Abstract: Economic liberalism facilitated Sri Lanka’s (Colombo’s) development into a modern state. However, corruption, plus an inability to repay its debts or replenish its stock of foreign reserves, has damaged Columbo’s credibility, and compromised its sovereignty. Sri Lanka is currently on its 17th IMF bailout despite the fact that it has not yet fulfilled the terms of any of its 16 predecessors. The Westernised institutions of the Bretton Woods system have pressured Colombo into adopting radical changes—at breakneck pace. Economic influence from the East has also come with strings attached. Mercantilist lenders from the People’s Republic of China, trusting in geopolitics more than in usurious interest, have established a network of special economic zones. These zones provide an invisible screen of securities implicitly backed by sea power. If Sri Lanka is to craft policy in the light of its most recent economic crisis, then it must chart a middle course between East and West; between short-term solvency, and long-term sovereignty.
Problem statement: How to understand Sri Lanka’s transformation from a story of economic success to that of a cautionary tale?
So what?: Contradictions between the SDGs, as presently formulated, are compounded by the UN’s accelerationist approach to the implementation thereof. Unless this approach is reversed, Sri Lanka threatens to become the rule of future SDG implementation rather than the exception.
Source: shutterstock.com/Ruwan Walpola
Political Economy
Sri Lanka obtained independence from Britain in 1948.[1] Civil war raged from 1983-2009, memories of which were evoked by a terrorist bombing in 2019. An economic miracle turned into a catastrophic mirage, fueling geopolitical rivalries thereby (e.g., purchases of Sri Lankan debt.) Today, the nation’s sovereignty and solvency have come into question, both attracted to, and repelled by, mercantilism and economic liberalism (e.g., “leases and loans”.)
While Sri Lanka (Colombo) is nominally a parliamentary republic, corruption, nepotism, and authoritarianism undergird the seemingly stable rule of law.[2] Under pressure by its international creditors, Colombo cast prudence aside and wagered its cash crop to achieve its SDG goals.[3] The consequences of such rashness plunged the nation into chaos, from which it has only recently (2023) emerged. Unless it can increase its exports, play-off competing U.S., Chinese, and Indian interests, and moderate implementation of the 2030 Agenda, Sri Lanka’s sovereignty will remain in question.
While Sri Lanka (Colombo) is nominally a parliamentary republic, corruption, nepotism, and authoritarianism undergird the seemingly stable rule of law.
Economy and Crises
In the past 15 years, Sri Lanka’s economy has been impacted by three key events: a global financial crisis in 2008; the Covid-19 pandemic; and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[4] Depressed demand had already sapped its export market, when increased prices for fuel followed in the wake of Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine. Lacking adequate currency reserves, Sri Lanka’s ability to purchase imports has been unduly affected thereby.
This is the context behind Sri Lanka’s latest financial crisis. The history of Sri Lanka’s economy might best be illustrated by its failure to live up to all 16 of its previous IMF agreements.[5] When Nandalal Weerasinghe was second in command at Sri Lanka’s central bank, he had warned President Rajapaksa against pursuing a radical economic agenda. For instance, by peremptorily banning non-organic fertilisers, Sri Lanka went from self-sufficiency in rice production, to being an importer thereof—virtually overnight.[6] The President persisted in pursuing the UN’s accelerationist approach to SDG implementation, while compounding the ensuing loss of revenue by cutting taxes Weerasinghe resigned. In July 2022, amidst the rationing of power, shortages of food and fuel, and inflation of up to 70%, 300,000 protestors precipitated Rajapaksa’s flight from power.[7]
Prior to his ouster, a desperate Rajapaksa had appointed Nandalal Weerasinghe as head of the central bank.[8] Rajapaksa’s Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, survived, and became Sri Lanka’s President.. However, In September 2024, Anura Dissanayake, a Marxist, defeated Ranil Wickremesinghe in a stunning electoral victory.[9] Wickremesinghe’s administration had previously obtained $2.9 billion via Sri Lanka’s 17th, and latest, IMF bailout. If it fails to honour the latest such agreement, then, according to Weerasinghe, “’I think that will be the end of the story’”.[10]
Organic Farming and Economic Crisis
SDG 2 reads, “End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture”.[11] When President Rajapaksa, invoking such goals, pressed for a shift to organic farming, Sri Lanka’s farmers had supported him.[12] However, the latter had requested a realistic timeframe, in order to implement the changeover.
Instead, President Rajapaksa opted for an accelerationist approach—much to the farmers’ chagrin: ”[A] majority of Sri Lankan farmers supported an organic transition, but wanted more than one year to do so—and they needed more support than they were given to switch to organic.”[13] Despite an economy already tottering from the effects of COVID-19, “[I]n the spring of 2021, President Rajapaksa banned synthetic fertiliser and pesticide imports practically overnight, forcing Sri Lanka’s millions of farmers to go organic”.[14]
A majority of Sri Lankan farmers supported an organic transition, but wanted more than one year to do so—and they needed more support than they were given to switch to organic.
