is more subtle, but probably also more realistic. With reference to the CRIO model, innovations that lead to the achievement of a sustainable competitive advantage need to be inimitable. However, inimitability can also arise from Red being unable to support innovation in its organisation, e.g. for cultural or doctrinal reasons. This makes innovation in favour of Blue inimitable.
One example of such a capability is mission command. This leadership innovation has given the Ukrainian Armed Forces a massive advantage, especially in the first phase of the war.[45] The agility of this form of leadership culture has enabled Ukrainian troops to hold their own against Russians who had become bogged down in detailed command. One should not be naive enough to think that the right leadership style would overcome every military deficit. Rather, it should serve as an illustrative example that one of the decisive opportunities for Ukraine in the current criticism is to use those capabilities that the opponent may know and copy but which are not supported due to its organisational prerequisites. For example, all those approaches that build on civil society and its resources are conceivable, just as drone workshops are already integrated into the battalions.
Another example is the support of the civilian population, which should be given urgent attention. Applied to Western European countries, these assets may turn out differently: in the example of armies with compulsory military service (currently Switzerland, Austria, Finland, or Norway, for example), this could include making greater use of civilian skills—for example, from vocational training. This may sound less innovative than talking about autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence or quantum communication. However, it seems realistic that a decisive difference can be made in these soft skills. So decisive, in any case, that we can establish the following:
Thesis IV: Manoeuvre warfare will remain dead as long as innovations are primarily based on civilian applications, with the exception of those that the enemy cannot imitate due to a lack of organisational support.
Manoeuvre Warfare is Dead. But it can be Re-Animated.
The traditional dichotomy of attrition and manoeuvre warfare is to be expanded into a triad of strategic choices, including guerrilla warfare. The rational actor thereby chooses according to the perceived strength of the enemy. Such perceptions may change, resulting in different strategic shifts, namely intensifying and hiding (from and to guerrilla) or unfreezing and freezing (to and from manoeuvre). In this model, overcoming the stalemate of attrition warfare, as intended by Western armed forces, corresponds to an unfreezing shift. Such a shift depends on gaining – and exploiting a competitive advantage over the enemy. Using the CRIO model from civilian management literature, it becomes obvious that this can only sustainably be achieved through innovations that add military value, which are rare, inimitable and organisationally supported. Unfortunately—from a military-strategic perspective —today’s cutting-edge innovations originate from the civilian field, which makes the required rarity and inimitability impossible.
Unfortunately—from a military-strategic perspective —today’s cutting-edge innovations originate from the civilian field, which makes the required rarity and inimitability impossible.
There are, apparently, two ways to overcome such stalemates in modern conflicts. The obvious option is to increase spending on military research and development significantly. Examples include the development of technologies in which civilians either have no interest, such as the lethality of systems, or do not have the resources to innovate, such as quantum communications, or both, such as stealth technologies. However, such options may be severely limited for Western countries, whether because of a lack of funds, the problem of orienting industry towards war in a free market economy, or—quite justifiably—ethical concerns. Moreover, given the constraints on defence spending, it is unclear whether additional spending, especially on R&D, is preferable to procurements that contribute to conventional deterrence.
It is, therefore, more likely to pursue an alternative course of action, i.e., to embrace and exploit competitive advantages resulting from innovations where the adversary does not have the corresponding organisational support. This is not only, or not primarily, about defence equipment and technologies but also cultural advantages such as mission command. Totalitarian systems in the 21st century seem to stick to rigid forms of command and control, possibly missing the opportunity to benefit from decentralised approaches and crowd intelligence. It is also worth remembering the strategic importance of soft power. The appeal of the free world, which gave hope to millions during the Cold War, has diminished considerably—not least because its ideals have been betrayed too often and promises of democracy and prosperity have not been kept. While these are not conventional military approaches, in the long run, they could help make it harder or even impossible for a totalitarian adversary to exploit its strengths—uniformity, mass, willingness to take risks, and tolerance of loss. It should be possible to overcome the war of attrition, which is ultimately—and this may be an ethical argument—a waste of human life and material resources.
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Hofstetter, PhD, M.Sc., is Co-Head of Leadership and Communication Studies at the Swiss Military Academy at ETH Zurich. He is an active General Staff Officer in the Swiss Armed Forces and currently commands Mountain Infantry Battalion 29. His research interests are command, leadership, and management in the armed forces. He has published on tactical command and training in the Swiss Armed Forces and co-edited the anthology “Krisenmanagement Schweiz” (2023).