Meanwhile, President Rajapaksa sought to deal with Sri Lanka’s massive debt by eliminating $400 million per annum, hitherto allotted for synthetic fertiliser.[15] While Sri Lanka “had been self-sufficient in rice-production,” the ensuing 20% falloff caused Colombo “to spend $450 million on rice imports”.[16]
This move was accompanied by monetary policies (e.g., printing more money, and tax breaks), intended to stimulate the economy.[17] Government revenues had already been depleted, owing to repeated shocks to Sri Lanka’s tourism and garment industries. The ensuing loss of tax revenues only compounded the problem. After such policies were implemented throughout 2021, Colomobo’s Real GDP Growth Rate fell from 4.21% for 2021 to –7.35% in 2022; and was still in the red for 2023 (-2.3%); GDP per capita fell from $14,300 for 2021, to $13,200 in 2022, and $13,000 in 2023; while inflation skyrocketed from 7.01% for 2021 to 49.72% in 2022; and remained high, at 16.54% in 2023.[18]
Domestic Politics and the Global Economy
Since 2005, the Rajapaksa family has dominated Sri Lankan politics.[19] Allies in politics, the media, and education have eclipsed seeming exceptions. A congeries of ethno-religious rivalries, enflamed by memories of a long civil war, comingle with corruption to bedevil the rule of law. The right to conduct local elections has not been honoured in Tamil concentrated zones since 2019.[20] Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court represents a rare domestic check on the Rajapaksas.[21] In 2018, it effectively squashed a bloodless coup, upon Mahinda Rajapaksa’s attempt to usurp the prime minister’s office.[22] Nonetheless, Mahinda became Prime Minister in 2019, when the President (his brother, Gotabaya) appointed him.
This did not prevent the Supreme Court from performing its constitutional duties: “In May 2022, the Supreme Court suspended the pardon Gotabaya Rajapaksa granted former legislator Duminda Silva, who had murdered another legislator in June 2022”.[23] Freedom House gives Sri Lanka an “independent judiciary” score of 3 out of 4.[24] Yet the feuding Rajapaksa brothers have backed “[a] constitutional amendment passed in 2020 that weakened commissions investigating corruption and granted the president far-reaching powers over the courts”.[25]
Amidst the tumult of the 2022 uprising, two of Gotabaya’s three brothers resigned from his cabinet.[26] Yet, Mahinda refused to follow. By May, Mahinda’s heavy-handed tactics against protestors had ignited a conflagration. That July, Gotabaya, as his brothers before him, was driven to resign; not before, however, having appointed Ranil Wickremesinghe to serve as prime minister (PM).
In July 2022, Wickremesinghe exchanged the PM-ship for the presidency (after briefly holding both positions).[27] The Rajapaksas’ party, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), maintained its sway, as evidenced by Wickremesinghe’s self-selected replacement as Prime Minister (Dinesh Gunawardena).
Freedom House (2023) rates Sri Lanka a 1 out of 4 corruption score.[28] Such corruption extends beyond the political to the military and communal spheres. Armed forces of the state have committed sundry atrocities, “all of which disproportionately affect Tamils”.[29] Such aspects of the rule of law received a Freedom House (2023) rating of 3 out of 4.[30] These excesses of corruption, in combination with a lack of the rule of law, have repelled the confidence of current and would-be foreign investors.[31] The economic impacts issuing therefrom have “also impacted the delivery of vital goods,” as well as rendering certain sales figures suspect (especially with regard to the gas, and staple goods, sectors).[32]
Corruption, in combination with a lack of the rule of law, have repelled the confidence of current and would-be foreign investors.
Sri Lanka harbours a curious pedigree when it comes to political economy. To this day, it is known as the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.[33] Yet this name is belied by its participation in, and even reliance upon, the institutions of economic liberalism. In recent years, the Bretton Woods institutions that helped build Sri Lanka up have accompanied its cataclysmic fall.[34] At the same time, its authoritarian government has often employed the forms, while subverting the substance, of democratic law.
Within the matrix of such counterfactual claims, the following polling data will be assessed: The Sri Lanka Opinion Tracker Survey (SLOTS) found that approximately half of all respondents have a favourable view of democracy and socialism, on the one hand; while unfavourable views of capitalism bested the favourable by a ratio of two to one (44% favourable, 22% unfavourable), on the other.[35]
Moreover, for all the power of the Rajapaksas, as well as their party (the SLPP), the 2022 uprising (known as the Aragalaya, or “struggle”), yielded three times the number of supporters (55%), as opposed to those against it (18%).[36] The Rajapaksas’ credibility appears to be dubious—among both Sinhala and Tamil: “[S]upport for the Aragalaya is similar across ethnic groups and provinces […] and not confined to the Sinhala community or those living in the Western provinces or urban areas”.[37]
Following this series of shocks, the devastation to Sri Lanka’s economy has unleashed a seething political instability, which previously had been lurking beneath. If Colombo wishes to attract tourism, loans, and foreign direct investment (FDI), then such instabilities cannot be allowed to subsist. Otherwise, such financial undertakings as might be obtained will continue to come with strings, the coinage of which trades sovereignty for security, attached.
Politics of the Global Economy
Given its position as a strategic chokepoint along the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Belt and Road, Sri Lanka is coveted territory.[38] From 2000-2020, 36.4% of Sri Lankan debt was owned via International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs), notably by Western non-state actors.[39] Sri Lanka’s second greatest creditor was the Asian Development Bank (14.3%), via loans.[40] Only then does one find nation-states, with Japan and the PRC at just under 11% each, via loans. By 2018, Sri Lanka’s bilateral and international engagements were paying off: 460,000 Sri Lankans returned to work.[41] Exhibiting regionally sound demographics, Sri Lanka was considered a success.
Then, a weak, corrupt, and authoritarian government quixotically sought to implement elements of the SDGs.[42] Abetted by an accelerated pace, in pursuance of the 2030 Agenda, and Rajapaksa’s dismissal of key economic advice, Sri Lanka’s economy collapsed.[43] Pressed by such crises, Sri Lanka leaned on the PRC, leasing it two Sri Lankan ports: Hambantota, and Colombo Port City.[44] The PRC’s penetration of Africa, via the setting up of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Djibouti, bears similar features to its leasing of Colombo Port City.[45] The PRC’s Touchroad SEZ in Djibouti enjoys certain privileges which, combined with a 99-year lease, is primed for “flooding Chinese imports rather than increasing local exports. Many African SEZs have failed to deliver what was promised”.[46]
The PRC has militarised its SEZ in Djibouti.[47] Sri Lanka, and all who might find themselves in a similar position would do well to heed the words of Santayana: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.[48]
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
When it comes to control of the Indo-Pacific, including vital nodes for international trade, repeated crises in the Sri Lankan economy have served as a beacon for competing geopolitical interests. According to Bandarage, “Over 80 per cent of the global seaborne oil trade is estimated to pass through the choke points of the Indian Ocean”.[49] Not only the PRC but, as recently as 2022, the U.S. was also rumoured to be seeking a Sri Lankan military base.[50] Sri Lanka serves as an object-lesson for adherents of the eco-accelerationist approach. Even if one were to grant that such an approach, in and of itself, might prove perfectly fine, in Sri Lanka’s case, neither the requisite economic, nor political, stability subsists to implement it.
Bretton Woods and the UN System
The Bretton Woods institutions have invited amour and vitriol in turn. Such partisans tend to see the UN system through the lens of idealised (and, hence, magnified), images of good and evil. Additionally, the case of Sri Lanka includes elements of the north-south divide, whereby decolonised peoples remain under the influence of foreign elites. At the same time, such criticisms should be weighed against Sri Lanka’s 16 bailouts by the IMF, without which the former might have collapsed or even fallen prey to another civil war (vide supra). Colombo’s continued human rights violations jeopardise its export privileges with the EU.[51] Failing effective reforms, the EU could impose duties on importers of Sri Lankan goods. Ensuing losses for Sri Lankan garment exporters might provoke another economic crisis.
Referring to Sri Lanka, in 2022, the [UN] “Human Rights Council adopted a resolution extending the mandate of a UN project to collect and analyse evidence of conflict-era violations for use in future prosecutions, and mandating enhanced UN monitoring of the rights situation”.[52] As a supplicant for liberal-economic assistance, Sri Lanka’s record on human rights remains open to scrutiny alongside cold economic facts. The international community shares a common interest in seeing a stable Sri Lanka, and an Indo-Pacific bereft of vacuum-induced strife. With regard to domestic, external, and international actors, a need for balance is indicated—not only between competing powers, but also with regard to implementing, let alone accelerating, sustainable development goals (SDGs).
SDGs
There is an emphasis on the need for “acceleration” in the SDG literature.[53] Otherwise, the timetable for implementing the 2030 Agenda will not be met. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) counsels, “Regional cooperation […] can help Sri Lanka accelerate its SDG progress in several areas, including climate change, renewable energy transition and food security”.[54] As for the wider 2030 Agenda, Sri Lanka represented a “blueprint,” and “an interesting case” for its neighbours to learn that “a country does not need to wait until it achieves economic affluence before tackling social well-being and environmental health”.[55] Such was the argument being pushed in the UN literature. That the organic farming disaster in Sri Lanka proved such theories inadequate, need not render them a priori incorrect. However, that the literature attending the UN system persists in using similar buzzwords, whose tempo it seems is “2030 or bust,” then overzealousness with SDGs bodes ill for the next bailout crisis.