Captain Alan Borioli commands the Infantry Support Company 4 of the Mountain Infantry Battalion 7. He is also pursuing a bachelor’s degree at the Military Academy at ETH Zurich to become a career officer in the Swiss Armed Forces. His study interests are military psychology and leadership. As a career officer, he will be involved in coaching and teaching reservists.
First Lieutenant Till Flemming is training to become a company commander. He is also pursuing a bachelor’s degree at the Military Academy at ETH Zurich to become a career officer in the Swiss Armed Forces. His study interests are history, technology, and strategy in a military context. As a career officer, he will be involved in coaching and teaching reservists.
The views contained in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the Swiss Armed Forces or ETH Zurich.
[1] C. Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” in: Advanced Land Warfare: Tactics and Operations, M. Weissmann and N. Nilsson, Eds., Oxford University Press, 2023, 0, DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192857422.003.0002.
[2] M. Mayer, “Multi-Domain Operations, Emerging Military,” NATO, 2023, https://www.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedings/STO-MP-SAS-OCS-ORA-2023/MP-SAS-OCS-ORA-2023-08.pdf.
[3] F.-S. Gady and M. Kofman, “Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition,” Survival, vol. 65, no. 2, 7–22, March 2023, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2193092.
[4] A. Vershinin, “The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine,” last accessed April 17, 2024, https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org.
[5] A. C. Fox, “The Israel-Hamas conflict: ‘You might not be interested in attrition, but attrition is interested in you,’” Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 0, no. 0, 1–13, 2024, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2024.2346128.
[6] J. Barney, “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,” Journal of Management, vol. 17, no. 1, 99–120, March 1991, DOI: 10.1177/014920639101700108.
[7] C. Clausewitz, On war, Weltbild Verlag GmbH, 1832.
[8] Susanne, “Rational Choice and Political Science,” last accessed October 07, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311899439_Rational_Choice_and_Political_Science.
[9] J. Fearon and A. Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” 2002, 52–72; although best known in economics, this assumption is also helpful in political science. It should be noted that rationalism does not have to be absolute, but can be gradual. In particular, it is not a philosophical assertion but a methodological approach.
[10] M. Hechter and S. Kanazawa, “Sociological Rational Choice Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 23, 191–214, 1997.
[11] J. R. Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict,” 1986, http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/.
[12] Chief of the General Staff, “Design for Military Operations – British Military Doctrine (BMD),” 1996.
[13] F.-S. Gady, “Manoeuvre Versus Attrition in US Military Operations,” in: Survival August-September 2021: Debating US Foreign Policy, Routledge, 2022.
[14] Chief of the General Staff, “British Military Doctrine (BMD),” 1996, https://www.navedu.navy.mi.th/stg/databasestory/data/youttasart/youttasarttalae/bigcity/UK/British_Military_Doctrine.pdf.
[15] R. Iron, “Viewpoint – What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by ‘Centre of Gravity,’” Defence Studies, vol. 1, no. 3, 109–112, Sepember 2001, DOI: 10.1080/714000041; usually, but not quite correctly, translated as ‘centre of gravity’ in English.
[16] J. F. Sullivan, “Sun Tzu on Force Ratios (Verse 3.07),” last accessed October 13, 2024, https://www.academia.edu/43268442/Sun_Tzu_on_Force_Ratios_Verse_3_07_.
[17] NATO, “NATOTermOTAN, Manoeuver warfare, Record 10384,” last accessed August 05, 2024, https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc.
[18] NATO, “NATOTermOTAN, Attrition warfare, Record 27596,” last accessed August 05, 2024, https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc.
[19] NATO, “NATOTermOTAN, Guerrilla warfare, Record 12580,” last accessed August 05, 2024, https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc.
[20] A. Matveeva, “No Moscow stooges: identity polarisation and guerrilla movements in Donbass,” in: The Ukrainian Crisis, Routledge, 2018.
[21] S. Sukhankin, “Unleashing the PMCs and Irregulars in Ukraine: Crimea and Donbas,” 2019, https://jamestown.org/analyst/sergey-sukhankin/.