Regional cooperation […] can help Sri Lanka accelerate its SDG progress in several areas, including climate change, renewable energy transition and food security.
SDG-13, Climate action, promotes sustainable land practices, such as might be obtained by a shift to organic farming.[56] On the other hand, SDG-2 (Zero hunger), calls for “access by all people to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round”.[57] Such potentially conflicting tradeoffs are implicit in the formulation of the 17 SDGs. Blowback from Sri Lanka’s failed attempt at implementing organic farming methods has resulted in land-clearing, deforestation, and attendant ecological damage—compromising, for instance, the “reverse land degradation” clause in SDG-15.[58] SDG-6, Clean water and sanitation, calls for “access to water and sanitation for all”.[59] Here again, unintended consequences confront the agenda with unpalatable facts. Hence, the Moragahakanda dam, “which was constructed in order to irrigate five districts resulted in the deforestation of thousands of acres,” in addition to ruining local elephant, and possibly aquatic, ecosystems.[60] Sri Lanka’s World Bank Country Director (Faris H. Hadad-Zervos) has warned: “ ’The current crisis is not a temporary liquidity shock that can be resolved by external financing support from outside. Instead, the crisis provides a unique opportunity to implement deep and permanent structural reforms that may be difficult in normal circumstances’.”[61]
The World Bank
The situation is further complicated by the fact that, according to the World Bank Group, “Until IBRD creditworthiness is re-established, Sri Lanka will have access only to IDA resources”.[62] $700 million of World Bank aid should help stabilise the economy, although reform-minded efforts are likely to produce distributively uneven effects. As much as Sri Lanka’s economy has improved since 2022, the World Bank Group presents the following sobering facts: “Sri Lanka’s poverty rate is estimated to have doubled from 13.1 to 25 per cent between 2021 and 2022 […] and is projected to increase by another 2.4 percentage points in 2023”.[63] Yet rather than streamlining potential sources of conflict implicit in the SDGs, the UN system disperses potential centres of gravity, in pursuit of tangential ends. For example, World Bank partner MIGA sees Sri Lanka as an arena for potential “opportunities to apply its Gender Strategy Implementation Plan”.[64] And “the Sri Lanka Development Update (SLDU), Time to Reset” report encourages efforts to “strengthen affirmative action policies targeted to ‘low opportunity’ groups”.[65] Without a more focused, flexible, and realistic approach, future SDG implementation can be expected to run up against similarly countervailing tradeoffs—and unintended consequences.
Until IBRD creditworthiness is re-established, Sri Lanka will have access only to IDA resources.
Foreign and International Creditors
While the PRC is Sri Lanka’s greatest bilateral creditor ($3 billion), the U.S., UK, Japan, and much of the continent are unofficial creditors under the aegis of the equally unofficial Paris Club ($2.4 billion).[66] The group acts as a resource for debtors, and a bridge towards future interstate agreements. India ($1.6 billion) is Sri Lanka’s next greatest bilateral creditor. As recently as 2019, Sri Lanka was a creditor, with regard to its official U.S. trade balance (a $2.595 billion surplus).[67] India has restructured Sri Lanka’s debt, affording the latter an extra 8 or 9 years to repay it.[68]
In its interplay with external lending, leasing, and geopolitical manoeuvring, Sri Lanka remains a small island amid many creditors. International organisations invest in the land, labour, and resources of developing nations. Sri Lanka boasts solid demographics in life expectancy (78.24 years), literacy (92.3%), and Real GDP per capita ($13,400, or twice India’s $6,600).[69] Nonetheless, bureaucratic corruption, ill-organised land-management, and inefficient public works, seem to have exacerbated Sri Lanka’s already uneven distribution of wealth.[70] “IMF itself has clearly outlined in its report released on 20 March 2023 that ‘risks to the IMF program implementation are exceptionally high’ and therefore, the government must be prepared with a contingency plan.”[71]
The IMF
To fulfil the terms of the $2.9 billion IMF bailout, Sri Lanka needs to achieve certain economic standards, such as debt restructuring, in a sustainable manner.[72] However, it is the regionally novel political requirement of clamping down on corruption, that might doom Sri Lanka’s ability to live up to the most recent IMF terms.[73] Such terms were not conceived in a vacuum. Rather, they meet the requirement “to strengthen governance and bring it in line with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption”.[74] Columbo recently enacted a legal means towards achieving this end. As promising as the substance of such measures might be, Sri Lanka’s history with the IMF might leave little room for optimism.
To fulfil the terms of the $2.9 billion IMF bailout, Sri Lanka needs to achieve certain economic standards, such as debt restructuring, in a sustainable manner.
On the other hand, the legislation offers an opportunity for enforcement, which is in the interests of the Sri Lankan people. The fulfilment of each tranche offers the prospect of continued IMF assistance (the cessation of which nearly cost the Rajapaksas their lives). Assuming even the most short-termed point-of-view, IMF assistance has already yielded tangible results: “[T]he latest inflation data showed the rate fell by half in June [2023]”.[75] “A stronger currency and strengthened reserves,” combined with the aforementioned drop in inflation, has prompted optimistic signals from the IMF.[76] While 2024 continues to bring optimistic signals from the IMF, health and economic indices might prove easier to maintain than measures aimed at countering corruption.[77]
Therefore, political and economic stability must be both developed and maintained over an extended period of time, before anti-corruption measures might be expected to take root. Otherwise, the partisans of the Aragalaya, as well as the seemingly deposed Rajapaksa opposition, might pose an even greater risk to Sri Lanka than that attending any more failures vis-a-vis the IMF.
Recommendations and Conclusions
Traditional farming practices need to be rendered more efficient, reducing the ratio of resources to yield.[78] The dangers of agrochemicals should be weighed against the dangers of eco-acceleration, with Sri Lanka as an object-lesson in unintended consequences. A “bad bank” should be established, whereby high-risk, unsound government investments might be transferred to the private sector.[79] Deregulation should be tailored to attract private investors, so as to alleviate the government of a portion of its debt. Realistic, transparent, and verifiable improvements in corruption, and human rights, should be pursued by Sri Lanka, as part of any sound economic package.[80] This is particularly important, with regard to maintaining favourable export terms with the EU.
A “bad bank” should be established, whereby high-risk, unsound government investments might be transferred to the private sector.
Sri Lanka needs to attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).[81] Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), such as that with Singapore, are a start. Greater opportunities for export markets should be pursued through regional participation in multilateral trading initiatives (e.g., via RCEP). Further, there needs to be a greater conversation, concerning the rights of the citizenry and indigenous populations, concerning the ownership of their own natural resources (which, basically, redounds to the question of land, or property). To the extent that external actors might possess a preponderance of de facto influence upon the economic activities of the state, then political influence can be expected to follow.
Economic liberalism facilitated Sri Lanka’s development as a modern state. However, corruption, plus an inability to pay back its debts, or replenish its stock of foreign reserves, has damaged Columbo’s credibility, and compromised its sovereignty. Mercantilist lenders from the PRC, trusting more in geopolitics than capital, have established a network of special economic zones, providing an invisible screen of securities, implicitly backed by sea power. If Sri Lanka is to craft policy in the light of its most recent economic crisis, then it should aim to craft a middle ground between East and West, between short-term solvency and long-term sovereignty.
Marc Cohen is an aspiring policy analyst with an MPA in Global Affairs. His approach to foreign policy embraces grand strategic, technological, and geopolitical conceptions. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.
[1] CIA, (July 11, 2023), Sri Lanka, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sri-lanka/.
[2] CIA, (July 11, 2023), Sri Lanka, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sri-lanka/; K. Torrella, (July 15, 2022), “Sri Lanka’s organic farming disaster, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2022/7/15/23218969/sri-lanka-organic-fertilizer-pesticide-agriculture-farming.
[3] Z. Huang, G. Tilakaratna, and D. De Mel, (August 07, 2019), “SDG implementation and budgeting: Sri Lanka’s efforts and challenges,” ESCAP, https://www.unescap.org/blog/sdg-implementation-and-budgeting-sri-lanka; K. Torrella, (July 15, 2022), “Sri Lanka’s organic farming disaster, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2022/7/15/23218969/sri-lanka-organic-fertilizer-pesticide-agriculture-farming.
[4] A. Bandarage, (May 12, 2022), Sri Lanka: Debt crisis, neocolonialism and geopolitical rivalry, Daily News, http://archives1.dailynews.lk/2022/05/12/features/278708/sri-lanka-debt-crisis-neocolonialism-and-geopolitical-rivalry.
[5] A. Jayasinghe, (2023), ““No second chance” to save Sri Lanka, Central Bank Governor warns,” Sri Lanka News – Newsfirst, https://www.newsfirst.lk/2023/07/08/no-second-chance-to-save-sri-lanka-central-bank-governor-warns/.
[6] K. Torrella, (July 15, 2022), “Sri Lanka’s organic farming disaster, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2022/7/15/23218969/sri-lanka-organic-fertilizer-pesticide-agriculture-farming; G. Shih and H. Farisz, (May 24, 2022), “Inside the collapse of the Rajapaksa dynasty in Sri Lanka,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/22/sri-lanka-rajapaksa-mahinda-gotabaya/.