[22] R. Johnson, “Dysfunctional Warfare: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine 2022,” 2022, https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:07958e8b-5fd2-4c61-8a85-b087f5a80a69/files/sws859g553.
[23] G. Gressel, “Beyond the counter-offensive: Attrition, stalemate, and the future of the war in Ukraine,” ECFR, last accessed July 23, 2024, https://ecfr.eu/publication/beyond-the-counter-offensive-attrition-stalemate-and-the-future-of-the-war-in-ukraine/.
[24] A. Worsnop, “From Guerrilla to Maneuver Warfare: A Look at the Taliban’s Growing Combat Capability,” Modern War Institute, last accessed August 16, 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/guerrilla-maneuver-warfare-look-talibans-growing-combat-capability/.
[25] The White House, “US Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/US-Withdrawal-from-Afghanistan.pdf.
[26] K. Katzman and C. Thomas, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy,” 2017.
[27] S. Savitz and W. Courtney, “The Black Sea and the Changing Face of Naval Warfare,” October 2023, last accessed August 16, 2024 https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/10/the-black-sea-and-the-changing-face-of-naval-warfare.html.
[28] F. W. Kagan and George, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19 | Institute for the Study of War,” last accessed August 16, 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19.
[29] B. Wernerfelt, “A Resource-Based View of the Firm,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 5, no. 2, 171–180, 1984.
[30] C. P. Despont, “Understanding Capability-Based Planning,” 4, February 2022, DOI: 10.3929/ETHZ-B-000526681.
[31] A. Hunzeker, “Dying to Learn by Michael A. Hunzeker | Hardcover,” Cornell University Press, last accessed October 07, 2024, https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501758454/dying-to-learn/.
[32] W. J. Lynn III, “The End of the Military-Industrial Complex: How the Pentagon Is Adapting to Globalization,” last accessed August 16, 2024, https://www.proquest.com/docview/1618199077?sourcetype=Magazines.
[33] S. Broadberry and M. Harrison, “The Economics of the Second World War: Seventy-Five Years On,” 2020, https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/60043-the_economics_of_the_second_world_war_seventy_five_years_on.pdf.
[34] Y. Evron and R. A. Bitzinger, The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Military-Civil Fusion: A New Paradigm for Military Innovation?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023, DOI: 10.1017/9781009333290.
[35] J. A. Alic, L. M. Branscomb, H. Brooks, A. B. Carter, and G. L. Epstein, “Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World | The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,” last accessed August 16, 2024, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/beyond-spinoff-military-and-commercial-technologies-changing-world.
[36] J. F. Sargent Jr, “US Research and Development Funding and Performance: Fact Sheet,” 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44307.pdf.
[37] “National Patterns of R&D Resources 2021-2022, Table 6 | NSF – National Science Foundation,” October 07, 2024, https://ncses.nsf.gov/data-collections/national-patterns/2021-2022#data.
[38] M. C. Libicki, “What Is Information Warfare?,” 1995, https://web.archive.org/web/20170829010416id_/http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Libicki_What_Is.pdf.
[39] P. Hofstetter and F. Jossen, “There Is No Need For A Cognitive Domain,” TDHJ.org, August 16, 2024, https://tdhj.org/blog/post/no-need-cognitive-domain/.
[40] M. Verbruggen, “The Role of Civilian Innovation in the Development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems,” Global Policy, vol. 10, no. 3, 338–342, 2019, DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12663.
[41] V. W. Ruttan, “Is War Necessary for Economic Growth?,” Historically Speaking, vol. 7, no. 6, 17–19, 2006.
[42] D. C. Mowery, “Chapter 29 – Military R&D and Innovation,” in: Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, vol. 2, B. H. Hall and N. Rosenberg, Eds., in Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Volume 2, vol. 2., North-Holland, 2010, 1219–1256. DOI: 10.1016/S0169-7218(10)02013-7.
[43] M. Twain, Is He Dead?: A Comedy in Three Acts, University of California Press, 2003. DOI: 10.1525/9780520939899.
[44] M. Zabrodskyi, J. Dr. Walting, O. V Danylyuk, and N. Reynolds, “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022,” Accessed: August 16, 2024, https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org.
[45] D. Sanders, “Ukraine’s third wave of military reform 2016–2022 – building a military able to defend Ukraine against the Russian invasion,” Defense & Security Analysis, vol. 39, no. 3, 312–328, Jul. 2023, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2201017.