[7] G. Shih and H. Farisz, (May 24, 2022), “Inside the collapse of the Rajapaksa dynasty in Sri Lanka,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/22/sri-lanka-rajapaksa-mahinda-gotabaya/.
[8] Idem.
[9] Krishan Francis and Bharatha Mallawarachi, “Sri Lanka Election: Marxist Anura Kumara Dissanayake Becomes President,” AP News, September 23, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/sri-lanka-president-dissanayake-6fdd1908da55520a494d68967a70fc82.
[10] A. Jayasinghe, (2023), ““No second chance” to save Sri Lanka, Central Bank Governor warns,” Sri Lanka News – Newsfirst, https://www.newsfirst.lk/2023/07/08/no-second-chance-to-save-sri-lanka-central-bank-governor-warns/.
[11] United Nations, (2015), “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” in: sdgs.un.org (A/RES/70/1), https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda.
[12] K. Torrella, (July 15, 2022), “Sri Lanka’s organic farming disaster, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2022/7/15/23218969/sri-lanka-organic-fertilizer-pesticide-agriculture-farming.
[13] Idem.
[14] Idem.
[15] Idem.
[16] Idem.
[17] A. Jayasinghe, (2023), ““No second chance” to save Sri Lanka, Central Bank Governor warns,” Sri Lanka News – Newsfirst, https://www.newsfirst.lk/2023/07/08/no-second-chance-to-save-sri-lanka-central-bank-governor-warns/; K. Torrella, (July 15, 2022), “Sri Lanka’s organic farming disaster, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2022/7/15/23218969/sri-lanka-organic-fertilizer-pesticide-agriculture-farming.
[18] CIA, (July 11, 2023), Sri Lanka, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sri-lanka/.
[19] G. Shih and H. Farisz, (May 24, 2022), “Inside the collapse of the Rajapaksa dynasty in Sri Lanka,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/22/sri-lanka-rajapaksa-mahinda-gotabaya/. Note that whether the recent election of a Marxist over a long-time Rajapaksa family ally indicates a lasting diminution of that family’s power remains to be seen.
[20] Freedom House (2023), Freedom in the World 2023: Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report | Freedom House; B. Fonseka, (April 01, 2023), Is transformation possible in Sri Lanka?, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/is-transformation-possible-in-sri-lanka/.
[21] Freedom House (2023), Freedom in the World 2023: Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report | Freedom House.
[22] G. Shih and H. Farisz, (May 24, 2022), “Inside the collapse of the Rajapaksa dynasty in Sri Lanka,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/22/sri-lanka-rajapaksa-mahinda-gotabaya/.
[23] Freedom House (2023), Freedom in the World 2023: Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report | Freedom House.
[24] Idem.
[25] G. Shih and H. Farisz, (May 24, 2022), “Inside the collapse of the Rajapaksa dynasty in Sri Lanka,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/22/sri-lanka-rajapaksa-mahinda-gotabaya/.
[26] Idem. Note that cabinet appointments are the president’s prerogative, owing to the 19th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution (cf. Freedom House (2023), Freedom in the World 2023: Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report | Freedom House.)
[27] Freedom House (2023). Freedom in the World 2023: Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report | Freedom House.
[28] Idem.
[29] Idem.
[30] Idem.
[31] Idem.
[32] Idem.
[33] CIA, (July 11, 2023), Sri Lanka, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sri-lanka/.
[34] A. Bandarage, (May 12, 2022), Sri Lanka: Debt crisis, neocolonialism and geopolitical rivalry, Daily News, http://archives1.dailynews.lk/2022/05/12/features/278708/sri-lanka-debt-crisis-neocolonialism-and-geopolitical-rivalry.
[35] Sri Lanka Brief, (August 03, 2023), Sri Lanka: Support for Aragalaya, Socialism and Democracy beat Capitalism, https://srilankabrief.org/sri-lanka-support-for-aragalaya-socialim-and-democracy-beat-capitalisim/.
[36] Idem.
[37] Idem.
[38] A. Bandarage, (May 12, 2022), Sri Lanka: Debt crisis, neocolonialism and geopolitical rivalry, Daily News, http://archives1.dailynews.lk/2022/05/12/features/278708/sri-lanka-debt-crisis-neocolonialism-and-geopolitical-rivalry.
[39] L. Mosley and B. P. Rosendorff, (September 12, 2022), “Sri Lanka can’t count on China to solve its debt problems,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/12/sri-lanka-debt-china-imf/; U. Jayasinghe, (January 17, 2022), Explainer: Sri Lanka on the edge as debt burden mounts, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/sri-lanka-edge-debt-burden-mounts-2022-01-17/.
[40] U. Jayasinghe, (January 17, 2022), Explainer: Sri Lanka on the edge as debt burden mounts, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/sri-lanka-edge-debt-burden-mounts-2022-01-17/. Note: These figures are from Jayasinghe (2022). According to Muhkherjee, China should be listed before Japan. A. Mukherjee, (July 10, 2023), “Sri Lanka needs a bad bank to unclog its financial arteries,” Bloomberg.com, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-07-10/sri-lanka-default-a-bad-bank-would-help-fix-its-finances?leadSource=uverify%20wall#xj4y7vzkg.
[41] R. Wickremesinghe, (August 29, 2018), “How we will make Sri Lanka rich by 2025,” World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/this-is-how-we-will-make-sri-lanka-rich-by-2025.
[42] K. Torrella, (July 15, 2022), “Sri Lanka’s organic farming disaster, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2022/7/15/23218969/sri-lanka-organic-fertilizer-pesticide-agriculture-farming.
[43] A. Jayasinghe, (2023), ““No second chance” to save Sri Lanka, Central Bank Governor warns,” Sri Lanka News – Newsfirst, https://www.newsfirst.lk/2023/07/08/no-second-chance-to-save-sri-lanka-central-bank-governor-warns/.
[44] A. Abeyagoonasekera, (July 08, 2021), “Before the phoenix nest: Questions surrounding the port city of Colombo,” London School of Economics, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/07/08/before-the-phoenix-nest-questions-surrounding-the-port-city-of-colombo/; B. A. Ethirajan, (January 17, 2022), “Colombo Port City: A new Dubai or a Chinese enclave?,” BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59993386.
[45] A. Abeyagoonasekera, (July 08, 2021), “Before the phoenix nest: Questions surrounding the port city of Colombo,” London School of Economics, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/07/08/before-the-phoenix-nest-questions-surrounding-the-port-city-of-colombo/.
[46] Idem.
[47] Idem.
[48] Smithsonian American Art Museum, (2023), “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,”–George Santayana, The Life of Reason, 1905. From the series Great Ideas of Western Man, https://americanart.si.edu/artwork/those-who-cannot-remember-past-are-condemned-repeat-it-george-santayana-life-reason-1905.
[49] A. Bandarage, (May 12, 2022), Sri Lanka: Debt crisis, neocolonialism and geopolitical rivalry, Daily News, http://archives1.dailynews.lk/2022/05/12/features/278708/sri-lanka-debt-crisis-neocolonialism-and-geopolitical-rivalry.
[50] Idem.
[51] Human Rights Watch, (2023), “Sri Lanka, Events of 2022,” Human Rights Watch. Section “Key International Actors,” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/sri-lanka. Note: While not a member of the UN, the EU, via its observer status, remains within the ambit of the UN system. Further, according to the European Union, “The EU is the single largest financial contributor to the UN system,” European Union, (August 05, 2021), The European Union and the United Nations. Delegation of the European Union to the UN and Other International Organisations in Geneva, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/un-geneva/european-union-and-united-nations_en?s=62.
[52] Human Rights Watch, (2023), “Sri Lanka, Events of 2022,” Human Rights Watch. Section “Key International Actors,” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/sri-lanka. Note that mercantilist China eschews such intangibles, in favour of maximising political-economic power.
[53] Z. Huang, G. Tilakaratna, and D. De Mel, (August 07, 2019), “SDG implementation and budgeting: Sri Lanka’s efforts and challenges,” ESCAP, https://www.unescap.org/blog/sdg-implementation-and-budgeting-sri-lanka; United Nations, (n.d.). About the SDG accelerations, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Development, https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/action-networks/acceleration-actions/about.
[54] Z. Huang, G. Tilakaratna, and D. De Mel, (August 07, 2019), “SDG implementation and budgeting: Sri Lanka’s efforts and challenges,” ESCAP, https://www.unescap.org/blog/sdg-implementation-and-budgeting-sri-lanka.
[55] Idem.
[56] Eric Pichon, European Parliamentary Research Service, and Marta Latek, 2023, “Understanding SDGs,” Report. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/751403/EPRS_BRI(2023)751403_EN.pdf.
[57] Idem.
[58] K. Torrella, (July 15, 2022), “Sri Lanka’s organic farming disaster, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2022/7/15/23218969/sri-lanka-organic-fertilizer-pesticide-agriculture-farming; United Nations, (2015), “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” in: sdgs.un.org (A/RES/70/1). https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda.
[59] Eric Pichon, European Parliamentary Research Service, and Marta Latek, 2023, “Understanding SDGs,” Report. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/751403/EPRS_BRI(2023)751403_EN.pdf.
[60] sundaytimes.lk, (July 05, 2022), “Moragahakanda dam project: an ecological disaster,” Times Online, https://sundaytimes.lk/online/news-online/Moragahakanda-dam-project-an-ecological-disaster/2-1138017.
[61] Emphasis added; OCHA, (April 04, 2023), “Sri Lanka Development Update 2023: Time to reset (April 2023),” Reliefweb, https://m.reliefweb.int/report/3950505/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-development-update-2023-time-reset-april-2023.
[62] World Bank Group, (June 28, 2023), “World Bank Group adopts country partnership framework for Sri Lanka to help reset the economy, protect the poor,” World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/06/27/world-bank-group-adopts-country-partnership-framework-for-sri-lanka-to-help-reset-the-economy-protect-the-poor.
[63] Idem.
[64] Idem.
[65] OCHA, (April 04, 2023), “Sri Lanka Development Update 2023: Time to reset (April 2023),” Reliefweb, https://m.reliefweb.int/report/3950505/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-development-update-2023-time-reset-april-2023.
[66] A. Hayes, (2022), Paris Club, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/parisclub.asp.
[67] World Bank, 2024, “Sri Lanka Trade Balance, Exports, Imports by Country and Region 2019, WITS Data,” World Bank.Org, October 28, 2024, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/LKA/Year/2019/TradeFlow/EXPIMP.
[68] The Island Online, (July 08, 2023), “India to allow Sri Lanka to repay debt over 12 years, instead of 3 to 4,” https://island.lk/india-to-allow-sri-lanka-to-repay-debt-over-12-years-instead-of-3-to-4/.
[69] CIA, (July 11, 2023), Sri Lanka, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sri-lanka/.
[70] Tharindu Udayanga Kamburawala, 2023, “How Is Sri Lanka Navigating Its IMF Bailout Program?,” The Diplomat, December 16, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/how-is-sri-lanka-navigating-its-imf-bailout-program/; Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment. 2017, “Final Country Report of the Land Degradation Neutrality Target Setting Programme in Sri Lanka,” United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/ldn_targets/Sri%20Lanka%20LDN%20TSP%20Country%20Report.pdf; Sachin Parathalingam, 2022, “Income and Wealth Inequality in Sri Lanka – Groundviews,” Groundviews, September 03, 2022, https://groundviews.org/2022/09/03/income-and-wealth-inequality-in-sri-lanka/.
[71] Gulbin Sultana, 2023, “IMF Bailout Package for Sri Lanka: Pros, Cons and Risks Involved,” Financial Express, March 24, 2023, https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/imf-bailout-package-for-sri-lanka-pros-cons-and-risks-involved/3021102/; JU. Jayasinghe, (January 17, 2022), Explainer: Sri Lanka on the edge as debt burden mounts, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/sri-lanka-edge-debt-burden-mounts-2022-01-17/.
[72] Ondaatjie and Martin, 2023, “Bloomberg – Are You a Robot?,” October 12, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-12/sri-lanka-nears-imf-deal-on-funding-while-debt-talks-proceed.
[73] Al Jazeera, (July 20, 2023), “Sri Lanka passes anti-corruption bill as part of IMF bailout plan,” Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/20/sri-lanka-passes-anti-corruption-bill-as-part-of-imf-bailout-plan.
[74] Idem.
[75] Ondaatjie and Martin, 2023, “Bloomberg – Are You a Robot?,” October 12, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-12/sri-lanka-nears-imf-deal-on-funding-while-debt-talks-proceed.
[76] Idem.; From approximately $1.7 billion in 2022 to $3.5 billion as of July 2023.
[77] Al Jazeera, (July 20, 2023), “Sri Lanka passes anti-corruption bill as part of IMF bailout plan,” Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/20/sri-lanka-passes-anti-corruption-bill-as-part-of-imf-bailout-plan; Adederana, 2024, “Encouraged by Sri Lanka’s Commitment to Continue Reform Efforts – IMF Chief,” Adederana.Lk, October 22, 2024, https://www.adaderana.lk/news.php?nid=102845.
[78] K. Torrella, (July 15, 2022), “Sri Lanka’s organic farming disaster, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2022/7/15/23218969/sri-lanka-organic-fertilizer-pesticide-agriculture-farming.
[79] A. Mukherjee, (July 10, 2023), “Sri Lanka needs a bad bank to unclog its financial arteries,” Bloomberg.com, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-07-10/sri-lanka-default-a-bad-bank-would-help-fix-its-finances?leadSource=uverify%20wall#xj4y7vzkg.
[80] Idem.
[81] R. Wickremesinghe, (August 29, 2018), “How we will make Sri Lanka rich by 2025,” World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/this-is-how-we-will-make-sri-lanka-rich-by-2025.
